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1 




Gift Of 

Mrs. William Dinsmore 
Briggs 

STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARIES 


1 




1 


J 




1 



THE WORKS 



OF 



GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D. 



FORMERLY BISHOP OF CLOYNE. 



(>L. I. 



lanllon 
MACMILLAN AND CO. 




FUBLISHERa TO THE VNirERSITT OF 



THE WORKS 



OF 



GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D. 



FORMERLY BISHOP OF CLOYNE: 



INCLUDING 
MANY OF HIS WRITINGS HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED. 



With Prefaces, Annotations, 
His Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy, 

BY 

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL ERASER, M.A. 

PROFESSOR OP LOGIC AND MBTAPHYSICS IN THB 
UNIVERSITY OP BniNBURCH. 



IN FOUR VOLUMES, 

Vol. I. 



AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 

M.DCCC.LXXI 
[All rights ntfrwd] 



764621 



THE WORKS 



OF 



GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D. 



FORMERLY BISHOP OF CLOYNE. 



COLLECTED AND EDITED 
WITH PREFACES AND ANNOTATIONS 

BY 

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL ERASER, M.A. 

raOFBSSOll OP LOGIC AND MBTAPKYStCS IN THB 

VKivBitsmr OP bdinbvrch. 



IN THREE VOLUMES, 

Vol. I. 



AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 

M.DCCCLXXI 
[AN righh mmrwd] 



I 



PREFACE. 



IT has often been remarked as singular that English 
literature should possess no complete edition of the 
works of Bishop Berkeley, and that no tolerable account 
of the life of one of the greatest philosophers of this 
nation should have been given to the world. 

A few years since I was honoured by a request to 
undertake the present edition for the Clarendon Press. 
I have devoted to it some long summer vacations of the 
Scotch Universities. However imperfectly successful in 
the result, the work has been the occasion of pleasant 
hours to one whose own love for philosophy was first 
ei^;aged by Berkeley in the morning of life, and who 
r^;ards his writings as among the best in English 
literature, for a refined education of the heart and the 
intellect. 

Berkeley has suffered more than perhaps any other 
great modern philosopher from misunderstanding. He 
lived through the most prosaic and least metaphysical 
age since the revival of letters : he was himself the 
greatest metaphysician in his own age. When re- 
flection returned to the springs of thought and feel- 
ing, his philosophical language had in some measure 
lost the meaning which he intended, and no adequate 
attempt has since been made to recover his point of 
view, or to recognise the intellectual influence which, 
partly originating in him, has since been silently modi- 
fying all the deeper thought of the time in physics and 



viii PREFACE. 

in metaphysical philosophy. Is an unknowing anc 
known something, called Matter, or is Intelligence 
supreme reality; and are men the transient resul 
material organization, or are they immortal bei 
This is Berkeley's implied question. His answer t 
although, in his own works, it has not been tho 
out by him into its primary principles, or sufficit 
guarded in some parts, nevertheless marks the begin 
of the second great period in modem thought, thfl 
which we are living. The answer was virtually reve 
in Hume, whose exclusive phenomenalism, reproduce 
the Positivism of the nineteenth century, led to 
Scotch conservative psychology, and to the great ( 
man speculation which Kant inaugurated. 

It is as a spiritual philosopher, having warm and i 
sympathy in all human life, that Bishop Berkeley n 
be looked at, and not at all as a professional ecclesiai 
His writings and his life centre in speculative ] 
losophy. But they radiate from it in various pract 
and fruitful directions ; for his inclination was to wha 
concrete, at first in a more polemical, but afterwards i 
meditative spirit. In their form, his works are numer 
and occasional, not individually bulky or systematic. 

Four editions of Berkeley's Collected Works he 
been already published. The first appeared in Dub 
in two quarto volumes, in 1784, more than thirty ye 
after his death. The next was published in Lond< 
in three volumes, in 1820. A cheap edition, in c 
volume, followed in 1837. The last edition was 
London one, in two volumes, in 1843. All of them 01 
important works which should have found a place, and 1 
same works are omitted in all, as if by common conse 
No attempt is made in any of them, except to a sm 
extent in the last, to collate and revise the text, which 



PREFACE. ix 

founded sometimes on one edition, and sometimes on 
another. The works are not arranged on any principle 
—duDnological or philosophical. 

In the preparation of the present edition I have had 
4e following objects chiefly in view : — 

(i) To revise the text of the works formerly pub- 
lished, and to present them in a satisfactory arrange- 
ment 

(2) To help the reader to reach Berkeley's own point 
of view in each work, by means of bibliographical and 
analytical prefaces, and occasional annotations or brief 
dissertations, in which the author might be compared 
I with himself, and studied in his relations to the circum- 
stances in which he wrote. 

{3) To collect and publish any hitherto unpublished 
writings of Berkeley which might illustrate his opinions 
or character. 

(4) To offer a comprehensive conception of his im- 
plied philosophy as a whole. 

It was not easy to apply any satisfactory principle for 
the arrangement of the Works. On the whole it seemed 
well to divide them into three groups : — the Pure Philo- 
sof^ical ; the Applied Philosophical ; and the Miscella- 
neous, some even of the last containing a pretty distinct 
metaphysical ingredient. 

I. The Pure Philosophical Works. 

Four small treatises present Berkeley's exposition of 
the Metaphysical Philosophy of his youth : — 

1. The Essay towards a New Tlieory of Vision 

(1709). 

2. The Treatise concerning the Principles of Human 

Knowledge (i 710). 



X PREFACE. 

3. TAe Three Dialogues (1713). 

4. The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language^ 

vindicated and explained (1733). 

These form the first volume in the present edition. 
They contain his reductio ad absurdum of Abstract 
Matter, and his reasoned exposition of the merely phe- 
nomenal nature of the real material world, in opposition 
to scepticism, and especially to the materialistic denial 
that Active Intelligence is of the essence of things. 
The dependent, sui generis, existence of space and the 
sensible world, in which we nevertheless become aware 
of what is external to our own subjective personality, is 
with Berkeley a datum of intuitive experience ; the 
independent or absolute existence of Matter is, on the 
contrary, an unintelligible hypothesis. He was the first 
in modern times to attack the root of what has been 
called Cosmothetic Idealism, and to lay the foundation, 
however indistinctly, of a reasoned Natural Realism — by 
discarding representative images in sense, and accepting 
instead what he believed to be the facts of consciousness. 
He maintains, accordingly, the certainty of sense per- 
ception, in opposition to ancient and modem sceptics, 
who dispute the possibility of any ascertainable agree- 
ment between our perceptions and reality ; and, however 
defectively, in opposition also to a merely subjective 
Idealism, like Fichte's, which refers the orderly succes- 
sion of sensible changes to the laws of the individual 
mind in which they are perceived. 

The last of the four treatises in the first volume is 
a defence not only of the New Theory of Vision, but 
also, in a reserved way, of the Philosophy involved in 
that Theory, which was unfolded twenty years earlier 
in the Principles and Dialogues, It has hitherto been 
unaccountably omitted in all the collected editions. 



PREFACE. xi 

II. The Applied Philosophical Works. 

In two other and larger works, Berkeley's Philosophy, 
in a popular form in the one, modified and carried forward 
in the other, is applied in the former to the defence of 
Christian Faith, and in the latter to recommend a sup- 
posed Medical Panacea for the relief of human suffering. 
They are : — 

1. Alciphrony or the Minute Philosopher (1732). 

2. Siris : a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and 
Inquiries, &c. (1744). 

These two works form the second volume in this 

{edition. The metaphysical importance of Siris has not 
been enough recognised. It is probably the profoundest 
English philosophical book of last century, and besides it 
gives Berkele/s philosophy in its latest form. In its 
mystical aphorisms about Life, one can, I think, trace 
germs of principles which supplement and correct extreme 
statements to which he was impelled in his youth by 
his enthusiasm against metaphysical abstractions. The 
^leculative thought of Berkeley is only partially con- 
ceived fay those who n^lect the latter part of Siris. 

III. The Miscellaneous Works. 

All the other hitherto published works of Berkeley are 
for the most part short occasional tracts which seem best 
arranged when put nearly in chronological order. The 
third volume consists of these, under the vague designa- 
tion of Miscellaneous Works, subdivided, however, as 
the)' are written in Latin or in English. The three Latin 
tracts — 

1. Arithmetica (1707), 

2. Miscellanea Mathentatica (1707), 

3. De Motu (1721), 

are placed first The De Motu, which relates to the 



xii PREFACE. 

metaphysics of natural philosophy, might almost have 
been put in the first or in the second gfroup, teaching 
as it does that all motion must be referred to intelligent 
activity as its cause, and that the space in which it occurs 
is relative to sense, and would pass away along with 
sensible things. But the language, and the way in which 
the subject is treated, seem to justify the place assigned 
to it. 

The English Miscellaneous Works follow in the same 
volume, nearly chronologically: — 

1. Passive Obedience (17 12). 

2. Essays contributed to the Guardian ( 1 7 1 3). These 

Essays have hitherto been omitted in all the 
collected editions. 

3. Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great 

Britain (1720). 

4. A Proposal for the Better Supplying Churches in 

our Foreign Plantations^ and for Converting 
the Savage Americans to Christianity ^ by a 
College {ij2^). 

5. Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and 

Learning in America. {^Date doubtful^ 

6. A Sermon preached before the incorporated Society 

for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign 
Parts (1732). 

7. The Analyst : or a Discourse addressed to an In- 

fidel Mathematician (i 7 34) . 

8. A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics: 

with an Appendix concerning Mr. WaltofCs 
Vindication of Sir Isaac Newton^s Principle 
of Fluxions (i735)- 

9. Reckons for not replying to Mr. Walton's Full 

A?tswer (lyss). 

10. The Querist — originally published in Three 

Parts, in 1735-36-37- 



PREFACE. xiii 

1 1. A Discourse addressed to Magistrates and Men 
in Authority (1736). 

1 2. A Letter to the Roman Catholics of the Diocese 
of Cloyne {\^\^. 

13. A Word to the Wise (1749). 

14. Maxims concerning Patriotism (1750). 

15. Four Letters concerning Tar-water (1744 — 47). 
One of these, addressed tx> Dr. Hales, was 

omitted in former collected editions. 

16. Farther Thoughts on Tar-water (1752). 

The English Miscellaneous Works, as spears from 
their titles, are chiefly on Moral, Social, and Econo- 
mical questions ; three are connected with Berkeley's 
American enterprise; three belong to the celebrated 
controversy with the mathematicians, and involve an 
important application of his metaphysical philosophy; 
odiers relate to tar-water, but only in its medical ap- 
plications. All of them except the Passive Obedience, 
the Essays in the Guardian, the Analyst and relative 
tracts, and the Letters concerning Tar-water, were 
collected by Berkeley himself, and published in his 
Miscellany, a few months before his death. 

The works thus arranged in the three volumes 
comprehend the writings of Berkeley which were pub- 
Usbed when he was alive. One other work, The Memoirs 
ef Signor Gaudentio di Lucca, has occasionally been 
assigned to him, but, I think, on insufficient grounds, 
as I have elsewhere explained. 

In an Appendix to the first volume, I have printed, 
with the various erasures and other changes, Berkeley's 
rough draft of the Introduction to the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, which is possessed in autograph by 



xiv PREFACE. 

the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. The 
Appendix also contains some other matter which 
trates the contents of the volume — especially the 
logy of Colliers conception of the material world 
Berkeley's. 

The Appendix to the second volume describes 
third edition o{ AlciphroUy which I had not seen y 
that work was passing through the press. 

Soon after the third volume was printed I was 
tunate enough to find the Three Parts of the ori| 
edition of the Querist — sought for in vain by foi 
editors of that remarkable tract. The large amour 
additional matter contained in that edition is now g 
in an Appendix to the third volume. It may gr 
those for whom the Querist, with its subtle yet { 
tical social reforms, may have more interest than 
thing else that Berkeley has written. 

A fourth, or supplementary volume, is biograph 
As the reader chooses, it may be regarded as consis 
either of Prolegomena or of Addenda to the other th 
For a writer so full of warm human feeling as Berke 
the best preliminary (or supplementary) dissertation 
his Works, might, it seemed, be found in an acco 
of his life, and of his philosophy regarded as the c< 
prehensive unity which interprets his life. The ev€ 
of the life have, however, been left in an obscurity wl 
probably any effort that might now be made could c 
imperfectly remove. A Life of Berkeley, on any 
tended scale, was not part of the original plan of i 
edition. What has been in the end attempted has grc 
out of a gradual accumulation of materials, which c 
tinued research might perhaps increase, but which, e^ 
as they are, it seemed desirable to preserve. 

The last chapter in the Life gives some critical acco 



PREFACE. XV 

L of the implied Philosophy as a whole. It is necessary 
i to unfold what is latent, as Berkeley presupposes im- 
portant principles which he does not articulately express. 
His philosophical method, moreover, is throughout a 
peculiar sort of appeal, through reflection, to an assumed 
intuition of the constant omnipresence or omnipotence 
of Mind in the universe — ^an intuition apt to be dormant 
in the individual, so that his appeal sometimes has the 
appearance of reasoning in a circle. This chapter, under 
another arrangement, might have formed an Introduction 
to the Works. 

More than a third of the Biographical Volume consists 
of writings of Berkeley hitherto unpublished, supplied 
by the valuable collection of Papers which Archdeacon 
Rose kindly placed at my disposal. This volume 
seems to be the proper place for writings which reflect 
so much light on Berkeley's character, and the growth 
of his opinions. That so much of his previously un- 
published writing should be given to the world nearly 
a hundred and twenty years after his death is a remark- 
able circumstance, which gives an interest to this edition 
of his Works that no preceding one could possess. 

The preface to the Biog^phical Volume gives a more 
particular account of its contents. 

Much is still wanting to realize my own conception of 
what an edition of the Works of Bishop Berkeley ought 
to be. The prefaces and annotations have been written 
from time to time, as opportunity offered, and those in 
the first volume have been in print for two or three 
)-ears. The annotations are in all cases by the Editor, 
except where they are expressly assigned to the 
'Author.' Some of my comments in the earlier parts 
of the work are perhaps somewhat differently conceived 
and expressed in the supplementary volume; but perhaps 



xvi PREFACE. 

there is no harm in the appearance, in a work do 
intervals, of those modifications of thought and lanj 
which result from prolonged solitary reflection appli 
a great thinker. It is unnecessary to add that the 
and discussions might have been indefinitely extei 
and the work expanded far beyond thje proposed 
if one had digressed into the many subjects of tern 
intellectual interest associated especially with the i 
sophical writings. As it is, the edition is enk 
beyond the intention, although the references are 
fined chiefly to the latter part of the seventeenth cei 
and to the eighteenth. 

I am not without hope that this reappearance of B< 
ley in the modern philosophical world, in these I 
years of the nineteenth century, under the auspice 
the great University with which death has associ 
him, may be the occasion of a candid consideratio 
this good philosopher's explanation of the meaning 
human existence, and of a fresh impulse to philoso 
in Europe and America. 

There are signs which encourage this hope, in a 
trospect of the history of recent opinion and metaphyj 
literature in England. 

The return to the deeper questions in metaphyj 
inaugurated by Coleridge and Hamilton more than f< 
years since, in conjunction with the increased inclinai 
in the interval to discuss first principles in theolc 
and in the physical sciences, including physiology, is m 
favourable to the entertainment of the thoughts wb. 
occupied so much of Berkeley's life, and perhaps 
harmony between science and faith, than the state 
things in almost any former period of the history 
this country. 

There are, besides, definite signs of an inclinatior 



PREFACE. xvii 

reconsider Berkeley in particular, and to draw from him 
what may be available for amending our conception of 
die nature of the existence we are participating in 
among the phenomena of sense ; or at least for assisting 
us before we finish our course to inquire what this sense- 
conscious life through which we are now passing really 
means. The ingenious and acute metaphysical works of 
the late Professor Ferrier may be referred to as an 
example, although they unfold a system which differs in 
some important respects from that of Berkeley, being 
constructed from the ontological, and not, like his, from 
the psychological point of view. With more form of 
demonstration, Ferrier leaves in the background the 
sense-symbolism, and intuition of efficient causality, which 
are essential to the externality and dualism of Berkeley 
—who, by the way, might as well be called a Sensa- 
tionalist, or a Phenomenalist, or a Presentationist, as an 
Idealist, as far as his own use of the word idea goes. 
The strikingly candid speculations of the late Professor 
Grote of Cambridge, which contain some of the most in- 
teresting English contributions to the higher philosophy 
of this generation, have also a tendency to Berkeley's 
point of view. Dean ManseVs learned and closely 
reasoned works in philosophy, besides reviving meta- 
phpical discussion in England, have occasionally ap- 
proached the speculation of Berkeley, bringing valu- 
able critical light. The assiduous zeal and subtlety 
of Mr. Collyns Simon, his book On the Nature and 
EUments of tlu Material Worlds and his various essays 
since have drawn attention to the subject, not only in 
these islands but also in Germany. Some chapters in 
Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamiltoft's 
Phibsophy^ and passages in his other writings, show how 
much in the new conception of the sensible world is 
appreciated by a fair and able thinker of phenomenalist 
roL. r. b 



xv-iii PREFACE. 

tendencies. Dr. J. H. Stirling, by directing reflecti- 
fresh aspects of questions which Berkeley raised b 
plication, has prepared some for looking at the pere 
philosophical problem with a fresh eye. Nor must 
keleys own .University be forgotten, where philosof 
now cultivated by men who are not unworthy of its : 
and who, either as expositors or as adverse critics, 
not forgotten its greatest name in metaphysics. 

I am inclined to believe that the present sta 
German speculation is not unfavourable to a 
ample and appreciative consideration of Berkeley 
he has hitherto received in the occasional allusions i 
by the philosophers and historians of philosophy o 
chief speculative nation of Europe. Since the 
volume of this edition was printed, an annotated ti 
lation into German of Berkeley's Prtfuiples of Hu 
Knowledge has been supplied by Dr. Friedrich Ueber 
the learned historian of philosophy, and Kant's succe 
in the Chair at Konigsberg. This translation hs 
understand, circulated widely in that country. It 
been partly the occasion of recent discussions on 
keley s Philosophy in some of the German periodical 

Berkeley's remarkable relations to America, and 
adoption of distinctive parts of his philosophy by tw 
his eminent American contemporaries, Samuel Johr 
and Jonathan Edwards, should secure for him a heai 
in that great country, whose advancement since he li 
in it has almost realized the dream even of his benevo 
imagination. 



A. C. ERASER 



College of Edinburgh, 
February^ 1871. 



CONTENTS. 



PAOS 

Editor's Preface to the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision . i 

An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. First printed in 

1709 25 

Eifitor's Preface to the Treatise 'concerning the Principles of 

Human Knowledge 113 

A TUATISS CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HuMAN KNOWLEDGE. 

[Part L] Wherein the chief causes of Error and Difficulty 
in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, 
and Irreligion, are inquired into. First printed in the year 
1710 131 

Editor's Preface to the Three Dialogues between Hylas and 

Philonous 239 

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. The design 
of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection 
of Human Knowledge, the Incorporeal nature of the Soul, 
and the Immediate Providence of a Deity, in opposition to 
Sceptics and Atlieists. Also to open a method for ren- 
dering the Sciences more easy, useful, and compendious. 
First printed in the year 1 7 1 3 255 

Mtor's Preface to The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language, 

vindicated and explained 361 

b2 



XX CONTENTS. 

The Theokt of Vision, or Visual Language, shewing the im- 
mediate PRESENCE AND PROVIDENCE OF A DeITT, VINDICATED 
AND EXPLAINED 3^9 

A Letter from an Anonymous Writer to the Author of The Minute 

Philosopher 40i 

APPENDIX. 

A. Berkeley's Rough Draft of the Introduction to the Principles 

of Human Knowledge 40; 

B. Arthur Collier 438 

C. New Theory of Vision. — Experience of persons bom bKnd . 444 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



TO THE 



TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION. 



I 



PREFACE. 



BY THE EDITOR. 



BERKELEY'S Essctj^ iawards a New Theory of Vision is the chrono- 
^fipal and also a logical introduction to his metaphysical philosophy. 
It is virtnafl v an inquiry into the nature and origin of our conception of 

I Space, that distin ^^iv*^ rhar agterisstic of the mat firia]! wnrld- 

iW Essaif was the first fruits of Berkeley's philoso p hical studies at 
DnMuL It was also tibe first elaborate attempt to demonstrate that our 
tppare mly immediate visual perceptions of space, and of bodies existing 
in it apart from our organism, are actually suggestions induced by the 
constant associ ation of visible ideas, and of ce r^^in nrp^ anic sensations 
vUdi acocmpany vision, with objects presented in our tactual e^^perience. 



The first edition of the Essay appeared early in 1 709, when Berkeley 
vas about twenty-five years of age. The second, with a few alterations, 
and an Appendix (not since reprinted), followed before the end of that 
jcar. Both were issued in Dublin, 'printed by Aaron Rhames, for 
Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row/ 

An edition was afterwards annexed to Alciphron^ on its first appear- 
ance at Dublin and London, in March 1732. It was partly the criticism 
to which the theological application of the New Theory in the Fourth 
Dialogue 6i Akiphron gave rise that drew from Berkeley, early in the 
foflowing year, his Theory of Vision or Visual Language^ shewing the 
mwudiate Presence and Providence of a Deify ^ vindicated and explained. 
Both works reflect much light upon the E^^ay. 

The edition of the Essay published in 1732 was the last in Berkeley's 
lifetime. 

la the present edition the text has been corrected according to that of 



B 2 



4 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

1732, collated with the two preceding and with the posthumous 
The Appendix is reprinted from the second edition. 

The ascertainment by reflection of the contents and relations of 
visual consciousness is one of three problems professedly solv 
Berkeley's metaph)rsical account of the material world. That ^ 
objects are a system of arbitrary signs of tangible matter, is the 
elusion of this Essay; that objects visible and tangible are a system c 
sible signs of absent objects of sense, is the conclusion of the Prind^ 
Human Knowledge^ and especially of the Dialogues ofHylas andPhik 
and that this arbitrary system of signs, which cannot exist with 
percipient, is a sensible expression of the Divine ideas, presence; 
providence, is the conclusion common to all the three treatises, 
last comprehensive conclusion is illustrated and applied in the 
Theory of Vision Vindicated^ and in Berkeley's other philosophical 
theological works. We trace it in his old age throughout the coi 
plative and mystical philosophy of Siris, 

A due appreciation of Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, and of it 
lative place in his metaphysics, thus requires a study not merely ol 
tentative and juvenile Essay , but also of its development and applica 
in his more matured works. This has been conmionly forgotten, ; 
by the hostile critics and by the professed disciples of the Theory. 

Various circumstances contribute to make this Essay more perple 
to the reader than perhaps any of Berkeley's other works. 

Its occasion and design, and its relation to his conception of ma 
are to some extent explained in the 43rd and 44th sections of the / 
cipies of Human Knowledge. These sections are so far a key to 
Essay. They inform us that in this earlier work Berkeley intention 
used language which seems to imply the absolute or independent ej 
ence oi tangible objects, — it being 'beside his purpose' to 'examine 1 
refute' that 'vulgar error' in 'a work on vision.' This reticence of 
metaphysical conception of matter, in reasonings on vision which 
fully explained only under that conception, is a chief occasion of 
comparative obscurity of the Essay. 

Another circumstance adds to our embarrassment. The ear 
English writers in metaphysics were often careless in the employm 
of equivocal words. Even Berkeley was no exception. We are n 
accustomed to greater precision in the use of metaphysical langua 
and that language has itself undergone many changes. Some of 
principal terms in the Essay are equivocal. It is enough to re 
to the words perception, sensation, sight, external, and distance, uith th 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 5 

iJQgates. Others, for example idea and touchy have had their mean- 
ing modified, and it is difficult for the modem reader habitually to 
Rtum to that with which they were associated in Berkeley's mind 
(cL KCt 1 20). 

The interchange of the terms 'outward/ 'outness/ 'externality/ 
* without the mind/ and ' without the eye' is confusing, if we forget 
dat Berkeley in this treatise adopts language which implies that mind 
ii k)ca]ly and literally diffused over our organism, and coextensive 
vilh itj so that being absent or at a distance from the organism is 
bang absent or at a distance from mind. I have tried in the annota- 
tions to obviate some of these ambiguities. 

The Essd^ abounds in repetition, while its logical structure, its train of 
dMmgfat, and even its leading generalization are not to be apprehended 
vidioat a careful study and collation of passages. This, with the active 
eioctse of thought, and exact use of words, which the nature of the 
irifject requires, as Berkeley himself repeatedly reminds us, has enveloped 
tbe treatise in a cloud of misconceptions, which the author's subsequent 
Vmdkaiim has not removed. 

I than endeavour in what follows to present in an orderly way the 
praidpal propositions of the Essay ^ and to indicate the nature of the 
evidence by which they are sustained. 

Tbe reader must remember that the Essay is a professed appeal to 
pore consciousness. It is an analysis, immediately of what we are 
conscious in seeing, and by suggestion of what we are conscious in 
touch. It takes no observation of mere optical or physiological phe- 
nomena (cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect, 43), in its exclusive 
attention to the facts of consciousness which underlie them; and it is 
only after what we are conscious of in seeing has been ascertained, that 
the result is incidentally, or now and then by way of verification, applied 
to solve some celebrated optical or physiological puzzle. The treatise 
it in short a professed account of the facts, the whole facts, and nothing 
but the facts of which we are visually conscious, as distinguished from 
pretended facts and metaphysical abstractions, which confused thought, 
an irregular exercise of imagination, or an abuse of words had substi- 
toted for them. It is a contribution to the psychological analysis of the 
fact of vision, and not a deduction from merely physical experiments 
in optics or the ph3r8iology of the eye. 

The Essay contains some preliminary analyses, which gradually conduct 
to the constructive principle that properly constitutes the Nnv Theory, 



6 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

These preUminary inquiries enforce the amiUhem of the two worlds of 

visible objects and tangible objects, as regards — 

1. Distance, i. e. externality in ^>ace relatively to our organism; 
a. Magnitude or size, i. e. occupancy of a larger or smaller quantity 

of space ; 
3. Situation, or position relatively to one another in space. 
The constructive principle, or New Theory proper, is the explanation 
of the synthesis in which, notwithstanding this radical antithesis of tfaeir 
constituents, we are accustomed to bknd in imagination what we see 
and what we touch, as common properties of ' the same thing/ * 

From the beginning of the second section onwards, the Esst0f wokj 
be broadly divided into six Parts, devoted in succession to a proof of the 
six following theses, regarding the relation of Sight to Extension in its 
three dimensions : — 

I. (Sect, a- 5 1.) Distance, or the fact of an interval between two 
points in the line of vision, in other words externality in space, in itself 
invisible, is, in all cases in which we appear to see it, only suggested 
to our imagination by certain visible phenomena and visual sensaticms, 
which are its arbitrary signs. 

II. (Sect 53-87.) Magnitude, or the external space that objects 
occupy, is absolutely invisible : all that we can see is merely a greater 
or less quantity of colour, and our apparently visual perceptions of real 
magnitude are interpretations of the tactual meaning of colours and 
other sensations in the visual organ. 

III. (Sect. 88-120.) The Situation of objects, or their relation to 
one another in space, is invisible : all that we can see is variety in the 
relations of quantities of colour to one another, our supposed pure vision 
of actual locality being an interpretation of visual signs. 

IV. (Sect 1 2 1- 1 46.) There is no sensible object common to sight 
and touch : space or extension, which has the best claim to this character, 
and which is nominally the object of both, is specifically as well as nu- 
merically different in each, — externality in space, or distance, beii^ 
absolutely invisible, while size and situation, as visible, have nothing in 
common with size and situation as tangible. 

V. (Sect 147-148.) The explanation of the unity which we attribute 

* In his two scientific expositions of his in the VindiceUion he descends syntiietically 
New Theory of Vision Berkeley reverses his from the Theory to those inferences regard- 
order of procedure. In this Essay he as- ing Situation, Magnitude, and Distance, 
cends from the preliminary analyses of which it involves. (See Essay, sect. I ; and 
consciousness, which enforce the antithesis cf. 71>eory of VisioH Vindicated^ O'c, sect, 
of the visual and tactual, to the summary 38.) 
generalisation or theory of their union; 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 7 

to sensible things, as complements of visible and tangible qualities of 
one and the same substance, is contained in the Theory that visible 
ideas and visual sensations, arbitrary signs in a Divine Language, are 
vgnificant of distances, and of the real sizes and situations of distant 
dungs ; while the constant association in nature of the two worlds of 
vision and touch, has so associated them in our thbughts, that visible 
and tangible extension are habitually regarded by us as specifically and 
even mnnericaUy one. 

VL (Sect 149-160.) The proper object of geometry is the kind of 
Extension given in our tactual experience, and not the kind of Exten- 
Mi given in our visual experience ; and neither real solids nor real 
pknes can be seen — real Extension in all its phases being invisible, 
ud cokmr in its modifications of quantity being the only proper object 
of sight, while colour, being a pure sensation, caimot exist extra- 
ofjpnically in q>ace. 

It is corioas that the doctrine of the invisibility of distance is popularly 
Rgvded as Berkeley's New Theory of Vision. In reality this is the assump- 
tioo with whidi the Eut^ sets out (sect a). The part of the treatise 
(sect a*5i) which especially treats of Distance does not profess to prove 
id invisibifitj, but, taking this for granted, to show that near distances as 
ndl as the more remote are suggested in seeing by certain arbitrary 
signs. That the relation between the signs and distances signified is, 
vhether the distance be remote or near, a purely arbitrary relation, 
discoverable only by experience, is the burden of sect. 3-40. The pre- 
lioQsly recognised arbitrary signs of ' considerably remote' distances — 
liiiear and aerial perspective — are mentioned (sect 3). But distances less 
remote were then commonly supposed to be necessarily inferred, by a 
lort of visual geometry, and not to be merely suggested in imagination 
by experience. The determination of the true visual signs of near dis- 
tances is the professed discovery of Berkeley regarding distance. 

According to the Essay there are three sorts of arbitrary signs of 
sear distances — 

1. The peculiar (M'ganic sensation which accompanies the adjust- 

ment of the eye to what is presented to it (sect. 16-20) ; 

2. The degree of confusion in the visible object (sect 21-26); 

3. The organic sensation of straining (sect 27). 

Berkeley endeavours so far to verify this, by applying the second sort 
of sign to explain an optical phenomenon which Dr. Barrow and others 
bad given up as inexplicable (sect 29-40). 

This generalization of the arbitrary signs of distance, visible and 



8 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

organic, is followed (sect 43) by a reference to the purely sensadoDal 
nature of colour — the ' proper and immediate object of sight,' from wfaidi 
it is inferred that visible extension, as a quality of colour, must also be 
'in the eye or rather in the mind.' We are thus led on, from the 
account given of the arbitrary signs of distances, to a proof that visible 
objects are not external to the animated organism, and that, inasmuch 
as they are sensations, they cannot exist without a mind. Berkdey's 
account of the manner in which distances are suggested in seeing, is 
his introduction to the doctrine that everything properly visible consists 
of, or is dependent on, the sensation of colour. 

It is next argued (sect. 44) that this ideal world of visible objects 
bears no resemblance even to 'things placed at a distance' from us. 
Then the tangible natiu-e of all things that are entitled to be called 
'real' is enforced (sect. 45). Here, for the first time in the JEtsqy^ 
Touch and our tactual experience are mentioned. Tactual and loco- 
motive experience is needed, we are virtually told, to infuse meaning 
into the term ' distance.' The notion cannot, it is alleged, be derived 
from seeing any more than from hearing (sect. 46). We can indeed 
both see and hear what suggests it, in consequence of our previous 
experience of the connexion of visible or audible signs with the tactual 
and locomotive meaning which they now signify. What we see is also 
apter, from its more frequent previous association, to suggest an am- 
bient space, and objects existing at a distance in it, than audible 
objects are (sect 47). Notwithstanding, it is as impossible to see and 
feel the same thing as it is to hear and feel the same thing. Visitde 
objects and organic sensations — the arbitrary signs of distances, and of 
things placed at a distance — are, to all intents and purposes, a lan^piage ; 
and they are one in which the signs are so blended with their signifi- 
cations that a life devoted to reflective analysis is not able fully to dis- 
entangle them (sect 51). 

Sections 43, 44, and 45 are in some respects the most important in 
the Essay, They represent visible extension as based upon sensation — 
the sensation of colour ; they recognise, as real or external, only that 
extension which is derived from tactual and locomotive experience. If 
sensations, in their varieties of quality and quantity, are the only objects 
we see, it follows that the visible world cannot be 'without the mind.' 
The problem of the Essay is, to explain how sensadons or ideas of colour, 
a consciousness of which constitutes vision, can inform us about tangible 
objects, which they do not in the least resemble, and with which they have 
no necessary connexion in thought That certain visible ideas, and 
certain organic sensations which accompany vision (sect. 3, 16, a i, 27, 56, 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



Sc) suggtsi to us the real or tangible extensions with which they are 
ubiirarily connecied in the system of nature, is the Berkeleian solution 
of this problem. 

It is at this point, too, that the principal ambiguity of the Essay ap* 
pears. It is argued, that visible objects and their accompanying organic 
sensations cannot exist ' without the mind,' and that they have no resem- 
blance to what is external: at the same time it seems to be taken for 
granted by Berkeley that we are percipient of absolute externality in 
touch. We appear to be told that we cannot see, but that we can and do 
touch, a distant world that exists independently of our intelligence. The 
reader is ready to say that we are as much (or as little) conscious of th-'s 
perception when we see as when we touch. This difficulty is relieved in 
the Principles of Human Knowlidge, where the objects of sight and touch 
are put on the same level, and the possibility of the absolute or purely 
cstcmal existence of eitlier is denied. The term 'external' may still be 
applied to our tactual and locomotive sensations or ideas, as con- 
trasted with our visual ; but that happens, according to Berkeley, not 
because of the ideal nature of what we see, and the absolute externality 
of what we touch, but only because our tactual and locomotive sensa- 
more steady and practically important, while 'extemalily' 

k'term appropriate to what is found to have these characteristics. 
; developed philosophy of Berkeley, the tangible world itself, as 
s its visible signs, consists of objects which cannot be independent 
of a mind ; their tsse is Pfrcipi. And, the distinction between organic and 
extra-organic existence is merged in the more general truth, that the 
human body and its organs, along with the entire extra-organic world, 
b itself dependent on mind. The organised body is contained in mind, 
tod not mind in the organised body. Externality, in the deeper meaning of 
an absolute independence of all mind, is argued to be impossible, because 
contradictory ; while ' externality.' either as significant of what is extra- 
organic, as contrasted with what is within our vital organism, or of what 
is tangible, as distinguished from what is visible, is simplified and ra- 
tionalised. But Berkeley preferred, as he tells us, to insinuate his meta- 
physical system by degrees, and he has in consequence to some extent 
exposed his Essay to the charge of incolierence. 

He seems in some passages (e.g. sect. 41) to take for granted that 
[he visilnlity of distance in the line of sight would imply externality 
— i.e. independence of sensation — on the part of the objects we see, 
as if this independence could be determined at al! by what we see 
or do not see. Even if distance, in the sense of extra- organic 
extemalily, could be seen, it would not follow that it was absolutely 



lO 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



independent of mind : rather the contrary, on his own principles. Thit 
we are not conscious of seeing it only proves that an 'ambient space* ii 
not an immediate object of sight — not that coloured eztensioii, in its 
other and visible dimensions, is purely ideal*. 



The way in which visual phenomena suggest extension in its dM 
dimension, and objects as actually at a distance from the organ <^ vision, 
having been thus explained in the first part of the Etu^^ the second 
and third parts (sect. 5a-iao) profess to prove the invisibility of red 
extension in two odier relations — magnitude and locality. 

The proof consists of a reference to consciousness, for tiie purpose 
of purifying the meaning of the term ' real,' as applicable to sizes and 
situations ; and an induction of the actual signs of real magnitude and 
situation. The only real sizes, shapes, and situations must, it is aignedl 
be tangible ones, dependent on tactual and locomotive experience. The 
reason given for this is, that they only are steady, uniform, and practi- 
cally connected with our physical comfort in this life of sense (sect 55» 
59). The signs (which are all arbitrary) of these tangible realities 
are pardy visible, and partly muscular sensations in the organ of sight 
(sect 56). 

This theory of antithetical phenomena — visual and tactual — connected 
by arbitrary signs, is, in these two parts of the Essay, applied to solve 
two celebrated difficulties in optics — 

1. The fact that the size of the horizontal moon is greater to the 
eye than that of the moon in its meridian (sect 67-87). This problem 
of the visible appearance of the horizontal moon gives rise to some 
curious incidental discussions — ^in particular one regarding mimma visi- 
Ulia, or units of colour, pluralities of which constitute the various degrees 
of visible extension (sect 79, &c.). 

2. The physical fact that we see objects erect only on condition of 
the formation of inverted images of them on the retina (sect 88-1 so). 
The explanation of this is sought for in a thorough-going application 
of the principle, that what we see and what we touch are extensions 
numerically different while nominally the same. In this part of the Essay 



* The reasoning against the visibility of 
distance is not to be confounded with that 
against the absolute externality or non-ideal 
character of what we see. The proof oi 
each thesis may be put thus — 

1. The visibility of any distance implies 
the visibility of an interval between two 
visible points ; but we are conscious of 
seeing only one point in the line of sight: 



therefore distance in the line of sig^ if 
invisible. 

a. The absolute externality of what we 
sec imi^ies its independence of sensation; hot 
seeing is simply being conscious of colouni 
which are sensations : therefore what we tee 
is not independent of sensation — is not 
* without the mind* or absolutely external. 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. ii 

the antithesis between the visible and the tangible world—- the world of 
coloured extension and the world of resistant extension — is pushed to 
the utmost The 'high and low' of the visible world is not the 'high 
and low' of the tangible world (sect 91-106). In no case is there 
any resemblance between these two extensions; not even when the 
number of visible objects happens to coincide with the number of tangible 
objects of which thej are signs, e. g. of visible and tangible fingers on 
the human hand. The mind constitutes its concrete units in an arbi^ 
trary way. At first we should not distinguish our feet as two, nor our 
fingers as five : we should not spontaneously recognise either a foot or a 
finger as one thing. A man bom blind would not, on first seeing, parcel 
out phenomena as those do who have learned by experience what those 
phenomena are which may be most conveniently or most scientifically 
conjoined in thought, and afterwards spoken about as qualities of par- 
ticular substances (sect 107- no). On the whole, it is argued, that the 
fiunous difficulty about erect vision is one which illegitimately takes for 
granted a relation between the visible and tangible worlds can be shown, 
by analysis of our sense-consciousness, not to exist The visible pictures 
on the retina no more resemble real things than what we see resembles 
whBt we touch. A purification of visual consciousness, by reflecting 
upon it, is assumed to be all that is required to remove the difficulty, 
and to unfold the true theory of vision — which however cannot 
become familiar to us without habitual thoughtfulness, and a precise 
use of the part of language which refers to seeing (sect 1 1 i~i ao). 

The fourth part of the £ssqy (sect 1 21-145) seeks to prove not 
only the numerical but also the specific or generic difference of the 
objects of sight and touch. Its thesis is, that sight and touch have 
no sensible object, nor any abstract notion even, that is common 
Co the two senses. Extension or space has the best claim to these 
characteristics. If its claim can be disposed of, the a fortiori argument 
may be applied to all other claimants. Now, coloured extension, which 
alone is visible, bears no resemblance to resistant extension, which alone 
is tangible. 

And, if these concrete or sensible extensions have nothing in common, 
the dispute, it is maintained, is at an end. The one possible extension 
is a sensible extension (sect. 123). Extension in the abstract is incom- 
prehensible and absurd, and cannot therefore be an object either 
of sight or touch, still less the common object of both (sect 124-126). 
The only question is, whether the (so-called) extension we see is 
in any respect similar to the extension we touch. That they are 



12 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

absolutely heterogeneous has been proved, it is alleged, in 
ceding parts of the Essay. 

What remains is to marshal this scattered evidence, and to gi 
foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted in 
128-146. 

The enunciation of the summary generalization, constructive p 
or New Theory proper (sect. 147, 148), forms what may be rega 
the fifth part of the Essay. 

The last part of the Essay (sect. 149-160) relates to some 6,ei 
from the Theory which, with one exception, Berkeley declines to 
He restricts himself here to an inquiry as to the sort of extensit 
which geometry has to do — an investigation in harmony with the fi 
mathematical studies of his youth. In concluding that tactual < 
and not visible or symbolical, extension is the only object reasonec 
in geometry, he imagines the condition of Idomenians or unem 
spirits, endowed with only a visual sense-experience, and endeavc 
determine what their conception of solid and plane extension she 
(sect. 153, &c.). In arguing that planes of colour are as invisi 
solids of colour (sect. 154-158), he opens the way to further refine 
in the interpretation of our visual consciousness which have not e< 
the attention of recent psychologists. 

Whether we can see more than non-resembling, arbitrary sig 
the real distances, sizes, shapes, and situations of things, is a qut 
of fact It may seem accordingly that experiments upon the 
and tactual consciousness of persons who are in circumstances tc 
the conclusions of the foregoing reflective analysis, is a suitable n 
for verifying its conclusions. Of this sort is the experience of 
sons who have been relieved from bom blindness; the notio 
extension and externality possessed by individuals originally destitu 
the visual sense, who have not been so relieved; the experienc 
it can be got) of those absolutely void of all tactual and locom 
experience, but endowed with visual ; and even the phenomena of 
in infants of the human species, and in the lower animals. 

Berkeley apparently made no observations of his own in this field, 
various parts of the Essay (sect. 41, 43, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 
128, 132-137), he infers, from the contrast of our visual 
tactual consciousness, what the first experience of those rescued 1 
bom -blindness must be; he speculates about the experiena 



EDITORS PREFACE. 13 

■^bodied spirits/ able to see, but originally destitute of the sense of 
Boch (sect 153-159); and in the Appendix he refers, in corroboration 
if hb theory, to a newly reported case of one bom blind who had 
sight But he everywhere treats his Theory independently of 
extremely delicate and difficult investigations. His testing facts 
sought elsewhere. Nor is it difficult to understand his compara- 
ive indifrerence to empirical experiments. An appeal to consciousness 
IB bdialf of the principle, that we cannot see tangible objects, nor touch 
nMe ones — ^with inductive evidence that our tendency to unite certain 
Ingftle and visible qualities in the same substance is a result of the con- 
association of the latter with the former — appeared to him to fulfil 
the conditi<ms of proof. Any apparently original fusion of tactual with 
experience was then dismissed as illusory. And indeed those 
phiaologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to determine 
irittt vision in its purity is, by observation and experiment, in cases either 
if communicated sight, or of continued bom-blindness, have illustrated 
Ae tradi of Diderot's remark — " preparer et interroger un aveugle-nd 
i'c6t point (x€ une occupation indigne des talens r^unis de Newton, 
Dti Cartes, Locke, et Leibnitz*." 

Berkele/s New Theory has been qhoted as an aknost solitary example 
of a discovery in metaphysics. It has, on the whole, kept its ground, 
IS the acknowledged modem theory of vision, amid the proverbial 
luctuations of thought on such subjects. I venture to append to the 
preceding analysis of the Essay a few notices of the state in which 
t foimd philosophical opinion on the questions to which it relates, and 
i the change which it has inaugurated. 

The subtle analysis which distinguishes seeing strictly so called from 
ndgments about extended things, which are only suggested, after a suf- 
tactual and locomotive experience, by what we see, appears to have 
mknown to the ancient philosophers, who, it may be added, were 
gBorant of much now known with regard to the organic conditions of this 
ense. Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the proper object of sight ; 
lot, in the passages of the De Animal where he names properties peculiar 
pvticiilar senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, rest, number, 
igure, and magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. This 

* lo Didferot't iMtn nar In aveugles, a ments are alluded to. 

dt etmrn qui woiemi^ where Berkeley, f Df Anima^ II. 6, III. i» &c. Aristotle 



40I711CIIJU CondilUc. and others are referred assigns a pre-eniinent intellectual value to 

ft. Cf. abo Appendix, pp. ill, 1 13; and the sense of sight. See, for instance, his 

Th&try ttf Vmom VinMeattd^ sect. 71, with Metapbysicf, I. 1. 
iic note, in which some recorded experi- 



M 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



distinction of Proper and Common Senaibles appears at first to oc 
Berkeley's doctrine of the absolute heterogeneity of the visible 
tangible. Aristotle, however, seems to question the perceptil 
mere sense of the Common Sensibles, and to regard tbem n 
produced by the activity of intelligence, in conjunction with aenac 

Some writers in Optics, in medieval times, and in the cmriy |N 
modem philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining the 
of our matured notion of distance to what we are originally oo 
of seeing, and in the fifteenth century it was (fiscovered by Ma 
that the rays of light from the object converge to a focus in ti 
but I have not been able to trace even the germ of the distinctii 
ciples of the New Theory in any of these speculations. 

Excepting some hints by Des Cartes, Malelxaiiche was amo 
first dimly to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving our supposed po 
seeing distances into an interpretation of arbitrary signs which w 
by experience gradually to understand ; and also in founding hia ei 
tion upon consciousness. The most important part of Malebn 
account of vision is contained in his Recherche de la Verite (Liv. I. 
in one of those chapters in which he discusses the general fallado 
of the senses, and in particular of sight, in its judgments about extc 
He accounts for the inevitable unceAainty of what we take to be ; 
diate visual perceptions of the distances of things, by an analysis 
manner in which these supposed perceptions are formed — in she 
assigning them not to sense proper but to the misinterpretation < 
sense-experience in thought He enumerates as signs <A distan 
(i) The angle made by the rays of our eyes, and the change i 
position of our eyes corresponding to the changes t)f this 
— ^which he illustrates, like Descartes and others, by the blind 
and cross sticks; (2) the figure of the organ of vision, depei 
on the tension of its muscles; (3) the size of the images pa 
at the bottom of the eye ; (4) the power of the object upon the 



• Sir A. Grant {fi&ics qJ ArisMU, 
vol. II. p. 17 a), remarks as to the doc- 
trine that tiie Common Sensible! are ap- 
prehended concomitantly by the senses 
— • This is surely the true view ; we see in 
the apprehension of number, figure, and the 
like, not an operation of sense, but the 
mind putting its own forms and categories, 
i. c. itself, on the external object. It would 
follow then that the senses cannot really be 
separated from the mind; the senses and 
the mind each contribute an element to every 
knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of kou^ 



d(<r(hr<rii woukl go £u-, if carried c 
modify his doctrine of the simple and 
character of the senses, e. g. sight, (c 
II. I, 4), and would prevent its al 
collision with Berkeley's Theory qf I 
—See Sir W. Hamilton, Rmfs WoTi 
828-830. 

Mr. Stewart {ColUcitd Works, vo! 
341, note) quotes Aristotle's Etbic$ 1 
evidence that Berkeley's doctrine, 
respect to the acquired perceptions of 
was quite unknown to the best meta 
dans of antiquity.* 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 45 

1) the clearness and distinctness of the image formed in the eye; 
6) the rdalion of the object to which the visual judgment refers to other 
Hervening objects. 

That the Xeckerchi of Malebranche, published more than thirty years 
before the JSssqy, was familiar to Berkeley, and that this with other 
was much under his eye, before the publication of his New 
U is proved by internal evidence, and by his commonplace book. 
[ am not able to discover signs of a similar connection between Berke- 
ley and the diapter on the mystery of sensation, in Glanvill's Scepsis 
Sami^ka (du g), published some years before the Recherche of Male- 
twndie, where Glanvill refers to ' a secret deduction,' through which — 
Cram motions, &c., of which we are immediately percipient — ^we ' spell 
oat' figures, distances, magnitudes, and colours, which have no resem- 
bhnoe to them. 

The nearest approach to the New Theory is to be found in a passage 
lUch irst appeared in the fourth edition of Locke's Essay, published 
in 1694, to which Berkeley refers in his own £ss<^ (sect. 132-35), and 
viudiy on account of its importance in the history of the Theory of 
Vmon, and of our notion of Extension, I shall here transcribe at length : — 

' We are further to consider concerning Perception that the ideas we 
receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, 
vithont our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round 
gk>be of any uniform colour, e. g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that 
the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously 
riadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our 
eyes. Bot, we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of 
ippeaiance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are 
made in the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible figures of 
bodies — the judgment presendy, by an habitual custom, alters the 
ippearances into their causes ; so that, from that which is truly variety 
of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of 
figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an 
Bniibrm colour, when the idea we receive from them is only a plane 
variously coloured, as is evident in painting. 

* To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very 
ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and 
vorthy Mr. Molyncux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some 
months since, and it is this : — Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, 
lod taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of 
he some metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he 
eh the one and the other, which is the cube and which the sphere. 



i6 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

Suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table, and the bliiid 
man be made to see : quere, whether, by his sight, before he toocfacd 
them, he could not distinguish and tell, which is the globe and whidi 
the cube ? To which the acute and judicious proposer answers : * Not' 
For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a 
cube affects his touch ; yet he has not obtained the experience that what 
affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so and so; so that a 
protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall 
appear to his eye as it does in the cube. — I agree with this thmking 
gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his 
problem, and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not 
be able to say with certainty which was the globe and which the cube, 
whilst he only saw them; though he would unerringly name diem by 
his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in their 
figures felt 

< This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for 
him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, im- 
provement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least 
use of, or help from them: and the rather because this observing 
gentleman further adds that, having, upon the occasion of my book, 
proposed this problem to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met 
with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by 
hearing his reasons they were convinced. 

' But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but those received 
by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of the senses, con- 
veying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculnr 
only to that sen§e ; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and 
motion, the several varieties of which change the appearance of its 
proper object, i. e. light and colours ; we bring ourselves by use to judge 
of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit, m 
things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly 
and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation, 
which is an idea formed by our judgment ; so that one, i. e. that of 
sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice 
of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding 
takes little notice of the character or sounds, but of the ideas that are 
excited in him by them. 

' Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we 
consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed ; for, as 
itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension, so its 
actions seem. to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 17 

Pi into an instani. I speak this in comparison of the actions or the 
B body. . . . Secondly, we shall not be much surprised thai this is done 
'0 with ua_m_so little notice, if we consider how the facility we get of 
^ doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us 
^ without notice. Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come 
^ at lost to produce actions in us which often escape our observation. . . . 
^ And therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change 
^ the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make the one 
k serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.' {£ssqy 
If eoiuermng Human Understanding, Book II. ch. 9, § 8.) 
L This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the conception of 
P the synthetic operation of imagination and habit, upon the materials 
\ originally given in sense, which, under the name of ' suggestion,' is the 
constructive principle of the Nm) Theory. 

The following sentences, relative to the invisibility of distances, con- 
tained in the Treah'se 0/ Dioptrics (published in 1690) of Locke's friend 
and correspondent William Molyneux — who was tutor in Trinity College, 
Dublin, when Berkeley entered the University, and whose son was 
Berkeley's pupil — illustrate Locke's statements, while they may be com- 
wilh the opening sections of the following Essay: — 
I plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of objects 
jcially when so far removed that the interval between our two 
eyes bears no sensible proportion tliereto, or when looked upon with 
one eye only) is rather the act of our judgment than of sense; and 
acquired by exercise, and a faculty of comparing, rather than natural, 
For, distance of itself is not to be perceived ; for, 'tis a line (or a length) 
presented to our eye with its end toward us, which must therefore be 
only a point, and that is invisible. Wherefore distance is chiefly 
perceived by means of interjacent bodies, as by the earth, mountains, 
tulls, 6elds, trees, houses, &c. Or by the estimate we make of the com- 
parative magnitude of bodies, or of their faint colours, kc. These I say 
are the chief means of apprehending the distance of objects that are 
considerably remote. But as to nigh objects— to whose distance the 
interval of the eyes bears a sensible proportion — their distance is perceived 
h)- ihc turn of the eyes, or by the angle of the optic axes (Gregorii Opt. 
Promnt. prop. z8). This was the opinion of the ancients, Alhazen, Vitellio, 
ic. And though the ingenious Jesuit Tacquel {Opt. Lih. I. prop, a) dis- 
approve lliereof, and objects against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a 
man's seeing only with one eye at a lime one and the same object), yet this 
notion of Ga.ssendus being absolutely false (a.s I could demonstrate were 
^^R beside my present pujpose). it makes nothing against this opiniotL ■ 



i8 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

' Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself pera 
if an object were conveyed to the eye by one single ray only, the] 
no other means of judging of its distance but by some of those 
before. Therefore when we estimate the distance of nigh i 
either we take the help of both eyes, or else we consider the p 
one eye as having breadth, and receiving a parcel of rajrs froi 
radiating point. And, according to the various inclinations of tl 
from one point on the various parts of the pupil, we make our e 
of the distance of the object And therefore (as is said before), 
single eye we can only judge of the distance of such objects to 
distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion. . • . F< 
observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see also Gregorii Opi. Pramoi. pr 
that for viewing objects remote and nigh, there are requi^te ' 
conformations of the eye — the rays from nigh objects that fall on 1 
diverging more than those from more remote objects.' (Tra 
Dioptrics^ Part I. prop. 31.) 

The preceding passages indicate the state of opinion regardii 
mental fact of vision about the time Berkeley's Essay appeared, esp 
among those with whose works he was familiar. I shall now r< 
one or two illustrations of the change in scientific belief which his t 
produced. * 

The Neu) Theory has occasioned much interesting criticism 
1709. At first indeed it drew little attention. For twenty years al 
publication the allusions to it were few. The account of Chese 
famous experiment, published in 1728, in the Philosophical Transa 
which seemed to bring the Theory to the test of a palpable pb 
experiment, drew some scientific interest to Berkeley's reasonings, 
state of theological controversy about the same time confirmed th* 
dency to discuss a doctrine which represented ordinary vision s 
interpretation of divinely constituted signs. 

Occasional discussions of some of the principles involved in tht 
Theory may be found in the Gentleman's Magazine ^ from 173 
Berkeley's death in 1753. Some adverse criticism is also con 
in Dr. Smith's Optics , published in 1738. 

The essential parts of Berkeley's analysis are very well explain 
Voltaire, in his Jtlenuns de la Philosophie de Newlon, The foil 
passage from that work is here given on its own account, anc 

* A work resembling Berkeley's in its Vitioms Tbeoria of Dr. Briggs, publ 
title, but in little else, appeared more than 1685. 
twenty years before the Euay — the Nova 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 19 

t prominent recognition of the new doctrine in f ranee, within thirty 

fiom its first promulgation : — 
'D but absohunent conclure de tout ceci, que les distances, les 
ks ntuations ne sont pas, k proprement parler, des choses 
c'est k dire, ne sont pas les objets propres et imm^diats de la 
L'objet propre et imm^diat de la vue n'est autre chose que la 



^ ■ " color^ : tout le reste, nous ne sentons qu' a la longue et par 



Nous apprenons k voir, precisement comme nons apprenons 
^ piiler et SiUre. La difference est, que Tart de voir est plus facile, et 
k nature est egalement k tons notre maitre. 

jngemens soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes nos &mes, k un 
age, portes des distances, des grandeurs, des situations, nous font 
; qiiH n'y it qu'it c ww ies yeux, pour voir la manibre dons nous 
les vojons. On se trompe ; il est faut les secours des autres choses. 
S les hommes n'avoient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auroient aucun 
voTenpoar connaitre Tdtendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur; etun 
por esprit ne la connottroit peut-etre, a moins que Dieu ne la lui r^v^l^t. 
n est tihs difficile de separer dans notre entendement I'extension d'un objet 
tfafec les couleurs de cet objet Nous ne voyons jamais rien que d'dtendu, 
€t de-Gk nous sommes toutes port^ k croire, que nous voyons en esset 
fAendne.' {EUmens de la Phtlos. de Newian, Second Partie, ch. 5.) 

Condillac, in his Essais sur VOrigine des Comnaissances Humanes (Part 
L sect, 6), published in 1746, combats Berkeley's Neiv Theory, and 
maintains that an extension exterior to the eye is discernible by sight, 
the eye being naturally capable of judging of figures, magnitudes, 
smations, and distances. His reasonings in support of this ' prejudice,' 
at he afterwards aUowed it to be, may be found at length, in the section 
entitled ' De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribu^s k Tame, sans fondement, 
00 sohition d'un probldme de m^taphysique.' Here Locke, Molyneux, 
Berkeley, and Voltaire are criticised, and Cheselden's experiment is 
referred to. Condillac's subsequent recantation is contained in his 
Tram des SensaHonSy published in 1754, and in his LArt de Penser. 
In the TraiU des Sensations (Troisieme Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, &c.) the 
vfaole question is discussed at length, and Condillac vindicates what he 
aOows must appear a marvellous paradox to the uninitiated — that we 
gradually learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. He argues in par- 
licular that the eye cannot originally perceive an extension that is beyond 
iuelf, and that the notion of trinal space is due to what we experience 
in touch. 

Vohaire and Condillac gave currency to the New Theory in France, 
ukI it soon became a commonplace \iith D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon 



c 2 



20 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

and other French philosophers. In Germany we have allusions to it in 
the Berlin Memoirs and elsewhere ; but, although well known by name, 
if not in its distinctive principle and latent idealism, it has not there 
obtained the consideration which its author's fully developed theory of 
matter has received. The ELantian account of Space, and of the origin 
of our mathematical notions, may have subsequently indisposed the 
German mind to the a posteriori reasoning of Berkeley's Essety. 

Its influence is most apparent in British philosophy. The following 
passages in Hartley's Observations on Man, published in 1749, illustrate 
the extent to which some of the distinctive parts of Berkeley's doctrine 
were at that time received by an eminent English psychologist : — 

'Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and figure bf 
the relative quantity of distance. . . . And, as the sense of sight is modi 
more extensive and expedite than feeling, we judge of tangible qualities 
chiefly by sight, which therefore may be considered, agreeably to Bishop 
Berkeley's remark, as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling; 
being, for the most part, an adequate representative of them, and a 
language common to all mankind, and in which they all agree v^ 
nearly, after a^ moderate degree of experience. 

' However, if the informations from touch and sight disagree at anjr 
time, we are always to depend upon touch, as that which, according 
to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects, is the true representa- 
tion of the essential properties, i. e. as the earnest and presage of niiat 
other tangible impressions the body under consideration will make 
upon our feeling in other circumstances; also what changes it will 
produce in other bodies ; of which again we are to determine by our | 
feeling, if the visual language should not happen to correspond to it 
exactly. And it is from this difference that we call the touch the reality, 
light the representative — also that a person bom blind may foretell with 
certainty, from his present tangible impressions, what Others would follow 
upon varying the circumstances ; whereas, if we could suppose a person 
to be born without feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he could not, 
from his present visible impressions, judge what others would follow 
upon varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a knife, drawn so 
well as to deceive his eye, would not, when applied to another body, 
produce the same change of visible impressions as a real knife does, 
when it separates the parts of the body through which it passes. But 
the touch is not liable to these deceptions. As it is therefore the fun- 
damental source of information in respect of the essential properties of 
matter, it may be considered as our first and principal key to the 
knowledge of the external world.' (Prop. 30.) 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 21 

In other passages of Hartley's work (e. g. Prop. $8) the relation of 

viraal judgments of magnitude, figure, motion, distance, and position, 

ilhe doctrine of association is explained, and the associated circum- 

by which these judgments are formed are enumerated in 

Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his Treatise on the Eye, the Manner and 
ntmrnuma of Vision (Edinburgh 1759), is an exception to the consent 
«ticli the doctrine had then widely secured He maintains, in opposition 
to Berkeley, that ' the judgments we form of objects being placed with- 
€it the eje, in those perpendicular lines, or, which is nearly the same 
dng, the judgments we form of the situation and distance of visual 
objects, depend not on custom and experience, but on original, connate, 
md immiitable law, to which our minds have been subjected from the 
ipK they were at first united to their bodies."* 

Berkde/s Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves our supposed 
visBl perceptions of distance into an interpretation of suggestive signs, 
noeifed the qualified approbation of Dr. Reid, in his Inquiry into the 
Human Mind an the Principles of Common Sense (1764). He criticises it 
ii detail m successive chapters of the Inquiry, where the doctrine of 
artxtraiy, natural signs, of which Berkeley's philosophy is the develop- 
■ent, is accepted, and to some extent applied. With Reid it is divorced, 
kmever, from the Berkeleian metaphysics as a whole, although the 
Theoiy of Vision was the seminal principle of Berkeley's Theory of 
llatter.t 

Berkele/s Theory of Matter was an object of professed hostility to 
Reid and his followers, while his Theory of Vision has obtained the al- 
iBOst unanimous consent of the Scotch metaphysicians. Adam Smith 
refers to it in his Essays (published in 1795) as 'one of the finest ex- 
amples of philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own 
or in any other language.' Mr. Stewart characterises it in his Elements^ 
which had appeared three years before, as ' one of the most beautiful, 
and at the same time one of the most important theories of modem 
philosophy.' 'The solid additions,' he afterwards remarks in his Dis- 
urtahom, 'made by Berkeley to the stock of human knowledge, were 
impoftant and brilliant Among these the first place is unquestionably 
due to his Nno Theory of Vision, a work abounding with ideas so different 
from those commonly received, and at the same time so profound and 
refinedt that it was regarded by all but a few accustomed to deep 

• Sec TWoAM oil iht Eyt^ Vol. II. pp. Ch. vi. § 94, and E^^ys on tbi InUllectual 
jM, A:c. Powers^ II. Ch. 10 and ly. 

t See RcmTi Inquiry, Ch. r. %% 3, 5, 6, 7 ; 



" EDITOR'S PREFACE 

metoph>'sical reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical loi 
of a sober inquiry after truth. Such, however, has since U 
grcss and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the kadij 
abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential 
elementary treatise on optics, and are adopted by the mo 
smatterers in science as fundamental articles of ieir faith 
Theory is accepted by Dr. Thomas Brown, who proposes (/ 
extend its reasonings to more refined conclusions. With 
perceptions of sight, Dr. John Young, in his Lecturer w In 
sophy (p. 102). sa}-s that * it has been universally admitted 
the days of Berkeley, that many of those which appear ta 
to be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn t 
that at least most of the perceptions of sight are founded 
information of touch ;~that colour, considered as a m< 
the mind, can give us no conception originally of diose c 
which produce it in us; and that primary vision giv 
of distance, nor of true relative magnitude, and, as I I 
of magnitude at all. Most certainly, at least, it can j: 
primarily of resistance, solidity, roughness and smoot! 
and yet these are among tlie chief elementary notior 
of matter.' Sir James Mackintosh, in his Dissertatioii 
Xac Tht'ory of Vision as * a great discovery in M- 
' Nothing in the compass of inductive reasoning,' rt 
Hamilton (Reid's Works, p. 182, note), * appears moi 
Berkeley's demonstration of the necessity and man! 
bv a slow process of obsenation and comparison a! 
between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, 
relates to the distance and real magnitude of extei 
regard to the method by which we judge of disUi 
he tells us in Mx&Licturts on Metaphysics (XXVUI 
pond ujwn an original law of the constitution, anil 
of any knowledge gained through the medium of 
This opinion was attacked by Berkeley in his K^ 
in which it appears most clearly demonstrated il. 
mation on this subject is acquired by experience ani' 

♦ While Sir W. Hauiilton acknowledges imtinct of distant 

tlio s.icniinc validity of Berkeley's cou- HV*s. p. U7. '^ 

elusion., i. to the way wc jud^je of disunces about Locke 

.„ >..in.. he curiously compUins. m the Problem, at tot 

same Icaure, that -the whole question is ;»«"«"*«• ^'• 

thrown into doubt bv the analog)- oi the Liv. U. en. 9. 
lower aninuls,* i. e. by their probable visual 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



»3 



1 



It is worthy of remark that the New Theory has been generally ac- 
cepted, so fiur as it was understood, alike by the followers of Hartley and 
\ef the associates and successors of Reid. Among British psychologists, 
illias recommended itself to metaphysical rationalists and sensationalists, 
Id the advocates of innate principles, and to those who would explain, 
\fl die laws of mental association, what theu* rivals attribute to the ab- 
folnte constitution of intelligence. This one doctrine, as Mr. J. S. Mill 
has been recognised and upheld with singular unanimity by the 
of aU schools of philosophical thought.* It may thus be fairly 
•ddoc ed as an example of an acknowledged discovery in metaphysics ; 
while a careful study of its nature and evidence is among the best meta- 
pfa^siGal exercises of the refined thought and exact use of words in which 
mental analjib is the only adequate education. 

A. C. F. 



*At afanott toUtiry ezce|>tions to this 
auformity of profession on a subtle 
m psjrcbologj, I may refer to two 
voiks, wfaicfa are valuable at least as much 
fior the critkim thej hare occasioned as for 
iheir oootents. In 184a Mr. Samud Bailey 
of Sheffield, a candid and able inquirer, pul^* 
fiihed a Rnuw qf BerktUyi Theory (/ 
Vaiomy dtugned to tbow ibt wuotmdnns of 
Aet etMrattd SpteulatioH. Mr. Bailey's 
book recalled attention, at the time of its 
appearance, to the tnsis in consciousness on 
which the theory rests. It was the subject 
of two interesting rejoinders — a well-weighed 
aiiiusn i, in the WtttminUar Revitw^ by Mr. 
J. SL MiD, since republished in his DUeW' 



sions : and an ingenious Essay by the late 
Profittsor Ferrier, in Blackwood's Magazine, 
now republished in hxiPhUoaopbiealRemaina, 
The controrersy ended on that occasion with 
Mr. Bailey's Letttr to a Pbilosopber in reply 
to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's 
Theory ^f Vision, and in further elucidation 
qfits unsoundness, and a reply to it by each 
of his critics. It was revived in 1864 by 
Mr. Abbott of Trinity College, Dublin, who 
produced his Sight and Touch, as ' an at- 
tempt to disprove the received (or Berkleian) 
Theory of Vision,' but he seems to have 
overlooked the nature of the Theory which 
he professes to disprove. 



1 



AN ESSAY 



TOWARDS 



A NEW THEORY OF VISION. 



] 



TO THE 



^ RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.', 

OSE OF HER majesty's MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL 

in the kingdom of ireland. 

Sir, 

I COULD not, without doing violence to myself, forbear upon this occa- 
BOQ to give some public testimony of the great and well-grounded 
esteem I have conceived for you, ever since I had the honour and hap- 
poess of your acquaintance. The outward advantages of fortune, and 
the early honours with which you are adbmed, together with the reputa- 
tion jou are known to have amongst the best and most considerable 
men, may well imprint veneration and esteem on the minds of those 
ito behold you from a distance. But these are not the chief motives 
that inspire me with the respect I bear you. A nearer approach has 
given me the view of something in your person infinitely beyond the 
external ornaments of honour and estate. I mean, an intrinsic stock of 
virtue and good sense, a true concern for religion, and disinterested 
love of your country. Add to these an uncommon proficiency in the 
best and most useful parts of knowledge; together with (what in my 
mind is a perfection of the first rank) a surpassing goodness of nature. 
Afl which I have collected, not from the uncertain reports of fame, but 
from my own experience. Within these few months that I have the 
hoDOor to be known unto you, the many delightful hours I have passed 
in your agreeable and improving conversation have afforded me the 
opportunity of discovering in you many excellent qualities, which at 
oocc fin me with admiration and esteem. That one at those years, and 

' Aftenrirds ^in 1733) Earl of Egmont. 173a he obtained a charter to colonize the 

He nccccded to the Baronetcy in 1691, and, province of Georgia in North America. His 

ifter tittin/r for several years in the Irish name appears in the list of subscribers to 

Hnme of Cofcmons, was in 1715 created Berkeley's Bermuda Scheme (1726). He 

Baroa Pcrcival, in the Irish peerage, In died in 1 748. 



28 DEDICATION. 

in those circumstances of wealth and greatness, should continue proof 
against the charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures so fashion- 
able and predominant in the age we live in; that he should preserve 
a sweet and modest behaviour, free from that insolent and assuming 
air so familiar to those who are placed above the ordinary rank of men; 
that he should manage a great fortune with that prudence and inspec- 
tion, and at the same time expend it with that generosity and nobkness 
of mind, as to shew himself equally remote from a sordid parsimonj 
and a lavish inconsiderate profusion of the good things he is intrusted 
with — this, surely, were admirable and praiseworthy. But, that he 
should, moreover, by an impartial exercise of his reason, and constant 
perusal of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a right notion of 
the principles of natiu^ and revealed religion ; that he should with the 
concern of a true patriot have the interest of the public at heart, and 
omit no means of informing himself what may be prejudicial or advan- 
tageous to his country, in order to prevent the one and promote the 
other; in fine, that, by a constant application to the most severe and 
useful studies, by a strict observation of the rules of honour and virtne, 
by frequent and serious reflections on the mistaken measiu'es of the 
world, and the true end and happiness of mankind, he should in all 
respects qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before him, 
to deserve the character of great and good in this life, and be ever 
happy hereafter — this were amazing and almost incredible. Yet all 
this, and more than this, Sir, might I justly say of you, did either your 
modesty permit, or your character stand in need of it I know it might 
deservedly be thought a vanity in me to imagine that anjrthing coming 
from so obscure a hand as mine could add a lustre to your reputation. 
But, I am withal sensible how far I advance the interest of my own, by 
laying hold on this opportunity to make it known that I am admitted 
into some degree of intimacy with a person of your exquisite judgment 
And, with that view, I have ventured to make you an address of this 
nature, which the goodness I have ever experienced in you inclines me to 
hope will meet with a favourable reception at your hands. Though 
I must own I have your pardon to ask, for touching on what may 
possibly be offensive to a virtue you are possessed of in a very distin- 
guishing degree. Excuse me, Sib, if it was out of my power to mention 
the name of Sir John Percivale without paying some tribute to that 
extraordinary and surprising merit whereof I have so clear and affecting 
an idea, and which, I am sure, cannot be exposed in too full a light for 
the imitation of others. Of late, I have been agreeably employed in 
considering the most noble, pleasant, and comprehensive of all the 



DEDICATION. 



29 



^ The fruit of that (labour shall I call it or) diversion is what 
present you with, in hopes it may give some entertainment to one 
in the midst of business and vulgar enjo3nnents, preserves a relish 
the more refined pleasures of thought and reflexion. My thoughts 
Vision have led me into some notions, so far out of the 
road^ that it had been improper to address them to one of 
ft amow and contracted genius. But, you, Sir, being master of a large 
understanding, raised above the power of those prejudices that 
the far greater part of mankind, may deservedly be thought a 
froper patron for an attempt of this kind. Add to this, that you are no 
Im disposed to forgive than qualified to discern whatever faults may 
occnr in it Nor do I think you defective in any one point necessary to 
iMm an exact judgment on the most abstract and difficult things, so 
■odi as in a just confidence of your own abilities. And, in this one 
give me leave to say, you shew a manifest weakness of judg- 
With relation to the following Essay ^ I shall only add that I beg 
four pardcm for laying a trifle of that nature in your way, at a time when 
you are engaged in the important affairs of the nation, and desire you to 
dank that I am, with all sincerity and respect. 

Sib, 

Your most faithful and most humble servant, 

GEORGE BERKELEY. 



\ 



tenns are applied to this sense by 
vrxtcfs widi whom Berkeley was familiar. 
~ Locke {Essay II. ix. 9) refers to sight 
** die most comprehensive of all our 
.** Des Cartes opens his Dioptrique by 
it as ** le plus unirersal et le plus 
de nos sens;** and he alludes to it 
{Prindp. IV. 195) as " le plus 
mMI de totts les sens.** Malcbranche begins 
\m analysis of sight (Recherche I. 6) by de- 



scribing it as " le premier, le plus noble, et 
le plus etendu de tous les sens." — The high 
place assigned to this sense by Aristotle has 
been already alluded to. Its office as the 
chief organ through which objective reality 
is given to us is recognised by a multitude 
of psychologists and metaphysicians. 

• On Berkeley's originality in his Theory 
of Vision see the Editor's Preface. 



CONTENTS. 



I. Design. 



2. Distance of itself invisible. 

3. Remote distance perceived rather by experience than by 

4. Near distance thought to be perceived by the angle of the optic 

5. Diflercnce between this and the former manner of perceiving distance. 

6. Also by diverging rays. 

7. This depends not on experience. 

8. These the common accounts, but not satisfactory. 

9. Some ideas perceived by the mediation of others. 

ID. No idea which is not itself perceived can be the means of perceivinf 
another. 

1 1. Distance perceived by means of some other idea. 

12. Those lines and angles mentioned in optics are not themselves perceived. 

13. Hence the mind does not perceive distance by lines and angles. 

14. Also because they have no real existence. 

15. And because they are insufficient to explain the phenomena. 

16. The ideas that suggest distance are — First, the sensation arising from the 

turn of the eyes. 

17. Betwixt which and distance there is no necessary connexion. 

18. Scarce room for mistake in this matter. 

19. No regard had to the angle of the optic axes. 

ao. Judgment of distance made with both eyes, the result of experience. 

21. Secondly y confusedness of appearance. 

22. This the occasion of those judgments attributed to diverging rays. 

23. Objection answered. 

24. What deceives the writers of optics in this matter. 

25. The cause why one idea may suggest another. 

26. This applied to confusion and distance. 

27. Tlfinifyf the straining of the eye. 

28. The occasions which suggest distance have in their own nature no relation 

to it. 

29. A difficult case proposed by Dr. Barrow as repugnant to all the known 

theories. 

30. This case contradicts a received principle in catoptrics. 

31. It is shewn to agree with the principles we have laid doMOi. 

32. This phenomenon illustrated. 

33. It confirms the truth of the principle whereby it is explained. 



CONTENTS. 31 

[3f» VBkn, when distinct and when confiised. 

The different effects of pandlel, diverging, and converging rays. 
^Jlw How co n verg i ng and diverging rays come to suggest the same distance. 

^. A person extremely purblind would judge aright in the forementioned case. 
[ jjL Lines and angles why useful in optics. 
fi|. The not understanding this a cause of mistake. 
^40^ A ^jnery, pr o posed by Mr. Molyneux in his Dioptrics^ considered. 
ft. One bom blind would not at first have any idea of distance by sight. 
^ 4a. This not agreeable to the common principles. 

4). The proper objects of sig^t not without the mind, nor the images of 
anything without the mind. 

44. This more fiilly explained. 

45. In what sense we must be understood to see distance and external things* 
4!. Dirtance, and things placed at a distance, not otherwise perceived by the 

eye than by the ear. 
47. The ideas of sight more apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch 

than those of hearing are. 
4! How this comes to pass. 

4|b Strictly speaking, we never see and feel the same thing. 
Sa Objects of si^t twofold — mediate and immediate. 
It: These hard to separate m our thoughts. 

p. The received accounts of our perceiving magnitude by sight, false. 
5}. Magnitude perceived as immediately as distance. 

54. Two kinds of sensible extension, neither of which is infinitely divisible. 

55. The tangible magnitude of an object steady, the visible not. 
5<. By what means tangible magnitude is perceived by sight. 

57. This £uther enlarged on. 

58. No necessary connexion between confusion or faintness of appearance 

and smaQ or great magnitude. 
59* The tangible magnitude of an object more heeded than the visible, and 
why. 

60. An instance of this. 

61. Men do not measure by visible feet or inches. 

(j. No necessary connexion between visible and tangible extension. 

(3. Greater visible magnitude might signify lesser tangible magnitude. 

(4. The judgments we make of magnitude depend altogether on experience* 

65. Distance and magnitude seen as shame or anger. 

66. But we are prone to think otherwise, and why. 

67. The moon seems greater in the horizon than in the meridian. 

68. The cause of this phenomenon assigned. 

69. The horizontal moon, why greater at one time than another. 

70. The account we have given proved to be true. 

71. And confirmed by the moon's appearing greater in a mist. 
7 J. Objection answered. 

7). The way wherein faintness suggests greater magnitude illustrated. 



32 CONTENTS. 

74. Appearance of the horizontal moon, why thought difficult to explah 

75. Attempts towards the solution of it made by several, but in yain. 

76. The opinion of Dr. Wallis. 

77. It is shewn to be unsatisfactory. 

78. How lines and angles may be of use in computing apparent magnit 

79. One bom blind, being made to see, what judgment he would n 

magnitude. 

80. The mimmum wibUe the same to all creatures. 

81. Objection answered. 

82. The eye at all times perceives the same number of visible points. 

83. Two imperfections in the visive faculty. 

84. Answering to which, we may conceive two perfections. 

85. In neither of these two ways do microscopes improve the sight. 

86. The case of microscopical eyes considered. 

87. The sight admirably adapted to the ends of seeing. 

88. Difficulty concerning erect vision. 

89. The common way of explaining it. 

90. The same shewn to be false. 

91. Not distinguishing between ideas of sight and touch cause of mista 

this matter. 
9a. The case of one bom blind proper to be considered. 

93. Such a one might by touch attain to have ideas of upper and lower. 

94. Which modes of situation he would attribute only to things tangible. 

95. He would not at first sight think anything he saw, high or low, ere 

inverted. 

96. This illustrated by an example. 

97. By what means he would come to denominate visible objects, ' higl 

' low,' &c. 

98. Why he should think those objects highest which are painted on 

lowest part of his eye, and vice 'versa. 

99. How he would perceive by sight the situation of extemal objects. 

100. Our propension to think the contrary no argiunent against what 

been said. 

10 1. Objection. 
1 03. Answer. 

103. An object could not be known at first sight by the colour. 

104. Nor by the magnitude thereof. 

105. Nor by the figure. 

106. In the first act of vision, no tangible thing would be suggested by sig 

107. Difficulty proposed conceming number. 

108. Number of things visible would not, at first sight, suggest the like nui 

of things tangible. 

109. Number, the creature of the mind. 

no. One born blind would not, at first sight, number visible thing 
others do. 



CONTENTS. 33 

tii. The sitoatioii of any object determined with respect only to objects 

of the same sense. 
iia. No distance, great or small, between a visible and tangible thing. 
tij. The not observing this, cause of difficulty in erect vision. 

114. Which otherwise includes nothing unaccountable. 
; IIS- What is meant by the pictures being inverted. 

111. Cause of mistake in this matter. 

117. Images in the eye not pictures of external objects. 

lit. In what sense they are pictures. 

119. In this affiur we must carefully distinguish between ideas of sight and 
touch. 

ISO. Difficult to explain by words the true theory of vision. 



III. The question, whether there is any idea common to sight and touch, 

stated. 
»J. Abstract extension inquired into. 
113. It is incomprehensible. 
' 114. Abstract extension not the object of geometry, 
las* The general idea of a triangle considered. 
ttk Vacimm, or pure space, not common to sight and touch. 
117* There is no idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses. 
12I. Fffst argument in proof hereof. 
119. Second argument. 

130. Vis3>le figure and extension not distinct ideas from colour. 
i}i. Third argument. 

ijj. Confirmation drawn from Mr. Molyneux's problem of a sphere and a 
cube, published by Mr. Locke. 

133. Which is falsely solved, if the common supposition be true. 

134. More might be said in proof of our tenet, but this suffices. 
13$. Farther reflection on the foregoing problem. 

136. The same thing doth not affect both sight and touch. 

137. The same idea of motion not common to sight and touch. 

138. The way wherein we apprehend motion by sight easily collected from 

what hath been said. 

139. Qmej. How visible and tangible ideas came to have the same name, 

if not of the same kind ? 
(40. This accounted for without supposing them of the same kind. 

141. 06j, That a tangible square is liker to a visible square than to a visible 

circle. 

142. jhu. That a visible square is fitter than a visible circle to represent a 

tangible square. 

143. Bat it doth not hence follow that a visible square is like a tangible 

square. 
(44. Why we are more apt to confound visible with tangible ideas, than 

other signs with the things signified. 
145. Several other reasons hereof assigned. 

D 



34 CONTENTS. 

146. Reluctancy in rejecting any opinion no argument of its truth. 

147. Proper objects of vision the Language of Nature. 

148. In it there is much acknirable and deserving our attention. 

149. Question proposed concerning the object of geometry. 

150. At first view we are apt to think visible extension the object of geo 

151. Visible extension shewn not to be the object of geometry. 

15a. Words may as well be thought the object of geometry as 
extension. 

153. It is proposed to inquire, what progress an intelligence that coul 

but not feel, might make in geometry. 

154. He cannot understand those parts which relate to solids, and 

surfaces, and lines generated by their section. 

155. Nor even the elements of plane geometry. 

156. The proper objects of sight incapable of being managed as geomi 

figures. 

157. The opinion of those who hold plane figures to be the imm 

objects of sight considered. 

158. Planes no more the immediate objects of sight than solids. 

159. Difficult to enter precisely into the thoughts of the above-ment 

intelligence. 

160. The object of geometry, its not being sufficientiy imderstood, cas 

difficulty and useless labour in that science. 



AN ESSAY 



TOWARDS 



i A NEW THEORY OF VISION. 



1. MY design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive by 
aglit the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects. Also to 
consider the difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and 
tOQcfa, and whether there be any idea common to both senses. 
[In treating of all which, it seems to me, the writers of optics 
bare proceeded on wrong principles ^] 

2. It is^ I think, agreed by all that distance of itself, and imme- 
diately, cannot be seen*. For distance^ being a line directed 
endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of 
the eye — which point remains invariably the same, whether the 
distance be longer or shorter^ 

3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make of 
the distance of objects considerably remote is rather an act of 
judgment grounded on experience than of sense. For example. 



' This sentence is contained in the first 
and coUccted editions only. 

* Sect. 3.5 1 explain the way in which we 
learn in seeing to judge of Distance, and 
of objects as existing at a distance from our 
organtsm, riz. by their association with what 
we see, and with certain organic sensations 
which accompany rision. Sect, a assumes, as 
already granted, the invisibility of distance 
is the line of sight. Of. sect. 1 1 and 88 — 
Firu Dialogs bUween Hylat and PMonous 
^AUipbnm, IV. S^Tbeory 0/ Vision Vin^ 
dkattd and Explaintd, sect. 62-69. 

' L c. distance from the point of vision— 
dstakcc to the line of sight — the third dimen- 
SMQ of space. Visible distance is the yisible 
space or interral between two points (see 
Mct. 1 1 a). We can of course be sensibly con- 



scious of it only when both its extreme points 
are seen. 

* This section is erroneously adduced by 
some of Berkeley's critics, favourable and 
adverse, as if it were a summary of the 
evidence for his Ntw Theory^ instead of 
being, as it is, a mere reference to the 
scientific ground of the already received 
doctrine of the absohite invisibility of dis- 
tance in the line of sight. See, for example, 
Bailey's Reviiw of Birktlty's Tbiory of 
Vision^ pp. 38-43, also his Tbiory ^ 
Reasonings p. 179 and pp. 100-7 — Mill's 
Discussions^ vol. ii. p. 95 — Abbott's Sighi 
and Touch, p. lo, where this sentence is 
spoken of as ** the sole positive argument 
advanced by Berkeley." 



D 2 



36 An Essay towards a 

when I perceive a great number of intermediate objects, such as 
houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which I have experienced to 
take up a considerable space, I thence form a judgment or con- 
clusion, that the object I see beyond them is at a great distance. 
Again, when an object appears faint and small which at a near 
distance I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appear- 
ance, I instantly conclude it to be far ofF^. — And this, it is evident, 
is the result of experience ^ without which, fix)m the faintness and 
littleness, I should not have inferred anything concerning the 
distance of objects. 

4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as that 
the interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it<^, 
the opinion of speculative men is, that the two optic axes (the 
fancy that we see only with one eye at once being exploded), 
concurring at the object, do there make an angle, by means 
of which, according as it is greater or lesser, the object is per- 
ceived to be nearer or farther off'. 

5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating 
distance there is this remarkable difference :^-that, whereas there 
was no apparent necessary connexion between small distance and 
a large and strong appearance, or between great distance and a 
little and faint appearance, there appears a very necessary con- 
nexion between an obtuse angle and near distance, and an acute 
angle and farther distance. It does not in the least depend upon 
experience, but may be evidently known by any one before he 
had experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic 
axes the greater the angle, and the remoter their concurrence is 
the lesser will be the angle comprehended by them. 

6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers, whereby 
they will have us judge of those distances in respect of which 
the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible bigness. And that 
is the greater or lesser divergency of the rays, which, issuing 
from the visible point, do fall on the pupil — ^that point being 

' i. e. aerial and linear perspective are * Cf. this and the four following sectioos 

acknowledged signs of the more remote with the quotations in the Editor's Prefiice, 

distances. But the question, in this and the from Molyneux's Treaiist o/Dioptricu 

thirty-six following sections, concerns the ^ In the last edition wc have this tn- 

visibility of near distances only — a few yards notation : * See what Des Cartes and others 

in front of us. It was • agreed by all * that have written upon the subject.' Cf. Appen- 

beyond this limit distances are suggested by dix, p. 100. 
our experience of their arbitrary signs. 



New Theory of Vision. 



37 



. 



jm^ed nearest which is seen by most diverging rays, and that 
icmoier which is seen by less diverging rays; and so on, the 
tpparent distance still increasing, as the divergency of the rays 
decreases;, till at length it becomes infinite when the rays that 
fidl CO the pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it 
is said we perceive distance when we look only with one eye. 

7* In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to expe- 
rience: it being a certain, necessary truth that, the nearer the 
drect rays falling on the eye approach to a parallelism, the farther 
off is the point of their intersection, or the visible point from 
irimce they flow. 

8. Now, though the accounts here given of perceiving near dis- 
tance by sight are received for true, and accordingly made 
use of in determining the apparent places of objects, they do 
imrertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory, and that for these 
following reasons'' : — 

9. \¥srst'^^ It is evident that, when the mind perceives any idea, 
not immediately and of itself, it must be by the means of some 
other idea. Thus, for instahce, the passions which are in the mind 
of another are of themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless 
perceive them by sight, though not immediately, yet by means 
of the colours they produce in the countenance. We often see 
shame or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the changes of 
his countenance to red or pale. 

10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea which is not itself per- 
ceived can be to me the means of perceiving any other idea. If 
I do not perceive the redness or paleness of a man's face them- 
selves, it is impossible I should perceive by them the passions 
which are in his mind. 

11. Now, from sect, ii., it is plain that distance is in its own 
nature imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight >^. It remains. 



' In the 6rst and collected editions this 
Mctioo stands thus : ' I have here set down 
the coaiinofi current accounts that are given 
of oor perceiving near distances by sight, 
which, thoogh they are unquestionably re- 
ceived for true by mathematicians, and 
accordittgly made use of by them in de- 
tcniiining the apfNirent places of objects, do 
aevcrthelcs«/ &c. 

* Omitted ID the author's last edition. 

** L e. ahhough immediately imperceptible, 



it is mediately perceived in seeing, through 
experience. Mark, here and elsewhere, the 
ambiguity of the term perception^ which 
now signifies the act of being sensibly con- 
scious, and again the inference — either in- 
stinctive or intelligent — of certain 'qualities* 
of the immediate objects of sense-conscious- 
ness, of which wc are at the time insentient ; 
while elsewhere it is applied to the object in- 
stead of the act, and to imagination as well as 
to sense-conKiousness. Cf.Locke's£!cs<i)r,II.9. 



38 



An Essay towards a 



therefore, that it be brought into view by means of some o 
idea, that is itself immediately perceived in the act of vision. 
12* But those lines and angles by means whereof s 
men'i pretend to explain the perceptions^ of distance, are tl 
selves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever thoug): 
by those unskilful in optics. I appeal to any one's experie 
whether, upon sight of an object, he computes its distance by 
bigness of the angle made by the meeting of the two optic a: 
or whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser divergenc 
the rays which arrive from any point to his pupil ? nay, wheth 
be not perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense the var 
angles wherewith the rays, according to their greater or lesser 
vergence, do fall on the eye^^? Every one is himself the 
judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain shall 
man'-* tell me, that I perceive certain lines and angles wl 
introduce into my mind the various ideas of distance, so 1 
as I myself am conscious of no such thing. 

13. Since therefore those angles and lines are not themse 
]perceived by sight, it follows, from sect, x., that the mind does 
by them judge of the distance of objects. 

14. [Secondly^^^ The truth of this assertion will be yet fart 
evident to any one that considers those lines and angles have 
real existence in nature, being only an hypothesis framed 
the mathematicians, and by them introduced into optics t 
they might treat of that science in a geometrical way. 

15. The [third and»<^] last reason I shall give for rejecting t 
doctrine is, that though we should grant the real existence of th 
optic angles, &c., and that it was possible for the mind to perce 
them, yet these principles would not be found sufficient to expl; 
the phenomena of distance, as shall be shewn hereafter. 

16. Now, it being already shewn ^ 7 that distance is suggested 



" * Some men* — * mathematicians,' in first 
edition. 

*• i. e. the mediate perception. 

^ In the first and collected editions only. 

'• 'any man' — 'all the mathematicians 
in the world/ in first edition. 

^ Omitted in the author's last edition. 

'* Omitted in the author's last edition. 

" Sect. 9. From sect. i6 to sect. 27, we 
have Berkeley's arbitrary signs of near dis- 
tances. 

^ Observe the first introduction by Berke- 



ley of the term suggestion, used by bin 
express a leading conception in his T^bfor 
Vision^ and indeed in his whole mctaphyi 
philosophy. It had been employed ot 
sionally, among others, by Hobbes and Lo< 
There are three ways in which the objects 
have an immediate perception of in sifht 1 
be supposed to occasion an imagination 
belief of what we are not thus percipi< 
(l) by instinctive interpretation, or what 
Reid calls * original suggestion ' (Inqu 
Ch. VI. sect, ao-34); (a) throngh a « 



New Theory of Vision. 



39 



to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is 
itself perceived in the act of seeing, it remains that we inquire 
what ideas or sensations there be that attend vision, unto which 
we may suppose the ideas of distance are connected, and by which 
they are introduced into the mind. — And, /rx/, it is certain by 
experience, that when we look at a near object with both eyes> 
according as it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the dis- 
position of our eyes, by lessening or widening the interval between 
the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with 
a sensation ^^, which seems to me to be that which in this case 
brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind. 

17. Not that there is any natural or necessary connexion 
between tiie sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes and 
greater oc lesser distance. But — because the mind has, by constant 
experience, found the different sensations corresponding to the 
different dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with a 
different degree of distance in the object — there has grown an 
habitual or customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas; 
so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising from 
the diffferent turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils 
nearer or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different idea 
of distance which was wont to be connected with that sensation. 
Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is immediately sug- 
gested to the understanding which custom had united with it. 

18. Nor do I see how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. 
I know evidently that distance is not perceived of itself ^0 — 
that, by consequence, it must be perceived by means of some 
other idea, which is immediately perceived, and varies with the 
different degrees of distance. I know also that the sensation 
arising from the turn of the eyes is of itself immediately perceived. 



toiBsry association of ideas, gradually pro- 
inctiire of the result, according to laws of ima- 
ginatioa recognised since Aristotle; (3) by 
genera] reasoning from a recognised universal 
premiss. Berkeley's * suggestion.' as after- 
wards Hmne's * custom/ corresponds to 
tbe second (cf. Theory of Vision Vindi- 
emttd, sect. 4 a). — Mr. Bailey, misled appa- 
fcndj by the double meaning of the term 
* pcrccptioo,' charges Berkeley with holding 
that * because the internal feeling has been 
fomkd to be accompanied by the external 
ooc, it will« when experienced alone, not 



only suggest the external sensation, but 
absolutely be regarded as external itself;* 
and he justly adds that * there is nothing 
in the whole operations of the human mind 
analogous to such a process.' {Revitw^p. 21.) 
See Mill's Dissertations, vol. II. pp. 9a, 93 
— Professor Ferricr's Pbilosopbical Remains, 
vol. II. pp. 326-8. 363-4. 

>» Cf. neory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 
66. where it is added that this * sensation' 
belongs properly to the sense of touch. Cf. 
also sect. 145 of Essay. 

* Sect. a. 



40 An Essay towards a 

and various degrees thereof are connected with different distant 
which never fail to accompany them into my mind, when I vi 
an object distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so sm 
that in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any cc 
siderable magnitude. 

19. I know it is a received opinion that, by altering the d 
position of the eyes, the mind perceives whether the angle of t 
c^ic axes, or the lateral angles comprehended between the i 
terval of the eyes or the optic axes, are made greater or less< 
and that, accordingly, by a kind of natural geometry, it judges t 
point of their intersection to be nearer or farther oflF. But th 
this is not true I am convinced by my own experience, since I a 
not conscious 21 that I make any such use of the perception I ha 
by the turn of my eyes. And for me to make those judgment 
and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that I do a 
seems altogether incomprehensible. 

ao. From all which it follows, that the judgment we mal 
of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is entire 
the result of experience. If we had not constantly found ce 
tain sensations, arising from the various disposition of the eye 
attended with certain degrees of distance, we should never mat 
those sudden judgments from them concerning the distance < 
objects; no more than we would pretend to judge of a man 
thoughts by his pronouncing words we had never heard before. 

21. Secondly^ an object placed at a certain distance from th 
eye, to which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable pre 
portion, being made to approach, is seen more confusedly ^2. ^ 
the nearer it is brought the more confused appearance it make 
And, this being found constantly to be so, there arises in the min< 
an habitual connexion between the several degrees of confusion an< 
distance ; the greater confusion still implying the lesser distance 
and the lesser confusion the greater distance of the object. 

22- This confused appearance of the object doth therefbr( 
seem to be the medium whereby the mind judges of distance 
in those cases wherein the most approved writers of optics wil 



" Here, as throughout the Essay, the " Sec sect. 35 for the difference between 

appeal is to our experience in conscious- confused and faint vision. Cf. sect. 32-38 

ness, and not to physiological phenomena with this section. Also Theory of Vision 

in the organism of the eye. Vindieaied, sect. 68. 



New Theory of Vision. 41 

have it judge by the difiFerent divergency with which the rays 
Sowing from the radiating point fall on the pupil ^^. No man, I 
bdieve, will pretend to see or feel those imaginary angles that the 
rijs are supposed to form according to their various inclinations 
OQ his eye. But he cannot choose seeing whether the object 
appear more or less confused. It is therefore a manifest con- 
sequence from what has been demonstrated that, instead of the 
greater or lesser divei^ency of the rays, the mind makes use of 
the greater or lesser confiisedness of the appearance, thereby to 
determine the apparent place of an object. 

33- Nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary 
coonezion between confused vision and distance great or small. 
For I ask any man what necessary connexion he sees between 
the redness dF a blush and shame ? And yet no sooner shall he 
behold that colour to arise in the face of another but it brings 
into his mind the idea of that passion which hath been observed 
to accompany it. 

04* What seems to have misled the writers of optics in this 
matter is, that they imagine men judge of distance as they do of 
a conclusion in mathematics; betwixt which and the premises it 
is indeed absolutely requisite there be an apparent, necessary con- 
nexion. But it is far otherwise in the sudden judgments men 
make of distance. We are not to think that brutes and children, 
or even grown reasonable men, whenever they perceive an object 
to approach or depart from them, do it by virtue of geometry and 
lemonstration. 

25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will 
suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any 
demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or without so 
mudi as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist. Of 
this there are innumerable instances, of which no one can be 
ignorant ^^ 

26. Thus, greater confusion having been constantly attended 
with nearer distance, no sooner is the former idea perceived but 
it suggests the latter to our thoughts. And, if it had been the 
ordinary course of nature that the farther ofF an object were 
placed the more confused it should appear, it is certain the 

* Sec sect. 6. cced on the recognition of association by 

" Thit and the foUowing sections pro- previous contiguity, as a Uw of imagination. 



42 An Essay towards a 

very same perception that now makes us think an object 
proaches would then have made us to imagine it went farther ol 
that perception, abstracting from custom and experience b< 
equally fitted to produce the idea of great distance, or small \ 
tance, or no distance at all. 

27. Thirdly^ an object being placed at the distance ab 
specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may neyerthe 
prevent, at least fbr some time, the appearance's growing ra 
confused, by straining the eye^^ In which case that sensat 
supplies the place of confused vision, in aiding the mind to ji* 
of the distance of the object; it being esteemed so much 
nearer by how much the effort or straining of the eye in ordei 
distinct vision is greater. 

28. I have here 26 set down those sensations or ideas^7 tl 
seem to be the constant and general occasions of introduci 
into the mind the diflFerent ideas of near distance. It is tr 
in most cases, that divers other circumstances contribute to fra 
our idea of distance, viz. the particular number, size, kind, 1 
of the things seen. Concerning which, as well as all other t 
forementioned occasions which suggest distance, I shall only c 
serve, they have none of them, in their own nature, any relati 
or connexion with it : nor is it possible they should ever sign 
the various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience th 
have been found to be connected with them. 

29. I shall proceed upon these principles to account fbr 
phenomenon which has hitherto strangely puzzled the writers 
optics, and is so far from being accounted for by any of th€ 
theories of vision, that it is, by their own confession, plain 
repugnant to them; and of consequence, if nothing else could I 
objected, were alone sufficient to bring their credit in questio 
The whole difficulty I shall lay before you in the words of tl 
learned Doctor Barrow, with which he concludes his Opt 
Lectures ^^. 

*■ Sec Reid's Inquiry, Ch. VI. sect. 22. distance, near and remote, are all eith 

*• Sect 16-27. — For the arbitrary signs of (a> states of the visual organ, or (6) stat 

more remote distances, see sect. 3. of the visible object. 

" i. e. muscular sensations in the organ, * See Molyneux's Treatise 0/ Dioptrit 

and degrees of confusion in the idea or Pt. I. prop. 31, sect. 9, in which Barron 

object seen. — Berkeley's * arbitrary ' signs of difficulty is stated. Cf. sect. 40 below. 



New Theory of Vision. 



43 




-p 



* Hacc sunt, qu« circa partem opticx praccipue mathematicam 
dkmda mihi suggessit meditatio. Circa reliquas (quse </>v(riKci- 
fi^itt sunt, adeoque sxpiuscule pro certis principiis plausibiles con- 
jecturas venditare necessum habent) nihil fere quicquam admodum 
terisimile succurrit, a pervulgatis (ab iis, inquam, quae Keplerus, 
Scheinenis, Cartesius, et post illos alii tradiderunt) alienum aut 
(fiTcrsunu Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam cramben re- 
ponere. Proinde receptui cano; nee ita tamen ut prorsus dis- 
cedam, anteaquam improbam quandam diflicultatem (pro sinceri- 
tate quam et vobis et veritati debeo minime dissimulandam) in 
medium protulero, quae doctrinae nostrae, hactenus inculcatac, se 
objidt adversam, ab ea saltern nullam admittit soiutionem. Ilia, 
brcvitcr, talis est. Lenti vel speculo cavo EB'B 
eipooatur punctum visibile A^ ita distans, ut 
ladii cz A manantes ex inflectione versus axem 
AB cogantur. Sitque radiationis limes (seu 
poncti A imago, qualem supra passim statuimus) 
punctum Z. Inter hoc autem et inflectentis 
verticem B uspiam positus concipiatur oculus. 
Qweri jam potest, ubi loci debeat punctum A 
J4>parere? Retrorsum ad punctum Z videri 
Don fert natura (cum omnis impressio sensum 
afficiens proveniat a partibus A) ac experi- 
cntia reclamat. Nostris autem e placitis con- 
scqui videtur, ipsum ad partes anticas apparens, ^ 
ab interval lo longissime dissito (quod et maxi- 
mum sensibiie quodvis intervallum quodammodo 
exsuperet), apparere. Cum enim quo radiis 
minus divergentibus attingitur objectum, eo 
(seclusis utique prxnotionibus et praejudiciis) 
longius abesse sentiatur; et quod parallelos ad oculum radios pro- 
jicit, remotissime positum aestimetur : exigere ratio videtur, ut quod 
convergentibus radiis apprehenditur, adhuc magis, si fieri posset, 
quoad apparentiam elongetur. Quin et circa casum hunc generatim 
inquiri possit, quidnam omnino sit, quod apparentcm puncti A locum 
determinet, faciatque quod constant! ratione nunc propius, nunc 
remotius appareat? Cui itidem dubio nihil quicquam ex hactenus 
dictorum analogia responderi posse videtur, nisi debere punctum 
A perpetuo longissime semotum videri. Verum experientia secus 



z 




44 -^^ Essay towards a 

attestatur, illud pro diversa oculi inter puncta B, Z, positi 
varie distans, nunquam fere (si unquam) longinquius ipso A lil 
spectato, subinde vero multo propinquius adparcre; quinimo, 
oculum appellentes radii magis convergunt, eo speciem obj 
propius acCedere. Nempe, si puncto B admoveatur oculus, 
(ad lentem) fere nativo in loco conspicitur punctum A (vel ae 
distans, ad speculum) \ ad O reductus oculus ejusce speciem ap| 
pinquantem cernit; ad P adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat^ ac 
sensim, donee alicubi tandem, velut ad ^5 constituto oculo, 
jectum summe propinquum apparens in meram confusionem 
cipiat evanescere. Quae sane cuncta rationibus atque decn 
nostris repugnare videntur, aut cum iis saltem parum amice c 
spirant. Neque nostram tantum sententiam pulsat hoc exp 
mentum, at ex xquo cxteras quas norim omnes : veterem imprii 
ac vulgatam, nostras prae reliquis affinem, ita convellere videtuTj 
ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. Tacquetus isti principio (cui p< 
soli totam inaedificaverat Catoptricam suam) ceu infido ac ina 
stanti renunciarit, adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labrfactarit ? 
tamen, opinor, minime facturus, si rem totam inspexissit peniti 
atque *difficultatis fundum attigissit. Apud me vero non ita pol 
hxc, nee eousque praepollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab iis qu« mai 
feste rationi consentanea video, discedam; praesertim quum, 
hie accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in singularis cujuspiam casus d 
paritate fundetur. Nimirum in prxsente casu peculiare quiddai 
naturx subtilitati involutum, delitescit, aegre fortassis, nisi pc 
fectius explorato videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod n 
fateor, hactenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur animo me 
nedum plane satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum hunc, utina 
feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo/ 

In English as follows: 

' I have here delivered what my thoughts have su^ested to m 
concerning that part of optics which is more properly math< 
matical. As for the other parts of that science (which, beic 
rather physical, do consequently abound with plausible conjecture 
instead of certain principles), there has in them scarce anythin 
occurred to my observation different from what has been ahead 
said by Kepler, Scheinerus, Descartes, &c. And methinks I ha 



New Theory of Vision. 



45 




-o 



■If 



Q 



z 



better say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often 
laid by others* I think it therefore high time to take my leave 
cf this sub)ect. But, before I quit it for good and all, the fair and 
ingeanoiis dealing that I owe both to you and to truth obliges 
me to acquaint you with a certain untoward difficulty, which 
leems directly opposite to the doctrine I have been hitherto incul- 
aUng, at least admits of no solution from it. In short it is this. 
Before the double convex glass or concave 
spcaiiuin JSBF, let the point A be placed at 
socb a distance that the rays proceeding from 
A^ after refiraction or reflection, be brought to 
unite somewhere in the axis AB. And suppose 
the point of union (i.f. the image of the point 
A^ as hath been already set forth) to be Z; be- 
tween which and B, the vertex of the glass or 
speculum, conceive the eye to be anywhere 
placed. The question now is, where the point 
A ought to appear. Experience shews that it 
doth not appear behind at the point Z $ and it 
weie contrary to nature that it should ; since all t^ 
the impression which affects the sense comes 
from towards A. But, from our tenets it should 
seem to follow that it would appear before the 
eye at a vast distance c^, so great as should in 
some sort surpass all sensible distance. For 
since, if we exclude all anticipations and prejudices, every object 
appears by so much the farther off by how much the rays it sends 
to the eye are less diverging; and that object is thought to be 
most remote from which parallel rays proceed unto the eye ; reason 
would make one think that object should appear at yet a greater 
distance which is seen by converging rays. Moreover, it may in 
general be asked concerning this case, what it is that determines 
the apparent place of the point A^ and maketh it to appear after 
a constant manner, sometimes nearer, at other times farther off? 
To which doubt I see nothing that can be answered agreeable to 
the principles we have laid down, except only that the point A 
ought always to appear extremely remote. But, on the contrary, 
we are assured by experience, that the point A appears variously 
according to the different situations of the eye between 




B 

O 

l-a 



46 An Essay towards a 

the points B and Z. And that it doth almost never (if at < 
seem farther oflF than it would if it were beheld by the naked q 
but, on the contrary, it doth sometimes appear much near 
Nay, it is even certain that by how much the rays falling on 1 
eye do more converge, by so much the nearer does the object se< 
to approach. For, the eye being placed close to the point B, t 
object A appears nearly in its own natural place, if the point B 
taken in the glass, or at the same distance, if in the speculu 
The eye being brought back to O, the object seems to draw nes 
and, being come to P, it beholds it still nearer : and so on by litl 
and little, till at length the eye being placed somewhere, suppc 
at §1^ the object appearing extremely near begins to vanish in 
mere confusion. All which doth seem repugnant to our pri 
ciples; at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our ten 
alone struck at by this experiment, but likewise all others th 
ever came to my knowledge are every whit as much endangen 
by it. The ancient one especially (which is most commcHi 
received, and comes nearest to mine) seems to be so effectual 
overthrown thereby that the most learned Tacquet has bee 
forced to reject that principle, as &lse and uncertain, on whic 
alone he had built almost his whole Catoptrics^ and consequent!; 
by taking away the foundation, hath himself pulled down tl 
superstructure he had raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do m 
believe he would have done, had he but considered the who) 
matter more thoroughly, and examined the difficulty to the botton 
But as for me, neither this nor any other difficulty shall have s 
great an influence on me, as to make me renounce that which 
know to be manifestly agreeable to reason. Especially when, a 
it here falls out, the difficulty is founded in the peculiar natur 
of a certain odd and particular case. For, in the present cas 
something peculiar lies hid, which, being involved in the sub 
tilty of nature, will perhaps hardly be discovered till such tim» 
as the manner of vision is more perfectly made known. Con 
cerning which, I must own I have hitherto been able to fine 
out nothing that has the least show of probability, not to men- 
tion certainty. I shall therefore leave this knot to be untiec 
by you, wishing you may have better success in it than ] 
have had.* 

30. The ancient and received principle, which Dr. Barrow 



New Theory of Vision. 47 

here mentions as the main foundation of Tacquet's ^9 Catoptrics^ is, 
that every * visible point seen by reflection from a speculum shall 
appear placed at the intersection of the reflected ray and the per- 
pendicular of incidence/ Which intersection in the present case 
happening to be behind the eye, it greatly shakes the authority 
of that principle whereon the aforementioned author proceeds 
diroughout his whole Catoptrics^ in determining the apparent place 
of objects seen by reflection from any kind of speculimi. 

31. Let us now see how this phenomenon agrees with our 
tenets *>. The eye, the nearer it is placed to the point B in the 
above figures, the more distinct is the appearance of the object : 
but, as it recedes to O, the appearance grows more confused ^ and 
at F it sees the object yet more confused; and so on, till the eye, 
beii^ brought back to Z, sees the object in the greatest confusion 
of alL Wherefore, by sect, ai, the object should seem to approach 
the eye gradually, as it recedes from the point B; that is, at O it 
should (in consequence of the principle I have laid down in the 
aforesaid section) seem nearer than it did at B, and at P nearer 
than at O, and at ^ nearer than at P, and so on, till it quite 
vanishes at Z. Which is the very matter of fact, as any one that 
pleases may easily satisfy himself by experiment. 

32. This case is much the same as if we should suppose an 
Englishman to meet a foreigner who used the same words with 
the English, but in a direct contrary signification. The English- 
man would not £ul to make a wrong judgment of the ideas an- 
nexed to those sounds, in the mind of him that used them. Just 
so in the [n-esent case, the object speaks (if I may so say) with 
words that the eye is well acquainted with, that is, confusions of 
appearance; but, whereas heretofore the greatest confusions were 
always wont to signify nearer distances, they have in this case 
a direct contrary signification, being connected with the greater 
distances. Whence it follows that the eye must unavoidably 
be mistaken, since it will take the confusions in the sense it 
has been used to, which is directly opposed to the true. 

* Andrea Tacquet, a mathematician, bora that the apparent contradictions, which 
at Antwcfp in 1611, and referred to by puzzled the mathematicians, really arose 
llolyncaz as * the ingenious Jesuit' He from the occurrence, in connexion with 
pahhshrd a number of mathematical treatises, certain distances, of certain arbitrary signs, 
Boft of which appeared after his death, in a which we thus learn to associate with 
ecflected fonn, at Antwerp in 1 669. them in imagination. 

* In what follows Berkeley would prove 



48 



An Essay towards a 



33. This phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opinioi 
those who will have us judge of distance by lines and auogles, 
which supposition it is altogether inexplicable, so it seems to 
no small confirmation of the truth of that principle whereby i 
explained'^*. But, in order to a more fiill explication of this poi 
and to shew how for the hypothesis of the mind's judging by 
various divergency of rays may be of use in determining the ap 
rent place of an object, it will be necessary to premise some i 
things, which are already well known to those who have any s 
in Dioptrics. 

34. Tirsty Any radiating point is then distinctly seen wl 
the rays proceeding from it are, by the refractive power of 
crystalline, accurately reunited in the retina or fimd of the c 
But if they are reunited either before they arrive at the retina, 
after they have passed it, then there is confused vision* 

35. Secondly y Suppose, in the adjacent figures, ^TP repres< 




an eye duly framed, and retaining its natural figure. In fig. i tb 
rays falling nearly parallel on the eye, are, by the crystalline A I 

^ It is offered, in short, as a deductive are suggested by constant but arbitnu 
verification of the theory that near distances signs. 



New Theory of Vision, 49 

refiacced, so as their focus, or point of union F, &lls exactly on 
the retina. But, if the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye, as 
in fig. 0, then their focus falls beyond the retina; or, if the rays 
are made to converge by the lens S^5, before they come at the 
eye, as in fig. 3, their focus F will fall before the retina. In which 
two last cases it is evident, from the foregoing section, that the 
appearance of the point Z is confused. And, by how much the 
greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays falling on the 
pupil, by so much the farther will the point of their reunion be 
from the retina, either before or behind it, and consequently the 
point Z will appear by so much the more confused. And this, by 
the bye, may shew us the difference between confused and faint 
vision. Confused vision is, when the rays proceeding from each 
distinct point of the object are not accurately re-collected in one 
corresponding point on the retina, but take up some space thereon 
—so that rays from different points become mixed and confused 
together. This is opposed to a distinct vision, and attends near 
objects. Faint vision is when, by reason of the distance of the 
object, or grossness of the interjacent medium, few rays arrive 
from the object to the eye. This is opposed to vigorous or clear 
vision, and attends remote objects. But to return. 

36. The eye, or (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving only the 
confusion itself, without ever considering the cause from which 
it proceeds, doth constantly annex the same degree of distance to 
the same degree of confusion. Whether that confusion be occa- 
sioned by converging or by diverging rays it matters not. Whence 
it follows that the eye, viewing the object Z through the glass ^5 
(which by refraction causeth the rays Z ^, Z 5, &c. to converge), 
should judge it to be at such a nearness, at which, if it were 
placed, it would radiate on the eye, with rays diverging to that 
degree as would produce the same confusion which is now pro- 
duced by converging rays, U9. would cover a portion of the retina 
equal to X> C. (Vid. fig. 3, xir^.) But then this must be understood 
(to use Dr. Barrow's phrase) ' seclusis praenotionibus et praeju- 
diciis,' in case we abstract from all other circumstances of vision, 
such as the figure, size, faintness, &c. of the visible objects — all 
which do ordinarily concur to form our idea of distance, the mind 
having, by frequent experience, observed their several sorts or 
degrees to be connected with various distances. 

£ 



50 An Essay towards a 

37. It plainly follows from what has been said, that a pers 
perfectly purblind {i.e. that could not see an object distino 
but when placed close to his eye) would not make the sai 
wrong judgment that others do in the forementioned case. F< 
to him, greater confusions constantly suggesting greater distano 
he must, as he recedes from the glass, and the object grows mc 
confused, judge it to be at a farther distance, contrary to what th 
do who have had the perception of the objects growing more co 
fused connected with the idea of approach. 

38. Hence also it doth appear, there may be good use 
computation, by lines and angles, in optics ''^2 • not that the nui 
judges of distance immediately by them, but because it judges I 
somewhat which is connected with them, and to the determin 
tion whereof they may be subservient. Thus, the mind judgii 
of the distance of an object by the confiisedness of its appearanc 
and this confusedness being greater* or lesser to the naked c] 
according as the object is seen by rays more or less diverging, 
follows that a man may make use of the divergency of the rays, i 
computing the apparent distance, though not for its own sake, y< 
on account of the confusion with which it is connected. But, s 
it is, the confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematician: 
as having no necessary relation with distance, such as the greate 
or lesser angles of divergency are conceived to have. And thes 
(especially for that they fall under mathematical computation) ar 
alone regarded, in determining the apparent places of objects, a 
though they were the sole and immediate cause of the judgment 
the mind makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they should no 
at all be regarded in themselves, or any otherwise than as they ar< 
supposed to be the cause of confused vision. 

39. The not considering of this has been a fundamenta 
and perplexing oversight. For proof whereof, we need go m 
farther than the case before us. It having been observed thai 
the most diverging rays brought into the mind the idea of nearest 
distance, and that still as the divergency decreased the distance 
increased, and it being thought the connexion between th< 
various degrees of divergency and distance was immediate — this 

naturally leads one to conclude, from an ill-grounded analogy. 



^ Cf. sect, 78 ; also Theory of Vihion Vindicated, sect. 31. 



New Theory of Vision. 51 

that converging rays shall make an object appear at an immense 
distance, and that, as the convergency increases, the distance 
(if it were possible) should do so likewise. That this was the 
cause of Dr. Barrow's mistake is evident from his own words 
which wc have quoted. Whereas, had the learned Doctor ob- 
served that diverging and converging rays, how opposite soever 
they may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same 
eflFect, to wit, confusedness of vision, greater degrees whereof are 
produced indiflFerently, either as the divergency or convergency 
of the rays increaseth * and that it is by this effect, which is 
the same in both, that either the divergency or convergency is 
perceived by the eye — I say, had he but considered this, it is 
certain he would have made a quite contrary judgment, and 
rig^ly concluded that those rays which fell on the eye with 
greater d^ees of convergency should make the object from 
whence they proceed appear by so much the nearer. But it is 
plain it was impossible for any man to attain to a right notion of 
this matter, so long as he had regard only to lines and angles, 
and did not apprehend the true nature of vision, and how far 
it was of mathematical consideration. 

40. Before we dismiss this subject, it is fit we take notice 
of a query relating thereto, proposed by the ingenious Mr. Moly- 
neux, in his Treatise of Dioptrics (par. i. prop. 31. sect. 9), where, 
speaking of the difficulty we have been explaining, he has these 
words: * And so he (i.e. Dr. Barrow) leaves this difficulty to the 
solution of others, which I (after so great an example) shall do 
likewise \ but with the resolution of the same admirable author, 
of not quitting the evident doctrine which we have before laid 
down, for determining the locus ohjectl^ on account of being 
pressed by one difficulty, which seems inexplicable till a more 
intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained by mortals. 
In the meantime I propose it to the consideration of the in- 
genious, whether the locus afparens of an object placed as in 
this ninth section be not as much before the eye as the distinct 
base is behind the eye?* To which query we may venture to 
answer in the negative. For, in the present case, the rule for 
determining the distance of the distinct base, or respective focus 
from the glass is this : As the difference between the distance of the 
object and focus is to the focus or focal lengthy so the distance of the 

E % 



52 



An Essay towards a 



otjeet from the glass is to the distance of the respective focus or £stin 
base from the glass. (Molyneux, Dioptr.^ par. i. prop. 5.) La 
us now suppose the object to be placed at the distance of tl 
focal length, and o;ie-half of the focal length from the glas 
and the eye close to the glass. Hence it will follow, by the ml 
that the distance of the distinct base behind the eye is doub 
the true distance of the object before the eye. If, therefor 
Mr. Molyneux's conjecture held good, it would follow that tl 
eye should see the object twice as far oflF as it really is^ an 
in other cases at three or four times its due distance, or mor 
But this manifestly contradicts experience, the object never a] 
pearing, at ferthest, beyond its due distance. Whatever, then 
fore, is built on this supposition (vid. corol. i. prop. 57. ibid 
comes to the ground along with it. 



41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest cot 
sequence, that a man born blind, being made to see, would a 
first have no idea of distance by sight : the sun and stars, th 
remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to b 
in his eye, or rather in his mind. The objects intromitted b 
sight would seem to him (as in truth they are) no other thai 
a new set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as near t 
him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the most inwar< 
passions of his soul. For, our judging objects perceived by sigh 
to be at any distance, or without the mind, is (vid. sect, xxviii. 
entirely the effect of experience, which one in those circumstance 
could not yet have attained to^^ 

42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition — tha 
men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes, just as one ii 
the dark, or a blind man by the angle comprehended by two sticks 
one whereof he held in each hand^^ For, if this were true, it woulc 
follow that one blind from his birth, being made to see, shoulc 



" Berkeley in this section passes on from 
his proof of the * suggestion' of all distances 
— i.e. intervals between two points in the line 
of sight, near or remote — by means of arbi- 
trary signs, and approaches the more subtle 
question of externality or an objective indepen- 
dence of onbodied mind. Cf. sect. 94, where 
he speaks of existence ' without mind' as 
existence ' in the ambient space ; ' sect. 1 1 a, 
where he denies that the reUtion of distance 



can hold between visible objects and tangibk 
objects; and sect. 119, where he sajrs th< 
visible eye exists only in the mind. See alsc 
note in Hamilton's Rtid^ P> I77> on the dis- 
tinction between a perception of extenialitj 
or outness and a perception of *fiffmirrf 
through the eye. 

^ See Des Cartes, Diopirimu, VI— Mal»> 
branche, Ricbercbe, liv. I. ch. 9, 3— Rod*! 
Inquiry t VI. 11. 



New Theory of Vision. 53 

stand in need of no new experience, in order to perceive distance 
bjr sight. But that this is false has, I think, been sufficiently 
denxMistrated. 

43. And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find 
tiiat even those who from their birth have grown up in a con- 
tinued habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other 
side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at a distance from them. 
For, at this time it seems agreed on all hands, by those who have 
had any thoughts of that matter, that colours, which are the proper 
and immediate object of sight, are not without the mind. — But 
then, it will be said, by sight we have also the ideas of extension, 
and figure, and motion; all which may well be thought without 
and at some distance from the mind, though colour should not. In 
answer to this, I appeal to any man's experience, whether the 
visible extension of any object do not appear as near to him as 
the colour of that object ; nay, whether they do not both seem to 
be in the very same place. Is not the extension we see coloured, 
and is it possible fi^r us, so much as in thought, to separate and 
abstract colour from extension? Now, where the extension is, 
there surely is the figure, and there the motion too. I speak of 
those which are perceived by sights*. 

44. But for a fuller explication of this point, and to shew 
that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas 
or resemblances of things placed at a distance, it is requisite that 
we look nearer into the matter, and carefully observe what is meant 
in common discourse when one says, that which he sees is at 
a distance from him. Suppose, for example, that looking at the 
moon I should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth 
distant from me. Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It is 
plain it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible 
moon, or that which I see — which is only a round luminous plain, 
of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in case I am 
carried from the place where I stand directly towards the moon, 
it is manifest the object varies still as I go on ; and, by the time 

* Bcrkdey here begins to found on the downwards it had been assumed that colour 

fdation betwee n extension and colour, and is the object of which we are immediately 

between Tiiible and tangible extension, a conscious in seeing. Visible extension, 

proof of the inritibtfity of objects as distant, visible figure, and visible motion are here 

wfakfa gndnally conducts to the main arti- assumed to be qualities of, or at least depen- 

dcs of the Nww Thtory, From Aristotle dent on, the sensation or idea of colour. 



56 Ah Essay towards a 

and sec it ; I walk out and enter into it. Thus^ common speech woul 
incline one to think I heard, saw, and toudied the same thing 
to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitto 
by each sense are widely different, and distinct from eadi other 
but, having been observed constantly to gp together, they an 
spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of tin 
noise, I perceive the di£Ferent distances of the coach, and knov 
that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear I perceivi 
distance just after the same manner as I do by the eye. 

47* I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like 
manner as I say that I see it — ^the ideas perceived by hearing no< 
being so apt to be confounded with the ideas of toudi as those 6 
sight are. So likewise a man is easily convinced that bodies and 
external things are not properly the object of hearing, but onl) 
sounds, by the mediation whereof the idea of this or that body, oi 
distance, is su^ested to his thou^ts. But then one is with more 
difficulty brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the 
ideas of sight and touch ^^ : though it be certain, a man no more 
sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the same 
thing. 

48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought a 
great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing should 
have any more than one extension and one figure. But, the ex- 
tension and figure of a body being let into the mind two ways^ 
and that indifferently, either by sight or touch, it seems to follow 
that we see the same extension and the same figure which we 
feel. 

49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the matter, 
it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the 
same object*^. That which is seen is one thing, and that which is 
felt is another. If the visible figure and extension be not the same 
with the tangible figure and extension, we are not to infer that 
one and the same thing has divers extensions. The true conse- 
quence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct 
things^\ It may perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive 
this distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little increased, 

" For an explanation of this difficulty. editions. 
sec sect. 144. ** This is the leading result in the ana- 

" • Object * — • thing,' in the earlier lytical parts of the Efsay. 



New Theory of Vision. 



55 



with such and sudi ideas of touch. So that, in truth and strictness 
of speedi, I neither see distance itself, nor anything that I take to 
be at a distance. I say, neither distance nor things placed at 
a distance are themselves, or their ideas, truly perceived by sight. 
This I am persuaded of, as to what concerns myself. And I 
believe whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and 
examine what he means by saying he sees this or that thing at a 
distance, will agree with me, that what he sees only suggests to 
his understanding that, after having passed a certain distance, 
to be measured by the motion of his body, which is perceivable by 
tOQdi39^ he shall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas, 
which have been usually connected with such and such visible 
ideas. But, that one might be deceived by these suggestions of 
sense, and that there is no necessary connexion between visible and 
tangible ideas su^ested by them, we need go no farther than the 
next looking-glass or picture to be convinced. Note that, when 1 
speak of tangible ideas, I take the word idea for any the im- 
mediate object Q& sense, or understanding — in which large signifi- 
cation it is commonly used by the moderns '*<>. 

46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence 
that the ideas of space, outness^', and things placed at a distance 
are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight ^'^ ; they are not other- 
wise perceived by the eye than by the ear. Sitting in my study I 
hear a coach drive along the street ^ I look through the casement 



• This C(»uiexion of our notion of dis- 
tiace with locomotive experience points to 
a theory which ultimately resolves exten- 
■00, apparcDtly simultaneous, into some 
sort of coatmuoos sense-experience or loco- 
iBotire energy. — ^We cannot touch distances 
(in tiie hmited application of * touch') any 
■ore than we can see them. Moreover, in 
this analjnit* under locomotion we must not 
fiorget the muscular movements of the visual 
organ itself. 

** Locke {Essay, Introduction, § 8) takes 
Hm as * the term which serves best to stand 
kt wiutsoever is the object of the under- 
itanding when a man thinks/ In this large 
meaning, as significant of the object of con- 
fcoosDcss — whether presented in sense or 
represented in imagination — the term was 
gcoerally used, in the time of Locke and 
Berkeley. Berkeley indeed elsewhere ob- 
Kcts to apply the term to the mere re- 



presentations of fancy. * If by ideas you 
mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then 
these are no ideas. If by ideas you mean 
immediate objects of the understanding, as 
sensible things .... then these things are 
ideas' {Third Dialogue between Hylas and 
Philonous), Oversight of this has made 
his theory of matter a riddle to many. But 
we here approach the great question of the 
true meaning of what he calls ideas in that 
theory, of which afterwards. 

** The expressive term 'outness,* so fa- 
voured by Berkeley, is here first used. 

*' * We get the idea of Space,' says Locke, 
* both by our sight and touch' {Essay, II. 13. 
§ a). Locke did not contemplate Berkeley's 
proof of the absolute antithesis of visible and 
tangible space or extension, and the conse- 
quent ambiguity of the term extension, 
which sometimes signifies coloured, and at 
others resistant experience- in sense. 



58 An Essay towards a 

and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed an 
riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of lau 
guage, and want of reflection. However, I doubt not but an 
one that shall attentively consider what we have already said, an 
shall say upon this subject before we have done (especially if h 
pursue it in his own thoughts), may be able to deliver himsel 
from that prejudice. Sure I am, it is worth some attention t 
whoever would understand the true nature of vision. 

52. I have now done with distance, and proceed to shew ho^ 
it is that we perceive by sight the magnitude of objects*^ It 1 
the opinion of some that we do it by angles, or by angles in con 
junction with distance. But, neither angles nor distance bein) 
perceivable by sight "^^^ and the things we see being in truth at » 
distance from us^^^ it follows that, as we have shewn lines an4 
angles not to be the medium the mind makes use of in appre 
bending the apparent place, so neither are they the mediun 
whereby it apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects. 

53. It is well known that the same extension at a near dis 
tance shall subtend a greater angle, and at a farther distance i 
lesser angle. And by this principle (we are told) the mind esti- 
mates the magnitude of an object ^^, comparing the angle undei 
which it is seen with its distance, and thence inferring the mag- 
nitude thereof. What inclines men to this mistake (beside the 
humour of making one see by geometry) is, that the same percep- 
tions or ideas which suggest distance do also suggest magnitude. 
But, if we examine it, we shall find they surest the latter as 
immediately as the former. I say, they do not first suggest dis- 
tance and then leave it to the judgment to use that as a medium 
whereby to collect the magnitude; but they have as close and 
immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the distance; 
and suggest magnitude as independently of distance, as they do 
distance independently of magnitude. All which will be evident 
to whoever considers what has been already said and what 
follows. 

54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects appre- 

" Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisibility of " Sect. 8-15. w Sect. 4I, Ac. 

the real Magnitude of objects. Of. Theory ^-^ Sec Moiyneux's Treatisi oh Dhpirus, 

of Vision Vindicated, sect. 54-61. B. I. prop. 28. 



New Theory of Vision. 



59 



bended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude, or 
dtension — the one, properly tangible, ue. to be perceived and 
measured by touch, and not immediately falling under the sense 
of seeing; the other, properly and immediately visible, by media- 
tion of which the former is brought in view. Each of these 
magnitudes are greater or lesser, according as they contain in 
them more or fewer points, they being made up of points or 
minimuins. For, whatever may be said of extension in abstract ^% 
it is certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible ^6. There 
is a mimlmmm tampUky and a rmnhnum visiUle^ beyond which sense 
onnot perceive. This every one's experience will inform him. 

55. The magnitude of the object which exists without the 
mind, and is at a distance, continues always invariably the same : 
but, the visible object still changing as you approach to or recede 
from the tangible object, it hath no fixed and determinate great- 
ness. Whenever therefore we speak of the magnitude of any 
thing, for instance a tree or a house, we must mean the tangible 
magnitude ; otherwise there can be nothing steady and free from 
ambiguity spoken of it *7, Now, though the tangible and visible 
magnitude do in truth belong to two distinct objects *«, I shall never- 
theless (especially since those objects are called by the same name, 
and are observed to coexist *9)^ to avoid tediousness and singularity 
of speech, sometimes speak of them as belonging to one and the 
same thing. 

56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magnitude 
of tangible objects is perceived by sight, I need only reflect on 
what passes in my own mind, and observe what those things be 
which introduce the ideas of greater or lesser into my thoughts 
when I look on any object. And these I find to be, first ^ the mag- 
nitude or extension of the visible object, which, being immediately 
perceived by sight, is connected with that other which is tangible 
and placed at a distance : secondly^ the confusion or distinctness : 



■ See sect- na-126. 

*• I. e. thrre if a point at which wc cease 
V Sr perripieiit of colour, in seeing, or of 
c>rtini«ou« resistance, in moving. — Though 
A^ilcr rej^ards all spaces or extensions as 
MTtMMe«. dependent on mind, he docs not 
Qrao that mind is extended. With him. 
rantv^n, though it exists only in mind, — 
■ c. at an object or idea seen, in the case of 



visible extension, and as an object or idea 
touched, in the case of tangible extension, 
— is yet no property of the mind. Mind 
can exist without it, though it cannot exist 
without mind. 

" But, as has been often remarked, this 
is true, though to a less degree, of tangible 
as well as o\ visible objects. 

*' Sect. 49. *• Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c. 



6o An Essay towards a 

and thirdly^ the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid vist 
appearance. Cateris farlhus^ by how much the greater 0£ lea 
the visible object is, by so much the greater or lesser do I a 
elude the tangible object to be. But, be the idea immediately p 
ceivcd by sight never so large, yet, if it be withal confused, I juc 
the magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be distinct a 
clear, I judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to 
yet greater. What is here meant by confusion and faintness 1 
been explained in sect. 35. 

57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, 
like manner as those of distance, depend on the disposition 
the eye J also on the figure, number, and situation^ rf intern; 
diate objects, and other circumstances that have been observed 
attend great or small tangible magnitudes. Thus, for instant 
the very same quantity of visible extension which in the figure 
a tower doth suggest the idea of great magnitude shall in tl 
figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller magnitud 
That this is owing to the experience we have had of the usu 
bigness of a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told. 

58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have 1 
more a necessary connexion with little or great magnitude tha 
they have with little or great distance. As they suggest tl 
latter, so they suggest the former to our minds. And, by consi 
quence, if it were not for experience, we should no more jud§ 
a faint or confused appearance to be connected with great or littl 
magnitude than we should that it was connected with great c 
little distance. 

59. Nor will it be found that great or small visible mag 
nitude hath any necessary relation to great or small tangible mag 
nitude — so that the one may certainly and infallibly be inferr© 
from the other. But, before we come to the proof of this, it is fi 
we consider the difference there is betwixt the extension an< 
figure which is the proper object of touch, and that other whidi i 
termed visible ; and how the former is principally, though not ira 
mediately, taken notice of when we look at any object. This ha 
been before mentioned *^^, but we shall here inquire into the caus 
thereof. We regard the objects that environ us in proportion a 

*• 'Situation' — not in the earlier editions. •' Sect, 55. 



New Theory of Vision. 6i 

* adapted to benefit or injure our own bodies, and thereby 

r in our minds the sensations of pleasure or pain. Now, 

>perating on our organs by an immediate application, and 

t and advantage arising therefrom depending altogether on 

gible, and not at all on the visible, qualities of any object 

is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us much 

ban these. And for this end [chiefly ^^-j ^hg visive sense 

to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, that, by the per- 

i of visible ideas (which in themselves are not capable of 

ig or anywise altering the frame of their bodies), they may be 

foresee 63 (from the experience they have had what tangible 

re connected with such and such visible ideas) the damage or 

which is like to ensue upon the application of their own 

to this or that body which is at a distance. Which fore- 

K>w necessary it is to the preservation of an animal, every 

xperience can inform him. Hence it is that, when we look 

object, the tangible figure and extension thereof are prin- 

attended to ; whilst there is small heed taken of the visible 

and magnitude, which, though more immediately perceived, 

sensibly affect us, and are not fitted to produce any altera- 

i our bodies. 

That the matter of fact is true will be evident to any one 
msiders that a man placed at ten foot distance is thought 
It as if he were placed at the distance only of five fiDOt; 
is true, not with relation to the visible, but tangible great- 
■ the object : the visible magnitude being far greater at one 
. than it is at the other. 

Inches, feet, &c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby we 
e objects and estimate their magnitude. We say, for 
le, an object appears to be six inches, or six foot long. 
that this cannot be meartt of visible inches, &c. is evident, 
e a visible inch is itself no constant determinate magni- 
, and cannot therefore serve to mark out and determine the 
:udc of any other thing. Take an inch marked upon a 
view it successively, at the distance of half a fDot, a foot. 



itted in the author's last edition. the use and conservation of our bodies, and 

what is called rision is virtually not for scientific and speculative knowledge, 

Cf. sect, 85. — See also Male- Ricbtrcbe, liv. I. ch. 5, 6, 9, &c. 

Ml the external senses, as given for ** Sect. 44. — Sec also sect. 55, and note. 



62 An Essay towards a, 

a foot and a half, &c. from the eye : at each of which, and at 
the intermediate distances, the inch shall have a different visil 
extension, i.e. there shall be more or fewer points discerned in 
Now, I ask which of all these various extensions is that stal 
determinate one that is agreed on for a common measure of oti 
magnitudes ? No reason can be assigned why we should pitch 
one more than another. And, except there be some invariai 
determinate extension fixed on to be marked by the word inch, 
is plain it can be used to little purpose^ and to say a thing a 
tains this or that number of inches shall imply no more than tt 
it is extended, without bringing any particular idea of that exte 
sion into the mind. Farther, an inch and a foot, from difiere 
distances, shall both exhibit the same visible magnitude, and ) 
at the same time you shall say that one seems several tim 
greater than the other. From all which it is manifest, that t 
judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight are alt 
gether in reference to their tangible extension. Whenever i 
say an object is great or small, of this or that determinate me 
sure, I say, it must be meant of the tangible and not the visib 
extension*^^ which, though immediately perceived, is neverthelc 
little taken notice of. 

62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion betwec 
these two distinct extensions is evident from hence — becaw 
our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to be ab 
to see nothing but what were less than the minimum tamgiU/e. I 
which case it is not impossible we might have perceived all tk 
immediate objects of sight the very same that we do now ; bi 
unto those visible appearances there would not be connecte 
those different tangible magnitudes that are now. Which sheii 
the judgments we make of the magnitude of things place 
at a distance, from the various greatness of the immediat 
objects of sight, do not arise from any essential or neces 
sary, but only a customary, tie which has been observed betwis 
them. 

63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sigl: 
might not have been connected with this or that idea of touc 

•• i. e. there arc * settled* fangibilia, but ricnce is itself relative — an object being ft 
not • settled * visibilia. Yet the sensible ex- as larger or smaller according to the sta 
tension given in touch and locomotive expc- of the organism. 



New Theory of Vision, 63 

now observe to accompany it, but also that the greater visible 

magaitudes might have been connected with and introduced into 

our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and the lesser visible magi- 

nitudes greater tangible magnitudes. Nay, that it actually is 

soi, we have daily experience — that object which makes a strong 

and laige appearance not seeming near so great as another the 

visible magnitude whereof is much less, but more faint, ^and 

the appearance upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower 

on the retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater 

magnitude and greater distance. 

64* From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest 
that, as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately 
by sight, so neither do we perceive them by the mediation of any- 
&ing which has a necessary connexion with them. Those ideas 
that now surest unto us the various magnitudes of external 
objects before we touch them might possibly have suggested no 
sodi thing ; or they might have signified them in a direct con- 
trary manner, so that the very same ideas on the perception 
whereof we judge an object to be small might as well have served 
to make us conclude it great ; — ^those ideas being in their own 
nature equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of small or 
great, or no size at all, of outward objects ^'^ just as the words of 
any language are in their own nature indifferent to signify this 
or that thing, or nothing at all. 

65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we see 
both in the same way that we see shame or anger in the looks 
of a man. Those passions are themselves invisible; they arc 
nevertheless let in by the eye along with colours and alterations 
of countenance which are the immediate object of vision, and 
vhidi signify them for no other reason than barely because they 
have been observed to accompany them. Without which experience 
wc should no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than 
of gladness. 

66. We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine those 
things which arc perceived only by the mediation of others to be 
themselves the immediate objects of sight, or at least to have in 

* What foUowf, to end of sect. 63, added we arc percipient in — which are constitntcd 
■ the author's last edition. by — our tactual and locomotive experience. 

• • oatward objects/ i. e. objects of which See Prineiplei, sect. 44. 



64 An Essay towards a 

their own nature a fitness to be suggested by them before e 
they had been experienced to coexist with them. From whi 
prejudice every one perhaps will not find it easy to emancip 
himself, by any the clearest convictions of reason. And thi 
are some grounds to think that, if there was one only invarial 
and universal language in the world, and that men were be 
with the faculty of speaking it, it would be the opinion of soo 
that the ideas in other men's minds were properly perceived 
the ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable tic with t 
sounds that were affixed to them. All which seems to arise fit 
want of a due application of our discerning faculty, thereby 
discriminate between the ideas that are in our understandinj 
and consider them apart from each other; which would preser 
us from confounding those that are different, and make us s 
what ideas do, and what do not, include or imply this or th 
other ideals. 

67. There is a celebrated phenomenon*^ the solution where 
I shall attempt to give, by the principles that have been laid dow 
in reference to the manner wherein we apprehend by sight tl 
magnitude of objects. — The apparent magnitude of the moo 
when placed in the horizon, is much greater than when it is i 
the meridian, though the angle under which the diameter of tl 
moon is seen be not observed greater in the former case than i 
the latter; and the horizontal moon doth not constantly appe; 
of the same bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater tha 
at others. 

68. Now, in order to explain the reason of the moon 
appearing greater than ordinary in the horizon, it must be ol 
served that the particles which compose our atmosphere do intei 
cept the rays of light proceeding from any object to the eye ; anc 
by how much the greater is the portion of atmosphere interjacen 
between the object and the eye, by so much the more are the ray 

•■ Cf. $cct. 144. Note, in this and the • In sect. 67-78, Berkeley attempts t 

three preceding sections, the stress laid on verify the foregoing doctrine of die sign 

the arbiirariruss of the relation between the of size, by applying it to solve a phenonie 

signs which suggest magnitudes or other non, the cause of which had been long de 

modes of extension, and their significates — bated among men of science — the visiM 

the fundamental fact of the New Theory^ magnitude of the moon and other heavenl] 

which thus resolves physical causality into bodies when in the horizon, 
a relation of signs to what they signify. 



New Theory of Vision, 65 

intercepted, and, by consequence, the appearance of the object 
rendered more faint— every object appearing more vigorous or more 
Eunt in proportion as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the 
eye. Now, between the eye and the moon when situated in the 
borizon there lies a far greater quantity of atmosphere than there 
docs when the moon is in the meridian. Whence it comes to pass, 
that the appearance of the horizontal moon is fainter, and there- 
fore, by sect. 56, it should be thought bigger in that situation than 
in the meridian, or in any other elevation above the horizon. 

(J9. Farther, the air being variously impregnated, sometimes 
more and sometimes less, with vapours and exhalations fitted to 
retund and intercept the rays of light, it follows that the appear- 
ance of the horizontal moon hath not always an equal faintness, 
and, by consequence, that luminary, though in the very same situa- 
tion, is at one time judged greater than at another. 

70. That we have here given the true account of the pheno- 
mena of the horizontal moon, will, I suppose, be farther evident 
to any one from the following considerations:— F/rxr, it is plain, 
that which in this case suggests the idea of greater magnitude, 
must be something which is itself perceived; for, that which is 
anperceived cannot suggest to our perception any other thing"^®. 
Samuily^ it must be something that does not constantly remain 
the same, but is subject to some change or variation; since the 
s^ypearance of the horizontal moon varies, being at one time 
greater than at another. [Thirdly^ it must not lie in the circum- 
jacent or intermediate objects, such as mountains, houses, fields, 
tc; because that when all those objects are excluded from sight the 
appearance is as great as ever'^^.] And yet, thlrdly^'^^ it cannot 
be the visible figure or magnitude; since that remains the same, 
or is rather lesser, by how much the moon is nearer to the horizon. 
It remains therefore, that the true cause is that affection or altera- 
tion of the visible appearance, which proceeds from the greater 
paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and which I term faintness : 
since this answers all the forementioned conditions, and I am 
aot conscious of any other perception that does. 

71. Add to this that in misty weather it is a common 

* Of. lect. 10. to Ptolemy, while it is sanctioned by eminent 

^ Omitted in the author's last edition. scientific names before and since Berkeley. 

Cf. sect- 76, 77. — The explanation in ques- ■" "Fourthly" in the second edition. Cf. 

ben it attributed to Alhazen, and by Bacon what follows with sect. 74. Why * lesser' ? 

F 



66 An Essay towards a 

observation, that the appearance of the horizontal moon is hx 
larger than usual, which greatly conspires with and strengtheos 
our opinion. Neither would it prove in the least irreconcilable 
with what we have said, if the horizontal moon should chance 
sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its usual extent, even in 
more serene weather. For, we must not only have regard to the 
mist which happens to be in the place where we stand ; we ought 
also to take into our thoughts the whole sum of vapours and 
exhalations which lie betwixt the eye and the moon : all which 
cooperating to render the appearance of the moon more faint, and 
thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to appear greater 
than it usually does even in the horizontal position, at a time 
when, though there be no extraordinary fog or haziness just in the 
place where we stand, yet the air between the eye and the moon, 
taken altogether, may be loaded with a greater quantity of inter- 
spersed vapours and exhalations than at other times"^^. 

7 a, It may be objected that, in consequence of our principles, 
the interposition of a body in some degree opaque, which may 
intercept a great part of the rays of light, should render the 
appearance of the moon in the meridian as large as when it is 
viewed in the horizon. To which I answer, it is not faintness 
anyhow applied that suggests greater magnitude ^ there being no 
necessary, but only an experimental connexion between those 
two things. It follows that the faintness which enlarges the 
appearance must be applied in such sort, and with such circum- 
stances, as have been observed to attend the vision of great mag- 
nitudes. When from a distance we behold great objects, the 
particles of the intermediate air and vapours, which are them- 
selves unpcrceivable, do interrupt the rays of light, and thereby 
render the appearance less strong and vivid. Now, faintness of 
appearance caused in this sort hath been experienced to coexist 
with great magnitude. But when it is caused by the interposition 
of an opaque sensible body, this circumstance alters the case ; so 
that a faint appearance this way caused does not suggest greater 
magnitude, because it hath not been experienced to co-exist with it. 

73. Faintness, as well as all other ideas or perceptions 

" When Berkeley, some years afterwards, they really were — a phenomenon which he 
visited Italy, he remarked that distant ob- attributed to the comparative purity of the 
jects appeared to him much nearer than southern air. 



New Theory of Vision. 67 

widch suggest magnitude or distance, does it in the same way 
tiat words suggest the notions to which they are annexed. Now, 
it is known a word pronounced with certain circumstances, or in 
a certain context with other words, hath not always the same 
import and signification that it hath when pronounced in some 
other circumstances, or diflFerent context of words. The very 
same visible appearance as to faintness and all other respects, i^ 
placed on high, shall not suggest the same magnitude that it 
would if it were seen at an equal distance on a level with the 
eye The reason whereof is, that we are rarely accustomed to 
view objects at a great height; our concerns lie among things 
sibated rather before than above us; and accordingly our eyes 
art not placed on the top of our heads, but in such a position as 
\& most convenient for us to see distant objects standing in our 
way. And, this situation of them being a circumstance which 
usually attmds the vision of distant objects, we may from hence 
account for (what is commonly observed) an object^s appearing ot 
different magnitude, even with respect to its horizontal extension, 
00 the top of a steeple, e.g. a hundred feet high, to one standing 
below, from what it would if placed at a hundred feet distance on 
a level with his eye. For, it hath been shewn that the judgment 
we make on the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible 
appearance alone, but also on divers other circumstances, any one 
of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make some altera- 
tion in our judgment. Hence, the circumstance of viewing a distant 
object in such a situation as is usual, and suits with the ordinary 
posture of the head and eyes being omitted, and instead thereof 
a different situation of the object, which requires a different pos- 
ture of the head, taking place — it is not to be wondered at if the 
magnitude be judged different. But it will be demanded, why a 
hi^ object should constantly appear less than an equidistant low 
object of the same dimensions; for so it is observed to be. It may 
indeed be granted that the variation of some circumstances may 
▼ary the judgment made on the magnitude of high objects, which 
we are less used to look at; but it does not hence appear why 
they should be judged less rather than greater? I answer, that in 
case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested by the extent 
of their visible appearance alone, and thought proportional thereto, 
it is certain they would then be judged much less than now they 

F 2 



68 An Essay towards a 

seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.) But, several circumstances concur- 
ring to form the judgment we make on the magnitude of dis- 
tant objects, by means of which they appear far larger than others 
whose visible appearance hath an equal or even greater extension; 
it follows that upon the change or omission of any of those cir- 
cumstances which are wont to attend the vision of distant objects, 
and so come to influence the judgments made on their magnitude, 
they shall proportionably appear less than otherwise they would. 
For, any of those things that caused an object to be thought greater 
than in proportion to its visible extension being either omitted, 
or applied without the usual circumstances, the judgment depends 
more entirely on the visible extension, and consequently the 
object must be judged less. Thus, in the present case the situa- 
tion of the thing seen being different from what it usually is in 
those objects we have occasion to view, and whose magnitude wc 
observe, it follows that the very same object being a hundred 
feet high, should seem less than if it was a hundred feet ofi^ oa 
(or nearly on) a level with the eye. What has been here set 
forth seems to me to have no small share in contributing to mag- 
nify the appearance of the horizontal moon, and deserves not to 
be passed over in the explication of it. 

74. If we attentively consider the phenomenon before us, we 
shall find the not discerning between the mediate and imme- 
diate objects of sight to be the chief cause of the difficulty that 
occurs in the explication of it. The magnitude of the visible 
moon, or that which is the proper and immediate object of vision'*, 
is no greater when the moon is in the horizon than when it is 
in the meridian. How comes it, therefore, to seem greater in 
one situation than the other ? What is it can put this cheat on 
the understanding ? It has no other perception of the moon than 
what it gets by sight. And that which is seen is of the same 
extent— I say, the visible appearance hath the very same or rather 
a less magnitude, when the moon is viewed in the horizontal than 
when in the meridional position. And yet it is esteemed greater 
in the former than in the latter. Herein consists the difficulty, 
which doth vanish and admit of a most easy solution, if we con- 
sider that as the visible moon is not greater in the horizon than 

^* i.e. the pure tense-givea intuition, apart from any synthetic operation of suggestion 
and thought. 



New Theory of Visiofi. 



69 



eridian, so- neither is it thought to be so. It hath been 
hewn that, in any act of vision, the visible object abso- 
• in itself, is little taken notice of — the mind still carry- 
lew from that to some tangible ideas, which have been 
to be connected with it, and by that means come to be 
j by it. So that when a thing is said to appear great or 
r whatever estimate be made of the magnitude of any 
is is meant not of the visible but of the tangible object, 
y considered, it will be no hard matter to reconcile the 
contradiction there is, that the moon should appear of 
nt bigness, the visible magnitude thereof remaining still 
. For, by sect. 56, the very same visible extension, with 
It faintness, shall suggest a different tangible extension, 
lerefore the horizontal moon is said to appear greater 

meridional moon, this must be understood, not of a 
visible extension, but of a greater tangible extension, 
T reason of the more than ordinary faintness of the visible 
ce, is suggested to the mind along with it. 
any attempts have been made by learned men to account 
appearance''^. GassendusJ^ Descartes'^'', Hobbes''^ and 
)thers have employed their thoughts on that subject ; but 
tless and unsatisfactory their endeavours have been is 
ly shewn in the Fhtlosopktcal Transactions'^^ (Numb. 187, 
vhere you may see their several opinions at large set forth 
lated, not without some surprise at the gross blunders 
rnious men have been forced into by endeavouring to 

this appearance with the ordinary principles of optics ^^ 
e writing of which there hath been published in the 



:ioH*$ Almagest^ II. lib. X. sect. 
\, wc have an account of the 
heses then current to account 
rent magnitude of the horizontal 
:her heavenly bodies, 
teiidi's 'Epistolae quatuor de ap- 
litudine solis humilis et subliniis.' 
n. III. pp. 430^477. Cf. Ap- 
is Esuiy, p. no. 
>pfrijue, VI. 

Larina, vol. I. p. 376, vol. II. 
English WorJts^ vol. I. p. 462. 
*t Edition.) 
ipcr in the Transactions is by 

ith's Optics, pp. 64 — 67, and 



Remarks^ pp. 48, &c. At p. 55 Berkeley's 
New Theory is referred to, and pronounced 
to be at variance with experience. Smith 
concludes by saying, that in • the second (?) 
edition of Berkeley's Essay, and also in a 
Vindication and Explanation of it (called 
the Visual Language) very lately published, 
the author has made some additions to his 
solution of the said phenomaion, but seeing 
it still involves and depends on the principle 
of faintness, I may leave the rest of it to the 
reader's consideration.' This passage, which 
appeared in 173S, is one of the very few 
early references to Berkeley's New Theory 
Vindicated. 



JO An Essay towards a 

TransMctioms (Numb. 187, p. 323) another paper xelating to the 
same afiair, by the celebrated Dr. Wallis, wherein he attempts 
to account for that phenomenon, \ehich, though it seems not to 
contain anything new, or difierent from what had been said before 
by others, I shall nevertheless consider in this place. 

76. His opinion, in short, is this: — ^We judge not of the 
magnitude of an object by the optic angle alone, but by the optic 
angle in conjunction with the distance. Hence, though the angle 
remain the same, or even become less, yet, if withal the distance 
seem to have been increased, the object shall appear greater. 
Now, one way whereby we estimate the distance of anything is 
by the number and extent of the intermediate objects. When 
therefore the moon is seen in the horizon, the variety of fields, 
houses, &c., together with the large prospect of the wide extended 
land or sea that lies between the eye and the utmost limb of the 
horizon, suggest unto the mind the idea of greater distance, and 
consequently magnify the appearance. And this, according to 
Dr. Wallis, is the true account of the extraordinary largeness 
attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at a time when 
the angle subtended by its diameter is not one jot greater than 
it used to be. 

77, With reference to this opinion, not to repeat what has 
been already said concerning distance®*, I shall only observe, 
firsty that if the prospect of interjacent objects be that which sug- 
gests the idea of farther distance, and this idea of farther distance 
be the cause that brings into the mind the idea of greater mag- 
nitude, it should hence follow that if one looked at the horizontal 
moon from behind a wall, it would appear no bigger than ordinary. 
For, in that case, the wall interposing cuts oflF all that prospect of 
sea and land, &c. which might otherwise increase the apparent 
distance, and thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon. Nor 
will it suffice to say, the memory doth even then suggest all that 
extent of land, &c. which lies within the horizon — which sug- 
gestion occasions a sudden judgment of sense, that the moon is 
farther oflF and larger than usual. For, ask any man who fix)m 
such a station beholding the horizontal moon shall think her 
greater than usual, whether he hath at that time in his mind any 
idea of the intermediate objects, or long tract of land that lies 

" Sect, a— 51. 



New Theory of Vision. 71 

between his eye and the extreme edge of the horizon? and 
whether it be that idea which is the cause of his making the 
aforementioned judgment ? He will, without doubt, reply in the 
negative, and declare the horizontal moon shall appear greater 
than the meridional, though he never thinks of all or any of those 
things that lie between him and it. [And as for the absurdity 
of any idea's introducing into the mind another, whilst itself is 
not perceived, this has already fallen under our observation, and 
is too evident to need any farther enlargen^ent on it®^.] Secondly ^ 
it seems impossible, by this hypothesis, to account for the moon's 
appearing, in the very same situation, at one time greater than 
at another; which, nevertheless, has been shewn to be very 
agreeable to the principles we have laid down, and receives a 
most easy and natural explication from them. — ®*For the further 
clearing up of this point, it is to be observed, that what we im 
mediately and properly see are only lights and colours in sundry 
situations and shades, and degrees of faintness and clearness, con- 
fusion and distinctness. All which visible objects are only in the 
mind ; nor do they suggest aught external ®% whether distance or 
magnitude, otherwise than by habitual connexion, as words do 
things. We are also to remark, that beside the straining of the 
eyes, and beside the vivid and faint, the distinct and confused ap- 
pearances (which, bearing some proportion to lines and angles, 
have been substituted instead of them in the foregoing part of this 
Treatise), there are other means which suggest both distance and 
magnitude — particularly the situation of visible points or objects, 
as upper or lower ; the former suggesting a farther distance and 
peater magnitude, the latter a nearer distance and lesser magni- 
tude — all which is an effect only of custom and experience, there 
being really nothing intermediate in the line of distance between 
the uppermost and the lowermost, which are both equidistant, or 
rather at no distance from the eye; as there is also nothing in 
upper or lower which by necessary- connexion should suggest 
greater or lesser magnitude. Now, as these customary experi- 
mental means of suggesting distance do likewise suggest magni- 
tude, so they suggest the one as immediately as the other, I say, 

* This letitence omitted in the author's tion is not contained in the two first 
lui edition. edition^. 

* What fdlowt to the end of this sec- " i.e. tangible. 



72 An Essay towards a 

they do not (vide sect. 53) first suggest distance, and then leave 
the mind from thence to infer or compute magnitude, but suggest 
magnitude as immediately and directly as they suggest distance. 

78, This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear in 
stance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the 
way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the magnitude of 
outward objects. There is, nevertheless, a use of computation by 
them** — in order to determine the apparent magnitude of things, 
so far as they have a connexion with and are proportional to those 
other ideas or perceptions which are the true and immediate occar 
sions that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of things* 
But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning mathe- 
matical computation in optics — ^that it can never®* be very precise 
and exact*"^, since the judgments we make of the magnitude of 
external things do often depend on several circumstances which 
are not proportional to or capable of being defined by lines 
and angles. 

79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this con- 
sequence, to wit, that a man born blind, and made to see, would, 
at first opening of his eyes, make a very different judgment of the 
magnitude of objects intromitted by them from what others da 
He would not consider the ideas of sight with reference to, or as 
having any connexion with the ideas of touch. His view of them 
being entirely terminated within themselves, he can no otherwise 
judge them great or small than as they contain a greater or lesser 
number of visible points. Now, it being certain that any visible 
point can cover or exclude from view only one other visible point, 
it follows that whatever object intercepts the view of another 
hath an equal number of visible points with it ; and, consequently, 
they shall both be thought by him to have the same magnitude. 
Hence, it is evident one in those circumstances would judge his 
thumb, with which he might hide a tower, or hinder its being 
seen, equal to that tower; or his hand, the interposition whereof 
might conceal the firmament from his view, equal to the firma- 
ment: how great an inequality soever there may, in our appre- 

*• Cf. sect. 38; and Thenry of Vision Optics, B. I. ch. v., and Remarks, p. 56, 

Vindicated, icct. ^J . in which he 'leaves it to be considered, 

M "Never" — "hardly," in two first edi- whether the said phenomenon is not as dear 

tions. an instance of the insufficiency of faintneic' 

*^ Cf. Appendix, p. 1 10. — See Smith's as of mathematical computation. 



New Theory of Vision. 



73 



hensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, because of the 
customary and close connexion that has grown up in our minds 
between the objects of sight and touch, whereby the very different 
and distinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and con- 
founded together as to be mistaken for one and the same thing — 
out of which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves. 

80. For the better explaining the nature of vision, and 
setting the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due 
li^tt, I shall proceed to make some observations concerning 
matters relating thereto, whereof the want of reflection, and duly 
separating between tangible and visible ideas, is apt to create 
in us mistaken and confused notions. And,^rxr, I shall observe, 
tbat the mimmum visshile is exactly equal in all beings whatsoever 
tbat arc endowed with the visive faculty*®. No exquisite formation 
rfthe eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can make it less in one 
creature than in another; for, it not being distinguishable into 
parts, nor in anywise consisting of them, it must necessarily be 
the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise, and that the minimum 
vmUU of a mite, for instance, be less than the minimum visihile of 
a man ; the latter therefore may, by detraction of some part, be 
made equal to the former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which 
is inconsistent with the notion of a minimum visihile or point. 

81. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the minimum visihile of 
a man doth really and in itself contain parts whereby it sur- 
passes that of a mite, though they are not perceivable by the man. 
To which I answer, the minimum visihile having (in like manner 
as all other the proper and immediate objects of sight) been shewn 
not to have any existence without the mind of him who sees it, it 
Wtows there cannot be any part of it that is not actually per- 



■ A faronrite doctrine with Berkeley, 
Kcording to whose theory there can be no 
abM^te risible (or tangible) magnitude, 
tfae muninmm being that perceivable, and 
tfcv rdatire to the percipient. This sec- 
tino is thus criticized, in January, 1753, 
in a letter signed • Anti-Berkeley,' in the 
Geni. Mag. (rol. XXII. p. 12): 'Upon 
vtat his lordship asserts with respect to the 
mammm viu'bile, I would observe that it is 
cntain that there are infinite numbers of 
atnials which are imperceptible to the 
Baked eye, and cannot be perceived but by 



the help of a microscope ; consequently there 
are animals whose whole bodies are far less 
than the minimum visihile of a man. Doubt- 
less these animals have eves, and, if their mini' 
mum visihile were equal to that of a man, it 
would follow that they cannot perceive any- 
thing but what is much larger than their 
whole body : and therefore their own bodies 
must be invisible to them, because we know 
they are so to men, whose minimum visihile 
is asserted by his lordship to be equal to 
theirs.* Cf. Appendix to Essay, p. in. 



e<]usj 



^ 
^ 



74 An Essay towards a ' 

ceived and therefore visible. Now, for any object to contaiii 
several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a 
mum 'aU'ibihj is a manifest contradiction, 

82. Of these visible points we see at all times an 
number. It is every whit as great when our view is contracted 
and bounded by near objects as when it is extended to larger anil 
remoter ones. For, it being impossible that one minimum vifiiik 
should obscure or keep out of sight more than one other, it is S 
plain consequence that, when my view is on all sides bounded l^ 
the walls of my study, I see just as many visible points as ! coulJ 
in case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all other obi, 
structions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields, mouitj 
tains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long as I am shut up within 
the walls, by their interposition every point of the external objecci 
is covered from my view. But, each point that is seen being abl 
to cover or exclude from sight one only other corresponding point 
it follows that, whilst my sight is confined to those narrow wall! 
I see as many points or minima vlsiiiUa as I should were th( 
walls away, by looking on all the external objects whose prosj 
is intercepted by them. Whenever, therefore, we are said to have 
greater prospect at one time than another, this must be understt 
with relation, not to the proper and immediate, but the second; 
and mediate objects of vision — which, as hath been shewn. 
properly belong to the touch. 

83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its 
mediate objects, may be found to labour of two defects, i 
in respect of the extent or number of visible points that are 
once perceivable by it, which is narrow and limited to a certain de« 
gree. It can take in at one view but a certain determinate number 
of minima 'viti^i/Ja^ beyond which it cannot extend its prospccU 
StcenJly, our sight is defective in that its view is not only narrow, 
but also for the most part confused. Of those things that we take 
in at one prospect, we can see but a few at once clearly and un- 
confijsedly; and the more we fix our sight on any one object, by 
so much the darker and more indistinct shall the rest appear. 

84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may 
imagine as many perfections, to wit, ist. That of comprehending 
in one view a greater number of visible points; idly, of being able 
to view them all equally and at once, with the utmost clearness 



New Theory of Vision. 75 

and distinction. That those perfections are not actually in some 
intelligences of a different order and capacity from ours, it is 
impossible for us to know^. 

85. In neither of those two ways do microscopes contribute 
to the improvement of sight. For, when we look through a mi- 
croscope, we neither see more visible points, nor are the collateral 
points more distinct than when we look with the naked eye at 
objects placed at a due distance. A microscope brings us, as it 
were, into a new world. It presents us with a new scene of visible 
objects, quite different fi'om what we behold with the naked eye. 
But herein consists the most remarkable difference, to wit, that 
whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a certain 
connexion with tangible objects, whereby we are taught to foresee 
what will ensue upon the approach or application of distant objects 
to the parts of our own body — which much conduceth to its pre- 
servation^ — there is not the like connexion between things 
tangible and those visible objects that are perceived by help of 
a fine microscope. 

86. Hence, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into the 
nature of microscopes, we should not be much benefitted by the 
change. We should be deprived of the fbrementioned advantage we 
at present receive by the visive ^^culty, and have left us only the 
empty amusement of seeing, without any other benefit arising 
from it. But, in that case, it will perhaps be said, our sight would 
be endued with a far greater sharpness and penetration than it 
DOW hath. But I would fain know wherein consists that sharpness 
which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It is certain, 
from what we have already shewn ^^, that the minimum visihiU 
is never greater or lesser, but in all cases constantly the same. 
And, in the case of microscopical eyes, I see only this difference, 
to wit, that upon the ceasing of a certain observable connexion 
betwixt the divers perceptions of sight and touch, which before 
enabled us to regulate our actions by the eye, it would now be 
rendered utterly unserviceable to that purpose. 

87. Upon the whole it seems that, if we consider the use and 

* These two defects are common to to assist our finite consciousness — reasoning 

Cfoy fonn of the intuitive consciousness being, as Pascal says, the sign at once of 

of Ban. See Locke's Etsay^ II. lo, on the our dignity and our degradation. 

Mrcii of meniory. It is this defective ^ Sect. 59. 

of intnitioQ which calls for reasoning, *^ Sect. 80^83. 



76 An Essay towards a 

end of sight, together with the present state and circumstances 
of our being, we shall not find any great cause to complain of 
any defect or imperfection in it, or easily conceive how it could 
be mended. With such admirable wisdom is that feculty con- 
trived, both for the pleasure and convenience of life. 

88. Having finished what I intended to say concerning the 
distance and magnitude of objects, I come now to treat of the 
manner wherein the mind perceives by sight their situation**. 
Among the discoveries of the last age, it is reputed none of the 
least, that the manner of vision has been more clearly explained 
than ever it had been before. There is, at this day, no one 
ignorant that the pictures of external objects are painted on the 
retina or fund of the eye; that we can see nothing which is 
not so painted ; and that, according as the picture is more dis- 
tinct or confused, so also is the perception we have of the object*'. 
But then, in this explication of vision, there occurs one mighty 
difficulty — The objects are painted in an inverted order on the 
bottom of the eye : the upper part of any object being painted 
on the lower part of the eye, and the lower part of the object 
on the upper part of the eye ; and so also as to right and left. 
Since, therefore, the pictures are thus inverted, it is demanded 
how it comes to pass that we see the objects erect and in their 
natural posture ? 

89. In answer to this difficulty, we are told that the mind, 
perceiving an impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of 
the eye, considers this ray as coming in a direct line from 
the lower part of the object ; and, in like manner, tracing the 
ray that strikes on the lower part of the eye, it is directed to 
the upper part of the object. Thus, in the adjacent figure, C, 
the lower point of the object ABC^ is projected on c the upper 
part of the eye. So likewise, the highest point A is projected 
on a the lowest part of the eye ; which makes the representation 
cha inverted. But the mind — considering the stroke that is made 
on c as coming in the straight line Cc from the lower end of 



^ Sect. 88—119 relate to the nature, retina. Of. Theory of Vision Vindieated, 

invisibility, and arbitrary signs of Situation, Sect. 44 — 53. 
including the celebrated paradox of erect " Of. sect, a, 1 14, 1 16, 118. 

vision, by means of inverted images on the 



New Theory of Vision. 



77 



the object ; and the stroke or impulse on a^ as coming in the 
line Am from the upper end of the object — is directed to make 




a right judgment of the situation of the object ABC^ notwith- 
standing the picture of it be inverted. Moreover, this is illus- 
trated by conceiving a blind man, who, holding in his hands 
two sticks that cross each other, doth with them touch the 
extremities of an object, placed in a perpendicular situation. 
It is certain this man will judge that to be the upper part of 
the object which he touches with the stick held in the under- 
most hand, and that to be the lower part of the object which 
he touches with the stick in his uppermost hand. This is the 
common explication of the erect appearance of objects, which 
is generally received and acquiesced in, being (as Mr. Molyneux 
tells us, Dtoft, part ii. ch. vii. p. 289) ' allowed by all men as satis- 
factory.' 

90. But this account to me does not seem in any degree 
true. Did I perceive®* those impulses, decussations, and direc- 
tions of the rays of light, in like manner as hath been set forth^ 
then, indeed, it would not at first view be altogether void of 
probability. And there might be some pretence for the com- 
parison of the blind man and his cross sticks. But the case 
is fer otherwise. I know very well that I perceive no such 
thing. And, of consequence, I cannot thereby make an estimate 
of the situation of objects. Moreover, I appeal to any one's 
experience, whether he be .conscious to himself that he thinks 
cm the intersection made by the radius pencils, or pursues the 
impulses they give in right lines, whenever he perceives by 
sig^t the position of any object? To me it seems evident 
that crossing and tracing of the rays, &c. is never thought on by 
children, idiots, or, in truth, by any other, save only those who 

•• Sect. 10. 



78 



An Essay towards a 



have applied themselves to the study of optics. And ftw tb 
mind to judge of the situation of objects by those things withow 
perceiving them, or to perceive them without knowing it**, tab 
which you please, it is perfectly beycmd my comprehension. Ad< 
to this, that the explaining the manner of vision by the exampli 
of cross sticks, and hunting for the object along the axes of th( 
radius pencils, doth suppose the proper objects of sight to h 
perceived at a distance from us, contrary to what hath beo 
demonstrated®^. [We may therefore venture to pronounce thi 
opinion, concerning the way wherein the mind perceives the 
erect appearance of objects, to be of a piece with those otha 
tenets of writers in optics, which in the foregoing parts of this 
treatise we have had occasion to examine and refute*'.] 

91. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other ex- 
plication of this difficulty. And I believe it not impossible to fiml 
one, provided we examine it to the bottom, and carefully dis- 
tinguish between the ideas of sight and touch; which cannot 
be too oft inculcated in treating of vision*®. But, more especial!) 
throughout the consideration of this afiair, we ought to carry 
that distinction in our thoughts, for that from want of a right 
understanding thereof, the difficulty of explaining erect vision 
seems chiefly to arise. 

92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever preju- 
dices we may entertain with relation to the subject in hand, 
nothing seems more apposite than the taking into our thoughts 
the case of one born blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made 
to see. And — though perhaps it may not be a task altc^ether easy 
and familiar to us, to divest ourselves entirely of the experiences 
received from sight, so as to be able to put our thoughts exactly in 
the posture of such a one's — we must, nevertheless^ as far as possi- 
ble, endeavour to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably 
be supposed to pass in his mind®*. 



•* Sect. 19. 

" Sect. 2 — 51. 

^ Omitted in author's last edition. 

•• This is Berkeley's universal solvent of 
the psychological difficulties in optics and in 
sense-perception. The synthesis or con- 
struction in thought of the heterogeneous 
phenomena presented in the different senses 
is due, with him, to our tendency to asso- 
ciate their arbitrary but constant con- 



nexions — not to a mysterious percipient act, 
in which we are originally cognizant of the 
co-existence of sensible qiulities in indiTidaal 
things. 

•• Cf. sect. 103. 106, no, laS, &c. 
Berkeley treats this case hypothetically in 
the Essay^ in defect of actual experiments, 
now so often referred to from Cheselden 
downwards. See however Appendix, p. 75 ; 
and Theory ofVidon Vindicated^ sect. 71. 



New Theory of Vision. 79 

93. It is certain that a man actually blind, and who had 
continued so from his birth, would, by the sense of feeling, attain 
to have ideas of upper and lower. By the motion of his hand, he 
might discern the situation of any tangible object placed within 
his reach. That part on which he felt himself supported, or to- 
wards which he perceived his body to gravitate, he would term 
* lower,* and the contrary to this * upper j* and accordingly de- 
nominate whatsoever objects he touched. 

94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning the 
situation of objects are confined to those only that are perceivable 
by touch. All those things that are intangible, and of a spiritual 
nature — his thoughts and desires, his passions, and in general all 
the modifications of his soul— to these he would never apply the 
terms upper and lower, except only in a metaphorical sense. He 
may perhaps, by way of allusion, speak of high or low thoughts : 
but those terms, in their proper signification, would never be 
applied to anything that was not conceived to exist without the 
mind. For, a man born blind, and remaining in the same state, 
could mean nothing else by the words higher and lower than a 
greater or lesser distance from the earth — which distance he would 
measure by the motion or application of his hand, or some other 
part of his body. It is, therefore, evident that all those things 
which, in respect of each other, would by him be thought higher 
or lower, must be such as were conceived to exist without his 
mind, in the ambient space ^^. 

95. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we suppose 
him made to see, would not at first sight think that anything he 
saw was high or low, erect or inverted. For, it hath been already 
demonstrated, in sect. 41, that he would not think the things he 
perceived by sight to be at any distance from him, or without his 
mind. The objects to which he had hitherto been used to apply 
the terms up and down, high and low, were such only as affected, 
or were some way perceived by his touch. But, the proper objects 
of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct and different 
from the former, and which can in no sort make themselves per- 
ceived by touch. There is, therefore, nothing at all that could 
induce him to think those terms applicable to them. Nor would he 

** i. e. tingible things. Cf. PrincipUi, tect 44. 



8o An Essay towards a 

ever think it, till such time as he had observed their connexion 
with tangible objects, and the same prejudice^ began to insinuate 
itself into his understanding, which, from their infancy, had grown 
up in the understandings of other men. 

96. To set this matter in a clearer light, I shall make use of 
an example. Suppose the above-mentioned blind person, by his 
touch, perceives a man to stand erect. Let us inquire into the 
manner of this. By the application of his hand to the several 
parts of a human body, he had perceived difi^rent tangible ideas, 
which being collected into sundry complex ones have distinct 
names annexed to them. Thus, one combination of a certain 
tangible figure, bulk, and consistency of parts is called the head; 
another the hand ; a third the foot, and so of the rest — all which 
complex ideas could, in his understanding, be made up only of ideas 
perceivable by touch. He had also, by his touch, obtained an idea 
of earth or ground, towards which he perceives the parts of his 
body to have a natural tendency. Now — by * erect* nothii^ more 
being meant than that perpendicular position of a man wherein 
his feet are nearest to the earth — if the blind person, by moving 
his hand over the parts of the man who stands before him, do per- 
ceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be farthest fiDm, 
and those that compose the feet to be nearest to, that other co^^ 
bination of tangible ideas which he calls earth, he will denominate 
that man erect. But, if we suppose him on a sudden to receive his 
sight, and that he behold a man standing before him, it is evident, 
in that case, he would neither judge the man he sees to be erect 
nor inverted ; for he, never having known those terms applied to 
any other save tangible things, or which existed in the space 
without him, and what he sees neither being tangible, nor per- 
ceived as existing without, he could not know that, in propriety 
of language, they were applicable to it. 

97, Afterwards, when, upon turning his head or eyes^ up and 
down to the right and left, he shall observe the visible objects to 
change, and shall also attain to know that they are called by the 
same names, and connected with the objects perceived by touch; 
then, indeed, he will come to speak of them and their situation in 

* The * prejudice/ to wit, which Berkeley sect. 35. 
sought, by his mental analysis of vision, to " i. e. by locomotive experience in the 

dissolve. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, organ. 



New Theory of Vision. 8i 

che same terms that he has been used to apply to tangible things : 
and those that he perceives by turning up his eyes he will call 
opper, and those that by turning down his eyes he will call lower. 

98. And this seems to me the true reason why he should 
diink those objects uppermost that are painted on the lower part 
of his eye. For, by turning the eye up they shall be distinctly seen j 
as likewise they that are painted on the highest part of the eye 
shall be distinctly seen by turning the eye down, and are for that 
reason esteemed lowest. For, we have shewn that to the imme- 
diate objects of sight, considered in themselves, he would not attri- 
bute the terms high and low. It must therefore be on account of 
some circumstances which are observed to attend them. And these, 
it is plain, are the actions of turning the eye up and down, which 
suggest a very obvious reason why the mind should denominate the 
objects of sight accordingly high or low 3. And, without this motion 
of the eye, this turning it up and down in order to discern different 
objects, doubtless * erect,* ^ inverse,' and other the like terms relating 
to the position of tangible objects, would never have been trans- 
ferred, or in any degree apprehended to belong to the ideas of sight — 
the mere act of seeing including nothing in it to that purpose ; 
whereas the diflFerent situations of the eye naturally direct the 
mind to make a suitable judgment of the situation of objects 
intromitted by it. 

99. Farther, when he has by experience learned the con- 
nexion there is between the several ideas of sight and touch, he 
will be able, by the perception he has of the situation of visible 
things in respect of one another, to make a sudden and true 
estimate of the situation of outward, tangible things corre- 
sponding to them. And thus it is he shall perceive^ by sight the 
situation of external* objects, which do not properly fall under 
that sense.l 

100. I know we are very prone to thiijk that, if just made to see, 
we should judge of the situation of visible things as we do now. 
But, we are also as prone to think that, at first sight, we should 
in the same way apprehend the distance and magnitude of objects, 

■ This briefly is Berkeley's solution of vision and optics have nothing to do with 

• the knot about inverted images.* * high * and * low,' * great ' and * inverted,' in 

• I. e. mediatdv — visible objects, per se, tlie real meaning of these terms. 
hsrtng no place or situation at all. Pure ' i. e. tangible. 

G 



32 An Essay towards a 

as we do now ; which hath been shewn to be a false and ground- 
less persuasion. And, for the like reasons, the same censure may 
be passed on the positive assurance that most men, before thej 
have thought sufficiently of the matter, might have of their being 
able to determine by the eye, at first view, whether objects were 
erect or inverse. 

loi. It will perhaps be objected to our opinion, that a man, for 
instance, being thought erect when his feet are next the earth, and 
inverted when his head is next the earth, it doth hence follow that, 
by the mere act of vision, without any experience or altering the 
situation of the eye, we should have determined whether he were 
erect or inverted. For both the earth itself, and the limbs of the 
man who stands thereon, being equally perceived by sight, one 
cannot choose seeing what part of the man is nearest the earth, 
and what part farthest from it, i.e. whether he be erect or in* 
verted. 

T02. To which I answer, the ideas which constitute the tangible 
earth and man are entirely different from those which constitute 
the visible earth and man. Nor was it possible, by virtue of the 
visive faculty alone, without superadding any experience of toudi^ 
or altering the position of the eye, ever to have known, or so much 
as suspected, there had been any relation or connexion between 
them. Hence, a man at first view would not denominate anything 
he saw, * earth/ or * head,' or * foot ;' and consequently, he could 
not tell, by the mere act of vision, whether the head or feet were 
nearest the earth. Nor, indeed, would we have thereby any thought 
of earth or man, erect or inverse, at all — which will be made yet 
more evident, if we nicely observe, and make a particular com- 
parison between, the ideas of both senses. 

103. That which I see is only variety of light and colours. 
That which I feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. 
What similitude, what connexion, have those ideas with these? 
Or, how is it possible that any one should see reason to give one 
and the same name* to combinations of ideas so very different, 
before he had experienced their co-existence? We do not find 
there is any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible 
quality, and any colour whatsoever. And we may sometimes per- 

* e. g. * extension/ which, according to two quite different meanings) to visihilia and 
Berkeley, is an equivocal term, common (in tangibilia. Cf. sect. 139, 140. 



New Theory of Vision. 83 

xive colours, where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth 
make it manifest that no man, at first receiving of his sight^, 
ipould know there was any agreement between this or that par- 
ticular object of his sight and any object of touch he had been 
already acquainted with. The colours therefore of the head would 
to him no more suggest the idea of head® than they would the 
idea of feet. 

104* Farther, we have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and 64) 
there is no discoverable necessary connexion between any given 
visible magnitude and any one particular tangible magnitude ; but 
that it is entirely the result of custom and experience, and depends 
on foreign and accidental circumstances, that we can, by the per- 
csption of visible extension, inform ourselves what may be the 
extension of any tangible object connected with it. Hence, it is 
certadn, that neither the visible magnitude of head or foot would 
bring along with them into the mind, at first opening of the eyes, 
the respective tangible magnitudes of those parts. 

105* By the foregoing section, it is plain the visible figure of any 
part of the body hath no necessary connexion with the tangible 
figure thereof, so as at first sight to suggest it to the mind. For, 
figure is the termination of magnitude. Whence it follows that no 
irisible magnitude having in its own nature an aptness to suggest 
iny one particular tangible magnitude, so neither can any visible 
figure be inseparably connected with its corresponding tangible 
figure, so as of itself, and in a way prior to experience, it might 
suggest it to the understanding. This will be farther evident, if 
we consider that what seems smooth and round to the touch may 
to si^t, if viewed through a microscope, seem quite otherwise. 

io6. From all which, laid together and duly considered, we may 
clearly deduce this inference : — In the first act of vision, no idea 
entering by the eye would have a perceivable connexion with the 
ideas to which the names earth, man, head, foot, &c. were annexed 
ifl the understanding of a person blind from his birth ; so as in 
aoy sort to introduce them into his mind, or make themselves be 
called by the same names, and reputed the same things with them, 
as afterwards they come to be. 

107. There doth, nevertheless, remain one difficulty, which 

' Ci. »ect. 93. ic6. 1 10, laS. • i. e. real or tangible head. 

G 2 



84 



An Essay towards a 



to some may seem to press hard on our opinion, and deserve not 
to be passed over. For, though it be granted that neither the colour, 
size, nor figure of the visible feet have any necessary connexion 
with the ideas that compose the tangible feet, so as to bring them 
at first sight into my mind, or make me in danger of confounding 
them, before I had been used to and for some time experienced 
their connexion ; yet thus much seems undeniable, namely, that the 
number of the visible feet being the same with that of the tangible 
feet, I may from hence, without any experience of si^t, reason- 
ably conclude that they represent or are connected with the feet 
rather than the head. I say, it seems the idea of two visible feet 
will sooner surest to the mind the idea of two tangible feet than 
of one head — so that the blind man, upon first reception of the 
visive faculty, might know which were the feet or two, and which 
the head or one. 

1 08. In order to get clear of this seeming difficulty, we need 
only observe that diversity of visible objects does not necessarily 
infer diversity of tangible objects corresponding to them. A 
picture painted with great variety of colours affects the touch in 
one uniform manner j it is therefore evident that I do not, by any 
necessary consecution, independent of experience, judge of the 
number of things tangible from the number of things visible. 
I should not therefore at first opening my eyes conclude that 
because I see two I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, before 
experience teaches me, know that the visible legs, because two, 
are connected with the tangible legs ; or the visible head, because 
one, is connected with the tangible head ? The truth is, the things 
I see are so very different and heterogeneous from the things I 
feel that the perception of the one would never have su^ested 
the other to my thoughts, or enabled me to pass the least judgment 
thereon, until I had experienced their connexion •. 



• Cf. sect. 140, 143. In Gent. Mag, 
(vol. XXII. p. 12), ' Anti-Bcrkcley* suggests 
the case of one born blind. • This man,' he 
adds, ' would, by being accustomed to feel 
one hand with the other, have perceived that 
the extremity of the hand was divided into 
fingers — that the extremities of these fingers 
were distinguished by certain hard, smooth 
surfaces, of a different texture from the rest of 
the fingers — and that each finger had certain 
joints or flexures. Now, if this man was re- 



stored to sight, and immediately viewed his 
hand before he touched it again, it is mani- 
fest that the divisions of the extremity of the 
hand into fingers would be visibly perceived. 
He would note too the small spaces at the 
extremity of each finger, which affected his 
sight differently from the rest of the fingers ; 
upon moving his fingers he would see the 
joints. Though therefore, by means of this 
lately acquired sense of seeing, the object 
affected his mind in a new and different 



New Theory of Vision. 85 

109. But, for a fuller illustration of this matter, it ought to be 
cxmsidered, that number (however some may reckon it amongst the 
primary qualities ^^ is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in 
things themselves. It is entirely the creature of the mind, con- 
sidering either a simple idea by itself, or any combination of 
simple ideas to which it gives one name, and so makes it pass for 
a unit. According as the mind variously combines its ideas, the 
onit yaries; and as the unit, so the number, which is only a col- 
lecticm of units, doth also vary. We call a window one, a chim- 
ney one ; and yet a house, in which there are many windows and 
many diimneys, has an equal right to be called one \ and many 
houses gp to the making of one city. In these and the like 
instances, it is evident the unit constantly relates to the par- 
ticular drau^ts the mind makes of its ideas, to which it affixes 
names, and wherein it includes more or less, as best suits its own 
ends and purposes. Whatever therefore the mind considers as 
one, that is an unit. Every combination of ideas is considered as 
one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is marked by one 
name. Now, this naming and combining together of ideas is 
perfectly arbitrary, and done by the mind in such sort as expe- 
rience shews it to be most convenient — without which our ideas 
had never been collected into such sundry distinct combinations 
as they now are. 

1 ID. Hence, it follows that a man born blind, and afterwards, 
liien grown up, made to see, would not, in the first act of vision, 
parcel out the ideas of sight into the same distinct collections 
that others do who have experienced which do regularly co-exist 
and are proper to be bundled up together under one name. He 
would not, for example, make into one complex idea, and thereby 
esteem and unite all those particular ideas which constitute the 
visible head or foot. For, there can be no reason assigned why he 
should do so, barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before 
him. There crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the 



. from whit it did before, yet. as by that the thing which he now law was tU 

he had acquired the knowledge of iamt which he had felt before and called his 

srrcnl dirisions, marks, and distinctions hand/ 

of the hand, and, as the new object of ught **> Locke. Essay, II. 8. 16. Aristotle re- 
appeared to be divided, marked, and distin- gards number as one of the Conmion Sensi- 
Ifuisbcd ilia similar manner, I think he would blcs. — Dt Anima, II. 6, HI. 1. 
certainly conclude, bt/ore be touched bis band. 



86 An Essay towards a 

visible man, in company with all the other ideas of sight perceived 
at the same time. But, all these ideas offered at once to his view 
he would not distribute into sundry distinct combinations, till 
such time as, by observing the motion of the parts of the man and 
other experiences, he comes to know which are to be separated 
and which to be collected together". 

111. From what hath been premised, it is plain the objects of 
sight and touch make, if I may so say, two sets of ideas, whidi are 
widely different from each other. To objects of either kind we 
indifferently attribute the terms high and low, right and left, and 
such like, denoting the position or situation of things; but then 
we must well observe that the position of any object is determined 
with respect only to objects of the same sense. We say any 
object of touch is high or low, according as it is mote or less 
distant from the tangible earth: and in like manner we deno- 
minate any object of sight high or low, in proportion as it is 
more or less distant from the visible earth. But, to define the 
situation of visible things with relation to the distance they bear 
from any tangible thing, or vice versa^ this were absurd and per- 
fectly unintelligible. For all visible things are equally in the 
mind, and take up no part of the external space; and conse- 
quently are equidistant from any tangible thing which exists 
without the mind". 

112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight are 
at no distance, neither near nor far from any tangible thing. For, 
if we inquire narrowly into the matter, we shall find that those 
things only are compared together in respect of distance which 
exist after the same manner, or appertain unto the same sense. 
For, by the distance between any two points, nothing more is 
meant than the number of intermediate points. If the given 
points are visible, the distance between them is marked out by 
the number of the interjacent visible points ; if they are tangible, 
the distance between them is a line consisting of tangible points; 



** * If the visible appearance of two ^ Here again Berkeley's reticence of 

shillings had been found connected from the his developed theory of matter. Tangible 

beginning with the tangible idea of one thuigs are meantime granted to be * with- 

shilling, that appearance would as naturally out the mind.' Cf. PrineipUs, sect. 43, 

and readily have signified the unity of the 44. 'Without the mind' — in contrast to 

(real or tangible) object as it now signifies what is visible, i. e. pure sensation or 

its duplicity.' Rcid, Inquiry ^ VI. 11. idea. 



New Theory of Vision. 

but, if they are one tangible and the other visible, the distance 
between them doth neither consist of points perceivable by siglit 
nor by touch, I.e. it is utterly inconceivable". This, perhaps, will 
not find an easy admission into all men's understanding. However, 
1 sBould gladly be informed whether it be not true, by any one 
who will be at the pains to reflect a little, and apply it home to 
his thoughts. 

IZ3. The not observing what has been delivered in the two 
last sections, seems to have occasioned no small part of the diffi- 
culty that occurs in the business of direct appearances. The head, 
which is painted nearest the earth, seems to be farthest from it ; 
and on the other hand, the feet, which are painted farthest from 
the earth, are thought nearest to it. Herein lies the difficulty, 
which vanishes if we express the thing more clearly and free from 
ambiguity, thus : — How comes it that, to the eye, the visible head, 
which is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the earth ; 
and the visible feet, which are farthest from the tangible earth, 
seem nearest the earth ? The question being thus proposed, who 
sees not the difficulty is founded on a supposition that the eye 
or visivc faculty, or rather the soul by means thereof, should 
judge of the situation of visible objects with reference to their 
distance from the tangible earth? Whereas, it is evident the 
tangible earth is not perceived by sight. And it hath been 
shewn, in the two last preceding sections, that the location of 
visible objects is determined only by the distance they bear from 
one another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far or 
near, between a visible and tangible thing. 

1 14. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight, 
the whole is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from, 
and the feet nearest to, the visible earth ^ and so they appear to 
be. What is there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us 
suppose the pictures in the fund of the eye to be the immediate 
objects of sight". The consequence is that things should appear 
in the same posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The 
bead which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen ; 
and the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth which is 
seen. And just so they are painted. 

" Cf >etl. III. " S«i.», 88, 116, 118. 



88 An Essay towards a 

115. But, say you, the picture of the man is inverted, and yd 
the appearance is erect. I ask, what mean you by the pictun 
of the man, or, which is the same thing, the visible man's bcin§ 
inverted ? You tell me it is inverted, because the heels arc upper- 
most and the head undermost ? Explain me this. You say thai 
by the head's being undermost, you mean that it is nearest to the 
earth ; and, by the heels being uppermost, that they are farthest 
from the earth. I ask again, what earth you mean ? You cannot 
mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible earth— 
for the picture of the head is farthest from the picture of the earth, 
and the picture of the feet nearest to the picture of the earth; 
and accordingly the visible head is farthest from the visible earth, 
and the visible feet nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that you 
mean the tangible earth ; and so determine the situation of visible 
things with respect to tangible things — contrary to what hath been 
demonstrated in sect. 11 1 and 112. The two distinct provinces 
of sight and touch should be considered apart, and as though their 
objects had no intercourse, no manner of relation to one another, 
in point of distance or position". 

116. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us mistake in 
this matter is that, when we think of the pictures in the fiind of 
the eye, we imagine ourselves looking on the fund of another's 
eye, or another looking on the fiind of our own eye, and beholding 
the pictures painted thereon. Suppose two eyes, -^ and B. A from 
some distance looking on the pictures in B sees them inverted, 
and for that reason concludes they are inverted in £. But this is 
wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of A the 
images of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, fee, which are 
painted on B. And, besides these, the eye B itself, and the objects 
which environ it, together with another earth, are projected in a 
larger size on A. Now, by the eye A these larger images are 
deemed the true objects, and the lesser only pictures in miniature. 
And it is with respect to those greater images that it determines 
the situation of the smaller images ; so that, comparing the little 
man with the great earth, A judges him inverted, or that the feet 
are farthest from and the head nearest to the great earth. Whereas, 

" In short, we sec only quantities of colour gradually associated with these quantities, as 
— the notions of real distance, size, shape, 1«- wc learn to connect what we see with our 
cality. up and down, right and left, &c., being tactual and locomotive experience. 



New Theory of Vision. 89 

if ^ compare the little man with the little earth, then he will 

appear erect, i.e. his head shall seem farthest from and his feet 

nearest to the little earth. But we must consider that B does not 

see two earths as A does. It sees only what is represented by the 

little pictures in A^ and consequently shall judge the man erect. 

For, in truth, the man in B is not inverted, for there the feet are 

next the earth ; but it is the representation of it in ^ which is 

inverted, for there the head of the representation of the picture of 

the man in B is next the earth, and the feet farthest from the 

earth — meaning the earth which is without the representation of 

the pictures in B. For, if you take the little images of the pictures 

in fi, and consider them by themselves, and with respect only 

to one another, they are all erect and in their natural posture. 

117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the 
pictures of external'* objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. 
It has been shewn there is no resemblance between the ideas of 
sight and things tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated^^, 
that the proper objects of sight do not exist without the mind. 
Whence it clearly follows that the pictures painted on the bottom 
of the eye are not the pictures of external *• objects. Let any one 
consult his own thoughts, and then tell me, what affinity, what 
liJceness, there is between that certain variety and disposition of 
colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of a man, 
and that other combination of far different ideas, sensible by 
touch, which compose the tangible man. But, if this be the case, 
how come they to be accounted pictures or images, since that 
supposes them to copy or represent some originals or other ? 

118. To which I answer — In the forementioned instance, the 
eye A takes the little images, included within the representa- 
tion of the other eye B, to be pictures or copies, whereof the 
archetypes are not things existing without", but the larger pic- 
tures" projected on its own fund ^ and which by A are not thought 
pictures, but the originals or true things themselves. Though if we 
suppose a third eye C, from a due distance, to behold the fund of ^, 
then indeed the things projected thereon shall, to C, seem pictures 
or images, in the same sense that those projected on B do to A. 

119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must care- 
fully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch, between the 

•• i. t. tangible. " Sect. 41^44. *' i. c. tangible things. ^^ i. e. visible. 



90 



An Essay towards a 



visible and tangible eye ; for certainly on the tangible eye nothiq 
either is or seems to be painted. Again, the visible eye, as wd 
as all other visible objects, hath been shewn to exist only in tin 
mind^^; which, perceiving its own ideas, and comparing then 
together, does call some pictures in respect to others. Wha 
hath been said, being rightly comprehended and laid together 
does, I think, afford a foil and genuine explication of the erec 
appearance of objects — whidi phenomenon, I must confess, I d 
not see how it can be explained by any theories of vision hitherto 
made public. 

1 20. In treating of these things, the use of language is apt tt 
occasion some obscurity and confosion, and create in us wronf 
ideas. For, language being accommodated to the common notion! 
and prejudices of men, it is scarce possible to deliver the nakec 
and precise truth, without great circumlocution, impropriety, anc 
(to an unwary reader) seeming contradictions. I do, therefor^ 
once for all, desire whoever shall think it worth his while tc 
understand what I have written concerning vision, that he would 
not stick in this or that phrase or manner of expression, but 
candidly collect my meaning from the whole sum and tenor of my 
discourse, and, laying aside the words" as mudi as possible, con- 
sider the bare notions themselves, and then judge whether they 
are agreeable to truth and his own experience or no. 

121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by media- 
tion of visible ideas", doth perceive or apprehend the distance, 
magnitude, and situation of tangible objects*". I come now to in- 
quire more particularly concerning the difference between the ideas 
of sight and touch which are called by the same names, and see 
whether there be any idea common to both senses**. From what 
we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts 



* Cf. sect, 41 — 44. The * eyes * — visible 
and tangible — are actually different objects. 
^ Cf. PrincipUst Introduction, sect, a 1 — 

" 'Visible ideas' — including sensations 
muscular and locomotive, in the organ of 
vision. Sect. 16, 37, 57. 

" i.e. objects which, in this Euay^ are 
granted, for argument's sake, to be external 
to or independent of mind, having an abso- 
lute, as well at a merely ideal existence. 

** i. e. to inquire whether there are, in 



this instance, any Common Sensibles, and, 
in particular, whether an tsUendon of the 
same kind at least, if not numerically one, 
is presented in each. The theory of an a 
priori intuition of space, the common condi- 
tion of tactual and visual experience, because 
implied in sense-experience as such, since to 
famous, through the Kantian criticism, and 
its effects on later metaphysical thought, it 
not here entertained by Berkeley. Cf. 
Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 15. 



New Theory of Vision. 91 

of this treatise, it is plain there is no one self-same numerical 
extension, perceived both by sight and touch ; but that the par- 
ticalar figures and extensions perceived by sight, however they 
may be called by the same names, and reputed the same things with 
those perceived by touch, are nevertheless different, and have an 
existence very distinct and separate from them. So that the ques- 
tion is not now concerning the same numerical ideas, but whether 
there be any one and the same sort or species of ideas equally 
perceivable to both senses ? or, in other words, whether extension, 
%ire, and motion perceived by sight, are not specifically distinct 
from extension, figure, and motion perceived by touch ? 

\%%. But, before I come more particularly to discuss this matter, 
I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in abstract*^. 
For of this there is much talk ^ and I am apt to think that when men 
qwak of extension as being an idea common to two senses, it is 
with a secret supposition that we can single out extension from 
all other tangible and visible qualities, and form thereof an ab- 
stract idea, which idea they will have common both to sight and 
touch. We are therefore to understand by extension in abstract, an 
idea* of extension — ^for instance, a line or surfece entirely stripped 
of all other sensible qualities and circumstances that might deter- 
mine it to any particular existence ; it is neither black, nor white, 
nor red, nor hath it any colour at all, or any tangible quality what- 
soever, and consequently it is of no finite determinate magnitude ^\ 
for that which bounds or distinguishes one extension from another 
is some quality or circumstance wherein they disagree. 

125. Now, I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or 
anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here 
spoken of. A line or surface which is neither black, nor white, 
nor blue, nor yellow, &c. j nor long, nor short, nor rough, nor 
smooth, nor square, nor round, &c. is perfectly incomprehensible. 
This I am sure of as to myself; how far the faculties of other 
men may reach they best can tell. 

* In the following reasoning against the ing in Malbematics^ sect. 45 — 48. 
poHibdity of abstract, as distinguished from ^ i. e. an intuition, either in sense or 

■finiMr (Ttsibic or tangible) extension, Berke- imagination. 

Itj vgcs his iairourite objections to * abstract '^ i. e. a supposed intuition, which per m 

idcaa.' Cf. Priiuipln, Introduction, sect. cannot be individualized in any perceivable 



. — Aldphrom, VII. 5 — 8. — Theory 0/ or imaginable object. 
Vutom ViMdkiUtd.'^Ik/mce o/Fne Think- 



93 An Essay towards a 

1 24. It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract 
extension. But geometry contemplates figures : now, figure is the 
termination of magnitude**; but we have shewn that extension in 
abstract hath no finite determinate magnitude ; whence it clearly 
follows that it can have no figure, and consequently is not the 
object of geometry. It is indeed a tenet, as well of the modem 
as the ancient philosophers, that all general truths arc con- 
cerning universal abstract ideas; without which, we arc told, 
there could be no science, no demonstration of any general 
proposition in geometry. But it were no hard matter, did I 
think it necessary to my present purpose, to shew that pr(^)osi- 
tions and demonstrations in geometry might be universal, thou^ 
they who make them never think of abstract general ideas of 
triangles or circles. 

125. After reiterated endeavours* to apprehend the general 
idea^ of a triangle^ I have found it altogether incomprehensible. 
And surely, if any one were able to let that idea into my 
mind, it must be the [deservedly admired"] author of the Essse/ 
concerning Human Understanding: he, who has SO far distinguished 
himself from the generality of writers, by the clearness and 
significancy of what he says. Let us therefore see how this 
celebrated author" describes the general or [which is the same 
thing, the**] abstract idea of a triangle. ^ It must be,' says he, 
^neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, 
nor scalenum ; but all and none of these at once. In eflect it is 
somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an idea, wherein some 
parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.' 
(Essay on Human Understanding^ B. iv. ch. 7. s. 9.) This is the idea 
which he thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge, which 
is the subject of mathematical demonstration, and without which 
we could never come to know any general proposition concerning 
triangles. [Sure I am, if this be the case, it is impossible for me 
to attain to know even the first elements of geometry : since I 
have not the faculty to frame in my mind such an idea as is here 



'^ Sect. 105. the notion should be intuitively represented. 

® 'Endeavours* — * efforts and pangs of ** Omitted in the author's last edition, 

thought/ in second edition. ^^ • this celebrated author/ — • that great 

'® i.e. a generic or specific image, in which man* in second edition, 

the logical extension and comprehension of ^ Omitted in the author's last edition. 



New Theory of Vision, 



93 



described*^.] That author acknowledges it doth < require some 
pains and skill to form this general idea of a triangle/ (I^iW.) 
Bat, had he called to mind what he says in another place, to wit, 
*that ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent ideas are 
pot together, cannot so much as exist in the mind, I.e. be con* 
ccivcd,* (vid. B. iii. ch. lo. s. 33, Ibld^ — I say, had this occurred to 
his thoughts, it is not improbable he would have owned it above all 
the pains and skill he was master of, to form the above-mentioned 
idea of a triangle, which is made up of manifest staring contra- 
dictions. That a man [of such a clear understanding'^] , who thought 
so much and so well, and laid so great a stress on clear and deter- 
minate ideas, should nevertheless talk at this rate, seems very 
sorprising. But the wonder will lessen, if it be considered that the 
source whence this opinion [of abstract figures and extension *•] flows 
is die prolific womb which has brought forth innumerable errors 
and difficulties, in all parts of philosophy, and in all the sciences. 
But this matter, taken in its full extent, were a subject too vast 
and comprehensive to be insisted on in this place ^. [I shall only 
observe that your metaphysicians and men of speculation seem 
to have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men, when they 
talk of general or abstracted triangles and circles, &c., and so 
peremptorily declare them to be the subject of all the eternal, 
immutable, universal truths in geometry**.] And so much for ex- 
tension in abstract. 

126. Some, perhaps, may think pure space, vacuum, or trine 
dimension, to be equally the object of sight and touch". But, though 
we have a very great propension to think the ideas of outness 
and space to be the immediate object of sight, yet, if I mistake 
not, in the foregoing parts of this Essay, that hath been clearly 
demonstrated to be a mere delusion, arising from the quick and 
sudden suggestion of fancy, which so closely connects the idea of 
distance with those of sight, that we are apt to think it is itself 
a proper and immediate object of that sense, till reason corrects 
the mistake^. 



" Omitted in last edition. 

* Omitted iu last edition. 

* Omitted in bst edition. 
'' See PrincipUs, passim. 

* Omitted in last edition. 

* He probably has Locke in his eye. 



" On Berkeley's theory, space without 
bodies (i. e. intangible space) would not be 
extended, as not having parts ; inasmuch as 
parts are assigned to it with relation to 
bodies, from which also the notion of dis- 
tancc is taken. Berkeley, moreover, does 




An Essay towards a 

127. It having been shewn that there are no abstract iJeas 
of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any precision of 
thought, to frame an idea of extension separate from all other 
visible and tangible qualities, which shall be common both to 
sight and touch — the question now remaining is", whether the 
particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived by sight, !>e 
of the same kind with the particular extensions, figures, and 
motions perceived by touch ? In answer to which 1 shall ventutc 
to lay down the following proposition ; — The extension, figTti, mi 
motions perceived hy sight are speelpeally distinct from the ideas of touchy 
ealhd iy the same names j nor is there any such thing as one idea, or 
iind of idea, eemmon" to both senses. This proposition may, with- 
out much difficulty, l>e collected from what hath been said in 
several places of this Essay. But, because it seems so remote from, 
and contrary to the received notions and settled opinion of man- 
kind, I shall attempt to demonstrate it more particularly and at 
large by the following arguments: — 

128. [Firrf",] When, upon perception of an idea, I range it 
under this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after the same" 
manner, or because it has a likeness or conformity with, or aSects 
me in the same way as the ideas of the sort I rank it under. In 
short, it must not be entirely new, but have something in it old 
and already perceived by me. It must, I say, have so much, at 
least, in common with the ideas I have before known and named, 
as to make me give it the same name with them. But, it has 
been, if I mistake not, clearly made out" that a man born blind 
would not, at first reception of his sight, think the things he saw 
were of the same nature with the objects of touch, or had any- 
thing in common with them; but that they were a new set of 
ideas, perceived in a new manner, and entirely different from all 
he had ever perceived before. So that he would not call them by 
the same name, nor repute them to be of the same sort, with any- 
thing he had hitherto known. [And surely the judgment of such 



nal diitinguiih (pice itom muiblc rxteniion. 
Cf. Reid'i Wot-*!, p. lafi, now— in which 
Sii W. Himillon tvggati that one niijr hire 
In n priori conception of ipice. and alio tn a 
potlfrmri perceplion of mitler u mended. 

" Sect. 121. Cf. Tbeoryof Vision Vin- 
dienltd, tict. 15. 

i. t. ihere are no Common Seniiblei; 



from whii 
from the 
anilogy. 1 



(bliowi that we can reawn 
whk to ihe other onlj bjr 
kI on the arbitrary but eiw>- 
n of their reipeetive pheno- 
I. Cf. Thtory of Vition VinibcaUd, 



New Theory of Vision. 95 

an tmprejudiced person is more to be relied on in this case than 
the sentiments of the generality of men; who, in this as in 
almost everything else, suffer themselves to be guided by custom, 
and the erroneous suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason 
and sedate reflection^.] 

109. Sec0mJfyy Light and colours are allowed by all to consti- 
tute a sort or species entirely different from the ideas of touch ; 
nor will any man, I presume, say they can make themselves per- 
ceived by that sense. But there is no other immediate object of 
si^ besides light and colours^. It is therefore a direct conse- 
ipence, that there is no idea common to both senses. 

150. It is a prevailing opinion, even amongst those who have 
dioi^t and writ most accurately concerning our ideas, and the 
ways whereby they enter into the understanding, that something 
more is perceived by sight than barely light and colours with their 
yariations. [The excellent^ Mr. Locke termeth sight <<the most 
comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the 
ideas of lig^t and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense ; 
and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion.'' 
(Ess^ mi Hmmam UmJerstaiuBngy B. iii. ch. 9. s. 9.) Space or dis- 
tance^, we have shewn, is no otherwise the object of sight than 
of hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, as for figure and extension, I 
leave it to any one that shall calmly attend to his own clear and 
distinct ideas to decide whether he has any idea intromitted 
immediately and properly by sight save only light and colours: 
or, whether it be possible for him to frame in his mind a distinct 
abstract idea of visible extension, or figure, exclusive of all colour ; 
and, on the other hand, whether he can conceive colour without 
visible extension ? For my own part, I must confess, I am not 
able to attain so great a nicety of abstraction. I know very well 
that, in a strict sense, I see nothing but light and colours, with 
their several shades and variations. He who beside these doth 
abo perceive by sight ideas far different and distinct from them, 
hath that faculty in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than 

* Omitted in bst edition. visible extension without any experience of 

^ Of. fcct. 43. 103. &c. A plurality of co- muscular movement in the eye he does not 

cTittmt naits or mimma of colour constitutes here say. 

Berkeley *f risible extension ; while a plural- ^ Omitted in last edition. 

ity of fooccfsively experienced minima of ** Here space s^ distance ; and the notion 

resismt points constitutes his locomotive of distance belongs with Berkeley originally 

Whether we can perceive this to our tactual and locomotive experience. 



96 An Essay towards a 

I can pretend to. It must be owned, indeed, that, by the mediation 
6f light and colours, other {2^ different ideas are suggested to my 
mind. But so they are by hearing^, which, beside sounds which 
are peculiar to that sense, doth, by their mediation, suggest not 
only space, figure, and motion, but also all other ideas whatso- 
ever that can be signified by words. 

131. Thirdly^ It is, I think, an axiom universally received, that 
^quantities of the same kind may be added together and make 
one entire sum.' Mathematicians add lines together; but they do 
not add a line to a solid, or conceive it as making one sum with 
a surface. These three kinds of quantity being thought incapable 
of any such mutual addition, and consequently of being compared 
together in the several ways of proportion, are by them for that 
reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous. Now let 
any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or surfi^e to a 
tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them making one con- 
tinued sum or whole. He that can do this may think them homo- 
geneous ; but he that cannot must, by the foregoing axiom, think 
them heterogeneous. [I acknowledge myself to be of the latter 
sort^.] A blue and a red line I can conceive added together into 
one sum and making one continued line; but, to make, in my 
thoughts, one continued line of a visible and tangible line added 
together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even insurmount- 
able — and I leave it to the reflection and experience of every 
particular person to determine for himself. 

132. A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn firom 
the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke 
in his Essay " ; which I shall set down as it there lies, together 
with Mr. Locke's opinion of it : — ^ Suppose a man born blind, 
and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between 
a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same 
bigness, so as to tell when he felt one and the other, which 
is the cube, and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and 
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man made to see : Quaere, 
Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now 

•• In second edition, * But then, upon this Moljucux, Worh$^ vol. IX. p. 34. — Leib- 

score, I sec no reason why the sight should nitz, Noweaux Essais, Liv. II. ch. 9, who. 

be thought more comprehensive than the so far granting the fact, disputes the hetcro- 

hearing, which,' &c. gencity. — Smith's Optics. — Remarks, §§ 161 

•* Omitted in last edition. — 170. — Hamilton's Reid, p. 137, note, and 

" See also Locke's * Correspondence* with Led. Metapb. II. p. 176. 



New Theory of Vision, 97 

4lisHiignish^ and teU, which is the globe, which the cube. To 
iriiidi the acute and judicious proposer answers : Not. For, though 
he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube a£Fects 
his toudi; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what 
aficcts his touch so or so must afFcct his sight so or so : or that 
a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, 
diail aj^^ear to his eye as it doth in the cube. I agree with this 
thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his 
answer to this his problem; and am of opinion that the blind 
man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which 
was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them/ {fissay 
m Hmmsm UmJerstandimgy B. ii. ch. 9. s. 8.) 

133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of the 
same sort with a square surface perceived by sight, it is cer- 
tain the blind man here mentioned might know a square surface 
as soon as he saw it. It is no more but introducing into his mind, 
by a new inlet, an idea he has been already well acquainted with. 
Since therefore he is supposed to have known by his touch that 
a cube is a body terminated by square surfaces y and that a sphere 
is not terminated by square surfaces — upon the supposition that 
a visible and tangible square differ only in numero^ it follows that 
he mig^t know, by the unerring mark of the square surfaces, 
which was the cube, and which not, while he only saw them. 
We must therefore allow, either that visible extension and figures 
are specifically distinct from tangible extension and figures, or 
else, that the solution of this problem, given by those two [very ^^j 
thoughtful and ingenious men, is wrong. 

134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the pro- 
position I have advanced. But, what has been said is, if I mis- 
take not, sufficient to convince any one that shall yield a reason- 
able attention. And, as for those that will not be at the pains of a 
little thought, no multiplication of words will ever suffice to make 
them understand the truth, or rightly conceive my meaning*^. 

135« I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem without 
some reflection on it. It hath been made evident that a man 
bUnd from his birth would not, at first sight, denominate anything 
be saw, by the names he had been used to appropriate to ideas 
of touch. (Vid. sect. 106.) Cube, sphere, table are words he has 

■ Omitted in bit edition. »• Cf. Theory o/ Vision Vindicated, icct. 70. 

H 



98 An Essay towards a 

known applied to things perceivable by touch, but to things per- 
fectly intangible he never knew them applied. Those words, in 
their wonted application, always marked out to his mind bodies 
or solid things which were perceived by the resistance they gave. 
But there is no solidity, no resistance or protrusion, perceived by 
sight. In short, the ideas of sight are all new perceptions^ to 
which there be no names annexed in his mind ; he cannot there- 
fore understand what is said to him concerning them. And, to ask 
of the two bodies he saw placed on the table, which was the sphere, 
which the cube, were to him a question downright bantering 
and unintelligible; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his 
thoughts the idea of body, distance, or, in general, of anything he 
had already known. 

136. It is a mistake to think the same^* thing afiects both 
sight and touch. If the same angle or square which is the object 
of touch be also the object of vision, what should hinder the blind 
man, at first sight, from knowing it ? For, though the manner 
wherein it affects the sight be different from that wherein it 
affected his touch, yet, there being, beside this manner or circum- 
stance, which is new and unknown, the angle or figure, which is 
old and known, he cannot choose but discern it. 

137. Visible figure and extension having been demonstrated 
to be of a nature entirely different and heterogeneous from 
tangible figure and extension, it remains that we inquire con- 
cerning motion. Now, that visible motion is not of the same sort 
with tangible motion seems to need no farther proof; it being an 
evident corollary from what we have shewn concerning the diflfer- 
ence there is betwixt visible and tangible extension. But, for a 
more fiill and express proof hereof, we need only observe that 
one who had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight 
know motion '^^ Whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable 
by sight is of a sprt distinct from motion perceivable by touch. 
The antecedent I prove thus — By touch he could not perceive any 
motion but what was up or down, to the right or left, nearer or 
farther from him; besides these, and their several varieties or 
complications, it is impossible he should have any idea of motion. 

" Cf. sect 49, 146, &c. Here * same* being only arbitrary signs of the latter, we 

includes * similar.* should not, at first sight, be able to interpret 

" i. e. visible and tangible motions being the visible signs of tactual motion, i. e. of 

absolutely heterogeneous, ind the former locomotion proper. 



New Theory of Vision. 99 

He would not therefore think anything to be motion, or give the 
name motion to any idea, which he could not range under some 
or other of those particular kinds thereof. But, from sect. 95, it is 
plain that, by the mere act of vision, he could not know motion 
upwards or downwards, to the right or left, or in any other pos- 
sible direction. From which I conclude, he would not know motion 
at all at first sight. As for the idea of motion in abstract, I shall 
not waste paper about it, but leave it to my reader to make the ^. 
best he can of it. To me it is perfectly unintelligible^®. 

138. The consideration of motion may furnish a new field 
lor inquiry^. But, since the manner wherein the mind appre- 
hends by sight the motion of tangible objects, with the various 
degrees thereof, may be easily collected from what has been 
said ooDceming the manner wh;erein that sense doth suggest their 
various distances, magnitudes, and situations, I shall not enlarge 
any farther on this subject, but proceed to inquire what may be 
allied, with greatest appearance of reason, against the proposition 
we have demonstrated to be true; for, where there is so much 
prejudice to be encountered, a bare and naked demonstration of 
the truth will scarce suffice. We must also satisfy the scruples 
that men may start in favour of their preconceived notions, shew 
whence the mistake arises, how it came to spread, and carefully 
disclose and root out those false persuasions that an early preju- 
dice might have implanted in the mind. 

139. Fhst^ therefore, it will be demanded how visible ex- 
tension and figures come to be called by the same name with 
tangible extension and figures, if they are not of the same kind 
with them ? It must be something more than humour or accident 
that could occasion a custom so constant and universal as this, 
whidi has obtained in all ages and nations of the world, and 
amongst all ranks of men, the learned as well as the illiterate. 

140. To which I answer, we can no more aigue a visible and 
tangible square to be of the same species, from their being 
called by the same name, than we can that a tangible square, and 
the monosyllable consisting of six letters whereby it is marked, 
are of the same species, because they are both called by the same 
name. It is customary to call written words, and the things they 

■• Of. sect. 122 — 125. space is not conceivable without an ex- 

** Cf. PrineipUs^ sect. Ill — Ii6; also perience of tactual or muscular locomotion. 
Am^ytt, qaery 12. On Berkeley's system 

H 2 



I02 An Essay towards a 

from confounding them. But, when we find the same signs suggest 
the same things all over the world ; when we know they are not 
of human institution, and cannot remember that we ever learned 
their signification, but think that at first sight they would have 
suggested to us the same things they do now : all this persuades us 
they are of the same species as the things respectively represented 
by them, and that it is by a natiu-al resemblance they suggest them 
to our minds. 

145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey of 
any object, successively directing the optic axis to each point 
thereof, there are certain lines and figures, described by the motion 
of the head or eye, which, being in truth perceived by feeling**, do 
nevertheless so mix themselves, as it were, with the ideas of sight 
that we can scarce think but they appertain to that sense. Again, 
the ideas of sight enter into the mind several at once, more dis- 
tinct and unmingled than is usual in the other senses beside the 
touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are apt 
to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound : but we can perceive, 
at the same time, great variety of visible objects, very separate 
and distinct from each other. Now, tangible*® extension being 
made up of several distinct coexistent parts, we may hence gather 
another reason that may dispose us to imagine a likeness or 
analogy between the immediate objects of sight and touch. But 
nothing, certainly, docs more contribute to blend and confound 
them together, than the strict and close connexion®^ they have with 
each other. We cannot open our eyes but the ideas of distance^ 
bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by them. So swift, and 
sudden, and unperceived is the transit from visible to tangible 
ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the imme- 
diate object of vision. 

146. The prejudice ^2 which is grounded on these, and what- 
ever other causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast oh our 
understandings, that it is impossible, without obstinate striving 
and labour of the mind, to get entirely clear of it. But then the 
reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinion can be no argument 
of its truth, to whoever considers what has been already shewn 
with regard to the prejudices we entertain concerning the distance, 

^ Cf. sect. 16, 27* 97* ^ i. e. as natural signs, associated with 

^ i. e. tangible in the strict meaning— their thus implied meaning, 
excluding locomotive experience (?). ■ Cf. Thtmy of Vision Vindicated, sect 35. 



New Theory of Vision. 



103 



magnitude, and situation of objects; prejudices so familiar to our 
minds, so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly give way to 
the clearest demonstration. 



147. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude ^^ that 
the proper objects of vision constitute the universal language of 
nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions, in 
order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation 
and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be 
hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their information that we 
are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. 
And the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the 
objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages 
and signs of human appointment ; which do not suggest the things 
s^ified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an 
habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe 
between them®*. 

148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be told 
by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps he shall 
come to the brink of a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must 
not this to him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot 
conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as 
these, which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as 
prophecy does to others. Even they who are blessed with the 
visive faculty may (though familiarity make it less observed) find 
therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art and 



* Berkeley, in this section, enunciates 
the constructive principle of the Essay^ 
with which he starts in his Theory of 
Viskm VmdieaUd^ where cf. sect. 38. — 
Reid and others have proposed objections 
to the arbitrary character of the rela- 
tioa between visible and tangible extension, 
founded on the rules of perspective and of 
the projection of the sphere. 

•• L e. under the laws of reproductive 
inugination, or association of ideas. * The 
** tolntioi)'* of the phenomenon that we ap- 
prehend, by the ideas of sight, certain other 
ideas, which neither resemble them, nor cause 
tbeni, nor arc caused by them, nor h»vc any 
necessary connexion with them,* compre- 
hends, Berkeley tells us, {Theory of Vision 
VituhcaieJ, sect. 42,) * the whole 1 heory of 
\ision. 

* The inugiiMtion of every thinking per- 



son will supply him with instances to prove 
that the ideas received by any one of the 
senses do readily excite such other ideas, 
either of the same sense or of any other, as 
have habitually been associated with them. 
So that if, on this account, we are to suppose, 
with a late ingenious writer, that the ideas 
of sight constitute a Visual Language, be- 
cause they readily suggest the corresponding 
ideas of touch, as the terms of a language 
excite the ideas answering to them, I see not 
but we may, for the same reason, allow of a 
tangible, audible, giistatory, and olefactory 
language, thotigh doubtless the Visual Lan- 
guagc will be abundantly more copious than 
the rest.' Smith's Optics. — Remarks^ p. 29. 
— And into this theory of physical causation 
and previsive interpretation, the philosophy 
of Berkeley ultinutcly resolves itself. 



104 An Essay towards a 

contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes 
for which it was apparently designed ; the vast extent, number, and 
variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease, and quick- 
ness, and pleasure, suggested by it — all these afibrd subject for 
much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us sooie 
glimmering analogous prsenotion of things, that are placed beyond 
the certain discovery and comprehension of our present state**. 

149. I do not design to trouble myself much with drawing 
corollaries from the doctrine I have hitherto laid down. If it bears 
the test, others may, so far as they shall think convenient, employ 
their thoughts in extending it farther, and applying it to whatever 
purposes it may be subservient to. Only, I cannot forbear making 
some inquiry concerning the object of geometry, which the subject 
we have been upon does naturally lead one to. We have shewn 
there is no such idea as that of extension in abstract*®; and that 
there are two kinds of sensible extension and figures, which arc 
entirely distinct and heterogeneous from each other *^. Now, it is 
natural to inquire which of these is the object of geometry**. 

150. Some things there are which, at first sight, incline one to 
think geometry conversant about visible extension. The constant 
use of the eyes, both in the practical and speculative parts of that 
science, doth very much induce us thereto. It would, without 
doubt, seem odd to a mathematician to go about to convince him 
the diagrams he saw upon paper were not the figures, or even the 
likeness of the figures, which make the subject of the demonstra- 
tion — the contrary being held an unquestionable truth, not only 
by mathematicians, but also by those who apply themselves more 
particularly to the study of logic ; I mean who consider the nature 
of science, certainty, and demonstration; it being by them as- 
signed as one reason of the extraordinary clearness and evidence 
of geometry, that in that science the reasonings are free from 

" Cf. Alcipbron, Dialogue IV. sect. 11 — implicate of our sense-experience, than, per 

15. ^ Sect. 12a — 125. $^, an object of any sense. This theory. 

•' Sect. 127 — 138. which is independent of the absolute hete- 

^ A large school of modem metaphysi- rogcneity of the extension given in sight 

cians say that neither tangible nor visible and touch, is not entertained in the Essay, 

extension is the object of geometry, but in- Cf. Kant's explanation of the origin of our 

tcUigible or a priori extension : and that mathematical knowledge, Kritik der rtinen 

space is rather a necessary concomitant, or Vernunft^ Elementarlehre, I. 



New Theory of Vision. 105 

those inconveniences which attend the use of arbitrary signs, the 
▼ciy ideas themselves being copied out, and exposed to view upon 
pE^ien But, by the bye, how well this agrees with what they like- 
wise assert of abstract ideas being the object of geometrical de- 
nxHistraticMi I leave to be considered. 

151. To come to a resolution in this point, we need only 
observe what has been said in sect, 59, 60, 61, where it is shewn 
that visible extensions in themselves are little regarded, and have 
no settled determinate greatness, and that men measure altogether 
by the application of tangible extension to tangible extension. 
All whidi makes it evident that visible extension and figures are 
not the object of geometry. 

15a. It is therefore plain that visible figures are of the same 
use in geometry that words are. And the one may as well be 
accounted the object of that science as the other ; neither of them 
being any otherwise concerned therein than as they represent or 
suggest to the mind the particular tangible figures connected with 
them. There is, indeed, this difference betwixt the signification 
of tangible figures by visible figures, and of ideas by words — that 
whereas the latter is variable and uncertain, depending altogether 
on the arbitrary appointment of men, the former is fixed, and 
immutably the same in all times and places. A visible square, for 
instance, suggests to the mind the same tangible figure in Europe 
that it doth in America. Hence it is, that the voice of nature, 
whidi speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation 
and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably 
subject to*^. From which may, in some measure, be derived that 
peculiar evidence and clearness of geometrical demonstrations. 

153. Though what has been said may suffice to shew what ought 
to be determined with relation to the object of geometry, I shall, 
nevertheless, for the fuller illustration thereof, take into my 
thougjits the case of an intelligence or unbodied spirit, which is 
supposed to see perfectly well, i.e. to have a clear perception of the 
proper and immediate objects of sight, but to have no sense of 
touch'**. Whether there be any such being in nature or no, is beside 

• 

• Of. sect. 51 — 66, 144. vision. Sec Reid's speculations on the 
^ Thi» is 1 conjecture, not as to the pof- * Geometry of Visiblcs ' and the Idomenians, 
iflrfe notions of one bom blind, hut as to Inquiry^ VI. 9 — as to which Priestley re- 
tike notions of an *■ unbodied' intelligence, marks, " I do not remember to have seen a 
capable only of the sense-experience of pure more egregious piece of solemn trifling than 



ro6 An Essay towards a 

my purpose to inquire ; it suffices, that the supposition contains 
no contradiction in it. » Let us now examine what proficiency 
such a one may be able to make in geometry. Which speculaticm 
will lead us more clearly to see whether the ideas of sight can 
possibly be the object of that science. 

154. Tirst^ then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence could 
have no idea of a solid or quantity of three dimensions, which 
follows from its not having any idea of distance. We, indeed, arc 
prone to think that we have by sight the ideas of space and solids; 
which arises from our imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see 
distance, and some parts of an object at a greater distance than 
others; which has been demonstrated to be the eflFect of the 
experience we have had what ideas of touch are connected with 
such and such ideas attending vision. But the intelligence here 
spoken of is supposed to have no experience of touch. He would 
not, therefore, judge as we do, nor have any idea of distance, out- 
ness, or profundity, nor consequently of space or body, either 
immediately or by suggestion. Whence it is plain he can have 
no notion of those parts of geometry which relate to the men- 
suration of solids, and their convex or concave surfaces, and con- 
template the properties of lines generated by the section of a 
solid. The conceiving of any part whereof is beyond the reach of 
his faculties. 

155. Farther y he cannot comprehend the manner wherein 
geometers describe a right line or circle; the rule and compass, 
with their use, being things of which it is impossible he should have 
any notion. Nor is it an easier matter for him to conceive the 
placing of one plane or angle on another, in order to prove their 
equality; since that supposes some idea of distance, or external 
space. All which makes it evident our pure intelligence could 
never attain to know so much as the first elements of plain 
geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be found 
he cannot even have an idea of plain figures any more than he can 
of solids; since some idea of distance is necessary to form the 
idea of a geometrical plane, as will appear to whoever shall reflect 
a little on it. 

the chapter which our author calls the but from sight." Cf. Rcid's allusion to this 

• Geometry of Visibles/ and his account of passage in his Essays on the Intellectual 

the ' Idomenians/ as he terms those imagi- Powers^ p. 382, Hamilton's Edition 
nary beings who have no ideas of substance 



New Theory of Vision. 107 

156. All that is properly perceived by the visive fiaculty 
amounts to no more than colours with their variations, and dif- 
ferent proportions of light and shade — but the perpetual muta- 
bility and fleetingness of those immediate objects of sight render 
them incapable of being managed after the manner of geometrical 
figures ; nor is it in any degree useful that they should. It is true 
there be divers of them perceived at once ; and more of some, and 
less of others : but accurately to compute their magnitude, and 
assign precise determinate proportions between things so variable 
and inconstant, if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be 
a very trifling and insignificant labour. 

157. I must confess, it seems to be the opinion of some very 
ingenious men that flat or plane figures are immediate objects of 
sig^t, though they acknowledge solids are not. And this opinion 
of theirs is grounded on what is observed in painting, wherein (say 
they) the ideas immediately imprinted in the mind are only of 
jdanes variously coloured, which, by a sudden act of the judgment, 
are changed into solids : but, with a little attention, we shall find 
the planes here mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are 
not visible but tangible planes. For, when we say that pictures 
are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch smooth 
and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity, or, in 
other words, this planeness of the picture is not perceived imme- 
diately by vision ; for it appeareth to the eye various and multi- 
form. 

158. From all which we may conclude that planes are no 
msxe the immediate object of sight than solids. What we strictly 
see are not solids, nor yet planes variously coloured — they are 
only diversity of colours. And some of these suggest to the mind 
solids, and others plane figures ; just as they have been experienced 
to be connected with the one or the other : so that we see plains 
in the same way that we see solids — both being equally suggested by 
the immediate objects of sight, which accordingly are themselves 
denominated planes and solids. But, though they are called by the 
same names with the things marked by them, they are, nevertheless, 
of a nature entirely different, as hath been demonstrated^^. 

^ CK. sect. 130, and Theory of Vision sight is unextended colour, and that, apart 
Vimdieaitd, sect. 57. Docs Berkeley, in from muscular movement in the eye and 
this and the two preceding sections, mean other locomotion, all visibilia are un- 
to hint that the only proper object of extended points? This question has not 



io8 An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. 

159. What has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to 
decide the question we proposed to examine, concerning the ability 
of a pure spirit, such as we have described, to know geometry. It 
is, indeed, no easy matter for us to enter precisely into the 
thoughts of such an intelligence; because we cannot, without 
great pains, cleverly separate and disentangle in our thoughts the 
proper objects of sight from those of touch which are connected 
With them. This, indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce 
possible to be performed; which will not seem strange to 0% if we 
consider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his 
native language, which is familiar to him, pronounced in his ears 
without understanding them. Though he endeavotu* to disunite 
the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless intrude into his 
thoughts, and he shall find it extreme difficult, if not impossible, 
to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never 
learnt the language, so as to be affi:cted barely with the sounds 
themselves, and not perceive the signification annexed to thenu 

160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither abstract nor 
visible extension makes the object of geometry ; the not discerning 
of which may, perhaps, have created some difficulty and useless 
labour in mathematics. [''^Sure I am that somewhat relating 
thereto has occurred to my thoughts, which, though, after the most 
anxious and repeated examination I am forced to think it true, 
doth, nevertheless, seem so far out of the common road of geo- 
metry, that I know not whether it may not be thought presump- 
tion if I should make it public in an age wherein that science 
hath received such mighty improvements by new methods ; great 
part whereof, as well as of the ancient discoveries, may perhaps 
lose their reputation, and much of that ardour with which men 
study the abstruse and fine geometry be abated, if what to me, 
and those few to whom I have imparted it, seems evidently true, 
should really prove to be so.] 

escaped more recent psychologists, including " The following sentence is not con- 
Stewart, Brown, and Mill, who hold that tained in the last edition, in which the first 
imextended colour is perceivable and ima- sentence of sect. 1 60 is the concluding one 
ginable. See also Professor Bain's Sense% of sect. 159, and of the Essay, 
and IrUellectf p. 376. 



I 



AN APPENDIX. 

\T6is jffff*diXy vihichfirft appeared in the second, is omitted i» tht 
last and in all the collected eiStions.] 

THE censures which, I am informed, have been made on the 
fiir^oing Essay inclined nle to think I bad not been clear and 
oprcss enough in some points; and, to prevent being mis- 
understood for the future, I was willing to make any necessary 
alterations or additions in what I had written. But that was 
impracticable, the present edition having been almost finished 
before I received this infonnation. Wherefore, I think it proper 
to consider in this place the principal objections that are come 
to my notice. 

In the first place, it is objected, that in the beginning of the 
Essay I argue either against all use of lines and angles ia optics, 
and then what I say is false j or against those writers only who 
will have it that we can perceive by sense the optic axes, angles, 
ftc, and then it is insignificant, this being an absurdity which 
no one ever held. To which I answer that I argue only against 
those who are of opinion that we perceive the distance of objects 
by lines and angles, or, as they term it, by a kind of innate 
gcfMnetry. And, to shew that this is not fighting with my own 
shadow, I shall here set down a passage from the celebrated 
Descartes" >- 

■ Distantiam prxterea discimus, per mutuam quandam con- 
sptrationem ocuJorum. Ut enim caecus 
noster duo bacilla tenens, j1 E et C E^ de 
quorum longitudine incertus, solumque in- 
tcrvallum manuum j4 et C, cum magnitu- 
dine angulorum j1 C E, et C j1 E explo- 
ratumhabens,inde,utcxGeometriaquadam 
omnibus innata, scire potest ubi sit punc-- 
turn B. Sic quum nostri oculi R S T ct 

™ TliUpUMge it contiined in tht Diopoita of Dtt Cartn, VI. 13; wtt alio VI. 11. 




no 



An Appendix, 




r s t ambo, vertuntur ad JT, magnitude linese S /, et anguloram 

X S s et X s Sy certos nos redduat 
ubi sit punctum X. £t idem 
opera alterutrius possumus inds^ 
gare, loco ilium movendo, ut a 
versus X ilium semper dirigentes^ 
primo sistamus in puncto S^ et 
statim post in puncto /, hoc suffi- 
ciet ut magnitude lineas ^ x, et 
duoruYn angulorum X S s ct X si 
nostrx imagination! simul occur- 
rant, et distantiam puncti X nos edoceant : idque per actionem 
mentis, quae licet simplex judicium esse videatur, ratiocinationem 
tamen quandam involutam habet, similem illi, qua Geometrae per 
duas stationes diversas, loca inaccessa dimetiuntur/ 

I might amass together citations from several authors to the 
same purpose, but, this being so clear in the point, and from an 
author of so great note, I shall not trouble the reader with any 
more. What I have said on this head was not for the sake of 
finding fault with other men ; but, because I judged it necessary to 
demonstrate in the first place that we neither see distance imme- 
diately, nor yet perceive it by the mediation of anything that 
hath (as lines and angles) a necessary connexion with it. For on 
the demonstration of this point^* the whole theory depends. 

Secondly^ it is objected, that the explication I give of the appear- 
ance of the horizontal moon (which may also be applied to the 
sun) is the same that Gassendus had given before. I answer, 
there is, indeed, mention made of the grossness of the atmosphere 
in both, but then the methods wherein it is applied to solve the 
phenomenon are widely different, as will be evident to whoever 
shall compare what I have said on this subject with the following 
words of Gassendus : — 

* Heine dici posse videtur : solem humilem oculo spectatum 
ideo apparere majorem, quam dum altius egreditur, quia dum vici- 
nus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum, atque adeo corpus- 



''^ i.e. the arbitrarinesSy as far as our 
thought is concerned, of the apparently con- 
stant relation between the proper objects of 



sight and certain visual sensations, on the 
one hand, and the distances perceived, 
through their means, on the other. 



An Appendix. iii 

culonim qux solis radios ita retundunt, ut oculus minus conniveat, 
et pupilla quasi umbrefacta longe magis amplificetur, quam dum 
sole multum elato rari vapores intercipiuntur, solque ipse ita 
splendescit, ut pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima efficiatur. 
Nempe ex hoc esse videtur, ciu* visibilis species ex sole procedens, 
et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in retinam, ampliorem in 
ilia sedem occupet, majoremque proinde creet solis apparentiam, 
quam dum per contractam pupillam eodem intromissa contendit/ 
Vid. Epist, I . De Apparente Magnitudtne Solis Humilis et SuhltnuSy p. 6. 
This solution of Gassendus proceeds on a false principle, to wit, 
that the pupil's being enlarged augments the species or image on 
the fund of the eye. 

Thirdly^ against what is said in Sect. 80, it is objected, that 
the same thing which is so small as scarce to be discerned by a 
man, may appear like a mountain to some small insect; from 
which it follows that the minimum visihile is not equal in respect of 
all creatures'*. I answer, if this objection be sounded to the bottom, 
it will be found to mean no more than that the same particle of 
matter which is marked to a man by one minimum visihile^ exhibits 
to an insect a great number of minima visiMia. But this does not 
prove that one minimum visihile of the insect is not equal to one 
minimum visihile of the man. The not distinguishing between the 
mediate and immediate objects of sight is, I suspect, a cause of 
misapprehension in this matter. 

Some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been made, 
but, in the points they refer to, I have endeavoured to be so very 
plain, that 1 know not how to express myself more clearly. All 1 
shall add is that, if they who are pleased to criticise on my Essay 
would but read the whole over with some attention, they might be 
the better able to comprehend my meaning, and consequently to 
judge of my mistakes. 

♦^* I am informed that, soon after the first edition of this 
treatise, a man somewhere near London was made to see, who had 
been bom blind and continued so for about twenty years''^. Such 

" Cf. sect. 80—83. of a young man, William Jones, bom blind, 

" The reference here seems to be to the who, at the age of twenty, on the 29th of 

cue described in the TatUr (No. 55) of June preceding, had received sight by a 

Angntt 16, 1709, which contains an account surgical operation. See also a narrative ot 



I 

a 

{ 



112 An Appendix. 

a one may be supposed a proper judge to decide how far some tenets 
laid down in several places of the foregoing Essay are agreeable 
to trutli; and if any ciu-ious person hath the opportunity of making 
proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should gladly see my 
notions either amended or confirmed by experience ''^. 

this case, entitled A fitU and true aeeount Mr, Roger Grant, oculist, London 1709. 

of a miraculous cure of a Young Man in ^ Of. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, 

Newington, who was Ixim hUnd, and was in sect. 71, with the rebtire note. 
Jive minutes brought to perfect sight by 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



TO THE 



TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



f 



TO THE 



TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 



BERKELEY'S TreoHse concerning the Principles of Human Know- 
Itdge is the most systematically reasoned exposition of his peculiar 
philosophy which his works contain. 

Like the New Theory of Vision, its pioneer, it was composed at 
Trinity College, Dublin. The first edition, * printed by Aaron Rhames, 
for Jeremy Pepyat,' appeared in Dublin in 1710. The next, which con- 
tains some additions and other changes, was published in London in 
'734> 'printed by Jacob Tonson,' the Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and PhiUnums being conjoined with it in the same volume. This 
edition was the last in the author's lifetime. The variations in these 
are carefully marked in the present edition. 

An edition of the Principles appeared in London in 1776, more than 
twenty years after Berkeley's death, 'with Remarks on each section, 
in which his doctrines are carefully examined, and shewn to be repug- 
nant to facts, his principles incompatible with the constitution of human 
nature, and the reason and fitness of things.' To this edition, likewise, 
the Dialogues between Hylcu and Philonous are appended, followed by 
' A Philosophical Discourse on the Nature of Human Being, containing 
a defence of Mr. Locke's Principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's 
Essay on Truth,' by the author of the Remarks, 

I 2 



ii6 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

To the edition of 1776 the following * Advertisement' is prefixed:— 

* Bishop Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, and his Dialogm 
between Hylas and Philonaus on the same subject, being out of print, 
and both being much inquired for, the Editor thought a new edition 
of them, with an Answer thereto, might not be unacceptable to the 
public. The tenets maintained in the Dialogues are precisely the same 
with those in the Principles, and the arguments are the same, though 
put into a different form ; but it was thought quite unnecessary to make 
any Reply to them, as the Remarks on the former are equally applicable 
to the latter. 

* How far the author of the Remarks is right in believmg they conUin 
a full refutation of the doctrines of the Bishop must be left to the 
judgment of the candid reader; he has, however, the satisfaction 
of knowing the rectitude of his intentions, and the pleasing hopes he 
entertains that his endeavoiu-s may be attended with some success in 
the cause of truths of the greatest importance.' 

The Remarks are printed on the right-hand page of the 1776 edition, 
in sections corresponding in number and length to those of the Prin- 
ciples. Their acuteness and conclusiveness, however, is by no means 
proportioned to their bulk: many of the glaring and ludicrous mis- 
representations of which Berkeley's philosophy has been the subject 
are here gathered and served up. 

Although this Treatise is the fullest explanation of Substance and 
Power, the two central conceptions of Berkeley's philosophy, that he 
has given, it bears the marks of an unfinished work. It is expressly 
designated * Part I,' and in the Preface to the Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous the author promises a Second Part, which never appeared 
Passages in the work itself, as well as allusions in Berkeley's Common- 
place Book, suggest that only a portion of what is required to complete 
his conception is here executed. In referring Dr. Samuel Johnson, of 
New York, many years after their publication, to this and his two other 
early metaphysical essays, Berkeley thus describes their character: — 
* I had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes. What 
I have done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men, 
who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and 
pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times reading these 
small tracts, and making what is read the occasion of thinking, would, 
I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take 
off that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend 
speculative truths.' 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 117 

The contents and language of the Principles of Human Knowle^e 
prove that Berkeley had been a careful student of Locke's Essay^ 
published twenty years previously, and dedicated, like the PrincipleSy 
to the Earl of Pembroke. This was to be expected, for the Essay^ 
psrtly through the influence of William Molyneux, the friend and cor- 
reqxmdent of Locke, had become an authority in Trinity College in 
Berketejr's undergraduate days. The Principles are proposed as a 
refotation of leading doctrines in the Essay. The term 'idea' is 
as characteristic of the former as of the latter; in both it stands for 
the immediaU object of consciousness — alike in external and internal 
intuition — ^in memory, imagination, and generalization. With both, the 
only objective universe of which we are directly aware consists of the 
'ideas' that we are conscious of, and by both this is assumed as a 
lelf-evident truth. Both appeal exclusively to this experience as their 
final test Locke's classification of ideas as simple and complex, 
with some of his divisions and sub-divisions in each class, re-appear, 
sometimes in altered i^iraseology, in the Principles, Berkeley's whole 
theory of Substance and Cause, Matter and Mind, Space and Time, is a 
boki and subde modification of Locke's theory of ' ideas.' A distinguish- 
ing feature in Berkeley is, that he recognises signs of independent reality 
in one order of Locke's 'ideas' — those given in the senses, and is 
thus able to dispense with the reasonings in the Fourth Book of the 
Essc^ on behalf of a real material worW. Then, the meaning of the 
word * Substance,' which perplexes Locke, is resolved by Berkeley 
into the concrete and familiar meaning of the word 'I' {ego) — the 
pennanent syntheses of ideas perceivable in sense being, according to 
him, subshuues only in a secondary meaning of that term. ' Cause' 
or ' Power' he finds exclusively in voluntary activity. Finite ' Space' 
is with him experience in unresisted organic movement, which is 
capaMe of being symbolised in the visual consciousness of co- 
existing colours. Finite 'Time' is the apprehension of changes in 
our ideas, length of time being measured by the number of changes. 
'Infinite Space' and 'Infinite Time,' because inapprehensible by in- 
telligence, are dismissed from philosophy, as terms void of meaning, 
or which involve contradictions. 

Next to Locke, the influence of Malebranche is apparent in the 
following Treatise ; but Berkeley is not so much at home in the 
'Divine vision' of the French metaphysician as among the 'ideas' of 
the English philosopher. The mysticism of the Richirche de la V/rite 
was repelled by the transparent clearness of Berkeley's thought The 
slender hold that is retained by Malebranche of external substance, as 



ii8 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

well as the theory of merely occasional causation of matter, commoa ; 
to him and Des Cartes, naturally attracted Berkeley, however, to the ; 
Cartesian school, then dominant in France, and reproduced in its 
mystical form in England by Mr. Norris. 

The Platonism which pervades Malebranche perhaps tended to 
encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning that appear in 
Berkeley's own later writings ; but Locke, Malebranche, and Des Caites 
are almost the only philosophers direcdy or indirectly recognised in 
the Principles of Human Knowledge, In fact, this juvenile Treatise 
moves, as it seems on the surface, towards the opposite pole from 
Platonism and a Platonic idealism; for, Berkeley by ideas' means 
phenomena and sensible things, not supersensible realities and Divine 
Reason of Ontology. 

The * Introduction ' to the Principles proclaims war with Universals, 
and more immediately war with Locke. Its remedy for the disorders 
of philosophy is the expulsion of abstract ideas — which, as under- 
stood by Berkeley, involve a contradiction; and the restriction of 
philosophers to the intelligible, concrete objects of which mind 
can be conscious. The metaphysician is here required to resolve the 
meaning of such terms as Matter, Substance, Space, and Time into 
ideas, relations of ideas, and mind which is the one necessary con- 
dition on which all ideas and their relations depend; and he is 
promised that, as the consequence of this, the real world, hitherto 
obscured by abstractions, will become intelligible. All ideas — in other 
words, all phenomena or objects of which we can be conscious — must, 
it is argued, be concrete and particular. It is relations among objects 
of which we can be conscious, and not pretended abstractions, that can 
be signified by universal terms. Abstract Matter, abstract Substance, 
abstract Space, abstract Time — that is Matter, Substance, Space, and 
Time which are supposed to be what cannot be resolved into particular 
ideas, and relations among such ideas — are thus in the sequel proved 
to be absolutely imintelligible. Berkeley's reformed doctrine of abstrac- 
tion, and of the office of language, virtually banishes them all. With 
him, ' abstract ideas' are absurdities, resulting from an unlawful analysis, 
which attempts to penetrate beneath perception or conscious experience 
— that essence or ground of existence; and the lesson of the 'Intro- 
duction' is virtually, that objective existence must consist exclusively of 
what is particular and concrete. The only lawful kind of abstraction 
is, that through which we have what Berkeley calls notions of relations 
among ideas, as distinguished from ideas themselves. And, as names 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

are required lo constitute notions, this introductory- polemic against 
abstract ideas, or pretended analyses or the original synthesis of 
knowledge and existence in perception, takes the form of what is called 
Nominalism *. 



The first Wo of the 156 sections which compose the Priiuiples of 
Human Krtmvltdge coniMn a classification of the objects of which 
we are conscious, and a recognition of Mind as the one condition 
common to them all. 

When wc reflect upon our knowledge, we find (sect, i) that its ideas 
or immtdiaU objiclt are — (a) the phenomena presented to us in or 
through our difl"erent organs of external sense ; (b) those of which we 
are conscious in our internal thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions ; 
and (c) representations (or misrepresentations) of both of these in me- 
morj- and imagination. Of these three sorts of ideas, the sensible ones 
are found in experience to be associated together independendy of the 
will of the percipient, in objective groups, forming what are commonly 
called ' sensible things,' or (in the popular meaning of substance) ma- 
terial substancest. And all, whether called phenomena, or objects, or 
ideas; whether presented in external senses, or feelings and operations 
confined to the individual who is conscious of them, or merely imaginary 
objects— inasmuch as ihoy are all objects of consciousness — imply 
(sect. 3) a subject, mind, self, or ego, that perceives them, remembers 
them, and judges of their relations. On mind they must all depend, 
so far at least as they are actual objects of consciousness, that is to 
say, so far as they arc ideas. 

What is immediately given to us in experience thus consists of 
Mind or Spirit, in the state of being conscious of ideas or objects that 



■ The I. 



t Phfn 



luUim (ipl >l (inl to be confounitcd with 
Ihe auertion or Protagoni) and Nominiliit 
UalLuD of Beckeley'i eirlj meliphyiicil 
■rritinM, on the one h»Hd, and the Pl»- 
lonic RuUiin and IdeiUnn of hit Sirii. on 
the other, \i one of the moit imporlaat, 
and yet hitherto lean eomideced, aipcctt of 
hii philotopby. In ^I'n'i (e.g. lect. 33;. 
&C.) he dillingnilha the Platonic Ideu 
(») from the ' inert, inactiire object! ' or phe- 
aomaa of irbich we are coiudoui. in our 
pretenlatiTe and tepicKOIative experience 
(i.e. hit own 'idea>'): and alio (b) riom 
■ abdract ideal, in the modem lenie.' Plalo'i 
Ideu are characleriied by Berkeley at ■ the 
most leal beingt, intellectual and unchange- 
■ " id iherefijre more real than the fleet- 



't% 



ing, traniient objectiof ienie, wl 
It lb iliiy. cannot be lubjeeti of 1 
tell of intellectual knovledge,' 

-f AccDidinff to Berkeley, we are imme- 
diately percipient ui seine only of Hiaplt 
ideal: our to-called perception of lenuble 
Ibi'ngs (i. e. coniii>iiUioHi of limple ideal) ii 
in a great degree mediate — involving a 
tepcetentative, along with a purely preten- 
talive, pciceplion. When we ur witat we 
recognite lo be an apple, but without tonch- 
ing. lasting. 01 imelling U, we hare already 
learned by cuilom to combine in qualitiei 1 
in-d we have learned alio to repretent In 
idea itt other than rltible igualiliei, on 
of the putely viiual itale of being 






r the colour, which alone 11 



lao EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

belong to one or other of the three classes already mentioned. Spirits 
and ideas constitute Berkele/s Dualism. (The exact definition of this 
duality has been one of the difficulties in his philosophy.) 

The lawful aims of human intelligence accordingly seem to be : — 

I. The observation of particular ideas, i. e. objects or phenomena. 

a. The scientific determination of the relations of particular ideas 
to one another. 

3. The philosophical recognition of their common relation of depen- 
dence on Mind ; and the study of Mind, as manifested in various orders 
of intelligent beings. 

But, according to the old ' Principles ' of metaphysicians, this is not 
philosophy at all Philosophy has to do with what is real, absc^te, 
or substantial — with Matter or Substance, and other abstractions, which 
are assumed to be independent of, i.e. external to, the perceptions of 
every mind 

The design of the sections which follow the two first is, to state and 
defend new universal or philosophical Principles, for the regulation of 
the understanding in itn attempts to conceive and reason about the 
universe. They are pro|K)sed instead of the old ones which assumed 
that real things must be abstract entities, independent of Mind. The 
sections in which they are explained, defended, and applied, may be 
surangcd in three Divisions, thus : — 

I. (Sect. 3 — 33.) Here the new Principles of philosophical knowledge 
are stated, illustrated, supported by facts and abstract reasoning, and 
contrasted with the old Principles to which Berkeley attributes the 
confusion and scepticism involved in all previous attempts. They are 
virtually three in number — one negative and two affirmative, viz. — 

1. The negation of Matter, in the philosophical meaning, or rather 
no-meaning, of ihe word ; i. e. as signifying an imperceiving and un- 
perceived substance and cause. 

2. The affirmation, as Substance proper, of what is signified by the 
terms mind, spirit, soul, or self— in short, by *I' (ego); and, as Cause 
proper, of what we are conscious in voluntary effort — a reasonable 
will. 

3. The affirmation of matter^ in the only intelligible meaning of 
that term, viz. as consisting of the ideas, objects, or perceptions of 
sense — which appear, disappear, and re-appear, independentiy of the 
will of the mind that is conscious of them, in uniform order of 
co-existence and succession, so that their changes may be foreseen, 
and which are the medium of intercourse between one mind and 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 121 

another ; of maUrial substances^ or groups of co-existing sense-per- 
ceptions, united in conscious experience independently of our will, and 
commonly called 'sensible things;' and of material causes ^ or uniform 
antecedents in the permanent and rational order of sensible changes. 

In short, the universe in which we find ourselves is a universe that 
consists, in the last analysis, of mind conscious of ideas or phenomena. 
The ideas of sense appear in an order which, because independent of 
our individual will, may be called external to each of us; and 
which, being uniform, is capable of being interpreted ; while it affords, 
through its meaning or reasonableness, exercise and development to 
reason, and, as a whole, perpetually illustrates the universal supremacy 
of Divine Mind. Abstract or unperceived Matter, and abstract or un- 
conscious Mind, are banished from philosophy and from the universe; 
particular ideas or objects, perceived or imagined, and dependent for 
their existence on conscious minds, capable of interpreting their rela- 
tions, are alone recognised as real, by the new Principles. What we 
have, or can have, to do with in the universe, must, accordingly, 
consist of the conscious experience of conscious agents, in the 
indefinite varieties of that experience which each may manifest. 
Unexperienced abstractions are negation or absurdity, to be exploded 
tmder the name of 'abstract ideas.' They can neither be believed 
in nor conceived. 

II. (Sect 34 — 84.) A series of supposed Objections to the foregoing 
Principles of the philosophical knowledge of the world and man are 
stated and refuted in succession in these sections. 

III. (Sect. 85 — 156.) The logical Consequences of the new Prin- 
ciples, in their application to our knowledge of (a) the ideas or 
objective things, and (b) the miruis or subjective things that consti- 
tute the universe, are here unfolded. A restoration of belief, and a 
simplification and purification of the sciences, by the exclusion of 
tmmeaning abstract questions, are represented as among their chief 
advantages. 

Let us now look at the grounds, in faith, reasoning, and experience, 
on which Berkeley rests these new Principles, in the thirty-one sections 
which form the First Division of his work. The discussion may be 
said to take its rise from a question which is virtually proposed in 
section 3. The objects of conscious experience — in a word our 
ideas — were alleged, in section i, to be (a) sense-given or external 
phenomena, (b) internal phenomena, (c) phenomena which may be 



122 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

representative or misrepresentative of both these. The question pro- 
posed, by implication, in section 3 is this : — 

Are any of these phenomena not ideas merely^ but also things that 
exist absolutely — that is to say, independently of their ideal character, 
and in complete abstraction from a conscious mind; or, if the veiy 
phenomena of which we are immediately percipient be not themselves 
thus independent of being perceived, do all, or any of them, represent 
something that does exist absolutely? In short, are we can we be, 
either directly or indirecdy, cognisant of aught existmg unintelligibly 
or without a Mind? 

Now, the objects or phenomena of which we are conscious in the 
senses, i. e. our x^»j^-ideas or perceptions, are, it is assumed, the only 
ones about which this question can be raised. Hence the problem 
of this Division of the Treatise is — to find whether the phenomena 
presented in the five senses, are either themselves in substance ex- 
ternal, or represent things that are in substance external — ^meaning by 
' external,' without (i. e. unperceived and unconceived by) a mind, 
foreign to all conscious experience. 

That the ideas or phenomena actually presented to us in die five 
senses cannot themselves be qualities of what is external, in this meaning 
of the term * external,' is afllrmed (sect. 3) to be * intuitively evident.' 
An object is called an idea because it is present in a conscious expe- 
rience. Now, we have no sensible proof that it continues to exist 
when it is not thus present; and every sensible thing includes qualities 
which, by the consent of all who think, are dependent on a sentient 
organization. 

But, although our very sense-given ideas themselves cannot exist 
substantially, when divested of their ideal or immediately objective 
character, and put out of all relation to a conscious mind, may they 
not, it is asked (sect. 8), represent what exists in an unthinking sub- 
stance ? This supposition, it is answered, is a mere unproved 
supposition, and it even involves a contradiction. Those supposed 
solid, extended, and coloured originals or archetypes of our sense-ideas 
are themselves perceived, or they are not. If they are perceived, they 
are ipso facto ideas ; for, an idea is simply that which, whatever else it 
may be, is the immediate object of a conscious mind. On the other 
hand, if they are not themselves, and cannot be, contained in a con- 
scious experience, they cannot resemble what is so contained. *An 
idea can be like nothing but an idea.' A quantity of conscious expe- 
rience can be like nothing but another quantity of conscious experience. 
This conclusion cannot be evaded, it is argued (sect. 9), by Locke's 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 123 

favourite discrimination of the qualities of this unperceiving and un- 
perceived Matter into primary and secondary : so that if solid, extended, 
Goloored substances exist per se, or absolutely, it is impossible that we 
should come to know this; and, if they do not thus exist, we should 
have exactly the same reason for believing in their absolute existence 
that we now have (sect. 20). 

The very supposition, however, of the existence of anything out of 
conscious experience involves, Berkeley further argues, a contradiction 
in terms (sect. 23). We may, indeed, imagine trees in a park, or 
books in our study, with no one at hand to perceive them, and 
maintain their existence in a presmtative experience. But, are we not 
oorsdveSy in the very act of thus imagining them, keeping them in 
existence in our representative experience? Thus, when we do our 
utmost, by imagination, to conceive bodies existing externally or abso- 
lutely, we are, in the very act of doing so, making them ideas — not of 
sense* indeed, but of imagination. The supposition itself of their unideal 
existence makes them ideas; inasmuch as it makes them imaginary 
objects, dependent on an imagining mind. 

On the whole, to say that sensible objects either themselves are, or 
themselves represent substances that exist independent of Mind, is to 
lay what involves a contradiction in terms, or it is to use words which 
mean nothing. It is to speak unintelligibly, in short, according to the 
general conclusion of this part of the Treatise. 

In thus banishing Absolute Material Substance, Berkeley does not 
allow that he has banished Substance — a substantiating or uniting 
principle, in which phenomena have their ground and meaning. He 
substitutes an intelligible, because intelligent, substantiating principle, 
of which we are conscious, for an unintelligible and contradictory 
one, of which we neither are nor can be conscious. Here Berkeley's 
thought becomes obscure. I think it may be worked out in this way: — 
Absolute Material Substance is, he says, an empty abstraction of metaphy- 
sicians, and every real substance must be either perceived or percipient ; 
for we cannot go below experience or consciousness. Now, every per- 
cept or phenomenon perceived implies a percipient, and every percipient 
implies a percept. Are substances, then (i. e. the ultimate ground of 
phenomena), percepts, or are they percipient minds ? When we com- 
pare these, we find that the deepest and truest ground of things lies 
in the latter, and not in the former; in a mind, and not in percepts 
or phenomena which depend upon a mind. We are aware in memory 
of the mysterious identity of the former, and to this personal identity 
there is no counterpart in the perpetual changes of the perceived 



124 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

or objective world. The substances of the universe are thus properly 
the minds or persons that exist in it. There is, strictly speaking, 
*no other Substance than Spirit , or that which perceives* (sect 7). 

It is next argued (sect. 25 — 27), that voluntary mental activity is 
the only Causation in the universe — ^that all Power, as well as all Sub- 
stance, is essentially mental. To satisfy ourselves that changes among 
phenomena are only the passive effects of spiritual agency, it is 
maintained that we have only to observe them. As the essence of 
all phenomena has been proved to consist in perception of them, it 
follows that they cannot contain anything of which the percipient is 
incognisant. Now, power or activity is not exhibited by any. SensiUe 
(or other) phenomena, therefore, cannot be the cause of our being 
conscious. Nor can they cause the changes which occur among them- 
selves: phenomena are related to each other as signs and significates, 
not as causes and effects. 

But, while the universe of ideas or phenomena is void of causality, 
power (implied in the changes of the objects of consciousness) must 
exist. As it cannot be attributed to ideas, it must belong to that 
on which they depend. Now, Berkeley has already concluded that 
what they depend on must be conscious Mind, Self, or Ego. To 
conscious Mind, Self, or Ego, accordingly, he refers all the changes 
in existence. Minds not only substantiate phenomena; they cause 
changes. 

But there is a plurality of powers at work among ideas. Each one 
of us finds, on trial, that his personal power over the phenomena of 
which he is conscious varies (sect. 28 — 33). We can make and 
immake at pleasure the objects of imagination; the ideas of the senses 
are independent in a much greater degree of the mind to which they 
are present. When in broad daylight we open our eyes, it is not in 
our power to choose whether we shall see or not, or to determine what 
particular objects shall present themselves to our view. In our sense- 
experience we find ourselves confronted by the signs of a larger reason 
and a firmer will than are exhibited in the arbitrary constructions of our 
own imagination; we encounter the Supreme Power signified by the steady 
natural laws of sense-given phenomena. In and through our senses, 
we awaken to the discovery, that our individual conscious life is, in the 
sense-given part of it, a portion of the Universal System,, which is evolved 
in a manner so orderly and constant that wx can, by interpreting what 
we perceive, foresee the future, and regulate our lives. What we per- 
ceive places us habitually in relation to Supreme or Essential Intelligence 
expressed in the laws of nature; and to other minds, like our own, 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 125 

who share with us this experience of the senses, and who, through 
its means, can (we find) convey to us, and we to them, indications 
of our respective experiences. The ideas which are given to us in 
the Senses are thus distinguished from all our other ideas. Their 
arrangements of co-existence and succession are not merely the arbi- 
trary results of our own imaginative activity; they are independent of, 
or external to, our will. They thus reveal to us the only contempo- 
raneous External World of which we have any proof, or of which 
we can even conceive the possibility — a world in other minds. Ideas 
of this sort (if, indeed, one should call them 'ideas' at all) may em- 
phatically be distinguished from all other ideas, as real ones; and 
their established combinations are what men commonly call * real 
things.' 

These sections (28 — 33) are among the most important in the 
Treatise. They express Berkeley's reasons for distinguishing groups 
of real or sense ideas — which, irrelative to anything beyond, can 
neither be representative nor misrepresentative — from ideas in an^ in- 
dividual imagination. All truth and all error belong to the latter, not 
to the former. Physical truth is the true interpretation of real or 
sense ideas. Physical error is the misinterpretation of these ideas. 
But sense -ideas themselves, which may be thus interpreted or mis- 
interpreted, represent nothing — except, indeed, the Divine meaning of 
which their laws are signs, and of which human science is the imperfect 
interpretation. They can have no archetypes behind them, existing 
in an unconscious substance. Imagination is the only representative 
faculty. A representative sense-perception is an absurdity*. The ideas of 
sense are what they are, and we cannot go deeper. If they were them- 
selves representations of other ideas, then these others would become 
the real ideas, and those so called would be relegated to imagination. 
And Absolute Matter is not their archetype, which, as it cannot be 
perceived in sense, can as little be suggested by custom and association, 
inferred by abstract reasoning, or believed in by the common faith or 
reason of men. The world of material things is thus substantially 
syntheses of phenomena in conscious minds, and Intelligence is the 
essence of the universe. 

Such in spirit are Berkeley's new Principles, with the grounds in 
reason and experience to which he refers them. What I have called 

♦ mustrations of this statement, and a ception with that of the Scotch psychologists. 
comparison of Berkeley's presentative per- will be given afterwards. 



126 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

the Second Division of the Treatise (sect. 34 — 84) is devoted to the 
statement and refutation of supposed Objections to the Principles. 

The objections and answers may be briefly presented as follows : — 

First objection, (Sect. 34 — 40.) The preceding Principles banish 
from existence all that is real and substantial, and substitute a universe 
of mere ideas or chimeras. 

Answer. This objection is a play upon the popular meaning of 
the word ' idea.' That word may be used to signify objects of sense — 
in respect of their necessary dependence upon mind; and not merely 
fancies and chimeras, the 'ideas' of popular language, creatures of 
individual minds, which may, and often do, misrepresent the real ideas 
of the natural system that is independent of our will, while dependent 
on Divine Mind and Will. An idea, in the language of this S3r8tem, 
is simply that of which we are conscious. 

Second objection, (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles abolish the 
distinction between Perception and Imagination — between imagining 
one's self burnt and actually being burnt. 

Answer, Real fire differs from the mere thought or fancy of it, 
as real pain does from the mere thought or fancy of pain; and yet 
no one supposes that real any more than imaginary pain can exist 
unperceived, or in an unperceiving substance. 

Third objection, (Sect. 42 — 44.) We see sensible things actuaUy 
existing at a distance from us. Now, whatever is thus seen at a 
distance is surely seen as external, which contradicts the foregoing 
Principles. 

Answer, Distance, or outness, is absolutely invisible. It is a concep- 
tion which is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connection 
between colours (which alone we see) and visual sensations that 
accompany seeing, on the one hand, and certain^ varieties of tactual 
and locomotive experience, on the other — as was proved in the Essay 
towards a New Theory of Vision^ in which the mere ideality of the 
visible world is demonstrated*. 

Fourth objection, (Sect. 45 — 48.) It follows from the new Principlesi 
that real things, i. e. combinations of real or sense ideas, must be at 
every moment annihilated and created anew. 

Answer, On the contrar}', it is quite consistent with the new Prin- 
ciples that a sensible thing may actually exist, in the sense-experience of 
other minds, during the intervals of perception by an individual 

• Moreover, even if the outness or dis- exist unperceived. On the contrary, the 
tance of things wert visible, it would not very h3rpothesis implies that they are per- 
follow that either they or their distance ceived visually. 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 127 

mind; for the Principles do not affirm their substantial and causal 
dependence on this, that, or the other mind, but on Mind. They 
imply, indeed, a constant creation or presentation in finite minds; 
but the conception of the universe in a state of constant creation 
was familiar to the Schoolmen and other Theists, and enables us 
impressively to realise Divine Providence. 

Fifth objection, (Sect 49.) If extension and the other primary quali- 
ties of matter can exist only in mind, it follows that extension is an 
attribute of mind — that mind is extended. 

Answer, Extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind not 
as modes or attributes, which is unintelligible, but as ideas^ or objects 
of Yrbidb. Mind is percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with 
the supposition that mind itself is extended or solid "*". 

Sixth objection, (Sect. 50.) The Newtonian and other discoveries 
in natural philosophy proceed on an assumption of external Matter, 
and are thus inconsistent with the new Principles. 

Answer, On the contrary, external Matter — if 'external* means what 
exists in absolute independence of Mind — is useless in natural philo- 
sophy, which is conversant exclusively with particular ideas, phenomena, 
or concrete things, and not with mere abstractions. 

Seventh objection, (Sect. 51.) It is absurd, because at variance with 
the universal use of language, to exclude power or causation from 
Matter, and to attribute every sensible phenomenon to Mind, as the fore- 
going Principles do. 

Answer, While we may continue to speak as the unreflecting multi- 
tude do, we should learn to think with the reflecting or philosophical. 
We may still speak of physical causes, even when, as philosophers, 
we have recognised that all true efficiency is in mind, and that the 
material world is only a system of sensible symbols regulated by 
mind. 

Eighth objection, (Sect. 54, 55.) The Common Sense or universal 
belief of men is inconsistent with the exclusively ideal character of 
real or external things. 

Answer, This is doubtful, when we consider that, in their natural 
confusion of thought, ordinary men do not comprehend the metaphysical 

* It is also to be remembered that involuntary states of feeling and imagination 

sensible things may exist * in mind,' without are mint, because their existence depends 

being mint — meaning by * mine ' the crea- on my individual consciousness of them ; 

turel of my wiU, Mind and they are con- and even sensible things are mint, because, 

nectcd, but not as cause and effect. Properly though present in many minds in common, 

speaking, that only is mine in which my they are, for me, dependent on my mind, 
will exerts itself. But, in another view, my 



128 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

meaning of their own assumptions; and it seems a small objection, 
when we recollect the prejudices, dignified as Common Sense, which 
have successively surrendered to philosophy. 

Ninth objection, (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is inconsistent 
with the common belief in the existence of an external world must 
be rejected. 

Answer, The fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the 
cause of changes in our x^»x^-ideas, which we gradually learn by 
experience to foresee, sufficiendy accounts for the conmion belief in 
externality, and is what men really mean by the word. 

Tenth objection, (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles concerning 
Matter and Mind are inconsistent with various established truths in 
mathematics and natural philosophy. 

Answer, The laws of motion, and the other truths here referred to, 
may' be all conceived and expressed in perfect consistency with the 
new Principles about the substantiality and causality of Minds, and 
the absence of all proper substance and causation in Matter. 

Eleventh objection. (Sect. 60—66.) If, according to the foregoing 
Principles, the material world is merely the series of phenomenal or 
ideal effects of which we are conscious in our senses, the elaborate 
contrivances which it contains are useless. 

Answer, These elaborate contrivances, while unnecessary as causes, 
are relatively necessary scs signs : they express to us the occasional 
presence of other finite minds, the constant presence and power of 
Supreme Mind, and the Divine Ideas of which the objective universe 
is the symbol. 

Thvelfth objection, (Sect. 67 — 79.) Although the impossibility' of an 
Absolute Material Substance that is active, solid, and extended may 
be a demonstrable Principle, this does not prove the imp>ossibility of 
one that is inactive^ and neither solid nor extendedy which may be the 
occasion of our sense-ideas, or which at any rate may exist 

Answer, This supposition is unintelligible: the words in which it 
is expressed cannot convey any meaning. 

Thirteenth objection, (Sect. 80, 81.) Notwithstanding the foregoing 
Principles, Matter may be an unknown somewhat^ neither substance nor 
accident, cause nor effect, spirit nor idea ; and all the reasonings against 
the notion of Matter, conceived as something positive, fail, when this 
purely negative notion is maintained. 

Answer, This is to use the word * Matter' as people use the word 
* nothing:' the supposed abstract existence cannot be distinguished 
from nothing. 



f 

EDITOR'S PREFACE. 129- 

Fourkenih objection. (Sect. 82 — 84.) Although we cannot, in oppo- 
sition to the new Principles, infer by reasoning the independent or 
absohite existence of Matter, according to any possible conception, 
either positive or negative, of what Matter is ; and although we may be 
noafale even to understand what the word means, yet. Holy Scripture 
b sufficient to convince every Christian of the existence of an external 
material world — as an object of faith. 

Answer. The absolute or independent existence of a material world 
is nowhere afi&rmed in Scripture, which employs language in its popular 
and practical meaning. 

In what I have called the Third Division of the Treatise (sect. 85 — 
156), the new Principles, thus guarded against objections, are applied to 
invigorate belief, which was suffering from the paralysis of metaphysical 
Scepticism. They are also employed to purify and simplify the sciences 
wbidi relate to the ideal world 0/ ihe senses — the Physical Sciences; and 
those which relate to spirits^ by whom ideas are sustained, and their 
changes determined — the science of Minds, and Theology. It may be 
thus subdivided : — 

I. (Sect 85 — 134.) Application of the new Principles, concerning 
Matter, Mind, Substance, and Cause, to our knowledge of the objective 
and physical world of ideas — 

1. To the refutation of Scepticism, as to the existence of sensible 

things (sect 85 — 91) ; and of God (sect 92 — 96) ; 

2. To the liberation of Thought from the bondage of unmeaning 

abstractions (sect 97 — 100); 

3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by correcting para- 

doxical conceptions of Time, Space, and Motion (sect. loi — 
116); 

4. And of Mathematics, through criticism of our notions of 

Number and Extension, and by the abolition of the con- 
tradictions involved in the common doctrine of Infinites (sect. 

117—134). 

II. (Sect. 135 — 156.) Application of the new Principles to our 

nations of Mind or Spirit — 

1. To explain and sustain our faith in our natural Immortality 

(sect. 137—144); 

2. To explain and vindicate the belief which each man has in the 

existence of other men (sect. 145); 

3. To vindicate belief in the existence of Supreme Mind (sect. 

146 — 156). 

K 



I30 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

It was only by degrees that this scheme of Berkeley's philosophy 
attracted the attention due to so original and ingenious a niode of 
conceiving the Universe. A fragment of metaphysics, by a young 
and almost unknown author, published at a distance from the centre 
of English intellectual Ufe, was apt to be overlooked. In connection 
with the Essay on Vision^ however, it drew enough of regard to carry 
its author with /ciai on his first visit to London, three years after the 
publication of the Principles, He then published the immortal Dia- 
logues between Hylas and PhiUmouSy in which the absiudity of Absolute 
Matter is illustrated, and the doctrine defended against objections, in a 
manner meant to recommend to popular acceptance what, on the first 
statement, seemed an unpopular paradox. 

A. C. F. 



A TREATISE 



CONCERNING 



THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 



[»PART I.] 

WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE 
SCIENCES. WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. ATHEISM, AND IR- 
RELIGION. ARE INQUIRED INTO. 



First Printed in the Year 1710. 



> Omitted on the title-page, but retained in the body of the work in the second or 
1 734 edition. 



K 2 



TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 

THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKES &c, 

KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND 
ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST 



HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. 



Mt Lord, 



You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the 

honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in 

this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design 

to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make 

choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by 

any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the 

church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament 

and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to 

make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged 

by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your 

lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour 

and bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our Society' gave 

me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one 

of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise 

at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have 

it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on 

account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in 

your lordship, 

My Lord, 

Your lordship's most humble 

and most devoted servant, 

GEORGE BERKELEY. 



* Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of Pem- 
broke and fifth Earl of Montgomery, the 
fneod of Locke-^who dedicated his Essay 
to him, as a work * baring some little cor- 
rcfpoodence with some parts of that nobler 
and rast system of the sciences your lord- 
ship has made so new, exact, and instructive 
a draft of* — and representative of a family 
renowned in English political and literary 
history. He was born in 1656; was a 
aoMcfluii of Christ Church, Oxford, in 



1673 ; succeeded to his titles in 1683 ; was 
sworn of the Privy Council in 1689; and 
was made a Knight of the Garter in 1700. 
He filled some of the highest offices in the 
state, in the reigns of Wimam and Mary, and 
of Anne. He was Lord Lieutenant of Ire- 
land in 1707, having previously been one of 
the Commissionen by whom the unkm be- 
tween EngUnd and Scotland was negotiated. 
He died in January 1733. 
■ Trinity College, DublixL 



THE PREFACE. 



What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry^, 
seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known — particularly 
to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the 
existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the 
soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially 
examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the 
success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to 
the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend 
his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that 
degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to 
deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are 
very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to 
be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an 
entire perusal will appear not to follow from them ; so likewise, though 
the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very 
probable my sense may be mistaken ; but to a thinking reader, I flatter 
myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of 
novelty and singularity'- which some of the following notions may seem 
to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account 
He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the 
sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration', for 
no other reason but because it is newly known ', and contrary to the 
prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order 
to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too 
apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it^ 



' In his Common-place Book Berkeley 
•ccmt to refer his speculations to his boy- 
hood. The theory of the sensible world 
propoimdcd in the following Treatise was 
obrkmsly conceived by him before the pub- 
lication of the Niw Theory of Vision, which 
was a first instalment of it. 

' Cf. Locke, in the 'Epistle Dedicatory* 
of his Estay. As regards the * novelty* of 
the chief principles of the following treatise, 
viz. the lugaiiom of Abstract Entities (abso- 
lute or imperceived Matter, absolute Space, 
abuAvte Time, absolute Substance, and ab- 
solute Cause) ; and the affirmatitm of Mind, 
M the S/nthesii, Substance, and Cause of all 



ideas or objects — the best preceding philo- 
sophy, ancient and modem, was a dim an- 
ticipation of it. 

' Cf. sect. 6, 23, 34, &c., in illustration 
of the demonstrative character of Berkeley*s 
distinctive doctrine. 

* Berkeley's one request to his reader, 
here and throughout his writings, is, to take 
pains to understand his meaning. This 
especially requires us to avoid confounding 
his sffuf-ideas with mere fancies or chimeras 
-—arbitrary creations of the individual mind. 
The history of this doctrine has been a his- 
tory of its misinterpretation. 



INTRODUCTION. 



I. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and 
truth', it may with reason be expected that those who have spent 
most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity 
of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be 
less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet 
so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the high- 
road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of 
nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing 
that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. 
They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and 
are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we 
depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior 
principle — to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, 
but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those 
things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices 
and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our 
view ; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insen- 
sibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, 
which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, 
till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we 
find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in 
a forlorn Scepticism^. 

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or 
the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It 

' * Pluloflophy, which it nothing but the common lense, by employing demonstration 

true knowledge of thinn.' Locke. to make conunon sense reveal itself truly. 

' The pnrpote of these early essajrs of Cf. the closing sentences in the Third Dia- 

Berkeley was to reconcile philosophy with logug bthPttn Hylat and Pbilomous, 



138 



Introdtution. 



is said, *the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature 
for the support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the 
inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of 
man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, 
it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and con- 
tradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate 
itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by 
that which is finite »/ 

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing 
the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong 
use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right 
deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences 
which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should 
believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men 
than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he 
had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to 
the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever 
appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually 
furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not 
fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think 
that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have 
hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to know- 
ledge, are entirely owing to ourselves — that we have first raised 
a dust and then complain we cannot see. 

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those 
Principles are** which have introduced all that doubtfulness and 
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several 
sects of philosophy^ insomuch that the wisest men have thought 
our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural 
dulness and limitation of our faculties'^. And surely it is a work 
well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the 
First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them 
on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect 



' Cf. Locke's Essay^ Introduction, sect. 
4 — 7; B. II. ch. 23, § I a, &c. Locke (who 
is here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the per- 
plexities of philosophy to our narrow faculties, 
which are meant, he maintains, to regulate 
our lives, and not to explain the mysteries of 
Being. See also Des Cartes, Principia, I. 26, 
27, &c. ; Malebranche, Recherche^ III. 2. 



* The assumption that Matter, Space, 
Time, Substance, Cause, may and do exist 
as abstract entities, i. e. unperceived and un- 
conceived by a mind, is, with Berkeley, the 
fundamental false principle, to which is due 
the alleged confusion and inconsistency of 
philosophy, and the consequent inclination 
to philosophical and religious scepticism. 



Introduction. 



139 



that those lets and difEculties, which stay and embarrass the mind 
in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and 
intricaq^ in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so 
much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and 
mi^t have been avoided. 

5* How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may 
seem, when I consider what a number of very great and extra- 
ordinary men have gone before me in the like designs^, yet I am 
not without some hopes — upon the consideration that the largest 
views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted 
will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a 
close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better 
eyes. 



6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier 
conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, 
by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of 
Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some 
measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems 
to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and 
perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and diffi- 
culties in almost all parts ot knowledge. And that is the opinion 
that the mind hath a power of framing atstract ideas or notions of 
things*. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and 
disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small 
part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more 



' A work preriouily undertaken under the 
same designation, by Des Cartes in his /Vin- 
tifia^ and, in fact if not in name, by Locke 
in his Euay. 

* Here * abstract idea ' and ' notion * are 
osfed conrertibly. Cf. sect. 14a. Of. with 
what follows against alntraet idiot in the 
remainder of the Introduction, sect. 97 — 100, 
1 1 8 — 133, 143 ; Niw Tbtory of Vision^ sect. 
122 — 125; AlcipbroHf Dial. rii. 5 — 7; Dr- 
fmc* o/Fret Tbtniimg in Maibemaiietj sect. 
45—48 ; SiriM, sect. 3J3. 335, Ac. where 
he distinguishes the Platonic Ideas from the 
'ideas' and Nominalism of his own early 
philosophy. 

In the following sections Berkeley has 
Locke chiefly in view. He appears here as 
the second great modem defender of Nomi- 



nalism, and is so referred to by Hume, 
TYeatise of Human Nature^ B. I. part I, ch. 7. 
Hobbes was the first. Berkeley's reasonings, 
in the sections which follow, have become 
commonplace in later discussions of the 
question, What are we cognizant of when 
we use the common terms on which human 
science depends ? According to Berkeley, it 
is not an i(Ua^ inasmuch as all ideas (i.e. 
presentative and representative objects) must 
either be particular or else involve contra- 
dictory characters ; it is, he concludes, a 
relation among ideas that we know when 
we employ general terms. Yet, many 
who have accepted his reasonings against 
abstract ideas have not discerned their con- 
nexion with his abolition of abstract Matter 
and Space.* 



140 Introductiofu 

especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which 
go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which 
passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime 
learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled 
in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, 
and that it is well acquainted with them. 

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of 
things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and 
separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended 
together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind 
being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from 
those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means 
frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by 
sight an object extended, coloured, and moved : this mixed or 
compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, 
and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frume the 
abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is 
possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but 
only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction^ the idea of 
colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both 
colour and extension. 

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular 
extensions perceived by sense there is something common and 
alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure 
or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it con- 
siders apart or singles out by itself that which is cbmmon, making 
thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, 
surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea 
entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by 
leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which 
distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only 
which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which 
is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. 
And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only 
from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, 
and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of 
motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular 
motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. 



Introduction. 141 

9« And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities 
or modes^ so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, 
attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings'' which 
indude several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having 
observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain 
common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the 
complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James and any other 
particular man, that which is peculiar to each^ retaining only what 
is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the 
particulars equally partake — abstracting entirely from and cutting 
oflF all those circumstances and differences which might determine 
it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said 
we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity, 
or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, 
because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be 
neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there 
is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise 
there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low 
stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all 
these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety 
of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the 
complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are 
peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all 
the living creatures, frames the idea of animal^ which abstracts not 
only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and 
insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are 
body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By My is meant 
body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one 
shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of 
hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, 
scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of par- 
ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. 
Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither 
walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but 
what that motion is it is not easy to conceive. 

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting 

^ Cf. sect. I of the Frinciples. 



142 



Introduction. 



their ideas% they best can tell : for myself, [^ I dare be confident 1 
have it not.] I find indeed I have indeed a faculty of imagining^ 
or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have 
perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can 
imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined 
to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, 
each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But 
then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular 
shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to 
myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a 
straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I 
cannot by any efibrt of thought conceive the abstract idea above 
described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the 
abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which 
is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like 
may be said of all other abstract general ideas 'whatsoever. To 
be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when 
I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, 
with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is pos- 
sible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can 
abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities 
which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can 
frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the 
manner aforesaid — which last are the two proper acceptations of 
atstraction. And there is ground to think most men will acknow- 
ledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which 
are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions^^. It 
is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and 
study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there 
be, they are confined only to the learned. 

II. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the 
doctrine of abstraction", and try if I can discover what it is that 
inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote 



■ Cf, Derodon's Logica, P. II. c. 6, 7; 
Pbilosopbia Contracta^ I. i. § 7 — 11 ; and 
Gassendiy Leg. InUit.^ I. 8, for reasoning 
fimilar to what follows in this section. 
Also Cudworth, Eternal and Intmutahle Mo- 
rality^ B. IV.; Browne's Procedure of the 
Understanding, B. II. ch. 4 ; Bolingbroke's 
Works, vol. I. pp. 117, &c. 



* Omitted in second edition. 

'* • abstract notions' — here used con- 
vertibly with * abstract ideas.' Cf. sect. 
142, on the meaning of the term notion. 

^^ Here assumed to mean, that we can 
perceive or imagine Entities, from which 
all phenomena of experience have been 
abstracted, and which are thus abstract 



Intrgduction. 143 

from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late 
[»^cxccllent] and deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, 
has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think th^ having 
abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point 
of understanding betwixt man and beast. ^ Tlie having of general 
ideas,' saith he, ^ is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt 
man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes 
do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no 
foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal 
ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not 
the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have 
no use of words or any other general signs.' And a little after. 
< Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the 
species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper 
difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last 
widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, 
and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot 
deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that 
they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have 
sense ; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them 
from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those 
narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge 
them by any kind of abstraction.' — Essay am Human UnderstanMng^ 
B. II. du 1 1. § 10 and i j. I readily agree with this learned author, 
that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. 
But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort 
of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be 
reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned 
why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general 
ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other 
general signs; which is built on this supposition — that the 
making use of words implies the having general ideas. From 
which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract 
or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of 
the author will further appear by his answering the question he in 
another place puts : ^ Since all things that exist are only particulars. 



objects or idat, e.g. 'Existence/ after ab- appear in the senses — perception or intelli- 

•Ifactioii of all the phenomena in which gence being abstracted, in short. 
it nnnifests itself to us ; or * Matter/ after " Omitted in second edition. 

abttractsoo of all the phenomena which 



144 Introduction. 

how come we by general terms ?* His answer is : ' Words be- 
come general by being made the signs of general ideas.' — Isigj 
OH Human Understanding^ B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems that a 
word Id becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract 
general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it 
indifferently suggests to the mind ^^, For example, when it is said 
*the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,' 
or that ^whatever has extension is divisible,' these propositions 
are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and 
nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an 
idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direc- 
tion and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general 
idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither 
great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other deter- 
minate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion 
I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, 
or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds 
equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it 
matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that 
magnitude or figure. 

12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better 
judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I 
do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there 
are any abstract general ideas 1* ; for, in the passages we have quoted 
wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed 
that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in 
sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, 
and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall 
acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, 

^^ * To this I cannot assent, being of soning or thinking, e. g. about length 

opinion that a word/ &c. — in first edition. without any reference to breadth, which he 

^^ Though we cannot have the logical allows ; and (b) having an idea or intuition 

exttrU and content of our concepts intuitively of length without breadth, which he denies 

exhibited to us, either in a percept or in an the possibility of. Length and breadth 

image, it is to be noted that we may have combined make only one itUa, or sensuous 

resembling signs of conceptual rebtions, as presentation or representation. All ideas, 

well as verbal or non>resembling signs. We whether in sense or imaginary, must be 

think by means of specimen-objects, in which particular. We rise above them only in a 

our concepts are exempliiied ; as well as by less or more extensive apprehension of their 

means of arbitrary verbal symbols — in short, relations^ — not by the apprehension of idea$ 

after the analogy of geometry, as well as different in kind, because abstract, and which 

after the analogy of algebra. Cf. the fol- were supposed to be the object-matter of 

lowing section. metaphysics. 

*' Berkeley distinguishes between (a) rea- 



Introduction . 145 

becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other 
(Muticular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an 
example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of 
cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black 
line of an inch in length : this, which in itself is a particular 
line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, 
as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever ; 
so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, 
in other words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line 
becomes general by being made a sign, so the name ^ line,' which 
taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. 
And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of 
an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that 
may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its 
gmerality from the same cause, namely, the various particular 
lines which it indifferently denotes. 

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of 
abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall 
add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding^ 
which is as follows : ^' Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy 
to diildren or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If 
they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and 
familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon 
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances 
of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily 
o6fer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it 
not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a 
triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, 
and difficult) ; for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither 
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at 
once ? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an 
idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas 
are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has 
need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the 
conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, 
to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet oni* 
has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. 
At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and 
general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily 

1. 



146 Introduction. 

acquainted with, nor such a$ its earliest knowledge is conversant 
about." — B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man has the feculty of framing 
in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described^ it is in 
vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it 
All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform 
himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, mcthinks^ 
can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy 
than for any one to look a little into his own thoughts, and there 
try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall 
correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea 
of a triangle — which is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, 
equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once>*? 

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry 
with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. 
And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and 
labour of the mind, to emancipate our thou^ts from particular 
objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are con- 
versant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural con- 
sequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming 
abstract ideas was not necessary for communication^ which is so 
easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they 
seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by con- 
stant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know 
at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that diffi- 
culty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for 
discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it 
seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking^ it remains 
therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the 
great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions* 7 will be 
found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to 
imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their 
sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till 
they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so 
framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them 
to every common name they make use of ? 

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlarge- 

" Cf. Alcipbron, Dial. VI [. 7. Sensible objects, passive states of mind, and 

" In Berkeley's language, we have notions representations (or misrepresentations) of 

but no ideas of substance proper (i.e. Mind), these in imagination, are alone ideas, Cf. 

or of relations among particular phenomena. sect. 1^2 ; also Siris^ sect. 308. 



Introduction, 1 47 

•/ knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point 
mudi insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about 
universal notions ^«, to which I fiiUy agree : but then it does not 
appear to me that those notions *« are formed by abstraction in the 
manner premised — universality^ so far as I can comprehend, not 
ooQsisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of any- 
thing, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or 
represented by it ; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or 
notions 1^, being in their own nature particular y are rendered um^ 
versml »9. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning 
triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal 
idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be understood as if I could 
frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor 
sealenon, nor equicrural ^ but only that the particular triangle I 
consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally 
stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and 
is in that sense umversaL All which seems very plain and not to 
include any difficulty in it. 

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any propo- 
sition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first 
seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which 
equally agrees to all ? For, because a property may be demonstrated 
to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow 
that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects 
is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that 
I the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to 
two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to 
all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal 
sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is 
universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration 
for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all 
demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the 
particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all 
equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea 

*• See note 17 on preceding page. tioni — the apprehension of relations being 

• I.e. 'things' and • notions' which are the essence of thought. Note that * notions* 

fcaembling, and 'names' which are non- are here said to be particular; which they 

rcsemblinir signs, are in themselves parti- are, in as far as they must be capable of 



r. IS every immediate object of which being individualized or exemplified in indi 

we arc consdoos must be. They are urn- vidual experiences. Notion seems here to 

in the act of tbinking tbeir rela- be used for relative image. 

r. 2 



148 Introduction. 

I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, 
that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a 
determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all 
other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And 
that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor deter- 
minate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstia- 
tion. It is true the diagram I have in yiew includes all these 
particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them 
in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three ai^es are 
equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or 
because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Whidi 
sufEciently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, 
and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held 
good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of 
any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a 
particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because 1 
demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. 
[^oAnd here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a 
figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular 
qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may 
abstract ^ but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, 
general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may 
consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, with- 
out framing the forementioned abstract idea, either of man or of 
animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.] 

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the 
Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the 
manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their 
doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them 
into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned 
dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty 
advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at 
this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had 
been well if the ill eflPects of that doctrine were confined to those 
only who make the most avowed profession of it.. When men 
consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many 
ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the 
sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of 

** What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the 1 734 edition. 



Introduction, 1 49 

them remain full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that 
are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to 
be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain 
in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the under- 
standings of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion 
of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than 
by being an innocent diversion and amusement ^^ — I say, the con- 
sideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and 
perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a 
view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, 
amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and 
extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this«2 of 
shtrsct general ideas. 

18. 1 come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion, 
and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less 
extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion 
so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other 
reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of 
abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to 
naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had 
been no such thing as speech or universal signs'^ there never had 
been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and 
elsewhere of the Essay m Hunum UnderstanMng. Let us examine 
the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of 
that mistake. — First then, it is thought that every name has, or 
ou^t to have, one only precise and settled signification, which 
inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas 
that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each 
general name ; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract 
ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. 
Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite 
signification 3^ annexed to any general name, they all signifying 
indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which does 

* So Bacon in the Novum Organon. image can represent in the phantasy the 

" Of. Introduction, sect, i — ' this that content and trntnt of a notion, which imply 

«c hare been endeaTooring to overthrow' the recognition by the mind of a relation 

first edition. among a plurality of particular objects. 



" This sbonld include resembling as well ** This must be understood of die denotft- 

u noD-rescmbling signs — relative images as tion of names. 
vdl at verbal symbols. But no particular 



1 50 Introduction, 

evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly 
«^pear to any one by a little reflexion. To this it will be ob- 
jected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained 
to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to 
be 'a plain surface comprehended by three right lines,' by which 
that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To 
which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the 
surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides 
are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they arc 
inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, 
and consequently there is no one settled idea^-^ which limits the 
signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a 
name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it 
stand everywhere for the same idea^^; the one is necessary ^% the 
other useless and impracticable. 

19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce 
the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a 
received opinion that language has no other end but the com- 
municating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for 
an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names 
which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always 
mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded 
that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names 
in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to 
others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, 
is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover 
that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant 
names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, 
excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for — 
in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as 
letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be 
marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that 
in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular 
quantity it was appointed to stand for27. 

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is 

*• i.e. presentative or rq>rcscntativc in- " Sec Leibnitz on Symbolical Knowledge 

tuition. {Opera Pbilosopbiea, pp. 79-80, Erdmann), 

*• A definition determines the ideas or andStewart on* Abstraction/ in his f^rmm/s, 

particular objects to which the name is ap- vol. I. ch. 4, § i. Names are constructive 

plicable, but the notion signified by the name in their office, as ministers of thought. Cf. 

cannot be individualized in an abstract object. Prmeiples^ sect. i. 



Introduction. 151 

not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. 
There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting 
to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some 
particular disposition — to which the former ^s is in many cases barely 
subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be 
obtained without it, as I think does not unlrequently happen in 
the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with 
himself, and see if it does not often happen, either in hearing or 
reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admira- 
tion, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon 
the perception of certain words, without any ideas^^ coming between. 
At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas^^ that were 
fitting to produce those emotions ; but, if I mistake not, it will be 
found that, when language is once grown femiUar, the hearing of 
the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended 
with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by 
the intervention of ideas ^9 that are now quite omitted. May we 
not, for example, be affected with the promise of a gttod things 
though we have not an idea of what it is ? Or is not the being 
threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we 
think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to 
ourselves an idea of danger in abstract ? If any one shall join ever 
so little reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe that 
it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used 
in the propriety of language without the speakers designing them 
for marks of ideas^^ in his own, which he would have them raise in 
the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not 
seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the 
ideas '^^ of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. 
For example, when a schoolman tells me 'Aristotle hath said it,* all 
I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion 
with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to 
that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the 
minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to 
authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of 
his person, writings, or reputation should go before. [^^So close 

* i.e. the communication of idaas — in " * ideas/ i.e. images of particular ob- 

othcr words, the excitement of particular jects to which the words are applicable. 
•maget in the fancy, which verbal language ** This sentence is omitted in the lecood 

often supersedes to a great extent. edition. 



152 Inirodtutton. 

and immediate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the very 
word Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the 
mii^ds of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind may be 
given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's 
experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? 

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. 
We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest 
patrons ; and endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those 
ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have 
traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears 
evidently to be language. — It cannot be denied that words are of 
excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge 
which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men 
in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the 
possession of one single person. But most parts of knowledge 
have been [3' so] strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of 
words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered, 
[i3i that it may almost be made a question whether language has con- 
tributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the sciences]. 
Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, 
['^^I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as 
possibly I can]: whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to 
take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my 
thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant 
use hath so strictly united with them ; from which I may expect 
to derive the following advantages : — 

22. First ^ I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely 
verbal — the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences 
has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound 
knowledge. Secondly^ this seems to be a sure way to extricate 
myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has 
so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men ; and that 
with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and 
more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was 
he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly^ so long 
as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas^^^ divested of words, I 

^* Omitted in second edition. objects of which I am presentativcly or 

^* * My own ideas/ i. e. the particular representatively conscious. 



Introduction. 153 

do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, 
I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking 
I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to 
imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are 
not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there 
are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any 
compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite 
than an attentive perception of what passes in my own under- 
standing. 

23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose 
an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare 
hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an 
union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that 
betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been 
very much increased by the doctrine of ahstraction. For, so long 
as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it does 
not seem strange that they should use words for ideas — it being 
found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the 
Mkstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceiv- 
able. This seems to me the principal cause why those-^3 who have 
so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of 
words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, 
have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been 
very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes 
which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy 
these evils, they ^-^ advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, 
and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. 
But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, 
it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so 
long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to 
signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general 
name was a determinate abstract idea. 

Z4. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with 
greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that 
knows he has no other than fartUular ideas, will not puzzle 
himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed 
to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for 

" He probably refers to Locke. 



154 Iniroduction, 

ideas 34 will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where 
there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that 
every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view 
of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress 
and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the 
judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our 
view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in 
vain do we consdlt the writings of learned men and trace the 
dark footsteps of antiquity— we need only draw the curtain of 
words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is 
excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Know- 
ledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make 
infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw con- 
sequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther 
we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be 
the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever there- 
fore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he 
would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and 
endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I 
had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to 
discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all 
danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he 
can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised 
ideas. 

^ Inasmuch as they may stand for rda- 142. In the state which Leibnitz calls 

tions of ideas, whether in sense or imagina- * symbolical consciousness* we can use words 

tion ; and for a Mind or Self, as distinguished without realizing their meaning, 
from any of its particular ideas. Cf. sect. 



OF THE 



PRINCIPLES 



OF 



HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 



PART I. 



I. IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the otjects^ 
of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted 
on the senses j or else such as are perceived by attending to the 
passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help 
of memory and imagination — either compounding, dividing, or 
barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid 
ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their 
several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and 
soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these 
more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes 
me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys 
sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. 
And as several of these are observed to accompany each other. 



' This threefold division of the o^^^ls or 
f he mom ema of which we are conscious — viz. 
(a) Stm$e-4dt€u or frtsf/Uatiotu ; (b) the 
ideas of the * passions and operations* of 
mind, by some called intimal presentationx ; 
(c) repmeniatiotu^ which may be more 
or less elaborated — nearly corresponds to 
Locke's simfrfe ideas of sense and reflection, 
and his complex ideas. The two first are 
Home's * impressions/ and the last his 
'ideas.' But Berkeley raises a question 
which Locke did not conceive, viz. Do 



any of the three classes of objects or 
ideas of which we are conscious exist in- 
dependently of a conscious mind ; or, if 
not, do any represent or surest what exists 
thus absolutely ? Are they, or at any rate 
do they stand for, ' things in themselves* 
— substances from which all perception or 
consciousness may be abstracted ? Can we, 
in short, find in perception, by any analysis. 
Mind and Matter existing in a muiuaUy 
md§ptndeHi duality? This Treatise is an 
answer to this question. Cf. sect. 86, 89. 



156 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one 
thing '^. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure 
and consistence having been observed to go together, are ac- 
counted one distinct thing, signified by the name ^Ui other 
collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like 
sensible things — which as they are pleasing or disagreeable exdte 
the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of 
knowledge, there is likewise something^ which knows or perceives 
them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, 
remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is 
what I call mlnd^ spirit^ saul^ or myself. By which words I do 
not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct ftom 
them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby 
they are perceived — for the existence of an idea consists in being 
perceived *•. 



3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by 
the imagination, exist without the mind^, is what everybody will 
allow. And to me it is no Jess evid ent that the vaH mig y^y^<^|-;nnc 
or_ ideas, imprinted on. the ^ense^ however bl ended or r^mhinf^ 
together (that is, whatever objects^ thjaLXlQmP Qse), cannot exist 
otherwise than in a mind 7 perceiving them.— I th ink an in tuitLvc 



' This is the synthetic or constructive 
function of names, according to Berkeley. 
He here and elsewhere distinguishes between 
sensible things properly so called, and the 
simple ideas or objects of sense, of which 
* things' are composed. Cf. sect. 33, 38. 

• This * something' is the Ego or con- 
scious subject, which the object-world implies, 
through which it is united and becomes 
intelligible, and by which it is causally re- 
gulated. But Berkeley does not affirm of 
the Ego, any more than of the world 
of ideas, that it exists ahsoiutdy^ i. e. inde- 
pendently of being conscious — that the per- 
dpient is independent of ideas, any more 
than that these last are independent of a 
percipient. — For Berkeley's notion of Self, 
as distinguished from his ideas, cf. sect. 7, 
where he speaks of the Self or Ego as the 
only 'substance;' and sect. 27, 125 — 140. 
Though he affirms, in this section and 
elsewhere, that Self and its ideas are * en- 
tirely distinct' from one another, he denies 
that they are distinct suhstances. The Du- 



alism of Berkeley — spirits and ideas — does 
not underlie perception, but is, so to speak, 
co-extensive with it. It is resolvable into 
the distinction between the Ego, as perma- 
nent or identical, and the phencmiena of 
which each Ego is oonsdous, in tense or 
otherwise, as changing — with whatever is 
implied in this, which, however, he does not 
try to analyse. 

* i.e. by a percipient — bat not neces- 
sarily by me. Cf. sect. 48. An idea must 
now be, or have been, or hereafter become, 
part of the experience of a mind, in order 
to its present, past, or future actual existence. 
Cf. sect. 6. 

' 'without the mind,' i. e. unperceived 
and unimagined. 

^ Here * objects* i== sensible things. This 
is the popular meaning of the term object, 
as distinguished from its more extensive 
or philosophical meaning. Cf. Theory of 
Vision Vindieatedt $tct. g — il. 

^ 'in a mind,' i.e. as phenomena of 
which a mind is conscious. The main pro- 



PART 1. 



of Human Knowledge, 



157 



Jmowlcdge may be obtained of this by any one t h at shall attend 
tp what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible 
thing . The table 1 write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel 
it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed — meaning 
thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some 
other spirit actually does perceive it s. There was an odour, that is, 
it was smelt ; there was a sound, that is, it was heard ; a colour or 
figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can 
understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what 
is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any 
relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unin- 
telligible. Their esse is percipiy nor is it possible they should have 
any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive 
them. 

4. 9 It is indeed an opinion »o strangely prevailing amongst men, 
that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, 
have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived 
by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and ac- 
quiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, 
yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if 
I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. 
For, what are the fbrementioned objects but the things we perceive 
by sense ? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sen- 
sations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or 
any combination of them, should exist unperceived'^ ? 



bicm of the book is. To determine whether 
Aot» otjidt or ideas wbieb cofutiiutt what 
flpv eommom^f ealUd rteU or setuibU tbing^s 
are independent of a conscious mind, in a 
waj that thoughts and passions and fancies 
are not — wfaeSier, in diort, the presented 
world of the iman is noo-egoistic, in another 
manner than the presented world of our own 
fceUnga, or than the representative world of 
ioiaginatioa; and, if so, what that manner 
may be. What should we nuan when we 
•ay that tmsr-ideas — in other words, objects 
of scDse—are 'external?' Is it that they 
exist independently of a perdpient mind ; 
or merely of my mind, they being my 
m xliuni of intercourse with other minds, 
asd of other minds with me ? Berkeley's 
totetion, here given by anticipation, is that 
like all other objects of con- 
cannot exist . actually, otherwise 
in a mind perceiving them (i.e. at 



objects immediately present to an intelli- 
gence). He afterwards enumerates marks 
by which real or sensible are distinguishable 
from merely imaginary objects. See sect. 

39—33. 

' This u part of Berkeley's interpretation 
of our belief in the dutinci and ptmuuunt 
existence of sensible things. It is a belief 
that they are conditionally presentable in 
sense — * permanent possibilities of sensation,' 
as Mr. J. S. Mill would say. See E^amma^ 
Hon of Hamilton* $ Pbilo$opfy, pp. aao-33, 
third edition. 

• Sect. 4 — 24 contain Berkeley's firoof 
of his doctrine, contained in sect. 3, about 
sensible ideas and things. 

'* He does not mean to say that this 
opinion can be held intdligtnily by those to 
whom he here attributes it. Cf sect. 54, 66. 

"Tlut all the objects of which we arc 
actually percipient are ideas or sensations 



L58 



Of the Principles 



PART I. 



5. If we throughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps^ be 
found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For 
can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish 
the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so 
as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, 
heat and cold, extension and figures — ^in a word the things we see 
and feel — ^what are they but so many sensations, notions'^, ideas, 
or impressions on the sense ? and is it possible to separate, even 
in thought, any of these fix)m perception ? For my part, I might 
as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in 
my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things 
which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I 
imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs^ or conceive 
the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, 
I will not deny, I can abstract — if that may properly be called 
ahstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such 
objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived 
asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend 
beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as 
it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual 
sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in 
my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct ^^^ from the sensa- 
tion or perception of it. \_^^ln truth, the object and the sensation 
are the same thing J % and cannot therefore be abstracted from 
each other.] 

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that 
a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this 
important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furniture 



(in Berkeley's meaning of the words) during 
the percipient act^ inasmuch as they are 
then objects -perceived, —whatever besides 
and in other circumstances they may be, — 
is self-evident. They are at least ideas^ i.e. 
perceived-objects, wbUe a mind is in the act 
0/ being sensibly percipient o/tbem. Whether 
they ever exist otherwise ; or whether, if 
not, they represent what is existing other- 
wise, are two questions which Berkeley 
proceeds to answer in the negative. He 
argues that their uneognised existence is not 
merely unproved but involves a contradiction 
in terms, or, at least, can mean nothing. 

** The term notion, elsewhere either re- 
stricted to minds or applied to concepts. 



seems to be here applied to the immediate 
object-world of the senses. Locke uses it 
with simibr looseness. 

" i.e. existing distinct from perception. 

** This sentence is omitted in the second 
edition. 

"With Berkeley 'object,' 'idea,* or 
* sensation,* with reference to our sense- 
experience, signify what is assumed to be 
numerically the same, and which cannot 
therefore be distinguished from itself by 
abstraction. An absolute negation of mean- 
ing, or else a contradiction in terms — which 
are virtually equivalent — alone remain, when 
an attempt is made to disentangle * sensible 
things' from a perception of them. 



I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



159 



I earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty 
"t of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that 
Mmg is to be perceived or known ; that consequently so long 
ey are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my 

or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no 
;nce at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit 
t)eing perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity 
straction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence 
»endent of a spirit. [i^To be convinced of which, the reader 

only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the 
of a sensible thing from its teing perceived.'] 
From what has been said it is evident there is not any other 
ance than Sfsrit^ or that which perceives ^ 7. But, for the fuller 
nstration of this point, let it be considered the sensible 
ties are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, &c., /. e. the ideas 
ived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving 

is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as 
Tceive ; that therefore wherein colour, figure, &c. exist must 
ive them ^ hence it is clear there can be no unthinking sub- 
e or substratum of those ideas. 

But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist 
)ut the mind » 8, yet there may be things like them, whereof 
are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the 

in an unthinking substance ^ 9. I answer, an idea can be like 
ng but an idea^ a colour or figure can be like nothing but 
ler colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our 
;hts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness 
>t only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed 
lals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or 



the iirft edition, instead of this sen- 
re have the following : * To make this 
with all the light and eridence of 
om, it seems sufficient if I can but 
I the reflexion of the reader, that he 
ike an impartial view of his own 
g, and ttim his thoughts upon the 

itself, free and disengaged from all 
as of words and prepossession in 
of received mistakes.' 
■rkeley thus holds a duality of 
' (riz. spirits and ideas), and a unity 
staiice.' Moreover, he does not say 
s 'substance' may exist unpercipient of 
u, whilst ideas or objects necessarily 



depend on being perceived. On the contrary 
he goes on to say that 'there can be no 
unthinking substance or substratum* of ideas. 
And elsewhere he argues that a mind must 
be always conscious. Cf. sect. 98, and also 
sect. 139, where he appears to hold that the 
very existence of a spirit or substance con- 
sists in perceiving ideas or being conscious — 
that its esu is percipere, 

^* As Sir W. Hamilton (e.f. Reid's 
Works, pp. 883 &c.) seems to say the inrnie- 
diate objects or ideas of sense do. 

" As some who hold a representative 
perception say. 



1 60 Of the Principles part i. 

representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, 
then they are ideas and we have gained our point ; but if you say 
they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert 
a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like 
something which is intangible ; and so of the rest. 

9* Some there are who make a distinction betwixt frhunj and 
secamdary qualities-^. By the former they mean extension, figure, 
motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter 
they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours^ sounds, tastes, and 
so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be 
the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or un- 
perceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities 
to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, 
in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, 
therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in 
which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is 
evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, 
and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea 
can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither 
they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. 
Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called Mmtter or 
corporeal substance^ involves a contradiction in it. [*^' Insomuch 
that I should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing 
its absurdity. But, because the tenet of the existence of Matter 
seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, 
and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be 
thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might con- 
duce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.] 

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the regt of the 
primary or original'^ Equalities do exist without the mind in un- 
thinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that 
colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, 
do not — which they tell us are sensations existing in the 
mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different 

^ Here again he refers to Locke, whose " Sometimes called objective qualities — 

notion of material substance is charged with which are supposed to exist without a mind 

being self-contradictory. See Essay, B. II. or unperceived, and in an unperceiring sub- 

ch. 8. stance. Cf. First Dialof^e betweem Hylas 

«* What follows to the end of the section and Pbilonous, pp. 279, &c. 
is omitted in the second edition. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 1 6 1 

size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter^^. 
This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demon- 
strate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those 
original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible 
qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted 
ftom them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. 
But 1 desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any 
abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a 
body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see 
evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body 
extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or 
other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the 
mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from 
ail other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other 
sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the 
mind and nowhere else^-*. 

] I. Again, great and small^ pwift and slvw^ are allowed to exist 
nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing 
as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The ex- 
tension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great 
nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are 
nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and 
motion in general : thus we see how much the tenet of extended 
moveable substances existing without the mind^^ depends on that 
strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark 
how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or 
corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into 
by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much 
ridiculed notion oi materia frima^ to be met with in Aristotle and 
his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; 
since therefore it has been shewn that extension *^^ exists not 
in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of 
solidity. 

" Cr. sect. lo. See Locke's Enay, B. II. gence, Dirine or finite. 

dt 8. § l8; ch. 23, ( II ; B. IV. ch. 3, ** Extension is thus the fundamental 

I 34^36. characteristic of the material world. Both 

** * in the mind, and nowhere else* — i. e. geometrical and ph3rtical solidity, as well as 

pcrcdred or conceired, and in no other motion, are said to imply extension. But 

Cf. Third Dialogue betwMH Hylas Berkeley's analysis rather resolret extension 



mtd Philomom p. 346. into a locomotire experience in sense, 

"' without the mind '« without a mind, which risual sensations of colour may 

or in an absolute negation of all imelU- symbolize. 

M 



l62 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



I a. That number is entirely the creature of the mind"^?, even 
though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be 
evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a difierent 
denomination of number as the mind views it with difierent 
respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, 
according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, 
or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's 
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should 
give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one 
book, one page, one line, &c. ; all these are equally units, thou^ 
some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is 
plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas 
arbitrarily put together by the mind^^. 

13. Unity I know some'^^ will have to be a simple or uncom- 
pounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That 
I have any such idea answering the word tmity I do not find; 
and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it : on the con- 
trary, it should be the most ^miliar to my understanding, since 
it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by 
all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is 
an abstract idea. 

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern 
philosophers prove^o certain sensible qualities to have no existence 
in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise 
proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for 
instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the 
mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the 
corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body 
which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, 
why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not 
patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because 
to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture 



" * the creature of the mind/ i. e. de- 
pendent on being conceived by a mind. 
Cf. iStrts, sect. 288. This dependence is 
here illustrated by the relation of number 
to the point of view of the individual 
mind; as the dependence of the other 
primary qualities was illustrated by their 
relations to the organization of the perci- 
pient. In this, the preceding, and the fol- 
lowing sections, Berkeley argues the in- 



consistency of the absolutengss attributed to 
the primary qualities, with thdr acknow- 
ledged dependence on our organization, and 
on our intellectual point of view. 

*• Cf. Ntw Theory of Vision, sect 107 — 
no. 

* e.g. Locke, Essay, B. H. ch. 7, § 7; 
ch. 16, § I. 

*• * certain sensible qualities ' — * colours, 
tastes, &c.' — in first edition. 



PART L of Human Knowledge. 163 

at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be 
the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind ? 
Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, 
because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed 
into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is 
it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, 
since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the 
motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without^i any 
alteration in any external object. 

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are 
thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in 
the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought 
to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion*)^. Though 
it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much 
prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object 3'*, 
as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or 
colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it 
to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other 
sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject 
without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing 
as an outward object. 

1 6. But let us examine a little the received opinion. — It is said 
extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the 
nAs t r a t m m that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain 
to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you, I 
have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, 
though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, 
you must at least have a relative idea of Mattery though you know 
not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it 
bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It 
is evident * support* cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense 
— as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense 
therefore must it be taken ? [-^'For my part, I am not able to dis- 
cover any sense at all that can be applicable to it.] 

* * withotit any alteration in any external object, which is alleged to be a contradic- 
objcct ' — * wtthoQt any external alteration ' tion, all objectivity implying relation to an 
—\n fint edition. intelligence, and the qualities in question 

' Cf. Pirti Dialogtu between Hylas and relation to an embodied intelligence, with its 

F hiomt mi , pp. 278 — 285. organic variations. 

* * an outward object,* i. e. an object ** This sentence is omitted in the second 
abstracted from all intelligence — an absolute edition. 

M 2 



1 64 Of the Principles part l 

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers 
declare themselves to mean by material substance^ we shall find 
them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those 
sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relatifC 
notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being 
appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all 
other ; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just 
now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of diose 
words ; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what 
that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts 
or branches which make the signification of the words maHrud 
substance^ I am convinced there is no distinct meaning aimeied 
to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, 
in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and 
motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they 
have an existence without the mind ? And is not this a direct 
repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable ? 

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable 
substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas 
we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? 
Either we must know it by sense or by reason ''*. — As for our senses, 
by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or 
those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them 
what you will : but they do not inform us that things exist without 
the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This 
the materialists themselves acknowledge. — It remains therefore 
that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be 
by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately 
perceived by sense. But (^^^i do not see) what reason can induce 
us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what 
we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not 
pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our 
ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in 
dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is 
possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, 

* ' reason/ i. e. reasoning, or inference either by the senses, or by reasoning from 

from our immediate «*«$e-experience— our our sense-perceptions, 
sensations or ideas of sense. It is argued, >* Omitted in the second edition, and the 

in this and the next section, that the abso- sentence converted into a question, 
lute existence of Matter cannot be prored. 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge, 



165 



though there were no bodies existing without resembling them 37. 
Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies ^^^ is not 
accessary for the producing our ideas \ since it is granted they are 
r produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the 
h tune order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence. 
jB 19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations 
f. witibout them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive 
and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external 
bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise ; and so it might be 
'at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their 
ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said ; for, though we 
give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own 
confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are pro- 
duced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what 
manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should 
imprint any idea in the mind^^. Hence it is evident the pro- 
duction^ of ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason 
why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances^i, since that 
is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without 
this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist 
without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very 
precarious opinion ; since it is to suppose, without any reason at 
ail, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely 
useless, and serve to no manner of purpose. 

30- In short, if there were external bodies ^^, it is impossible 
we should ever come to know it ; and if there were not, we might 
have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. 
Suppose — what no one can deny possible — an intelligence without 
the help of external bodies ^^, to be affected with the same train of 



* But the ideas or objects of which we 
an cognizant in dreams, &c. differ in 
ioiportant diaracteristics from the ideas or 
objects of which we are conscious in sense. 
Ct sect. 39—33. The former are not in 
karmooy with what may be called the uni- 
fcnal ufed well-ordered dream of real life. 

* * eztcnial bodies/ i. e. bodies that 
exist absolutely or uiipcrceived — indepen- 
dendy of any sense-experience. 

* Le. they cannot shew how the un> 
intelHgible or contradictory hypothesis of 
ilbadatc Matter accounts for our having 
the acoae-ezperience we hare had, are con- 



scious of having, or expect to have; or 
which we suppose other conscious minds 
to be having, to have had, or to be about 
to have. 

•• * the production,* &c., i. e. the fact that 
we and others actually have sense-percep- 
tions. 

^ * Matter,' in an intelligible meaning 
of the term, he not only allows to exist, 
but maintains its existence to be intuitively 
evident 

^ i. e. bodies existing without being 
perceived or conceived by any knowing 
substance. 



1 66 Of the Principles part i. 

sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and 
with like vividness in his mind 4^. I ask whether that intelligence 
hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal sub- 
stances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, 
that you can possibly have for believing the same thing ? Of this 
there can be no question — which one consideration were enough 
to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever 
arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence of 
bodies without the mind. 

ai. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the 
existence of Matter^^^^ after what has been said, I could instance 
several of those errors and difEculties (not to mention impieties) 
which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless 
controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far 
greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail 
of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori 
are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, 
sufficiently demonstrated a friari^ as because I shall hereafter find 
occasion to speak somewhat of them ^5. 

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly 
prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate 
on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a 
line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflection ? It 
is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you 
can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour 
to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial -•^ may 
perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright 
contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon 
this issue : — If you can but conceive it possible for one extended 
moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything 
like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it*7^ I 
shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of 
external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, 

*' i.e. to have all our sense-experience. reflection — directly upon our own experience 

" i. e. absolute or uncogniscd Matter — and indirectly upon that of others, 
not interpretable sense-perceptions, the ex- " i.e. otherwise than as an idea — per- 

istence of which last Berkeley assumes. ceived or conceived — a presented or repre- 

** Cf. sect. 85—156. sented object. 

•• The appeal here and elsewhere is to 



PAET I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



167 



though you cannot either give mc any reason why you believe it 
exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, 
the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an 
ai^gument that it is so. 

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to 
imagine trees^ for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, 
and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is 
no difficulty in it^ but what is all this, I beseech you, more than 
framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, 
and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that 
may perceive them ? But do not you yourself perceive or think of 
them all the while *» ? This therefore is nothing to the purpose : it 
only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in 
your mind ; but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible 
the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make 
out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived 
or untbought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do 
our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies ^^^ we are 
all the while only contemplating our own ideas ^0. But the mind 
taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does 
conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though 
at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself *>. A 
little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of 
what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other 
proofs against the existence of material substance. 

04. [*« Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, 
we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It 
\s very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to 
know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant 
by the ahsolute existence of sensible objects in themselves^ or 



** There teems to be a confusion of 
utCDoe in tmat with existence in imagin- 
I, in this section. To exist as an ob- 
ject in fancy is indeed to exist, but not 
a» part of the nnirersal system of sensible 
order ; and it is the apparently interrupted 
eziftcnce of tbU system, on his doctrine, 
that Berkeley has to reconcile with the 
eammoo belief, on which we all act 

* ' to coocetre the existence of external 
bodict,' i.e. to conceire bodies that are 
■dther percdred nor conceired — that are 
or objects at all, but which exist 



absolutely. To suppose what we conceive 
to be thus unconceived, when we are actually 
conceiving it, is, it is argued, to suppose a 
contradiction in terms. Such Being is abso- 
lutely unapproachable by intelligence. 

"^ * ideas ' — i. e. ideas of imagination, 
not of sense. 

^ A delusion which is at the root of 
those objections to metaphysics which over- 
look the subjective phase of all physics. 

^ This sentence is omitted in the second 
edition. 



1 68 



Oj the Principles 



PAKT L 



imthout the mind^. To me it is evident those words mark out 
either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to 
convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to 
entreat they would cahnly attend to their own thoughts ; and if by 
this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions 
does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their convic* 
tion. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute 
existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning^ 
or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and in- 
culcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the 
reader. 

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions ^<, or the things which we 
perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, arc 
visibly inactive— there is nothing of power or agency included in 
them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or 
make any alteration in another ^^. To be satisfied of the truth of 
this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our 
ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the 
mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is per- 
ceived : but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or 
reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity ; there 
is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention 
will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passive- 
ness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea 
to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: 
neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, 
as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that exten- 
sion, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. 
To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting 
from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, 
must certainly be false. 



^ * The absolute existence of sensible ob- 
jects, i.e. in themselves or without a mind/ 
is the principle which Berkeley argues 
against as either tneaningUts or comtradietory 
— not the existence of a material world or 
sensible order, regulated independently of 
our individual will, and to which our actions 
must conform if we are to avoid pain and 
secure pleasure. 



^ Here again * notion* applied to ideas 
or inactive things. 

^ In this and the next section, Berkeley 
argues that there can be no power or causal- 
ity proper, in the world of ideas ^r objects, 
uniformities of co-existence and succession 
alone being either immediately or mediately 
perceivable — the doctrine of Hume, Brown, 
Comte, and Mr. Mill. 



FART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



169 



a6. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are 
anew exdted, others are changed or totally disappear. There 
is therefore some cause ^^ of these ideas, whereon they depend ^7^ 
and whidi produces and changes them. That this cause cannot 
be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the 
preceding section. It must therefore be a substance ^s; but it has 
been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance : it 
remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active 
substance or Spirit. 

37. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it per- 
ceives ideas it is called the tmderstanJing^ and as it produces or 
otherwise operates about them it is called the mjilL Hence 
there can be no Idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas 
whatever, being passive and inert, (vid. sect. 25,) they cannot 
represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. 
A little attention will make it plain to any one that to have 
an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and 
change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of 
tf^'i Of ^^^ which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but 
only by the effects which it produceth*^. If any man shall doubt 
of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and 
try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being ; and 
whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the 
names owV/ and itnderstanMmg^ distinct from each other as well 
as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a 
relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the afore- 
said powers — which is signified by the name soul or spirit. 
This is what some hold ; but, so far as I can see, the words w/V/, 
[^imderstamJingy mnd^ saul^ ^P^^^y do not stand for difierent ideas, 
or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is 



* Berkdej here atstunes at granted the 
mctaphjtical and tynthetical principle of 
cauadity — that erery phenomenal dunge 
implies a came which cause, he goes on to 
shew, cannot be itself phenomenal. 

* • depend * — not for their very exisHnee, 

whidi, according to Berkeley, depends upon 

their being perceived, but for the cbangmg 

formu in which they exist relatively to one 

anotbcf. 

* He here connects the metaphysical and 
syotbctkal principles of Cause and Sub- 

-fioding them united and realised 



in actively conscious Mind. 

** In other words, it cannot be an object 
of perception, though its effects can. We 
are conscious of it as percipient only, 
not as perceived. Does this consdousneu 
of being percipient imply consciousness of 
active will? For Berkeley's treatment of 
the objection that mmtal substances and 
causes are as unmeaning or contradictory as 
nuUirial substances or causes, see IVrd 
Dialogyt betumm Hylas and Pbiionomt, pp. 
327-339. 

** Omitted in second edition. 



I70 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be 
like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [«» Though it 
must be owned at the same time that we have some jmImv of 
soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind<^; sudi as willing, 
loving, hating — inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning 
of these words.] 

28. I find I can excite ideas^ in my mind at pleasure, and vary 
and shift the scene as oft as 1 think fit. It is no more than 
willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and 
by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. 
This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate 
the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on ex- 
perience : but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting 
ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words**. 

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, 
1 find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like de- 
pendence on my will^^ When in broad daylight I open my eyes, 
it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or 
to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to 
my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the 
ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There 
is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. 

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct 
than those of the imagination 'ifi; they have likewise a steadiness, 
order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those 



^ This sentence is not contained in the 
first edition. 

^ In sect. I he speaks of * id§(u per- 
ceived by attending to the operations of 
the mind.' 

^ * ideas/ i.e. of imagination. 

** With Berkeley the object-world of 
ideas is partly distinguished from Self by 
its essential passivity. Every object is 
caused ; nothing except a Self or Ego 
causes. Cause or power is with him of 
the essence of our notion of mind, to 
which we necessarily attribute power or 
activity — thus distinguishing our Self from 
the changing ideas of which we are con- 
scious. Except figuratively, we never attri- 
bute action to ideas or objects. Cf. Sirist 
sect. 249. 350. 393 — 395. 

** In this and the four following sections, 
Berkeley mentions marks by which Mns#- 
phenomena are found in experience to be 



distinguished from all the other ideas of 
which we are cognisant, and in conse- 
quence of which they are termed * real,* 
* external,* or properly • objective ; * while 
other phenomena (those of feeling and ima- 
gination) are called subjective or individual. 
The changes in the ideas or phenomena 
presented in the senses are found to he 
part of Universal External Order — exttmal, 
inasmuch as it is independent of the will of 
the sense-percipient — the interpretation of 
which enables us to foresee (sect. 31) more 
or less of our future sense-experience ; thus 
determining our pleasures and pains, and 
also informing us of the existence of other 
conscious minds. 

" This mark — the superior strength, 
liveliness, and distinctness of our sense-ideas 
— was afterwards noted by Hume. See 
Inquiry eoncermng Human UndtrUanding^ 
sect. II. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 171 

which are the efiects of human wills often are, but in a regular 
train ot series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently 
testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set 
rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on 
excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the Aru;x of nature $ 
and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and 
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the 
ordinary course of things. 

31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate 
our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should 
be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything 
that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain 
of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us ; 
that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and 
in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means 
are conducive — all this we know, not by discovering any necessary ^^^ 
connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the 
settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in un- 
certainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how 
to manage himself in the af&irs of life than an infant just born. 

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently 
displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose 
Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our 
thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second 
causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly 
followed by other ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, 
we forthwith attribute power and agenc v* to the ideas themselves, 
and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be 
more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having ob- 
served that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous 
figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation 
called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause 
of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision 
of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the 
latter the effect of the former****. 

^ Berkeley insists throughout his writings "So Schiller, in Don Carlos, Act II L 

on the arbitrary character of the laws of where he represents the sceptics as failing 

nature in general, and of those by which to see the God who veib Himself in erer- 

thc phenomena of vision symbolize those of lasting laws. Berkeley, like Hume, Rrown, 

touch in particular. Comte, Mill, &c.. eliminates all power or 



172 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



33* The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature 
are called real tUngs : and those excited in the imagination being 
less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly^ tenhed idessy 
or images of things^ which they copy and represent. But then 
our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are never- 
theless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, 
as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are 
allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, 
orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind ^ but this is no 
argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less 
dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives 
them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more 
powerful spirit^ yet still they are ideas^ and certainly no idea, 
whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind 
perceiving it7^ 

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some 
time in answering objections 7 1 which may probably be made against 
the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, 
if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire I 
may be excused, since all men do not equally apprehend things of 
this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one. 

Firsty then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all 



causality from the material world ; but, un- 
like them, he recognises power or causality, 
prc^perly to called, in conscious mind — in the 
Ego — distinguished from the ideas of which 
it is immediately cognisant as contempo- 
raneous and successive. * Physical causa- 
tion,* or constant order in the co-existence 
and succession of phenomena, accordingly, is 
not causation proper, but the effect of it. 

** In popular language *idea* is applied 
exclusively to the representations and mis- 
representations of fancy or thought, and 
not, as with Berkeley, to the * real things ' 
present in the senses. See Leibnitz, De 
modo dUtingvendi Pbtnomma Rtalia ah 
Imaginariis. 

^ In the thirty-one preceding sections, 
two relations should be carefully distin- 
guished — that of conscious mind to the 
sense-id^as of which it is conscious, and 
which depend upon conscious mind for their 
very existence ; and that of mind to the 
cb<mges of such ideas or phenomena. The 
former relation — that of percipient and per- 



cept — is not the relation of cause and 
effect at all, but is sui geturii. The latter 
and correlative relation, also involved in 
our consciousness, is alone causal, and is 
our only proper example of causality — the 
orderly relations of phenomena to one 
another being only results of causal energy 
—of intending volition — and not power 
or causality itself. Note also that while 
Berkeley regards all phenomena as depen- 
dent on on intelligence and a will, he re- 
gards the changes in smsf-pheoomena as 
emphatically independent, for all practical 
purposes, of the tuili of the finite sense- 
percipient. 

^ Sect. 34 — 84 contain Berkeley's an- 
swers to supposed objtcdons to the forego- 
ing principles, concerning the true meaning 
of the terms * Matter * and * Mind,' * Sub- 
stance ' and * Cause ;* and to his distinction 
between the presented realities of the ma- 
terial or sensible world, and the chimeras 
of imagination. 



PAET I. of Human Knowledge. 173 

that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, 
and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. 
All things that exist exist only in the mind, that is, they are 
purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and 
stars ? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, 
stones ; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many 
diimeras and illusions on the fency ? To all which, and whatever 
else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the 
principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. 
Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, 
remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a 
rerum uMtura^ and the distinction between realities and chimeras 
retains its fiill force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, 
where we have shewn what is meant by real tUngs^ in opposition 
to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; but then they both 
equally exist in the mind, and in that sense ^a are alike ideas. 

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that 
we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things 
I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, 
I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence 
we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal sub- 
stance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest 
of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist 
indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his 
impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost 
a great handle for trifling and disputation. [73 But that is all the 
harm that I can see done.] 

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality 
of things, he is very hx from understanding what hath been pre- 
mised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an 
abstract of what has been said: — ^There are spiritual substances, 
minds, or human souls, which will or excite^^ ideas in themselves 
at pleasure; but these 7^ are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect 
of others they perceive by sense — which, being impressed upon 

" To be an * idea' is, with Berkeley, in the negatire) it, the possibih'ty of the 
to be the object of a conscious intelligence. existence of sense-ideas— objects of sense- 
Bat be does not define precisely the rela- experience— om/ ofibii nlaiiom. 
tioo of ideas to minds conscious of them. ^ Omitted in second edition. 

in the mind' is existence im thii ^* i. e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28^.30. 



rdaikm. His problem (which he determines 



174 



Of the Principles 



PART 1. 



them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak them- 
selves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human 
spirits75. These latter are said to have more rtality in them than 
the former; — ^by which is meant that. they are more aflfectii^ 
orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind 
perceiving them 76. And in this sense the sun that I see by day 
is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of 
the former. In the sense here given of reaUtjy it is evident that 
every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of tiie 
mundane system, is as much a real keing by our principles as by 
any other. Whether others mean anything by the term rtaGtf 
different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own 
thoughts and see'/. 

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that 
we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that 
if the word mhstance be taken in the vulgar sense — for a combina- 
tion of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and 
the like — this wc cannot be accused of taking away 78 : but if it be 
taken in a philosophic sense — for the support of accidents or quali- 
ties without the mind"** — then indeed I acknowledge that we take 
it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had 
any existence, not even in the imagination. 

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat 
and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does 
so — the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify 
the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called 
things i and it is certain that any expression which varies from 
the ^miliar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But 
this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which in other 
words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those 
things which we perceive immediately by our senses 7^ The hard- 
ness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike 



" Cf. sect. 29. 

'^ Cf. feet. 33. * Not fictions/ i. e. they 
are presentative, and therefore cannot be 
misrepresentative in their character. 

^ The metaphysic of Berkeley is an en- 
deavour to convert the word * real ' from 
being the symbol of an unintelligible abstrac- 
tion into that of the conscious experience of 
a mind. 



'• With Berkeley substances arc either 
(a) conscious minds, which are substances 
proper, or (b) the divinely conceived and 
constituted groups of sense-phenomena called 
* sensible things,' which are substances con- 
ventionally. 

^* And which, because perceived, are ideas 
— an idea being with Berkeley a perceived 
or imagined object. 



VIAIT I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



175 



fuditieSy which combined together ^^ constitute the several sorts of 
victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind 
that perceives them ; and this is all that is meant by calling them 
jfatfi which word if it was as ordinarily used as things w'>uld 
sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for dis- 
puting about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If 
therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad 
with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unper- 
orived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more 
proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things 
rather than ideas. 

59. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea^ and 
do not rather in compliance with custom call them things; 1 
answer, I do it for two reasons : — first, because the term thingy in 
contradistinction to iiUay is generally supposed to denote some- 
what existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath 
a more comprehensive signification than /Vm, including spirit 
or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of 
sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and in- 
active, I chose to mark them by the word iiiea^ which implies 
those properties"'. 

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, 
he will still believe his senses, and never sufier any arguments, 
how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be 
it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are 
willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth 
exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do 
of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense 
can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not 
perceived by sense ^2. We are not for having any man turn sceptic 



"* * comtnned together/ i. e. as * sensible 
thingi,' according to the natural laws of the 
coatcmporaneity and succession of ideas or 
phenomena. Of. sect. 33. 

** Berkeley's philosophy is a system of 
Intelligible Realism or Dualism, rather than 
of Idealism in the popular meaning of 
«4m — for, he uses the word idea merely 
to marie the fact, that he recognises the 
existence of objective things only so far 
as they are perceived and passive objects of 
a coQscioitt mind ; and he does not, as the 
term Idealism suggests, regard * sensible 



things* as created or constructed by the 
voluntary activity of the individual mhid in 
which they appear. They are perceived, but 
neither created nor regulated, by the finite 
percipient, and are thus external in the only 
practical meaning of that term. 

* The existence of Matter, out of the 
relation of percept and percipient, cannot, 
without a contradiction, be said to be sen- 
sibly perceived. Therefore, our sense-per- 
ceptions, at any rate, do not justify us in 
affirming more about their immediate objects 
than that they are ideas or objects of which 



176 



Of the Principles 



PAITL 



and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all 
the stress and assurance imaginable ; nor are there any principles 
more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as 
shall be hereafter clearly shewn 83. 

41. Secondly^ it will be objected that there is a great difference 
betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dream- 
ing or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so : if yoa 
suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put 
your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. TTas 
and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To 
all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said •*; 
and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very difiereot 
from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very 
different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will 
pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an un- 
perceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea«*. 

42. Thirdly^ it will be objected that we see things actually 
without or at a distance frx)m us, and which consequently do not 
exist in the mind ; it being absurd that those things which are seen 
at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own 
thoughts 86. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in 
a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance 
off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have 
their existence only in the mind. 

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth 
while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things 
placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see 
external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer. 



we are sentient. Custom, not sense, accord- 
ing to Berkeley, induces our imagination and 
expectation of such and such ftiture sense- 
perceptions, in consequence of such and such 
present and actual ones. But cf. Siris^ sect. 

347— 349- 

■* Cf. sect. 87—91, against the scepti- 
cism which originates in the alleged fallacy 
of the senses. 

** It is always to be remembered that 
with Berkeley the presented ideas or objects 
of sense are thtnudvei the archetjrpes or 
real things, whilst the ideas of imagination 
are images of, or derived from, the arche- 



types of sense. 

^ Here feelings are spoken of as in the 
same relation to a conscioumess of them 
as sensible things are, i.e. both are alike 
dependent on, but not of the essence or 
substance of, the percipient — the conscious 
person. 

** That our percepts should be seen * at 
a distance of several miles' is not incon- 
sistent with their being dependent on a 
percipient, if the distance — the ambient or 
external space — is itidf only an object- 
perceived, and therefore dependent on a 
perdpient. Cf. sect. 67. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 177 

olhers farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what 
hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The 
cxmsideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay 
tawmrds a New Theory of Vision^ which was published not long 
since ^^ — wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither 
immediately of itself perceived by sight ss, nor yet apprehended or 
judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary 
Donnexion with it s^ • but that it is only suggested to our thoughts 
by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which 
In their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation 
either with distance or things placed at a distance ^o • but, by a 
connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and 
suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any 
language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for 9i • insomuch 
that a man bom blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at 
first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at 
any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fbrementioned treatise. 
44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely dis- 
tinct and heterogeneous 9^^. The former are piarks and prognostics 
of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist with- 
out the mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn 
even in that treatise ^-^ Though throughout the same the contrary 
be supposed true of tangible objects — not that to suppose that 
vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid 
down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute 
it in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth the 
ideas of sight ^*, when we apprehend by them distance and things 
placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things actually 
existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch ^^ 
will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, 
and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident 
From what has been said in the fbregping parts of this Treatise, and 
in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the ,Essay concerning Vision, that 

" See the Editor's preface to the Essay. ** i. e. tactual sensatioiu. Touch is here 

** Essay, sect. a. taken in its wider meaning, and includes our 

"* Jhid,wtcl. II — 15. muscular and locomotive experience, which 

** Jhid, sect. 16— a8. with Berkeley is involved in the conception 

** Ihid, sect. 51. of distance. Cf. Mr. Mill's Examination of 

" Ibid, sect. 47 — 49, lai — I4I. Sir W, HarmUon*s Philosophy, chap. 13, in 

** Ihid, sect. 43. third edition. 
** i. e. what we are conscious of in seeing. 

N 



178 Of the Principles paitl 

visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit 00 
whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to 
imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our 
own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer 
to the Essay itself. 

45. Fourthly^ it will be objected that from the foregoing prio- 
ciples it follows things are every moment annihilated and created 
anew9«. The objects of sense exist only when they arc perceived 5 
the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parkxir, 
no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. 
Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to 
nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In 
answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said 
in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means 
anything by the actual existence 97 of an idea distinct from its being 
perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, 
I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those 
words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own 
thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he 
can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes 
to exist without being perceived, then 1 give up the cause ; but 
if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to 
stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge 
on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions 
which at bottom have no meaning in them. 

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received prin- 
ciples of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pre- 
tended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing 
my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to 
nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly ac- 

** To define the condition of sensible they always exist actually in the Diyine 

things during tht intervals of our perception Conception, and potentially, in relation to 

qf Aem, consistently with the belief of all finite minds, in the Divine Will, the evolu- 

sane persons regarding the material world, tions of external nature being the constant 

is a challenge which has been often addressed expression of that Will. — As to creation, cf. 

to the advocates of an Intelligible Realism. AWs, sect. 335 — 328, &c. 

According to Berkeley, there are no inter- ^ Berkeley allows to unperceived bodies 

▼als in the existence — either actual, i. e. as a potential or conditional, though not an 

perceived, or potential, i. e. as perceivable actual, existence relatively to us. When 

—of sensible things. They are permanently wc say a body exists potentially, we mean 

perceivable, under the laws of nature, though that if, in the light, we open our eyes, and 

not perpetually perceived by this, that, or look towards it, we shall see it, and that if wc 

the other finite percipient. In other words, place our hand where it is we shall feel it. 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



179 



knowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, 
which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are 
mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? 
Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things 
should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is com- 
monly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they ac- 
knowledge the existence of Matter 9^, and that the whole mundane 
fiibric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot 
subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is ex- 
pounded to be a continual creation ^9. 

47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we 
allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will 
unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally 
admitted, that the particular bodies^ of what kind soever, do none 
of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from 
sect. 1 1 and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers con- 
tend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those 
particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are 
distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it 
must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now 
universally allowed, at least by the most approved and consider- 
able philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it 
beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite num- 
ber of parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived 
by sense * 00. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to 
be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts 



** * Matter/ i. e. material substance or 
Matter existing per si, 

•• •Th^e who have contended for a 
material worid have yet acknowledged that 
fUMhira tuUurans (to use the language of 
the Schoolmen) is God, and that the Divine 
conservation of things is equipollent to and 
in fact the same ttung with a continued 
repeated creation ; in a word, that conserva- 
tion and creation differ only as the terminus 
a qko. These are the common opinions of 
Sdioolmen; and Durandus, who held the 
world to be a machine, like a clock made 
up and put in motion by God, but after- 
wirds continued to go of itself, was therein 
particular, and had few followers. The very 
poets teadi a doctrine not unlike the Schools 
— metu agitat moiem (Virgil, ^neid, VI). 
The Stoics and Platonists are ever3rwhere 



full of the same notion. I am not therefore 
singular in this point itself, so much as in 
my way of proving it.* (Berkeley's Letter 
to Dr. Samuel Johnson of New York.) Cf. 
Alcipbron, Dial. IV. sect. 14; Vindication 
of New Theory of Vision^ sect. 8, 17, &c. ; 
SiriSf piusim^ but especially in the latter 
part See also Correspondence between Clarke 
and Leibnitz. Jonathan Edwards, in his 
book on Original Sin, and elsewhere, main- 
tains the continual creation of all existing 
persons as well as things, and employs it 
in defence of his theology. In several of 
his writings Edwards approaches the pe- 
culiar doctrines of Berkeley regarding the 
material world. It is worthy of note that 
when Berkeley was in Rhode Island, Edwards 
was settled in Massachussetts. 
"• Cf. sect. 123 — 132. 



N 2 



i8o Of the Principles pait i. 

to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it 
contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not 
acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the 
sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of 
parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure 
varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceiv- 
able appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles 
from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after 
various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes in- 
finitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all whidi 
there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Eadi 
body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and con- 
sequently void of all shape and figure. From which it follows 
that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never 
so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves 
are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither 
the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, 
exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, 
is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that 
frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, 
any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. 

48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in 
sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we 
have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against 
our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be 
nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we 
may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while 
they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit 
that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies 4re said 
to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood 
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever'. 
It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that 
bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at 
all during the intervals between our perception of them. 

49. Fifihly^ it may perhaps be objected that if extension and 
figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended 
and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to 

^ Cf. sect, a, 3, &c., and the Second and Third Dia!oguu ofHylat and Pbilonota, 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



i8i 



speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it 
exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they 
are perceived by it — ^that is, not by way of mode or attribuU^ but 
oiily by way of idea'^ ^ and it no more follows the soul or mind 
is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that 
it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknow- 
ledged to exist in it, and nowhere else 3. As to what philosophers 
say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unin- 
telligible. For instance, in this proposition ^a die is hard, extended, 
and square,' they will have it that the word dtt denotes a subject 
or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure 
whidi are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I 
cannot comprehend : to me a die seems to be nothing distinct 
from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, 
to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those 
qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only 
an explication of the meaning of the word die. 

50. Sixthly^ you will say there have been a great many things 
explained by matter and motion ; take away these and you destroy 
the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical 



' i. e. * mode or attribute,' as philo- 
ioplicn employ these terms, when they (un- 
intelligibly) distinguish mod§s or attribuUs 
from abaolnte material $ulj4ett or tuhstanen. 
With Berkdey, the 'substance' of matttr 
(wlien the term is applied at all to sensible 
dangf) it the established group of phenomena 
of nmkh a particular thing consists. Now 
eztenskm, and the other so-called qualities 
of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, 
related to mind either (a) according to the 
m m t m ummg relation of subject and attribute, 
of which philosophers speak, nor (b) as one 
tcnsc-idea or phenomenon is related to 
another sense-idea or phenomenon, in the 
group of sense-phenomena which constitutes, 
with him, the (perceivable) $uhttane4 of a 
muUerial thing. A mind and its sense-percep- 
tions are, on the contrary, related as per- 
cipient or person to the ideas or objects 
pcrcdred — ^whaterer ' otherness' that iui 
gmgrit relation implies. Berkeley sees in 
this relation a certain sort of duality, i.e. 
(i) mind or person, and (a) its ideas; but 
it has been disputed whether this distinction 
of p t nomi and ibtir idsa* is with him a 
properly nometical, or a merely logical dis- 



tinction. At any rate, he rejects the unin- 
telligible hypothesis that sense-ideas exist as 
entities that are independent of all intelli- 
gence of them— Divine or finite; and he 
also refuses to regard them as mere creations 
or constructions, due to the will of the 
finite thinker who is conscious of them. 
Sense-ideas are signs of that Universal Divine 
Order, which Qod enables us, through im- 
mediate perception and custom or sugges- 
tion, to become so cognisant of in phjrsical 
science, as that the Order is in a measure 
understood by us. And the sense-ideas pre- 
sent in one mind are numerically different 
from the sense-ideas present in another— 
like different copies of the same book, all 
suggesting a like (i. e. the same) meaning. 
Of. Collier's theory of the •inexistence' of 
Matter in human minds, and the existence of 
all minds in the kdyoi. Parr's Mttapbytical 
Tracts, pp. ii6, &c. 

' Moreover, mind can conceivably exist 
without perceiving extended or sensible ob- 
jects, for it may exist conscious of objects 
of another sort ; but extended objects can- 
not exist without being perceived. Hence 
mind is distinct from any of its ideas. 



i82 Of the Principles part i. 

principles which have been applied with so much success to 
account for the j^enomena. In short, whatever advances have 
been made, either by ancient or modem philosophers, in the study 
of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance 
or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is not 
any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may 
not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear 
by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all 
one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are afiected 
with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a 
Spirit, or produce any idea in it ^, is what no philosopher will pretend 
to explain ; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter 
in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for 
things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and 
other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and 
therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already 
shewn. See sect. 25. 

51. Seventhly^ it will upon this be demanded whether it does 
not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every- 
thing to the immediate operation of Spirits ? We must no longer 
say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a 
Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed 
at, who should talk after this manner ? I answer, he would so j in 
such things we ought to ' think with the learned, and speak with the 
vulgar.' They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of 
the Copemican system do nevertheless say 'the sun rises,' 'the 
sun sets,* or 'comes to the meridian;' and if they afiected a 
contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very 
ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it 
manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner 
of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. 

52. In the ordinary aflfairs of life, any phrases may be retained, 
so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to 

* Philosophers have treated the relation perception is neither the cause nor the effect 

of Matter to Mind in perception as one of of its object, but in a relation to it that is 

cause and effect — the result, according to sui generis and ultimate. Cf. Prof. Ferrier 

Berkeley, of illegitimate analysis or abstrac- on • perception' and 'matter,* in his Institutes 

tion, which creates a fictitious duality of of Metaphysics, Prop. IV., and Remains, 

substance. By his new principles, philosophy Vol. II. pp. a6l — 388, 407^409. 
is based on a recognition of the fact diat 



act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false 
soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. 
Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by aistom, 
language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always 
the truest. Hence it is impossible — even in the most rigid, philo- 
sophic reasonings—so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue 
we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend diffi- 
culties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will 
collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a 
discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech 
which use has made inevitable. 

53, As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this 
has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is 
of late by others among the mtxlern philosophers, who though they 
allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate 
efficient cause of all things^. These men saw that amongst all the 
objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity 
included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of 
whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto 
the immediate objects of sense**. But then, that they should sup- 
pose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they 
acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in 
nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, 
since God might have done everything as well without them — 
this 1 say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very 
unaccountable and extravagant supposition ?. 



54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of 
mankind^ may be thought by some an invincible argument in 
behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we 

• He teftn to Del Cailu. »iid opfciilly 
Omliiix. Mil'bnnche, &c.. who. wbile they 
■rgiKd r<n miicrial tuUtiaici, denied the 
eauKiliiy of Mniibic ihtngi. With them, 
ai with Berkdey. there are no cauttt ia 
the material or phenomcDal world — only 
eflecU. which lie evolred in a coostint 
order, contempOTaneoui and mcceiiive, and 
(biu clpnu the meaning of the Supieme 
Power. See Malebranche. Snlrititnt, VI„ 



VII. 



* I.e. of their hypolhelical material world. 



* On the principle, ' Entia non >un[ mol- 
tiplicanda pralei necessitatem.' 

■ Commonly called the argnmenl frotn 
Common Seme, and illustiated in the writings 
of Reid and oiher Scotch piychologiin. 
That the unreflecting pari of mankind ihould 
hold an unuilctligible, OT at lead confottd. 
Realism ii not to be wondered it, when 
we recollect that it ii the very olflce of 
philoiophy to interpret the leniible reality, 
which they and philosopheis ackuowledge 
in common id be ' exienul,' in MnM nuaning 
vf ibt term- 



i84 Of the Principles pa»t l 

suppose the whole world to be mistaken ? And if so, what Guise 
can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?— I 
answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be 
found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of 
Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe 
that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it', is 
impossible ; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that 
sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one 
sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, 
they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, whidi afiects 
them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some 
senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend 
any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled 
speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is 
not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by 
imagining they believe those propositions which they have often 
heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. 

55* But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never 
so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak 
argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number 
of prejudices and felse opinions are everywhere embraced with 
the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far 
greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes 
and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities 
even by men of learning : and if it be considered what a small 
proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at 
this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable 
footing in the world. 

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, 
and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, 
that men knowing they perceived several ideas 'o, whereof they 
themselves were not the authors — as not being excited from within 
nor depending on the operation of their wills — this made them 
maintain those ideas^^o or objects of perception had an existence 
independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that 

' Sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, a a, a4. of the finite percipient, it does not follow 

** i.e.SffMf-ideas. — Though his own sense- that they are independent of his peretptkm, 
ideas or objects are independent of the unU Cf. sect. 2^ — 33. 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



185 



a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers 
having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do 
not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the 
mistake of the vulgar 1 ' ; but at the same time run into another which 
seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really 
existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from 
being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, 
imprinted by those objects 12 on the mind. And this notion of the 
philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, 
namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of 
their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted 
from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct 
itoTCi the minds on which they are imprinted. 

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited 
in us by things in their likeness,, and not rather have recourse to 
Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they 
were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing 
things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them 
power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which 
excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to 
our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as 
human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. 
And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. 
Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men 
are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we 
see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us 
any reflection; their order and concatenation, though it be an 
argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their 
creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think 
them the immediate eflFects of a 'Free Spirit i especially since 
inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, 
is looked on as a mark of freedim^^. 



^ By recogniting that what we are im- 
mediately percipient of must be idtal, or 
at least that it is only known by us in sense 
at ideal — as a sense-percept. 

" i. e. by the unperceived or absolute ob- 
jects which, on this hypothesis of a repre- 
sentative sense-perception, were assumed to 
exist Mnnd the properly perceived objects 
or ideas, and to be (according to some) the 



, eausi of their appearance in our conscious- 
ness. Cf. Third Dialopu httufun Hylas 
and Phiitmou*^ p. 359. 

^' Hence the difficulty men have in re- 
cognising that the Divine Ideas and Will, 
and the Laws of Nature, are coincident. 
But in fact the scientific discovery of laws 
in nature, iiutead of narrowing, extends the 
sphere of intelligible Divine agency. 



1 86 Of the Principles part l 

58. Tenthfyy it will be objected that the notions we advance 
are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and 
mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now 
universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the 
clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing 
principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an 
idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not : but the 
motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that 
tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the prin- 
ciples we have premised; for, the question whether the earth 
moves or no amounts in reality to no more that this, to wit, whether 
we have reason to conclude, ftx)m what has been observed by 
astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circum- 
stances, and such or such a position and distance both from the 
earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the 
choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of 
them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we 
have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the 
phenomena. 

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and 
succession of ideas'^ in our minds, often make, I will not say un- 
certain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions con- 
cerning the ideas 14 we shall be affected with pursuant to a great 
train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what 
would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circum- 
stances very different from those we are in at present. Herein 
consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and 
certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be 
easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may 
be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries 
in astronomy or nature. 

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose 
serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal me- 
chanism in the parts of animals ; might not vegetables grow, and 
shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their 

^* * ideas/ i. e. sense-ideas or sensations. order of external nature, not mere * asso- 
This 'experience' consists of the established ciation of ideas' — ^in the popular meaning 
association of unsations or 'percepts in the of the word idea. 



PAET I. of Human Knowledge. 187 

motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts 
so elegantly contrived and put together^ which, being ideas, have 
fiothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary 1^ 
cxmbezion with the effects ascribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that 
immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we 
must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether 
of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though 
an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement of 
a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would 
produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done 
to DO purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the 
mdfCXj and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the 
Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the 
movements and putting them together ? Why does not an empty 
case scrft as well as another? And how comes it to pass that 
whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some 
corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being 
mended by a skilful hand all is right again ? The like may be 
said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so won- 
derfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best micro- 
scope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any 
tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an 
innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the 
most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very 
apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of 
phenomena? 

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some 
difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the 
uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could 
not solve by the fi^regping principles, yet this objection could 
be of small weight against the tnith and certainty of those things 
which may be proved afriori^ with the utmost evidence and rigour 
of demonstration 1^. Secondly, but neither are the received principles 
free from the like difficulties ; for, it may still be demanded to 
what end God should take those roundabout methods of efifecting 

^ Cf. feet. 25, and also various passages is thus that he speaks of a lamguagt of 

in Berkdejr's writings in which he insists Vision. Cf. Tbtory of Viuom Vinduaitd, 

upon the arhitrarituu of the so-caUed causal passim, 
rdatioos among sensible things, and the ^* Cf. sect. 3, 4, a a — a4. 

consequent sense>symboIism of Nature. It 



1 88 0/ the Principles pa»ti. 

things by instruments and machines^ which no one can deny mi^ 
have been efiected by the mere command of His will without all 
that apparatus : nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the 
objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold 
the existence of those machines without the mind ^ for it has been 
made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have 
no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any 
one eflfect in nature. See sect 25. Whoever therefore supposes 
them '7 to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they arc 
not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use 
that is assigned to them ^ 7^ as they exist unperceived, is that they 
produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed 
to anything but Spirit. 

6%. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that 
though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not ab- 
solutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary 
to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to 
the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run 
through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by 
the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as 
well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament 
of life as to the explaining the various phenomena — ^which explica- 
tion consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phe- 
nomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same 
thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production 
of natural effects ; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to 
the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to accoimt for 
appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these 
regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme 
Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that 
a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are neces- 
sary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the 
producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. 
Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intel- 
ligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might 
if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on 

^^ * them/ i. c. the solid and extended attributes the orderly appearance, ditappear- 

objects, which are supposed to exist unper- ance, and reappearance of ideas or objects 

ceived and unpercipient — as distinguished in the senses, 
from the Intelligent Cause to whom Berkeley 



PAKT I. of Human Knowledge. 189 

the dial-plate of a watch, thougb nobody had ever made the move- 
ments and put them in it : but yet, if He will act agreeably to the 
rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and main- 
tained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the 
watdunaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts 
them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions ^ as also that 
any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some 
oorresponding disorder in the movements, which being once cor- 
rected all is right again. 

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the 
Alitor of nature display His overruling power in producing some 
appearance out of the ordinary series of things ^^. Such exceptions 
frcMn the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe 
men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Beings but then they 
are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why 
they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the 
ocmvindng our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, 
which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, 
and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their 
Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by 
anomalous and surprising events. 

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, 1 shall observe 
that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no 
more than this : — ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, 
there being a certain order and connexion between them, like 
to that of cause and effect : there are also several combinations of 
them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem 
like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as 
it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing 
those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, 
being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the phi- 
k)Sopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to 
what purpose is that connexion ? And, since those instruments, 
being barely inefficacious perceftions^^ in the mind, are not sub- 
servient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why 
they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned 

" So far as that icrief has been inter- tern of Unirersal Proridence, is here touched 
prclcd by us. The nature and moral office upon, 
of miracnlouf or supernatural erents, in a sjs- " Cf. sect. 35. 



190 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



why God should make us, upon a dose inspection into His works, 
behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so 
much according to rule ; it not being [^0 credible] that He would be 
at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity 
to no purpose. 

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of 
ideas does not imply the relation of cause and efftcty but only of a 
mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not 
the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the 
mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that 
I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the 
ambient bodies, but the sign thereof«>. Secondly, the reason why 
ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular con^ 
binations, is the same with that for combining letters into words^. 
That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number 
of efiFects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined 
together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, 
these combinations must be made by r»/f, and with njoist cem- 
trivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed 
unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such 
actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting 
such and such ideas — which in effect is all that I conceive to 
be distinctly meant when it is said^^^ that, by discerning the figure, 
texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether 
natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and 
properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. 

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the 
notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production 
of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great 



" * imaginable* — in first edition. 

" According to Berkeley, Minds, Spirits, 
Persons are the only proper causes; and 
it is only by an abuse of language that the 
term ' cause* it applied to the ideas or 
objtcts which are invariable antecedents 
of other ideas or objects — the prior form 
of dieir objective or phenomenal existence. 
He contrasts so-called Physical with Spiritual 
Causation — the latter being implied in our 
conception of mind ; the former consisting 
in the observable relations of phenomena, 
in which causation proper is unperceived, 
and therefore non-existent. Physical Science 
is the interpretation of natural signs, and 



is only confused (Berkeley would say) by 
reference to an unconscious agency which 
is inconceivable. 

" Berkeley, in meeting this objection, 
thus reverts to his favourite theory of a 
Universal Natural Symbolism as the true 
character of the sensible woiid. See next 
section, which describes the orderly co-exist- 
ences and sequences of nature as not causally 
neetsiory^ but arbitrarily construcUd — in 
order to be a means of social intercourse, 
and for the use of man in his contemplation 
of the Supreme Mind. 

*• See Locke's Essay, B. IV. ch. 3. § 25 — 
28. &c. 



PAKT I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



191 



may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and 
dmous use assigned to them, when they are considered only as 
marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after 
and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may so call it) 
of the Author of nature, that ought to be the employment of the 
natural philosopher^ and not the pretending to explain things by 
corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged 
the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and 
wise Spirit ^ in whom we live, move, and have our being.' 



67. In the t'welph place, it may perhaps be objected that — ^though 
it be dear from what has been said that there can be no such 
thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable 
substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe 
Matter — ^yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the 
positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say 
that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that 
exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of 
our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas 
in us — it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may 
possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no 
less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to 
suppose accidents without a substance^^. But secondly, though we 
should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where 
can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind^* is 
agreed ; and that it exists not in place is no less certain — since all 
place or extension exists only in the mind 2% as hath been already 
proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all. 

68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us 
of mstter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for 
this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, 
unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of 
negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under 



** With Berkeley, mattriai lubftance it 
merely the compleinent of simple ideas or 
phcoomena which arhiirarily constitute t 
pvticiUar thing. (Cf. sect. 37.) The Divine 
Will is, with him, the cause of phenomena 
bctag thus constituted, combined, or sub- 
•Caatiated. His substance-proper, i. e. mind, 
is nii'iiiiirjf, because an object-perceired 



necessarily implies a percipient. 

* i. e. that it is not perceived. 

* i.e.* place* exists only as perceived or 
conceived by an intelligence — sense>percep- 
tion being its real, and conception its ima- 
gined existence. Mind is thus, with Berkeley, 
the plaet of locality and of space. Cf. 
Sirit^ sect. 385, ftc. 



192 Of the Principles part l 

or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports 
nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a 
nmeniitj I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the 
imkmavm occasiw'^Ty at the presence of which ideas are ezdted in 
us by the will of God. Now, 1 would fain know how anything cui 
be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflection, 
nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all 
extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words 
^to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some 
abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to com- 
prehend. 

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by oecssi^m. So £ur 
as I can gather from the common use of language, that woti 
signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else some- 
thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordi- 
nary course of things. But, when it is applied to Matter as above 
described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter 
is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or 
efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all 
sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions 
in the latter sense — as when the burning my finger is said to be 
the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be 
meant by calling matter an occasion? This term is either used 
in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received 
signification. 

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived 
by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion 
of exciting ideas in our minds*^". For, say you, since we observe 
our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, 
it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and 
regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that 
there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corre- 
sponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in 
our minds, or anywise immediately aflFect us, as being altogether 
passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by 
whom they are perceived ^^^ as it were so many occasions to remind 

* He refers to the Cartesian theory of they are accordingly ideas. And, if this 
occasional causes. means merely that the sensible sjrstem is the 

* So Geulinz and Malebranche. expression of Divine Ideas, which are \U 

* As known by the Divine intelligence, ultimate archetjrpe — that the Ideas of God 



fAET I. of Human Knowledge. 193 

Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds — that so things 
aiay go on in a constant uniform manner. 

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is 
Ime stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a 
tiiiiig distinct from Sfhit and tdea^ from perceiving and being 
perceived ^ but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not 
wlat sort, in the mind of God, which are so many marks or notes 
that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a 
ooDStant and regular method — much after the same manner as a 
musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmo- 
nious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, 
though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and 
may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter 
(iriiidi after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from 
what is said of unknown occasions) seems too e}ctravagant to 
deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in e£Rsct no objection against 
what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived 
substance. 

7 a. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, firom the constant 
uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom 
of the Spirit who excites them in our minds ; but this is all that I 
can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is 
evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and 
powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of 
nature^. But, as for Inert ^ senseless Matter^ nothing that I perceive 
has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. 
And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon 
in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the 
lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or 
even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. 
For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn 
that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that 
it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us ; 
and what this amounts to we have just now seen. 

arc fjrmboUsed in our senses, to be inter- operation of the Supreme Being is too bold 

preled or misinterpreted by human minds, ever to carry conriction with it to a mind 

as rcftfoo in man is applied or misapplied — sufficiently apprised of the weakneu of 

Ihii theory allies itsdf with the Platonic. human reason, and the narrow limits to 

It it ptrtly worked oat in SiriM, which it is confined in all its operations.' 

"* *It seems to me,' says Hume, *that Inqmry conetrmimg Human UndtrUanding, 

^tttorj of the unirersal energy and sect. VII. p. i. 

O 



1 94 Of ^^ Principles part l 

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives whidi 
induced men to suppose ihe existence of material suhstancei that 
so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those 
motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent 
that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that 
colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or 
accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for this reason 
it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking sutstraium or 
substance wherein they did exist — since they could not be conceived 
to exist by themselves •'^^ Afterwards, in process of time, men being 
convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensibly 
secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they 
stripped this suhstratum or material substance of those qualities^ 
leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which 
they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently 
to stand in need of a material support. But, it having be shewn 
that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a 
Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no 
longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter 33 • nay, that it 
is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as 
that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities 
or accidents wherein they exist without the mind. 

74. But — ^though it be allowed by the materialists themselves 
that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting acci- 
dents, and, the reason entirely ceasing ^4^ one might expect the mind 
should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief 
of what was solely grounded thereon — yet the prejudice is riveted 
so deeply in our thotights, that we can scarce tell how to part 
with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is inde- 
fensible, at least to retain the name^ which we apply to I know 
not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, 
though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. 
For, what is there on our part, or what .do we perceive, amongst all 
the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, 

'^ Is the assumption of the need for thing existing unperceived and unperceiving. 

substance of some sort, percipient if not cor- But * matter/ in another and intelligible 

poreal, regarded by Berkeley as a truth of meaning of the word, according to Berkeley, 

the absolute or common reason ? may and does exist. 

^ e. g. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, ** Seeing that sensible phenomena are 

Sec. sufficiently * supported ' by mind. 

" That is, if we mean by Matter, some- 



of Human Knowledge. 



195 



by sense or reflection, from whence may be inferred the 
nee of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion ? and, on 
:her hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can 
be that should make us believe or even suspect He is 
^ by an inert occasions^ to excite ideas in our minds? 
It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, 
uch to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a 
?ss, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless 
hat^ by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen 
from the Providence of God, and remove it farther oft from 
fairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to 

the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we 
^our to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the 

and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an 
nation not regulated by reason to make out that poor 
ility, yet the upshot of all is — that there are certain unknown 
in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I 
ive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this 

bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the 

Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, 
hether they may be called by the name Matter^ I shall not 
e^. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking sub- 

or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, 
o me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such 
, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should 
n or be supported by an unperceiving substance ^7. 

But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless 
t of extension and the other qualities or accidents which 
rceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving 
nee or suhtratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible 
is colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a 



ets that ' occasion ' is only another 
His own Ideas ? 

keley's philosophy seems to imply 
cnce of Divine Ideas, which receive 
>n in the laws of nature, and of 
imian science is the imperfect inter- 
I. In this view, the assertion of the 
* of Matter, material substance, or 
is simply an assertion that the 



phenomenal universe into which we are 
bom is a reasonable or interpretable universe ; 
and that it would be acttully interpreted, 
if our conceptions were harmonized with the 
Divine or Absolute Conceptioa which it 
expresses. The Divine Thought would thus 
be Absolute Truth or Being. Cf. Suit 
passim. 

■' Cf. sect. 3 - 34. 



O 2 



196 Of the Principles part l 

sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should 
possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made 
to see does of the existence of li^t and colours. — I answer, fiist, 
if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown 
support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is sudi 
a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see 
the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not 'wbetj 
and we know not luhy. 

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish 
us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the 
same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance 
that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, 
colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing 
else but sensations or ideaSy which exist only in a nund perceiving 
them ; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted 
with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever. 

79. But, you will insist, what if 1 have no reason to believe the 
existence of Maitter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or 
explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that 
word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists^ 
and that this Matter is in general a suhstance^ or occasion of ideas i 
though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any 
particular explication of those words may be attended with great 
difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, 
you may put them together as you please without danger of running 
into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two 
is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words 
of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of 
you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there 
is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the 
occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by 
one proposition as the other. 

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause 
of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown 
somewhat — neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, 
thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no 
place ? For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or 
occasion^ or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 197 

no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is 
adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the 
word ^ Matter' in the same sense as other men use ^ nothing,' and 
so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this 
is what appears to me to be the result of that definition — the parts 
whereof when I consider with attention, either collectively or 
separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect 
or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by 
the term nothing. 

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fi>resaid definition is 
included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing — the 
positive abstract idea of quid£ty^ entity^ or exigence. I own, 
indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract 
general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say 
they, the most abstract and general notion of all ; that is, to me, 
the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great 
variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties 
both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of 
my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for 
me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets 
of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme 
Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and 
presumption — since there may be, for aught that 1 know, innu- 
merable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, 
and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds 3®. 
But, how ready soever 1 may be to acknowledge the scantiness of 
my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits 
and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a 
notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from sfhrit and tdea^ from 1 
perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright re- 
pugnancy and trifling with words. — It remains that we consider the 
objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. 

82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the 
real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed 
not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so 

* Matter and ph3rtical science it rtlathft, coune at present inconceirable by man. Or, 

masmnch as we may suppose an indefinite we may suppose an intelligence destitute of 

oomber of additional senses, affording cor- all ims^-perceptions, and baring ideas or 

ropoodtng rarieties of sense<«zperience, of objects of another sort altogether. 



198 Of the Principles paml 



clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good Chris- 
tian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than moe 
ideas ; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related wluch 
evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and 
rivers, and cities, and human bodies ^9. Xo which I answer 
that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, whidi use 
those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to haw 
a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in 
question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, 
that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in 
the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: 
and the difference betwixt things and tdeas^ realities and cbimerm^ 
has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, ^6y fcc And 
1 do not think that either what philosophers call Mmttery or the 
existence of objects without the mind^o^ is anywhere mentioned in 
Scripture. 

83. Again, whether there be or be not external things ^i, it is 
agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking 
our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived 
by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid 
down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and signifi- 
cancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as 
it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so very 
manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that 
it is needless to insist any farther on it. 

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of 
their stress aiid import by our principles. What must we think of 
Moses' rod ? was it not really turned into a serpent, or was there 
only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators ? And, can 
it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast 
in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the 
guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of 
wine ? The same may be said of all other miracles ; which, in 

* Holy Scripture, and the assumed pos- prove that the material world exists, but to 

sibility of its existence, added to our natural explain what we should mean when we say 

tendency to believe, are the grounds on that it exists. 

which Malebranche and Norris infer the ^ i. c. existing uncognised by any intdli- 

existence of a material world. Berkeley's gence — finite or Divine, 

material world needs no proof — unless of its ** • external things/ i. e. things existing 

permanent orderliness, which he re^ts on absolutely, or out of all relation to €Uiy 

suggestion and custom. His aim is not to cognitive agent. 



•A»T I. of Human Knowledge. 199 

Doscquence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only 
• so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. — ^To this I reply, that 
fae rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real 
Hne. That this does not in the least contradict what I have 
diewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this 
tesiness of real and Imapnary has been aheady so plainly and 
blly explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about 
tt arc so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were 
sm affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication 
of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who 
were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and 
find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality ^^ ; 
— -60 that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place 
at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and conse- 
quently makes rather for than against what has been said. 

85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to 
propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and 
weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our 
tenets in their Consequences ^3, Some of these appear at first sight — 
as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance 
of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from 
philosophy. ^Whether corporeal substance can think,* * whether 
Matter be infinitely divisible,' and *how it operates on spirit' — these 
and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philo- 
sophers in all ages ; but, depending on the existence of Matter, 
they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other 
advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, 
which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been 
premised ; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. 

86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human 
knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads — that of ideas 
and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order. 

** The simultaneous consciousness of, or ^ They are unfolded in the remaining 

participation in, the * same ' MnM-ideas, by sections of the Treatise, sect. 85—156: 

difTerent persons, as distinguished from the those which apply to idtOM and sensible 

purely indiridual or personal consciousness things in sect. 8(^134: what belongs to 

of ttnaginary objects and emotions, is here tpiritt^ or subjectire substances and powen, 

referred to as a test of the nality of the in the remainder of the Treatise. 
former. 



200 Of the Principles paet l 

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of 
these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have 
been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold ezisU 
ence of the objects of sense ^^ — ^the one mtelBpUe or in the mind, 
the other real and without the mind ; whereby unthinking things 
are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct firom 
being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath 
been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the 
very root of Scepticisms^ ; for, so long as men thought that real 
things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was 
only so far forth real as it was conformable to real tUngs^ it follows 
they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. 
For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are 
conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the 
mind? 

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered 
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, 
there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they 
are looked on as notes or images, referred to tUmgs or arcbetyfes 
existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. 
We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. 
What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really 
and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only 
the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. TWngs re- 
maining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even 
whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really exist- 
ing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for 
aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom 
and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things 
existing in rerum natura. All this sceptical cant follows from our 
supposing a difference between things and ideaSy and that the 
former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It 
were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the argu- 
ments urged by sceptics in alKages depend on the supposition 

*• Berkele/s • principles * abolish this rt- the objects of sense,' the germ of scep- 

presentathf* idea in perception, and recognise ticism. Berkeley claims that under bit 

as the real object only what we are sensibly interpretation of what reality, externality, 

conscious of— not any uncognised archetjrpe. and existence mean, an intuitire know- 

^ So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who ledge of the real existence of sensible things 

see in the hypothesis of a representative is giren to us. 
perception, implying * a twofold existence of 



PAKT I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



201 



of external objects. [^^ But this is too obvious to need being 
insisted on.]. 

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking 
tiiii^s, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only im- 
possible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real 
unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see 
]^hilosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of 
heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their 
own bodies. And, after all their labouring and struggle of thought, 
they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or 
demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things^?. But, 
all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind 
and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes 
if we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse ourselves 
with the terms * absolute,* ^ external,* * exist,* &c. — signifying we 
know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own 
being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by 
sense ; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object 
should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the 
same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence di 
an unthinking being consists in being percelved^^. 

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm 
system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against 
the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct 
explication of what is meant by things reality^ existence ^ for in 
vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or 
pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed 
the meaning of those words ^5. TUng or Being is the most 



^ This lentCDce is omitted in the second 
edition. 

^ This is admitted by Des Cartes, Male- 
branche, and Locke. 

* On Berkelejr's own principles, there is 
DO contradictioa in the non-existence in 
umm of these ' qualities* of a material 
sobstanoe which we are not at the moment 
sensibly percipient of — which we merely 
infer we shonld be percipient of on certain 
conditions, e. g. the smell, &c. of an orange 
whilst we are only looking at it. Thar 
non-existence in imaginatiom, when they 
are soggested by what we are sensibly con- 
idoiis of, is inideed, on his principles, con- 



^ The chief end of the Berkeleian philo- 
sophy is to reach an inUUigihle conception of 
Being, Existence, or Thing, (farourite terms 
with philosophen) ; which, according to 
Berkeley, are not, as Locke would have it, 
simple ideas, but general names. Being or 
Existence, as explained by Berkeley, may be 
viewed either in relation to its permanent, 
or to its variable element In the former 
aspect it is the spiritual substance or self; 
in the latter, when manifested in the scnsf- 
given co-existences of simple ideas or objects, 
it is what we call material or sensible exist- 
ence. Spirits and also syntheses of sense- 
given objects may be called * things.' With 
Berkeley the word 'thing* stamU, not for 



202 



Of the Principles 



PAKT L 



general name of all ; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely 
distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but 
the name, vix. sfhrits and tietu. The former are active, indivisible, 
[*oincomiptible] substances: the latter are inert, fleeting [*<>perish- 
able passions,] or dependent beings, which subsist not by them* 
selves ^1, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual 
substances. p^We comprehend our own existence by inward 
feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason *3. We 
may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own 
minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we 
have not ideas^^. In like manner, we know and have a notion of 
relations ^^ between things or ideas — which relations are distinct 
from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may 
be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me 
it seems that ideas^ spirits^ and relatims are all in their respective 
kinds the object of human knowledge and^^ subject of discourse; 
and that the term $ika would be improperly extended to signify 
everything we know or have any notion of.] 

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really 
exist *7 • this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist 
without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resem- 
blances of any archetypes existing without the mind*® ; since the 
very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an 
idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived 
by sense may be termed external^ with regard to their origin — 
in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but 
imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. 
Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 'without the mind* in 



an archetype of the associated groups of 
phenomena of which a mind is percipient, 
but either for the groups themselves, or for 
the minds cognizant of them, and who cause 
the changes which they manifest. 

^ Omitted in second edition. 

** But whilst ideas or objects depend on 
being perceived, do not spirits depend on 
ideas in order to be percipient ? 

^ What follows to the end of this section 
was added in the second edition. 

** * reason,* i. e. reasoning or inference, 
from the changes in the sense-ideas or 
phenomena of which we are conscious. 

»• Cf. sect. 139—143. 

■• • Notion • is thus applied by Berkeley 



to our knowledge of minds^ and to our 
knowledge of relations among ideas. 

* •and' = or(?), — unless 'object* is used 
in a vague meaning, including more than 
idea. Cf. sect, i ; also New Theory of Vision 
Vindicated, sect 1 1 , 1 a ; Siris, sect. 297, 308. 

" Cf. sect. 33, for the meaning of the 
term * real.* 

"i.e. without or unpcrceived by any 
mind, human or Divine ; which is quite con- 
sistent with their being 'external' to t 
finite percipient, i. e. independent of his 
will, and determined by the conceptions 
of a higher mind than his— ccmsistent also 
with the existence of archetj'pal Ideas in 
the Divine Mind. 



PART 1. 



of Human Knowledge. 



203 



another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind ; thus, 
fidien I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must 
be in another mind^^. 

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derc^tes 
in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the 
received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all 
sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to 
subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are 
allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and 
consequently cannot subsist by themselves^. Thus far it is agreed 
on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an 
existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may 
exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their 
redJitjy and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the 
difierence is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived 
by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and 
cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended 
indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive 
them ; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do 
exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they 
call Matter — to which they attribute a natural subsistence, ex- 
terior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by 
any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, 
wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances^i 
created by Him : if indeed they allow them to be at all 
created^. 



92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal 
substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, 



" Berkeley here explains what he regards 
as the Intimate meanings of the term 
tsUemalUy. Men cannot act, cannot live, 
without assuming an external world — in some 
conception of the term * external.' It is the 
btisiiiess of the philosopher to say what that 
conception ought to be. Berkeley here 
acknowledges (a) an externality in our own 
possible experience, past and future, as deter- 
mined by natural laws, which are inde- 
pendent of the wiU of the percipient ; and 
(b) an externality to our own conscious 
experience, in the contemporaneous, as well 
•s in the past or future, experience of oibtr 
Bunds, finite or Divine. 



** i. e. they are not properly substances, 
though Berkeley sometimes speaks of them 
as such. Cf. sect. 37. 

•* 'ideas of the corporeal substances' — 
whereas Berkeley might say real ideas which 
are tbemselves our world of sensible things. 

** On the scheme of intelligible Realism, 
* creation* of matter is the production, in 
finite minds, of sense-objects or ideas, which 
are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in 
a language which God employs for the ex- 
pression o( His Ideas, and of which human 
science is the partial interpretation. Cf. 
SirtM, sect. 336. 



204 Q/" ^ Principles part l 

so likewise upon the same foundation have bieen raised all the 
impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a 
difEculty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of 
nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosoidiets, 
even of those who maintained the being of a God, have tbou^ 
Matter<>i) to be uncreated and ooetemal with Him. How great 
a fiiend material sutstamce has been to Atheists in all ages were 
needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible 
and necessary a dependence on it that, when this comer-stone 
is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the 
ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a 
particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect 
of Atheists. 

93. That impious and profane persons should readily £sdl in 
with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding 
immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and 
subject to corruption as the body; which ezdude all freedom, 
inteUigence, and design from the formation of things, and instead 
thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root 
and origin of all beings ; that they should hearken to those who 
deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the 
affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either 
to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one 
body on another — all this is very natural. And, on the other 
hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of re- 
ligion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter^ and all of them 
use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, 
methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand 
support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your 
Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow 
of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in 
the world. 

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only 
been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same 
principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. 
Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every 

*^ * Matter/ i. e. an unperceiring and that of the universe in which we find oar- 
unperceived &ibstance and Cause — ^to which selves. Such Matter once allowed, what proof 
Atheists attribute our personal existence and that it is not Supreme or Abcohite Being ? 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 205 

other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their 
minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, 
doubtless they would never foil down and worship their own 
Hems — but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible 
Mind which produces and sustains all things. 

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the 
articles of our foith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Chris- 
tians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples 
and objections have been raised by Socinians and others ? But do 
not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that 
a body is denominated the same^ with regard not to the form or 
that which is perceived by sensed, but the material substance, which 
remains the same under several forms ? Take away this material 
sutstamce — about the identity whereof all the dispute is — and mean 
by tody what every plain ordinary person means by that word, 
to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a 
combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most 
unanswerable objections come to nothing. 

96. Matter^^ being once expelled out of nature drags with it 
so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number 
of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the 
sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless 
work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against 
it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently 
seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion 
have reason to wish they were. 

97. Beside the external^ existence of the objects of perception, 
another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal 
knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas^ such as it hath been 
set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, 
those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, 
when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely 
difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in 
particular or concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having 

** or which Berkeley does not pcedicate knowing, and unknown by any intelli- 

a mmmgrieal identity. Cf. TVrd Dialog^ gence. 

ht tmmn Hylat and PbSonout, pp. 543 — ^ * external,' i. e. in the phikMOphical, 

345. hut not in Berkde/t meaning of ezteniality. 

* * matter/ i. e. absolute Matter, un- Cf. sect 90, note. 



206 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too 
abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. 
Bid your servant meet you at such a thme in such a /£«#, and 
he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; 
in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by 
which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But 
if thm be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas 
that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or 
duration in abstract, then it wiU perhaps gravel even a philosopho' 
to comprehend it. 

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple 
idea of time^ abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, 
which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost 
and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of 
it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak 
of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my 
existence 67 ^ — since that doctrine lays one under an absolute neces- 
sity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages 
without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of 
his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being 
nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, 
it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated 
by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that 
same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the 
soul always thinks ; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide 
in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its 
captation y will, I believe, find it no easy task^". 

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and 
motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, 
we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. 
[69 Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the * fire is not hot,* nor 
< the wall white,* &c., or that heat and colour are in the objects 
nothing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold 



** i. e. of what Mind, Self, the Ego means, 
of its relation to time, and what personal 
identity consists in. Berkeley sometimes 
seems to imply that the existence of the 
Ego is independent of time or succession, 
in an eternal present (an / am), amid the 
changes of phenomena of which it it con- 
scious. 



* As the tsst of sense-iddu or sensible 
objects is percipit according to Berkeley, 
so the essi of minds or persons is pereipert. 
The existence of a Mind thus dependis on 
consciousness, and the sensible existence of 
Matter depends on a sense-perdpient 

^ This sentence is omitted in the second 
edition. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 207 

abstraction ^ first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may 
be abstracted from all other sensible qualities ^ and secondly, that 
the entity of extension may be abstracted firom its being perceived. 
But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he 
says^ will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities 
are alike smsatiims and alike rea/^ that where the extension is, 
there is the colour too, i.e. in his mind70j and that their archetypes 
can exist only in some other mnd'J^ ; and that the objects of sense 7^ 
are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, , or (if one 
may so speak) concreted together j none of all which can be sup- 
posed to exist unperceived. \]'^ And that consequently the wall is as 
truly white as it is extended, and in the same sense.] 

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every 
one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happi- 
ness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from 
everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So like- 
wise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas 
of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words 
stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and 
actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the 
study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect one may 
make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being the 
wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself 
in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his 
neighbours than he did before. This hint may suffice to let any 
one see the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed 
towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. 

101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant 
about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and 
Mathematics; with regard to each of these T shall make some ob- 
servations. — And first 1 shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. 
On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of 
arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make man- 
kind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this 
head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the 

*• Cf. Niw Tbwry of Vitton, lect. 43, things. Cf. icct. r, on the meaning of 

Ace. thingt as distinct from object-prop^ or 

*' i. e. as ideas, sensible or intelligible — simple idea, 
haman or Dirinc. ^ This sentence is omitted in the second 

^ * objects ofsense/ i.e. sensible or external edition. 




■ 

I 

■ 

I 



Of the Principles pakt i. 

true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to 
enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, 
and amused only with the outside and show of things. The rea! 
essence '*, the internal qualities and constitution of every the 
meanest object, is hid from our view j something there is in every 
drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyonci the power 
of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is 
evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is 
groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that 
degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of 
those things which we perfectly comprehend. 

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant 
of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything 
includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there 
is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its 
discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have 
pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but cf 
late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the 
figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible par- 
ticles'*; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efScient 
cause than spirit^ it being evident that motion, as well as all other 
Idtas^ is perfectly inert. See sect, 25. Hence, to endeavour to 
explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, 
magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And 
accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satis- 
factory. Which may be said in general of those instances wherein 
one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need 
not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and 
how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine'*. 

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is tttrmetitm. 
That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, 



" Wilh Bakelty. ihi nominal ot logial 


" e.E. Lockc-.ffHoji, IV. 3. 


(uetKC it the real cskikc of ihingt, in « 


'■ BeikeUyism ii » fai a Spititukl Poiili- 


far at Ihingi an m Mnie what they are 


Tiim, -hich elimiuatei all cauiation ftooi the 


concciTed 10 be. Bal Ihii i> quite COD- 


oijwaw world, concentrata it in Mind, and 


•iitent with the ftcl that we may and do 






the Imat of their coniunt co-eliiteDce and 


coiulitute our niitcrial uniTene; and thu» 


lucceuion. Bui the modem Putiliniti deny 




that we may thut infer the ultimate cauaalily 




of Mind, holding that the ultimate canie or 


nominal eucnce become! lUflerent from 





PAKT I. of Human Knowledge, 209 

may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are 
we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction ? Is it that 
that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by 
the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or 
protruded towards each other ? But, nothing is determined of the 
manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be 
termed * impulse,* or ' protrusion,* as ' attraction/ Again, the parts 
of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted 
for by attraction ; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not 
perceive that anything is signified besides the eflFect itself; for as 
to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause 
which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. 

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and 
compare them together, we may observe soipe likeness and con- 
formity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to 
the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, 
crystallization, &c., there is something alike, namely, an union ur 
mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like 
phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who 
has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that 
only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and 
out of the ordinary course of our Observation. That bodies should 
tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because 
it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they 
should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon 
may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is dis- 
cerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take 
in a laiger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude 
of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue 
innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, 
which he denotes by the general name ' attraction,* whatever can be 
reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains 
the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the 
moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a 
particular example of a general rule or law of nature. 

105. If therefore we consider the diflPerence there is betwixt 
natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge 
of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter 
knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them— for that can 



2IO 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



be no other than the wrV/ of a sfhrit — but only in a greater largeness 
of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements 
are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular efiects ex- 
plained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which nile% 
grounded on the analc^ and unifbrmness observed in the produc- 
tion of natural efiects, are most agreeable and sought after by the 
mind ; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and 
near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures toudi- 
ing things that may have happened at very great distances of 
time and place, as well as to predict things to come ^ which soit 
of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. 

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are 
apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice 
of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried 
to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in 
the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears 
in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it «»- 
versal i and that to attract and be attracted by every other body 
is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas 
it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each 
other ; and, so far is that gravitation from being essentia/ to bodies 
that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew 
itself^ as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity 
of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case"', 
but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit 7% who 
causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each 
other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed 
distance ; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly 
asunder just as He sees convenient. 

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down 
the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse 
themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient 
cause, distinct from a w/W or spHf, Secondly, considering the whole 
creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent^ it should 



" According to Sir W. Hamilton, for 
example, we arc inteUectually necessitated 
to think that every new phenomenon must 
have previously existed iti another form — 
but not necessarily in this, that, or the 
other particular form ; for a knowlcd^^c 
of which we are indebted to experience. 



^* In other words, what the preceding form 
of any new phenomena actually was, has 
been determined by the Supreme Will, and 
is, in that sense, arbitrary. God is the proper 
cause of the antecedent and consequent forms 
or phenomena of existence being what we 
actuallv find them to be. 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



211 



seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary 
to what some hold'^) about the final causes of things j Qofor, be- 
sides that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the 
mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only discovers 
to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also direct us in 
several instances to the proper uses and applications of things^] 
and I must confess I see no reason why pointing out the various 
ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were 
originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be 
thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy 
a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason 
can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, 
and observations and experiments made — which, that they are of 
use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is 
not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between 
things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to 
men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31. 
Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our 
view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them 
deduce the other phenomena^ I do not say demonstrate^ for all 
deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of 
nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of 
those rules we take for principles^' — which we cannot evidently 
know. 

108. [«*^ It appears from sect. 66^ &c. that the steady consistent 
methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of its 
Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and 
directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life. And 
to me] Those men who frame ^=^ general rules from the phenomena, 
and ^terwards derive'*^ the phenomena from those rules, seem** 
to consider signs rather than causes. »'> A man may well understand 



^ He probably refen to Bacon. 

** Omitted in second edition. 

** Our assumed * principles,' or supposed 
Imm of naturt^ may be subordinate or special, 
and therefore rariable, associations of sensi> 
Ue signs which, in their ultimate meaning, 
express a perfect, and therefore necessary, 
Dmoeldea. 

"* Omitted in the second edition. 

•' i. e. inductively. 

*• i. e. deductirely. 



** *seem to consider signs rather than 
causes ' — * seem to be grammarians, and 
their art the grammar of nature. - Two 
ways there are of learning a language — 
either by rule or by practice' — in first 
edition. 

^ * A man may be well read in the lan- 
guage of nature without understanding the 
grammar of it, or being able to say,' &c. 
— in first idition. 



P 2 



212 



Of the Pf^jinciples 



PART I. 



natural signs without knowing their analc^, or being able to say 
by what ruje a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to 
write improperly, through too strict an observance of general 
grammar-rules ; so, in aiguing from general laws of nature, it is 
not impossible we may extend «7 the analogy too far, and by that 
means run into mistakes. 

109. [«8To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other books 
a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply 
it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the 
language ; so, in perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is 
beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing 
each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it 
follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, 
namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the 
beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by 
proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, 
and beneficence of the Creator ^ and lastly, to make the several 
parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends 
they were designed for, God^s glory, and the sustentation and 
comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. 

1 10. [«9Thc best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science 
will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise 
of Mechanics.'] In the entrance of which justly admired treatise. 
Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and 
relative^ true and apparent^ mathematical and vulgar-, — which dis- 
tinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose 
those quantities to have an existence without the mind ; and that 
they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to 
which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at 
all. 

111. As for Time^ as it is there taken in an absolute or ab- 



" * extend * — • stretch* — in first edition. 

" Omitted in second edition. 

• In the first edition, instead of this 
sentence, the section commences thus : * The 
best grammar of the kind we are speaking 
of will be easily acknowledged to be a 
treatise of Mecbamcs^ demonstrated and 
applied to nature by a philosopher of a 
neighbouring nation whom all the world 
admire. I shall not take upon me to make 



remarks on the performance of that extra- 
ordinary person; only some things he has 
advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine 
we have hitherto laid down, that we should 
be wanting in the regard due to the au-> 
thority of so great a man did we not take 
some notice of them.' He refers, of course, 
to Newton. The first edition was published 
in Ireland — hence * neighbouring nation.* — 
On absolute Space, cf. Sirii, sect. 170, &c. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 213 

stracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of 
things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has 
been akeady said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, 
this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space^ which, being 
unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immoveable j 
and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being moveable 
and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly 
taken for immoveable space. Place he defines to be that part of 
space which is occupied by any body ^ and according as the space 
is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is 
said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute 
place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. 
And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our 
senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible mea- 
sures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies 
which we regard as immoveable. But, it is said in philosophical 
matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that 
none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and 
the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at restj 
as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and 
motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same 
time, according as its place is variously defined. All which am- 
biguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all 
in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded 
in philosophy. And the true we are told are distinguished from 
apparent or relative motions by the following properties.— First, 
in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same 
position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the 
whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed 
therein is also moved ; so that a body moving in a place which 
is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, 
true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force 
impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always 
changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in 
circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which 
nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to 
the quantity of motion. 

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it 
does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than 



214 ^f ^^ Principles part i. 

relative^ i so that to conceive motion there must be at least con- 
ceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in r^ard 
to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in 
being it could not possibly be moved. This to me seems very 
evident, in that the idea I have of motion does necessarily include 
relation. — [^i Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little 
attention may satisfy them.] 

1 13. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive 
more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, 
namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance 
or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may 
define relative motion, so as to term that body moved -whidti changes 
its distance from some other body, whether the force [9* or action] 
causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as [^I cannot 
assent to this ; for, since we are told] relative motion is that which 
is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it 
follows that every man of common sense knows what it is as well 
as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense 
of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over 
may be said to move^ because they change distance with his feet ? 
To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one 
thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the 
relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of some- 
what which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from 
another body which is not therefore itself in motion, [^ I mean 
relative motion, for other T am not able to conceive.] 

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion 
which is related to it varies 9\ A man in a ship may be said to be 
quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move 
with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect 
of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common 
affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place 
of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted 
absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent 

•• On motion, cf. Analyst^ qu. 12, and sect. ii6. 
Ik Motu. See also Malebranchc, Re- *^ Omitted in second edition. 

cbercbe, I. 8. All attempts to imagine space " Added in second edition, 

imply the thought of locomotive sense-cx- " Omitted in second edition, 

perience — an unimpeded, as distinguished •* Omitted in second edition, 

from an impeded power of locomotion. Cf. •* See Locke's Essay^ B. II. 13. § 7 — 10. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 215 

of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover 
even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their 
notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and 
the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby 
they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I 
believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea 
of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. 
For, as has been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all 
external relation, is incomprehensible ; and to this kind of relative 
motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects 
ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to 
agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does 
not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how 
this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. 
See Fbilosophsae Naturalis Frmcipta Mathematical in SchoL Def. FIIL 
For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have 
the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at 
all ; as is plain from the foregoing section. 

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that 
it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body j 
secondly, that the force occasioning that change be impressed on 
it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to 
the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be 
said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to 
think a body which we see change its distance from some other to 
be moved, though it have no force reapplied to it (in which sense 
there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force 
causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be [^7 applied or] 
impressed on that body thought to move j which indeed shews we 
are cap>able of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and 
that is all, [^'^but does not prove that, in the common acceptation of 
motion, a body is moved merely because it changes distance from 
another; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the 
moving force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be 
moved. So, on the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof 
preserve a given position between themselves) is imagined to 

•• • applied to' — * impressed on* — in first •• What follows to the end of this section 

edition. is omitted in the second edition. 

^ Added in second edition. 



2 1 6 Of the Principles part i. 

exist, some there are who think that it can be moved all manner 
of ways, though without any change of distance or situation to any 
other bodies ; which we should not deny if they meant only that it 
might have an impressed force, which, upon the bare creation 
of other bodies, would produce a motion of some certain quantity 
and determination. But that an actual motion (distinct bom the 
impressed force or power productive of change of place in case 
there were bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a 
single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.] 

1 1 6. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic 
consideration of motion does not imply the being of an sitsolute 
Space^ distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related 
to bodies ; which tliat it cannot exist without the mind is dear 
upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other 
objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire narrowly, we shall 
find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of 
all body. This I must confess seems impossible ^9^ as being a 
most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of 
my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space y 
but if 1 find a resistance, then I say there is Body : and in pro- 
portion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the 
space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty 
space, it is not to be supposed that the word 'space^ stands for 
an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion — 
though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands 
for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which 
has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all 
the world to be annihilated besides my own body, 1 say there still 
remains pure Space^ thereby nothing else is meant but only that 
1 conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all 
sides without the least resistance ; but if that too were annihilated 
then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space ^^o. Some, 
perhaps, may think the sense of seeing does furnish them with the 
idea of pure space ; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere 
shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by 
that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision. 

•• 'seems impossible' — 'is above my unresisted motion of the body, or of any 

capacity' — in first edition. of its organs. See this less fully developed 

'*• i.e. pure Space, as immediately per- in New Theory o/ Vision. 
ceived, is ultimatelv the sensation of an 



PART I. of Human Knowledge, 217 

1 1 7. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those 
disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned 
concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage 
arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, 
to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject 
imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real 
Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which 
is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both 
which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is 
certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great 
note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either 
limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And 
some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incom- 
municable attributes of God agree to it'. Which doctrine, how 
unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must 
confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we 
adhere to the received opinions. 

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make 
some enquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative 
knowledge, to wit. Mathematics ^ These, how celebrated soever 
they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, 
which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be 
supposed altogether free from mistakes, if so be that in their prin- 
ciples there lurks some secret error which is common to the 
professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathema- 
ticians, tho^jgh they deduce their theorems from a great height of 
evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration 
of quantity : and they do not ascend into any enquiry concerning 
those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular 
sciences, each part whereof. Mathematics not excepted, does con- 
sequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the 
principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of 
deduction from those principles clear and incontestible, we do not 
deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of 
greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason 
not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the 

■ Clarke's Demonstrattom o/ibi Being and Attribute o/Ood, which appeared in 1 706. 

■ Sect. 118 — 131. 



2i8 Of the Principles part l 

whole progress of that science ; and that the ill effects of those 
secret unexamined errors are dififiised through all the branches 
thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are no less 
deeply concerned than other men in the errors arising from the 
doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects 
without the mind. 

1 19. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract 
ideas of Nttmieri of which to understand the properties and 
mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative know- 
ledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of num- 
bers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosopheis 
who seem to have afiected an uncommon fineness and elevation 
of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical 
speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for 
amusement^ and hath heretofore so iar infected the minds of 
some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in 
numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. 
But, if we natrowly inquire into our own thoughts, and consider 
what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion 
of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries 
about numbers only as so many Jifficibs 9ug^y so far as they are 
not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. 

lao. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, 
from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly 
follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a 
^ collection of units,' we may conclude that, if there be no such 
thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number 
in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The 
theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the 
names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well 
as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have 
nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely 
the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune 
and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere 
speculation. 

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the 
specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time 
in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it 
will not be amiss if we more folly consider and expose the vanity 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 219 

of that pretence ; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of 
Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that origin- 
ally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they 
directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of 
memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in 
writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was 
made to signify an unit, /. t. some one thing of whatever kind they 
had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more 
compendious ways of making one character stand in place of 
several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians 
or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few 
characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure 
according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly 
expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, 
so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by 
figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first 
numeral names ;ind places in the former, corresponding trt denomi- 
nations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the 
simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, 
from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how 
placed are proper to denote the whole, or iihe -versa. And having 
found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed 
throughout, it is easy to read them into words ; and so the number 
becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular 
things is said to be known, when we know the name or %ures 
(with their due arrangement) that according to the standing 
anal<^ belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by 
the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the 
particular sums signified by them ; and, thus computing in signs, 
(because of the connexion established betwixt them and the 
distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken Ibr an unit), we 
may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things 
themselves that we intend to number. 

132. In Arithmetic, thcrefijre, we regard not the thing* but the 
figti, which nevertheless are not regarded ft.ir their own sake, but 
because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and 
dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before 
observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here 
likewise that abstract ideas are thought tn l>e signified by numeral 



220 Of the Principles part i. 

names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular 
things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more 
particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is 
evident from what has been said, those things which pass for 
abstra(^ truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality 
conversant about no object distinct from particular numerable 
things, except only names and characters, which originally came to 
be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable 
to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to 
compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own 
sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, 
neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of 
language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon 
words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal =*. 

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension^ ^ which is 
the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility o( finite exten- 
sion, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or 
theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the 
same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and 
essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in 
Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make 
the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from 
whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which 
have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of man- 
kind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet 
debauched by learning; so is it the principal occasion of all that 
nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics 
so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear 
that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely 
divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of 
Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions 
which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and 
withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time 
and pains than it hitherto has been. 

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be 
the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, 
and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, there- 

^ Cf. New Theory 0/ Vision, sect. 107, * Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 12a — 

&c. 125. 149 — 160. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge, 221 

fore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension 
that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it ; but, it 
is evident- that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any 
particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, 
or figure to myself in my mind : wherefore I conclude they are 
not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the 
extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas ; and it 
is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an 
infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely 
divisible \ If by finite extension be meant something distinct 
from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so 
cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms ^extension,' 
^ parts,' &c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, 
then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite 
in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction, that every one 
at first sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it 
should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not 
brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile^ to 
the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices 
do often pass into principles ; and those propositions which once 
obtain the force and credit of a frindple^ are not only themselves, 
but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged 
From all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, 
by this meatis, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. 

1 25. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine 
rf abstract general ideas may be [7 easily] persuaded that (whatever 
[)e thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract is infinitely 
divisible. And any one who thinks the objects of sense exist 
(urithout the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to 
idmit that» a line but an inch long may contain innumerable 
parts — really existing, though too small to be discerned. These 
rrrors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other 
men, and have a like influence on their reasonings ; and it were no 



* Infinitely divitible extention, being un- come insensible or non-existent, 
icrcei red, mast be non-existent — if existence * 'converted Oentile* — 'pagan convert' 

iccessarily depends on a percipient, and must — in first edition. 
« actually perceived. The only possible ' Omitted in second edition, 

xtension is then sensible extension, which ' * will perhaps in virtue thereof be 

annot be infinitely divided, but only divided brought to admit that,' ftc. — ' will not stick 

lown to the point at which its parts be- to tmrm that/ ftc. — in first edition. 



222 Of the Principles part l 

difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use 
of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on 
them. [9 But this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter 
find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present 
we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians 
are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. 

\%6. It has been observed in another place that the theorems 
and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal 
ideas (sect. 15. Introd.); where it is explained in what sense 
this ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and 
figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innu- 
merable others of different sizes j or, in other words, the geometer 
considers them abstracting from their magnitude — which does not 
imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not 
what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but 
looks on that as a thing indiflFerent to the demonstration. Hence 
it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be 
spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is 
regarded not in itself, but as it is universal ; and it is universal 
only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines 
greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand 
parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After 
this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very 
usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, 
thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature. 

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is 
possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said 
to contain parts more than any assignable number ; which is true, 
not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified 
by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, 
slide into a belief that the small particular line described on 
paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such 
thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch ; but there is of a mile 
or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. 
When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side 
not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this 
I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; for, 

Omitted in second edition. 



PART I, of Human Knowledge. 223 

though the ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself is 
nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without any 
error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only 
marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten 
thousandth part is vefy considerable, it follows that, to prevent 
notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts 
or more. 

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the 
end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we 
speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained 
parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine 
the matter throughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot 
conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a 
thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than 
an inch, and represented by it ; and that when we say a line is 
infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely 
great '^. What we have here observed seems to be the chief 
cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension 
lias been thought necessary in geometry. 

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed 
from this felse principle might, one would think, have been 
esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by 1 know 
not what Ic^ic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be 
admitted against propositions relating to infinity — as though it 
wrere not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contra- 
dictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a 
necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever 
:x>nsiders the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived 
3n purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather 
uxjuiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go 
ihrough with a severe examination of those principles it has ever 
embraced for true. 

130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have run so high, 
md grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small 
<:ruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. 
!ome there are of great note who, not content with holding that 
inite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do 

^ * we mus*. ni^an a line,' &c. — * we mean (if we mean anjrthing) a line,' Ace. — in fint 
ditioo. 



224 ^f ^^ Principles part l 

yet Estrther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself 
subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a 
second order, and ^ on ad infimtum. These, I say, assert there 
are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals^ &c^ without 
ever coming to an end : so that according to them an inch does 
not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of 
an infinity of an infinity ad mfimtmm of parts. Others there be 
who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing 
at all 'y thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is 
any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied 
infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet 
on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, 
cube, or other power of a positive real root, should itself be 
nothing at all^ which they who hold infinitesimals of the first 
order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to 
maintain. 

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are Utb in 
the wrong, and that there is in efiect no such thing as parts 
infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any 
finite quantity ? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it 
will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and 
those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a 
height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To 
this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and 
promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and 
unshaken on our principles — that science considered as practical 
will rather receive advantage than any prejudice fix)m what has 
been said. But to set this in a due light, and shew how lines and 
figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, without 
supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible, may be the 
proper business of another place". For the rest, though it should 
follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative 
Mathematics may be pared oft without any prejudice to truth, yet 
I do not see what damage will be thence derived' to mankind. 
On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of 
great abilities and obstinate application >2 would draw oft their 

" See Amalyst. and most obstinate application/ &c.— in first 

" * men of great abilities and obstinate ap- edition, 
plication/ &c. — * men of the greatest abilities 



PART 1, of Hitman Knowledge. 225 

thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study 
of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more 
direct influence on the manners. 

132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are 
discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, 
which could never have been if their existence included a contra- 
dirtion in it — I answer that upon a thorough examination it will 
not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of 
or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities 
less than the minhnum sensibile -, nay, it will be evident this is 
never done, it being impossible. ['-'And, whatever mathematicians 
may think of fluxions, or the differential calculus and the like, a 
little reflection will shew them that, in working by those methods, 
they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what 
are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and 
almost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or infinitesimals of in- 
finitesimals, if they please; but at bottom this is all, they being in 
truth finite— nor docs the solution of problems require the supposing 
any other. But this will be more clearly made out hereafter.] 



133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very 
numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those 
^se Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of 
this treatise ; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the 
same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do 
flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philo- 
sophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the abiolute'^* 
existnct of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the 
most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether 
human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and con- 
fidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of 
unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them 
a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing 
is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inex- 
plicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter '^ is barely 



Whil foUowi 10 the end of this ttoti 


lu hire no positive cmi 


cplion M ill. 


itted in the letODd edition. 


■• i.e. nlHolute 


r unpetcei*^ MjHer. 


' >b<a1ulc.' i.e. unpetceived or in 


E- but not Ihe rdaliv 


or perceived materii] 




c- world of the lenie). 





226 



Of the Principles 



PA&T L 



precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reascm; 
if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free 
inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence 
of ^infinites being incomprehensible;' if withal the removal of 
this Matter ^^ be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it 
be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay mudi 
easier conceived without it ; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists 
are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideaS;, and this 
scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion 
— methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly em- 
braced, though it were proposed only as an kypotbesisy and the 
existence of Matter ^^ had been allowed possible, which yet I think 
we have evidently demonstrated that it is not. 

J 34. True it is that, in consequence of the forgoing principles, 
several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean 
parts of learning, are rejected as useless [>^and in eflfect conversant 
about nothing at all]. But, how great a prejudice soever against 
our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply 
engaged, and made lai^e advances in studies of that nature, yet by 
others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to 
the principles and tenets herein laid down — that they abridge the 
labour of study, and make human sciences far more dear, com- 
pendious, and attainable than they were before. 



135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning 
the knowledge of Ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the 
next place to treat of Spirits' 7 — with regard to which, perhaps, 
human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The 
great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the 
nature of spirits is — our not having an idea of it. But, surely it 
ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding 
that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly 



*^ See note 1 5 on preyious page. 

^ Omitted in second edition. 

" Sect. 135—156 treat of the conse- 
quences of the new Principles of Haman 
Knowledge, in their application to Spirits 
or MituU — ^the second of the two correla- 
tives in the dualism of Berkeley. This 
dualism Berkeley does not sufficiently ex- 



plain. When he speaks of Mind as a Svin 
stance^ and of minds in the plural, he cannot 
mean by * substance' what Spinoza meant— 
that which for its existence needs nothing 
beyond itself. Mind, with Berkeley, needs 
ideas, and must be conscious; and finite 
minds are dependent on God, in a relation 
which he does not define. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 227 

impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake 
not has been demonstrated in section 27 ; to which I shall here add 
— ^that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support 
wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist ^ but that this 
smkstmut which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an 
idea or like an idea is evidently absurd. 

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some 
have imagined'^) proper to know substances withal, which, if we 
had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I 
answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we 
could only receive tl^ereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. 
But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms 
S9ml and sutstance is only some particular sort of idea or sensa^ 
tion. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, 
it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that 
they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking 
substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being 
able to comprehend a round sjuare. 

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the 
manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and 
heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the 
soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a 
doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their 
body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of 
it. That an Idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof 
consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an 
agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than 
barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps 
you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its 
thinking^ acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other 
respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all 
respects like the original. 

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible 
it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the 
power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains 
nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the 
word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives ; 
this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If 

« Locke. 



228 Of the Principles part l 

therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should 
be represented in an idea \}^ox notion], it is evident there can be 
no idea [^^or notion] of a spirit. 

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by 
the terms swl^ spirit^ and siAstMrnce^ they are wholly insignificant, 
or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or 
signify a real thing^which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but 
that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. 
What I am myself — that which I denote by the term 1 — is the 
same with what is meant by s&iU or sftritMsl sutsttmce. [^But if I 
should say that I was nothing, or that J was an idea or notion, 
nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these pro- 
positions.] If it be said that tibis is only quarrelling at a word, 
and that, since the immediate significations of other names are by 
common consent called idessy no reason can be assigned why 
that which is signified by the name spirit or sml may not 
partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking 
objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive and 
their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or 
spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being 
perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking*^. It is therefore 
necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding 
natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish 
between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. 

140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea 
P*or rather a notion] of spirit i that is, we understand the meaning 
of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of 
it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of 
other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resem- 
blances of them ; so we know other spirits by means of our own 
soul — which in that sense is the image or idea of them ; it having 
a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me per- 
ceived has to those ideas perceived by another^^. 

^ Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. he professes to apply the term noiitm ex- 

143* clusively to our knowledge of the Ego, and 

* Ihid. to our knowledge of rnatioiu among our 
^ If the existence of a mind consists in ideas. Sect. 142. 

perceiring, it follows that mind is as de- ^ We know other minds or Egos pheno- 

pendent on ideas (of some sort) as ideas menally, i. e. through phenomena, or by 

are on mind. inference from them, but not as ideas or 

* Introduced in second edition, in which phenomena of which we oorsdvet are con- 



PART I. 



of Human Knowledge. 



229 



141. [^^The natural immortality of the soul is a necessary con- 
sequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we attempt to 
prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] 
It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural im- 
mortality of the soul^^ are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable 
of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who 
first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or 
dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed 
who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of 
animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since 
there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which 
it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle 
wherein it is inclosed. And this notion has been greedily em- 
braced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most 
effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. 
But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture 
soever, are barely passive ideas' in the mind — which is more distant 
and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness 3^. We 
have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, 
and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer 
than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we 
hourly see be^ natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the 
cmtrst of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncom- 
pounded substance : such a being therefore is indissoluble by the 
force of nature; that is to say, ^the soul of man is naturally 
ixximortaX'^T * 

142. Af^er what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our 
souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, in- 
active objects, or by way of idea. Sphiu and ideas are things so 
wholly different, that when we say * they exist,* * they are known,* 
or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything 



•doiis. Cf. sect 148. It is thus a phe- 
nomenil knowledge that we have of other 
finite minds ^- of Ego viewed empirtcallj 
and in plurality. The real meaning of 
Ego in the plural number, distinguished from 
the absolute or transcendentau Ego, is a 
question which Berkeley has not discussed. 

** Omitted in second edition. 

** 'the soul,' Le. the finite mind or 
empirical Ego. 

* This is an emphatic assertion of the 



dualism of Berkeley — Minds or Egos being 
distinguished from their ideas or objects. 

" Although minds are dependent on 
ideas, as well as ideas on minds, yet minds 
are not, by any abstract necessity, dependent 
on siiu#-ideas or physical organization. 
Hence, while pure materialism is, on Berke- 
ley's principles, a contradiction, the con- 
tinued existence of a disembodied spirit in- 
volves no necessary absurdity. 



230 



Of the Principles 



PART 1. 



common to both natures^^. There is nothing alike or common 
in them ; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlaigement 
of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a 
triangle^^, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. 
This is inculcated because 1 imagine it may be of moment to- 
wards clearing several important questions, and preventing some 
very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. [^ We 
may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idem of an active 
being, or of an action^', althou^ we may be said to have a nttim 
of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and 
its acts about ideas — inasmuch as I know or understand what is 
meant by these words. What I know, that 1 have some notion 
of. I will not say that the terms idem and neti^m may not be used 
convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to 
clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very difierent 
by difllerent names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations 
including an act of the mind^'^, we cannot so properly be said to 
have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes 
bf^ween things. But if, in the modern way, the word Idtm is 
extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an 
afl^r of verbal concern.] 

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of akstrmtt 
ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate 
and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual 
things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of 
the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded 
as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective 
objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and am- 
biguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been 



* The objective essence of matter, or the 
sense-given non-ego, is, with Berkeley, purely 
phenomenal or ideal; the essence of mind 
— the Ego — is substantial and causal. Sense- 
ideas or phenomena are at once dependent 
on mind, and symbolical of the intentions 
of mind. Mind and its ideas are, in short, 
at the opposite poles of existence— being 
related as subject knowing and object known, 
as cause and efltects, as substance and pheno* 
menon. But he does not say that these poles, 
thus opposed, are numerically distinguish- 
able as things independent of nch other. 

" i. e. objectively — as an object or idea. 



•• What follows was introduced in the se- 
cond edition, in which the term noft'on is 
defined, and assists to express Berkeley's 
duality in things. 

** Yet he speaks elsewhere (sect. I, &c.) 
of ideas formed by attending to the * opera- 
tions* of the mind. He probably refers to 
the 9Jfkcts of the operations, holding that 
the effects, but not their cause, are ideal. 

" Here is the germ of Kantism. But 
Berkeley has not analysed that activity of 
mind which constitutes relation, as di5tin- 
guished from the personal acting of will . Cf . rc- 
nurkable passages in Siris, sect. 297, 308, &c. 



of Htitnan Knowledge. 



231 



introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have 
grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. 

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards en- 
gaging men in controversies and mistakes with r^ard to the 
nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak 
of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For ex- 
ample, the will is termed the mot'ton of the soul: this infuses a 
belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impielled and 
determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the 
stroke of 3 racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of 
dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may 
be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could 
but philosophers be prevailed on to [['-'depart from some received 
prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into themselves, and 
attentively consider their own meaning. ["But the difficulties 
arising on this head demand a more particular disquisition than 
suits with the design of this treatise.] 

145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know 
the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, 
or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, 
changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are 
certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them 
and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of 
other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas ; 
but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to 
agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant 
signs". 



" Omitted ID fiFcond rdilion. 

" Thii i» one of the moit importuW 

(HC Rcid't Esiaji, VI. f, ftc.) to allege 
dill, on Eerkcley't ptbciplei, I have no 
reaun ta belieie in the eiiilence of tribtr 
mindi or wilk~a pluulity of Egoi. or »t 
aaj tite in other Egot than my own. and 
die Supieme 01 Absolute. I can deiiga or 
intend ; »!1 the rcit 11 Ood'i — my volidoni 
and Hii detennine the phenomenal nniverte. 
Now, Bcikctey hddi that wi hare the fame 
MTf of leuon to beliere in the exiilcncc of 
other bunuut tniudi that we have to believe 
in the uincnce of God, n'l. the scnw-jytn- 
boliim which implici the exiilcnce nf other 
finite minds, embodied like onr own, ai lis 
only rrajonable inlerprelition. Cf. iccl. 



147, I4B- Both are beliirfl giihertd Troni 
the BiggalioHs of experience. Thii eniblei 
us to infer the exitlencenot merely of olher, 
and by us, at pie«nl, unperceivcd pheno- 
mena, in our own past ot future experience ; 
and phenomena in Ihe present, pail or 
future expeiience of otbrr mimli ; but also, 
as implied in the litter, the tuiilfno of 
other minds — other Klfi. His tnode of 
looking It ihe universe leaves the eiidenee 
for the existence of other m«n >< it Wai before 
(although our ideas and those of other men 
are with him not narDcrically identical, but 
ooly in t humony of timilirily) ; while hii 
theory was believed by him to intcntify the 
evidence of Divine Presence and Providence. 
Sec Aleipbrm. Dial. IV., and ViiulicatiQ» 
0/ New Tbmry 0/ VUioK, sect. 8, 38, &c. 



232 



Of the Principles 



PART L 



146. But, though there be some things which convince us human 
agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to 
every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, 
that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by 
us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There 
is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repug- 
nant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, 
if we attentively consider the constant r^;ularity, order, and con- 
catenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty 
and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the 
smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony 
and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough- 
admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural 
inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals — I say if we con- 
sider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning 
and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, 
and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the 
aforesaid Spirit, ^ who works all in all,' and ^ by whom all things 
consist.' 

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and 
immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from 
ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far 
more evidently perceived than the existence of men ; because the 
effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable 
than those ascribed to human agents 33. There is not any one mark 
that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not 
more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of 
Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will 
of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of 
his body j but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite 
any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the 
Creator. He alone it is who, ^ upholding all things by the word 
of His power,' maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby 
they are able to perceive the existence of each other^fi. And yet 



» Cf. Alcipbrwt, Dial. IV. 8—14; Vin- 
diccLiioH ofNtw Tbewy of Vision, sect. 8. 

" God so reguhtes the sense-giveii pheno- 
mena or ideas of which spirits are individually 
conscious, as that these phenomena, tt^iU 
numerically dijfwrtnt in each mind, are 
nevertheless a practical medium of inter- 



course between minds. Egoism is seen not 
to be a necessary result of the fact that no 
one but myself can be conscious of my own 
experience, when we recognise that persons 
only are powers, and that / am not the 
cause of all the changes which my ideas 
or phenomena exhibit. Without being 



PART 1. 



of Human Knowledge. 



233 



this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself 
invisible p7to the greatest part of mankind]. 

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd 
that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we 
see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His 
commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the 
Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than 
we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see 
God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view ; or see 
corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which repre- 
sents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is^% I must con- 
fess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning : — 
A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being 
an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and 
motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas 
excited in our own minds \ and these being exhibited to our view 
in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the 
existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is 
plain we do not see a man — if by num is meant that which lives, 
moves, perceives, and thinks as we do — but only such a certain 
collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct prin- 
ciple of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and 
represented by it. And after the same manner we see God ; all 
the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assem- 
blage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we 
direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive 
manifest tokens of the Divinity — everything we see, hear, feel, or 
anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of 
God ; as is our perception of those very motions which are pro- 
duced by men 39. 



tbcmselres conscioai of my consciousness, we 
may infer that other persons or minds are 
at work to modify it. In short, our ex- 
perience of power or volition, and of our 
own limited power, is essential to Berkeley's 
recognition of a plurality of minds or sub- 
stances—to his escape from the unity of 
Absolute Egoism, and to his scientific recog- 
nition of liM external world. 

" Omitted in second edition. 

** Malebranche, as imderstood by Berke- 
ley. According to Malebranche we see 
material or sensible things in Ood, who 
transcends, and in transcending unites the 



substantial antithesis of Mind and Matter. 
See Rteherchi^ liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, dtc. 

» Of. Aleipbnm, Dial. IV., and VindtcO' 
Hon of Ntw Tbwry of Vitiom^ sect. 8, 38, 
&c. The gttmal existence of conscious 
Mind, and the pmtni existence of other 
finite minds than my own, are both infer- 
ences, according to Berkeley. The former, 
howerer, follows from the assumption that 
tomedfmg must be eternal, because something 
now exists ; seeing that this * something,' as 
existing, must be a mind conscious of ideas 
or objects. 



234 ^f ^ Principles paet i. 

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to 
any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence of 
God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing 
in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually 
affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, 
in short ^ in whom we live, and move, and have our being/ That 
the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to 
the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a 
sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though 
they are surrounded with such dear manifestations of the Deity, 
are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded 
with excess of light. 

150. But you will say. Hath Nature no share in the production of 
natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and 
sole operation of God ? I answer, if by NdUfre is meant only the 
visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, 
according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that 
Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all ^. But, 
if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from 
the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess 
that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible 
meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain 
chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of 
the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more 
unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, profess- 
ing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those 
effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers 
are wont to impute to Nature. ^ The Lord He causeth the vapours 
to ascend J He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth 
the wind out of his treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. ^He tumeth the 
shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with 
night.* Amos v. 8. ^ He visiteth the earth, and maketh 
it soft with showers : He blesseth the springing thereof, and 
crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are 
clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.* 
See Psal. Ixv. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant lan- 
guage of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from 
believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. 

*• Cf. sect. 25, 51—53, 60—66, &c. 



PART I. of Human Knowledge. 235 

Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute 
some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may 
believe Saint Paul) ^ He be not far from every one of us/ 

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow, gradual, 
and iXHindabout methods observed in the production of natural 
things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of 
an Almighty Agent ^1. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits 
blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries 
incident to human life, and the like, are so many ai^uments thai 
the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and super- 
intended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the 
answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62 ^ 
it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely 
necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general 
rules^ and after a steady and consistent manner ^ which argues both 
the wisdom and goodness of God. [^'^For, it doth hence follow that 
the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless 
sinner, which gives him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and 
grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. 57.)] Such is the artificial 
contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its 
motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand 
which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh 
and blood. ^Verily' (saith the prophet) ^thou art a God that 
hidest thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord conceal 
Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not 
be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiassed and 
attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the 
intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates, 
and sustains the whole system of beings *3. [^^ Secondly.] It is 
clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating 
according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance 
in the afiairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that 
without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity 
and design, could serve to no manner of purpose ; it were even 
impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the 
mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly out- 
balances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 

*' Cf. s€Ct. 60—66. « So Patcal in the Ptmitz, 

^ Omitted in second edition. ** Omitted in second edition. 



236 Of the Principles part l 

152. But, we should iurther consider that the very blemishes and 
defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an 
agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of 
the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set oflF the brig^iter 
and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to ex- 
amine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and 
accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to 
full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the 
eflfect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and 
saving mortals 't^. In man indeed a thrifty management of those 
things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry 
may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the 
inexplicably fine machine of an animal or v^;etable costs the great 
Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble 
does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit 
can indiflterently produce everything by a mere fimt or act of his 
will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural 
things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the 
agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument 
of the riches of his power. 

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the 
world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of 
finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is 
indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are 
too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular 
pain into our thoughts, and account it evtl^ whereas, if we enlarge 
our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, coimexions, and 
dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what propor- 
tions we are aflFected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human 
freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world \ 
we shall be forced to acknowledge that those partiailar things 
which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature 
of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of 
beings 4^ 

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any con- 
sidering person, that it is merely for want of attention and com- 
prehensiveness of mind that there are any fevourers of Atheism or 
the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting 

" So Butler, in his Ancdogy, Also cf. sect. 60—66. 



of Human Knowledge. 



souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providences^ — the beiuity 
and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the 
pains, to comprehend j but those who are masters of any justness 
and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never 
sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that 
shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there 
which glares so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of 
thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it, 
at least with a full and direct view ? Is it therefore to be wondered 
at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or 
pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should 
not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God 
which might be expected in reasonable creatures? 

155. We should rather wonder that men can be tbund so stupid 
as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of 
such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared 
that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, 
are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into 
[•^a sort of Demy-]Atheism. ["They cannot say there is not a 
God, but neither are they convi need that there is. For what else can 
it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret misgivings of mind 
with regard to the existence and attributes of God, which permits 
sinners to grow and harden in impiety?] Since it is downright 
impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough 
sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty 
Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We 
ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those im- 
portant points; that so we may attain conviction without all 
scruple 'that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding 
the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all 
places whither we go, and givetb us bread to eat and raiment to 



m 1 

luty 1 

the I 



•* A conrtJtil Divine Thought ind Profi- 
dcDce in the chingei of tha phenomenal 
world, nthii thin Ibe originil creation of 
finite miiiili indortheii ideu orphoioiiieRa. 
!• the conception vhich luiu through Beike- 
lej"! philoioph}-, lonipicuouily In Siris. 

" Onulted in Mcoiid edition. Qui alleged 
necetMry igaoiince of the vldmau nuie 
uul meining of the Unirerie io which we 
find ounclvei ii, in the preKnt day, i 
common objection to Ihc asiumptiou that 



iti phenomena may be inleipreted u tig- 
niScint of Supreme or Abtolute Mind. 
Ai Hume or Comle would have it the 
Uaifeiie it a aitgvlar effect or coiiq)lement 
of phenomena, which we can interpret only 
to far u our lecoUr wants and dutiei are 
concerned. Tbey look to the phyiical 
01 'phenomenal, and not to the moral and 
spiritual evidence. 
" Omitted in KCond edition. 



238 Of the Principles^ &c. fart l 

put on;' that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; 
in fine, that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence 
on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but 
fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which 
is the strongest incentive to Virtue^ and the best guard against 
Vice. 

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is 
the consideration of God and our Duty ; which to promote, as it 
was the main drift and design of my labours^ so shall I esteem 
them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I 
cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of 
God ; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren 
speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, 
the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary 
truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practise is the nighest 
perfection of human nature. 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



TO THK 



THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND 



PHILONOUS. 



i 



f. 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



TO THE 



THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND 

PHILONOUS. 



THIS work is the gem of British metaphysical literature. Berkeley's 
claim to be the great modem master of Socratic dialogue rests, 
indeed, upon Alciphron, which surpasses the conversations between 
Hylas and Philonous in expression of individual character, and in 
general dramatic effect. Here the conversational form is adopted 
merely as a convenient way of treating the chief objections to the theory 
of Matter which is contained in the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
But the clearness of thought and language, the occasional colouring of 
fancy, and the glow of practical human sympathy and earnestness that 
pervade the subtle reasonings by which the fallacies of metaphysics 
are inexorably pursued through these discussions, place the following 
Dialogues almost alone in the modern metaphysical library. Among 
those who have employed the English language, except perhaps Hume 
and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art of uniting deep meta- 
physical thought and ingenious speculation with an easy, graceful, and 
transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when 
we recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination 
came from Ireland, at a time when that country was scarcely known 
in the world of letters and philosophy. 

The Essay on Vision and the Treatise on the Principles of Human 
Knowledge may be said to comprehend between them the early meta- 
physical doctrine of Berkeley. But it appears in these works in a form 
more suited to scholars and logicians than for obviating popular objec- 
tions, and promoting the moral purpose their author had in view. His 

R 



242 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

Essay on Vision was the precursor of the New Theory of Knovkdge 
contained in his Principles, The doctrine regarding sight and toodi 
propounded in the former was meant to be the first movement in a mr 
against the abstractions of metaphysics that was openly proclaimed in 
the latter. In the preliminary analysis of visual consciousness, the 
abstraction commonly called Space or Extension was resolved, bj 
psychological analysis, into its original elements, as given in sense, ind 
especially in the sense-symbolism of Sight. But Abstract Space is only 
a part of the structure of abstractions, reared by metaphysicians, in 
which Berkeley believed that the current scepticism of his day im 
finding shelter, and which he wanted to break up, alike in the interest 
of religion and philosophy. An abstract idea is, with him, a contn* 
diction in terms ; and the abstract idea of Matter is, of all others, the 
parent of doubt and confusion. He argues that the existence of abso- 
lute or unperceived Matter is impossible ; that all real Matter must be 
sensible Matter, as all real extension must be sensible extension ; that 
Matter which is neither seen, nor touched, nor heard, nor tasted, nor 
smelt — of which we are in no way conscious in any of the senses- 
must be at the best a mere word, an empty abstractioiL Whatever 
actually exists, accordingly, must be either an object of which a mmd 
is conscious — that is to say, an idea; or else a self-conscious miniy 
capable of exerting power over ideas. All actual Existence must be 
dependent on conscious mind, finite or Divine; abstract Existence 
involves a contradiction in terms, or rather it is a term which contains 
no meaning. 

According to Berkeley, the popular and the philosophical conception 
of Matter are both absurd — the former because adulterated by the latter. 
The unreflecting have a confused belief (which can be explained), that 
what they perceive in the senses exists whether it is perceived or not 
The philosophers, granting that what they immediately perceive in the 
senses is dependent on (embodied) mind, indulge in the irrational 
hypothesis, that sense -ideas are for us representatives of, or at least 
substitutes for, an unperceived and unperceivable material world, which 
exists per se, in absolute independence of any perception or imagination 
of its contents. Berkeley argues against both; against the former for 
assuming the absolute existence of Ihe objects of which we are conscious, 
which, so far as we know, must be ideas, inasmuch as they can be 
known to exist only while they are perceived or imagined ; against the 
latter for assuming the abstract or absolute reality of unintelligible 
material substance, existing, as it were, behind the immediate objects or 
ideas of our conscious experience. He infers that sense-ideas them- 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 243 

selves, or at least the established combinations of them, are the real 
jlhings — the only material world; while he warns us that these are not 
to be confounded with transient personal fancies, in which the real 
world may be either represented or misrepresented They are parts in 
an orderly system. They may be called exiernalj if we choose ; but not 
because they have an absoluiey that is to say, an imperceived and un- 
conceived existence. Their 'externality' consists in their arrangements 
of perceived co-existence and succession being independent of the will 
of the finite percipient ; and in the fact that, unlike our personal feelings 
and imaginations, they are virtually objects conmion to a plurality of 
minds, and the medium of intercourse between one mind and another. 
Our sense-consciousness is, on Berkeley's principles, the only material 
world to which our actions have any reference, or with which either 
pnu:tica]]y or speculatively we can have any concern. Abstract Matter 
disappears, as Abstract Space or Extension had previously disappeared 
in the New Theory of Vision, Sensible Space and Sensible Matter take 
their place; and the esse of Sensible Space and Sensible Matter is 
percipi^ because both are dependent on a percipient. 

The paradoxes and paralogisms of pure and mixed mathematics, 
with regard to Space, Time, Number, Motion, and Infinity, disappear 
from sciences confined to sensible extension and matter ; and the inves- 
tigation of nature becomes simply an attempt to interpret the arbitrarily 
established order of co-existence and succession among ideas, in the 
s^noibolical world of sense-experience. The prospect of our personal 
immortality is brightened; for, on these principles, it is metaphysically 
impossible that the sensible world, whether organic or extra-organic, can 
exist without a conscious mind, while it is at least metaphysically possible 
that created minds may maintain their consciousness of objects without 
any x^«j^-objects to be conscious of Organisms, along with the whole 
world of the senses of which our organisms are part, are thus substan- 
tially dependent on mind ; but minds are not in like absolute dependence 
on organisms or on any other sensible things — for it is conceivable 
that the matter of our experience might be exclusive of all sense-objects, 
and composed of other objects altogether. And, as the common reason 
of men, tested by their actions, demands the permanence of sensible 
things, even though they are not permanently present to the senses of 
any one embodied mind, it follows that the very existence of the things 
of sense (apart from any * marks of design ' in their collocations) implies 
the permanent existence of Supreme Mind, by whom all real objects 
are perpetually conceived, and in whom their orderly appearances, dis- 
appearances, and reappearances in finite minds may be said to exist 

R 2 



244 EDITOR'S PREPACK 

potentially. We thus find ourselves living in a sensible world which has 
its being in Mind. 

This was the Philosophy of Substance and Power which Berkeley 
had proposed in his Principles^ instead of the 6ld Materialism— the 
latent Scepticism and Atheism of which last left the sentiments of 
reverence and love, along with faith and imagination, unsatisfied, deeplj 
rooted as all these are in the nature of man. 

The following Dialogues discuss what Berkeley regarded as the 
most plausible Objections, popular and philosophical, to his doctrine 
of Sensible Things. 

The principal aim of the Firsl Dialogue is to illustrate the contradic- 
tory, or at ieast unmeaning, nature, and sceptical tendency of the 
common philosophical opinion — that we perceive in sense a material 
world which is real only inasmuch as it exists in absolute inde- 
pendence of any perceiving or conceiving mind. The absurdity of 
percipient intercourse with such a world, either in respect of its so- 
called Secondary or its so-called Primary qualities, and that whether 
the perception be immediate and presentative, or mediate and repre- 
sentative, is illustrated in detail. Absolute Matter, whether sensible 
or substantial and abstracted from the senses, cannot, without a contra- 
diction, it is argued, be presented or represented, in or through any sense. 

The Second Dialogue is first directed against some refined modifi- 
cations of the philosophical account of absolute Matter, which attribute 
our knowledge of it to inferences, founded on our experience of 
sense-ideas assumed to be representative, and not to the senses them- 
selves. The advocates of metaphysical or super-sensible Matter are 
here assailed in their various hypotheses— that Matter may be the active 
Cause, or the Instrument, or the Occasion of our sense-experience, or 
that it is an unknown Something somehow connected with that ex- 
perience. It is held in this and in the preceding Dialogue, by Philonous, 
who personates Berkeley, that Matter — meaning by that term either an 
extended, solid, figured, moveable substance ; or an unknowing some- 
thing, existing unperceived and unconceived, of which we cannot affirm 
extension and solidity, whether identified with the immediate objects 
of perception, or viewed as capable of being inferred from them — is 
not merely unproved, but a proved impossibility : it must mean nothing 
at all, or else mean a contradiction, which virtually comes to the same 
thing. It cannot be perceived ; nor suggested by what we perceive ; 
nor demonstrated by abstract reasoning ; nor even believed in as an 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 246 

•itide in the fundamental faith of Common Reason. The only con- 
sistent theory of the universe implies, it is maintained, that thirds must 
be either (a) passive objects of a conscious mind, and controlled by 
mind, or (b) active minds, conscious of objects, and capable of regulating 
tfaem. And neither of these two sorts of 'things' is strictiy speaking 
ahschiU^ that is to say, independent of the other; though the latter, 
as identical amid the variations of the phenomena which are the essence 
of the former, may be regarded as their ground or substance. The 
Second Dialogue ends by substituting, as matter of fact and intelligible 
Realism, this Theory of the imiversal dependence of the material world 
upon Mind, in place of the hypothetical Realism, which requires philo- 
sophers to defend, by fallacious reasonings. Absolute Matter, unperceived 
and unconceived, as the type of objective reality. 

In the Hiird Dialcgiie fresh objections to the New Theory of Sensible 
Things are discussed. Some of them were treated of in the Principles 
of Human Knowledge, 

Is it said that the New Theory is essentially sceptical, and its 
author another Protagoras, on account of his negation of Absolute Matter 
— that supposed unchanging essence of the changeable qualities or 
ideas which we perceive in sense? The answer is, that the reality of 
sensible things, according to the practical conviction of men, does not 
consist in an abstract essence that cannot be perceived, suggested, de- 
monstrated, or even conceived, but in the facts that sensible phenomena 
arc actually seen and touched, and that our future may with reason- 
able confidence be anticipated by the analogy of our present sense- 
experience. 

Is this negation of Absolute Matter assumed to be a mere hypo- 
thesis, against which as many objections may be pressed as ag^ainst 
the counter hypothesis which affirms its existence? It is answered, 
that the affirmation of such Matter is indeed the affirmation of a mere 
hypothesis, and one self-convicted by its own contradictions; but that 
its negation is no hypothesis at all, and only a simple falling back on 
the facts of experience, without any attempt to explain them. 

Is it objected that the reality of sensible things involves their per- 
manence during the intervals of our attention to them, and, indeed, 
their independence of the perceptions and existence of any individual 
percipient ? It is answered, that, according to the New Theory of Real 
Existence, sensible things are permanently dependent on, or relative to, 
a conscious mind, but not this, that, or the other finite mind. 

Is it alleged that the existence of Spiritual Substance or Mind is 



246 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

exposed to all the objections against Absolute Material Substance; 
and that, if we deny unperceived Matter, we must in consistency aDov 
that Mind can be only a system of floating ideas,^withoiit s MJsJM fi to 
support them ? The answer is, that there is no parity between conscious 
or mental substance, and a material substance that is out of all relatioa 
to any consciousness. We are aware, in memory, of our own personalitr 
and identity ; that we are not our ideas, ' but somewhat else' — a dunk- 
ing, active principle, that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about 
ideas, and that is revealed as continuous. Each mind is conscious of 
itself; and, although not conscious of, may reasonably infer the existence 
of other minds, that can be conceived by us after the analogy of oar 
own. A conceivable Self conscious of objects is thus quite diflfeient from 
abstract and inconceivable Matter. 

Is it said that sane people cannot help distinguishing between the 
existence of a thing and its being perceived? It is answered, that all 
they really mean is, to distinguish between being perceived exclusively 
by the indi\idual percipient, and being independent, as sensible things 
are, of any one sense-conscious individual. 

Does an objector complain that this ideal sense-realism removes the 
distinction between facts and fancies ? He is reminded of the meaning 
of the word idea. That term is not limited by Berkeley to fancies in 
the world of thought, but is applied also to the immediate objects of 
our sense experience, which are the test or criterion of physical truth. 

Is the supposition that Spirit of which we are conscious is the proper 
Cause of all the changes in nature declaimed against as extravagant? 
It is answered, that the supposition of an inert, unconscious Cause of 
sensible phenomena is still more extravagant. 

Is tlie negation of Absolute Matter said to be repugnant to the 
common belief of mankind? It is argued in reply, that Absolute 
Matter is foreign to common belief, which is incapable of even enter- 
taining the conception ; and which only requires to reflect upon what 
it does entertain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal existence of 
sensible things. 

But, if sensible things are the real things, the real moon, for instance, 
it is alleged, can be only a foot in diameter. It is maintained, in 
opposition to this, that the term * real moon ' is applied only to what is 
an inference from the moon, one foot in diameter, which we immediately 
perceive ; and that the former is a part of our pre\4sive experience or 
mediate perception, which is not strictly speaking perceived at all. 

The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next objected ; and, 
since all parties refer our sensible ideas and the things which they con- 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 247 

fltttute to a Power that is external to the percipient mind, why not call that 
imiversally acknowledged Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not 
%itrit? The reply is, that this would be a ridiculous misapplication 
of language, and a violation of its commonest usage. 

But may we not, it is next suggested, assume the possibility of a third 
r mftare — ^neither idea nor spirit ? Not, says Berkeley, if we are to keep 
^ lo the rule of having meaning in the words we use. We know what 
K is meant by a spirit, or intending and percipient cause, for each of 
^ 08 has inmiediate experience of one ; and we know what is meant by 
m lense-ideas and sensible things, for we have immediate and mediate 
1 experience of many. But we have no immediate, and therefore can 
f have no mediate, experience of what is neither an object of a con- 
scious mind, nor a state of conscious activity ; and, moreover, * entia 
; non simt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.' 

Again, the New Theory of Existence implies, it is said, imperfection, 

, because a sentient nature, in the Supreme Mind. This objection, it is 

I answered, implies a confusion between being actually sentient and 

merely conceiving what sensations are, or employing them, as God 

does, as signs for conveying His conceptions to created minds. 

The negation of Absolute Matter seems to some objectors to anni- 
hilate all the received explanations of physical phenomena given by 
natural philosophers. But, to be assiu-ed that it does not, we have 
only to recollect what a physical explanation means — that it is the 
reference of an apparently irregular phenomenon to an acknowledged 
general rule of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas. 

Is the proposed Theory of Existence summarily condemned as a 
novelty ? It can be answered, that all discoveries are novelties at first ; 
or that this theory, when fully imderstood, is not so much a novelty 
as a reflective interpretation of common thought and belief. 

Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real things into 
mere appearances or ideas. Here we have only to consider what we 
mean when we speak of sensible things as real. It is the changing 
appearances of which we are conscious in sense, united by custom and 
association, that are what men mean by ' real sensible things.' 

The Theory is inconsistent with the identify of material things, it is 
complained, and also with the acknowledged fact that different persons 
are percipient of the same thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we 
attend to the true meaning of the word * same,' and dismiss from our 
thoughts a pretended abstract idea of identity which is nonsensical. 

But people exclaim against the supposition that the sensible universe 
exists in mind, regarding it as a virtual assertion that mind itself is 



248 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

extended, and co-extensive with the sensible universe. Now this pro- 
ceeds, it is urged, on a forgetfuhiess of what being ' in mind' means. 
That form of words is intended to express, being an object or phe- 
nomenon of which a mind is cognisant 

Is the Scripture account of the creation of Matter said to be irre- 
concileable with the negation of absolute material substance? It is 
answered that the conception of creation being dependent on the exist- 
ence of finite minds is really most in harmony with the Mosaic account 
It is what is seen and felt, and not the cause of what -is seen and felt 
that is created. 

The Third Dialogue closes with a statement of Berkeley's doctrine 
of Matter, in two propositions, which it professes to reconcile — the one- 
sided proposition of ordinary common sense ; and the one-sided pro- 
position of the philosophers. 

Most of the objections to Berkeley's doctrine of Matter which have 
been urged in the last century and a half, by its British, French, and 
German critics, are discussed by anticipation in these Dialogues, The 
history of objections to the doctrine is very much a history of its 
misconception. Rightly conceived, or misconceived, it powerfully 
affected subsequent psychological and metaphysical discussion in 
these islands, and especially in Scotland. 

The first formal criticism of Berkeley by a British author is con- 
tained in Andrew Baxter's Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, 
published in 1735. The section is entitled, *Dean Berkeley's Scheme 
against the existence of Matter examined, and shown to be inconclusive.' 
Baxter's most plausible objection is, the tendency of the new doctrine 
to universal scepticism. To deny Matter, for the reasons given by 
Berkeley, involves, according to Baxter, the denial of mind, and so 
a universal denial of what is fixed and substantial. It was thus that a 
few years afterwards, Hume sought, in his Treatise of Human Nature, 
to work out Berkeley's theory of Matter into his own universal pheno- 
menalism or positivism — a process against which Berkeley sought to 
guard his doctrine by anticipation, in a remarkable passage introduced 
in the last edition of the Dialogues (pp. 327 — 329). 

The writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas 
Brown are a magazine of objections to the new doctrine. Reid — who 
curiously seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, less clearly and con- 
clusively than Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of 
a double or representative perception — urges chiefly the spontaneous 
belief or common sense of mankind, which obliges us to recognise an 






EDITOR'S PREFACE. 249 

external material world. He overlooks what with Berkeley is the only 
question in debate, namely, the meaning of the term external; for, Reid 
and Berkeley are agreed in holding the existence of a sensible world 
that is external to, in so far as it is independent of, the will of finite 
percipients, and a sufficient medium of social intercom'se among them. 
With Berkeley, as with Reid, ihts external existence of sensible things 
is practically self-evident ; and also their sufficiency as symbols for the 
conveyance of meaning from one mind into another. The same ob- 
jection, more scientifically defined — that we have a natural belief in 
the independent existence of Matter, and in our own consciousness 
of its qualities — is Sir W. Hamilton's assumption against Berkeley ; 
but Hamilton does not define the independent existence thus claimed 
for it * Men naturally believe/ he says, * that they themselves exist — 
because they are conscious of a Self or Ego ; they believe that something 
different from themselves exists — because they believe that they are 
conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego/ (Discussions, p. 193.) Now, the 
existence of a Non-ego that is independent of each finite Ego (which 
alone is affirmed by Hamilton, in his belief of * something different from 
themselves ') is deeply rooted in Berkeley's principles ; though I do not 
know that he would say that we are conscious of it. According to both, 
we are conscious of solid and extended phenomena or ideas ; but with 
Berkeley these ideas are dependent on, at the same time that they are 
* entirely distinct ' from, the percipient. The Divine and finite minds 
we can infer from our ideas of sense with their respective ideas, are 
Berkeley's Non-ego proper. 

That Berkeley's doctrine contains the seeds of Universal Scepticism ; 
that it is virtually a system of Pan -egoism, which deprives us of 
reasonable belief in a universe of matter and minds external to the 
phenomena of our individual consciousness ; that it is virtually a system 
of Pantheism, inconsistent with all individuality — these are probably the 
three most comprehensive objections that have been alleged against it. 
They are in a measure due to Berkeley's imperfect conception of the 
distinction between sense and imagination, notwithstanding the numerous 
passages which he has devoted to the illustration of this distinction ; 
and to the obscurity in which he has left his doctrine regarding 
the permanence of sensible things on the one hand, and of persons 
or minds on the other, as well as the dualism thus involved in his 
system. Is existence, with Berkeley, the antecedent condition, or is 
it only the consequence, of being conscious ? The empirical basis of 
the earlier Berkeleian metaphysics, with the mystery which it leaves 
around the answer to this question, separate his conception of the 



250 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

universe from the Egoistic Idealism of Fichte, and from the logical evolu- 
tion of mind and matter out of the primitive Hegelian identity of subject 
and object. 

In England the Berkeleian theory, on its negative side, as was natural, 
received a countenance among the sensational psychologists, which 
was denied to it in Scodand and Germany. Hardey and Priestley shew 
various signs of affinity with Berkeley. An anonjrmous Essa^ on the 
Nature and Existence of the Material World, dedicated to Dr. Priestley 
and Dr. Price, which appeared in 1781, is a sceptical argument, on 
empirical grounds, for the purely sensational nature of Matter. The 
tendency is now more fully and profoundly developed in the writings 
of Mr. J. S. Mm. 

The Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous were published in London 
in 1713, ' printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, 
in St. Paul's Churchyard.' The Essay towards a New Theory of Visitm 
and the Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge first appeared in 
Dublin. Berkeley's subsequent works were published in LondoiL 

The Dialogues apparently attracted more readers than either the Essay 
or the Treatise, The second edition, which is simply a reprint, ap- 
peared in 1725, 'printed for William and John Innys, at the West 
End of St. Paul's.' A third edition, the last in the author's lifetime, 
* printed by Jacob Tonson,' which contains some important additions, 
was published in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of the Principles, 
The Dialogues were reprinted in 1776, in the same volume with the 
edition of the Prituiples wliich then appeared. 

Of Berkeley's earlier metaphysical works, the Dialogues alone have 
been translated into French and German. 

The French version appeared at Amsterdam in 1750. The trans- 
lator's name is not given in the work itself, but it is attributed to the 
Abb^ Jean Paul de Gua de Malves^ by Barbier, in his Diciionnaire 
dcs Ouvrages anottymes et pscudonynus^ tom. i. p. 283. It contains a 
Prefatory Note by the translator, along with three curious vignettes 
(given in the note below) meant to symbolise what, according to the 
translator, was the leading thought in each Dialogued 

^ For some information relative to Gua logue le sentiment du Vulgaire et celui des 

de Malves, see Querard's La France Litti' Thilosophcs, sur les quali^''S secondaires et 

raire^ tom. iii. p. 494. premieres, la nature et I'existence des corps ; 

^ The following is the translator's Prcfa- et il protend prouver en mdme tems Tinsuf- 

tory Note on the objects of the Dialogues^ fisance de I'un et de Tautre. La Vignette 

and in explanation of three illustrative qu'on voit h la tdte du Dialogue, fait al- 

vigncttes: — lusion h cct objet. Elle repnSsente un 

* L'Autcur expose dans le premier Dia- Philosophe dans son cabinet, lequel est distrait 



EDITOR'S PREFACK. 



1 German uanslation, by John Christopher Eschcnhadi. Professor 
iog^y in Rostock, was published at Rostock in 1756. h forms 

Lr Philfaophi! til At Vtirmr oil il croii que 
tombc renfiot: ttndit qu'aii liii applique i. 
lui-nidmc ccs moU tin^ d'lloiacc : 
. .fabala iSt tt 




' \jt MCoiid Dialogue en employ^ k exposei I'altcntian que I'amc doanc ik da idiei no 

b •cntlmmt ile I'Autrui <iir Ic mjmc lujet, objeu; let ubleaui qu'oii i plicxi lui teuli 

■fiioii, que l« chntn corp<iTelle> oii( une eodroila nil la rayoiu abtiutiBmt, trtdonl let 

niMeurc rttVa dini lu cipriu qui lei ap- lujeUtontiirEidebdetcriptiondeibmitfcile 

MM Iwn de tuui [« opiiu k la foU, mfime leuleiillei id^ou obltttqucrarnecoiuiileiv, 

dc rEVit uilini de Oicu ■. el que pai coiu^- pat le tecooit dca facullei qu'cllc a icfu« de 

^oent ta Mali^, pribe stiiTant J'acceptioii Dieu; el I'acllan derKtremprAmc titi rarne» 

o(din*in da mot, cion leulement n'eiiite eti ■■){«[>'« par iin nail, qui. paitant d'ontri- 

point, mail Miaii CD^me itiialuintfit imp<M- angle, •j'inbole de la Diriuiii. ei per^nt lea 

tible. On a licM dc repriKiitet aun ycux nuii;e> doni U iriaiigie cti ciiviroim^. t'fteod 

ee •entinwiit dam li Vigiiettc dn Dialogue, juiqu'it i'linc pout la vtrifiet. enlin. on a Tail 




F«5» 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



I 
I 



the larger part of a volume entitled Sammlung der vornehmsUn Srhnfi- 
sklhr die dU Wtirklichkeii ihres etgnm Korperj und der gan%rn Kiaftt- 
welt Idugntn, This professed Collection of llie most eminent aulborj 
who deny the (absolute) existence of their own bodies and of tlie whole 
material world consists of Berkeley's Dialogues, and Artijur Oillirt't 
Clavis Universalis, or Demonstration of the Non-cxistcnee or /m/>osiiiiii.i 
of an External World. The volume contains some aimotaiions, and an 
Appendix in which a counter demonstration of the existence of Maiici 
IB attempted. Eschenbach's principal argument is indirect, and of the 
nature of a reduclio ad absurdum. He argues (as so many others law 
done) that the reasons produced for the merely ideal or depemlcni 
existence of Matter are equally conclusive against Mind or Self, assumii^, 
as he does, that we have a like consciousness or intuitive coiiWctioD of 
Ihe independent existence of each. 

A citrious circumstance connected with tlie first publication of the 
Dialogues bctivcen Hyhs and Philonous was the appearance, in the same 
year, of this Clavis Universalis, or Demonstration of the impossibili^ of 
Matter, of Artliur Collier, in which a theory is maintained similar to 
Berkeley's, as regards the merely ideal or phenomenal existence of the 
sensible world. A more curious coincidence is not to be found in the 
history of speculative thouglit than the production, simultaneously, without 
concert or apparently even knowledge on the part of either author oftbe 
opinions of the other, of a theory which implies so great a rerolutioii 



qu'itant bien aitcudu, il 
\a plus commutici. Ei ■ 
prime II la fin du livrc ci 



ivitnX )ux notioiu banin d'oii ellc dtoil d'lbord putic: «a 

imme I'Auleur ti- pcis cct eniblBme pour Ic tujci de Ii VipKHc 

le deroibre peni^ de ce Diilogue ; on a repni»eDt* ea < 

nt de dire, h l'c»ii quence daiu telle demiire Vignette la 

que lei deiuc lalerlocuienri son! nippotlli •nit Inlerlocatcun, ie promroiDt dins le Uea oi 

jaitlitd'un jet.etqu'il retniique que la mfiine rAulcuilnmppoie. ets'sitretenanl li-dcHtit. 

force de la giavit£ fait £le>er juiqu'b une et pour doancr au Lectenr I'eicplicalion de 

|- certaioe hauleur et retomber eusuite daiu le I'embl&ne. on a itilt au bat le Ten (aivul ■' 

Vrgtt aqtiai vU laraim, taJem JUetttqut dimnm. 




EDITOR'S PREFACE. 253 

in the philosophical point of view for such questions. It goes to prove 
that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England con- 
tained elements favourable to such a result. They are both the genuine 
produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche. Neither Berkeley nor 
Collier, both at the time young men, were, when they published their 
theory, familiar with ancient Greek speculation ; that of modem Germany 
had not even begun to loom in the distance. The Kantian, still more 
the post -Kantian German philosophy, with its negation of Absolute 
Matter or 'things in themselves,' and its substitution of an Absolute 
Knowledge identical with Absolute Existence; the Phenomenalism of 
Auguste Comte; the advance of the modem interpretation of nature; 
and the revived study of Plato, have now changed the conditions under 
which the problem is studied, and are making intelligible to this genera- 
tion a manner of conceiving the Universe which, for nearly a century and 
a half, the British critics of Berkeley were unable to realize. 

Although Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge appeared three 
years before the Clavis Universalis ^ Collier tells us that it was ' after a 
ten years' pause and deliberation,' that, 'rather than the world should 
finish its course without once offering to inquire in what maimer it 
exists,' he had ' resolved to put himself upon the trial of the conmion 
reader, without pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry 
reason and metaphysical demonstration.' Mr. Benson, his biographer, 
says that it was in 1703, at the age of twenty-three, that Collier came 
to the conclusion that 'there is no such thing as an extemal world;' 
and he attributes the premises from which Collier drew this conclusion 
to his neighbour, Mr. Norris. Among Collier's MSS., there remains 
the outline of an essay, in three chapters, dated January, 1708, on the 
non-externality of the visible world. 

The coincidence between the publication of Berkeley's theory of the 
relativity of sensible things, and Collier's demonstration of the impossi- 
bility of an extemal or absolute world, is not more curious than the 
coincidence in their way of unfolding what they taught. Berkeley vir- 
tually presented his New Theory of Vision as the first instalment of his 
New Theory of Knowledge and Existence — thus teaching that visible 
Matter, at any rate, is not, and cannot be, extemal or independent of 
perception. Now, the first of the two Parts into which Collier's Clavis 
is divided, consists of experimental proofs that the visible world is not, 
and cannot be, external. Berkeley, moreover, in his Principles 0/ Human 
Knowledge J and in these Dialogues between Hylas and PhilonouSy disposes 
of the extemality not of visible things only but of Matter in general ; 
and maintains that the hypothesis of absolute or extemal Matter, in every 



«54 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



modification of it, is essentially irrationaL And in like manner the 
Second Part of the Clavts consists of reasonings in proof of the impos- 
sibility of an external world. Finally, in his full-blown theory, as well as 
in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, as intuitively known, the 
existence of sensible, including visible, matter ; meaning by this, its reb- 
tive existence, in necessary dependence on a mind. In like manner, 
what may be called the third proposition of Collier's system asserts the 
existence of visible matter in particular, and of sensible matter in genenL 

Berkeley and Collier are not, however, to be identified. 

The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes and sttni- 
tions, and their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols, proposi- 
tions which occupy so large a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, 
have no counterpart in Collier's First Part His proof of the non- 
externality of the visible world consists of an induction of instances of 
visible objects, which are allowed by all not to be external, although they 
seem in visual sense to be as much so as any that are called external. 

The Second Part of Collier's Demonstration consists of nine proofs 
of the impossibility of an external or absolute world, which may be 
compared with the reasonings and psychological analyses of Berkeley. 

Collier's Demonstration concludes with answers to objections, and an 
application of the theory of a dependent material world to the refutation 
of the Roman doctrine of the substantial existence of Christ's body in 
the Eucharist. 

The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, his broad recognition of 
the distinction between physical or symbolical, and efficient or proper 
causation, and his large philosophical insight, are all wanting in the 
narrow but acute reasonings of Collier. Berkeley's philosophy, owing to 
its O'wn comprehensiveness, not less than to the humanity of his sym- 
pathies and the beauty of his style, is now recognised as a striking 
expression or solution of problems of modern thought, while Collier 
is condemned to the obscurity of a mere reasoncr of the Schools ^ 

A. C. F. 



* Collier never came fairly out in sight of 
the philosophical public of last century. He 
is referred to in Germany by Biliinger, in his 
Dilftddaliones Pbilosopbicae (i 746), and also 
in the Acta Eruditorum, Suppl. VI. 244. &c., 
and in England by Corry in his Rejtecttons 
OH Liberty and Necessity (1761), as well as 
in the Remarks on the Reflections, and 
Answers to the Remarks, pp. 7. 8 (1763), 
where he is described as ^a weak reas^oner, 
and a very dull writer also.' Collcr was 
dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Rcid, in 



his Essays on the Intellectual Powersj Essay 
II. ch. 10. He was a subject of correspond- 
ence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at 
Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of 
curiosity to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful 
reprint of the Clavis (of the original edition 
of which only seven copies were then known 
to exist) appeared in Edinburgh in 1836; 
and in the following year it was included in 
a publication of Metaphysical Tracts by 
English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Cen- 
t^iry, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr. 



THREE DIALOGUES 

BETWEEN 

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 

THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY TO DEMONSTRATE 
THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF 

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 

THE INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE 

SOUL, 
AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A 

DEITY: 
IN OPPOSITION TO 

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS. 



ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE EASY, 

USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS. 



FIRST PRINTED IN THE YEAR I713. 



VuL 1. p. ISS* 



'.1 



ii 

I* 

f 



TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 

THE 

LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON\ 

MASTER OF TH£ ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR 

OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF 

HER majesty's MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. 

My Lord, 

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to dis- 
tinguish your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure 
men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and 
honour: and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great 
Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your 
sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been 
owing to any application from your lordship, bijt entirely to her majesty's 
own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an incli- 
nation to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with 
an intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am 
encouraged by the favour you have treated me with, to address these 
papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious of doing this, 
because a Philosophical Treatise could not so properly be addressed to 
any one as to a person of your lordship's character, who, to your other 
valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy. 

I am, with the greatest respect. 

My Lord, 

Your lordship's most obedient and 

most humble servant, 

GEORGE BERKELEY. 

* WUliam, fourth Lord Berkeley of Strat- wis succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see 

ton, bom about 1663, succeeded his brother Burke's Extinct Pitragts), It is said that 

in 1697, and died in 1 741 at Bruton in Somer- Bishop Berkeley's father, Collector at Belfast, 

setshire. The BerkeleysofStratton were de- was his natural son. The Bishop himself 

scended from a younger son of Maurice, Lord was introduced by Dean Swift, in 1 713* to 

Berkeley of Berkeley Castle, who died in the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, to whom the 

1326. His descendant. Sir John Berkeley Dialoptes are dedicated, as *a cousin of his 

of Bruton, a zealous Royalist, was created Lordudp* The title of Berkeley of Stratton 

first Lord Berkeley of StraUon in 1658, and became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord 

in 1669 became. Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in 1773. 
an office which he held till 1672, when he 



THE PREFACE ». 

Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the | 
design of nature and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, 
or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions ; yet those 
who are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of 
another mind. And, indeed, if we consider the pains that have heen 
taken to perplex the plainest things — ^that distrust of the senses, those 
doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that occur in 
the very entrance of the sciences ; it will not seem strange that men of 
leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruidess disquisitions, 
without descending to the practical parts of life, or informing themsdves 
in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge. 

Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of 
the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught 
to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. 
Hence arise Scepticism and Paradoxes. It is not enough that we see 
and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature, its absolute 
external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our 
own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is 
fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those 
things which other men evidently know, and believing those things 
which they laugh at and despise. 

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain re- 
searches, it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its per- 
plexities ; and, if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy 
solution of them, together with their own native evidence, may at once 
recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from 
those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Which, with a plain demon- 
stration of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the 
natural Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, 
as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue. 

This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the 

* This Preface is omitted in the last edition of the Dialogves^ and in all the collected 
editions of Berkeley's works. 



THE PREFACE. 259 

Principles 0/ Human Knowledge^ published in the year 17 10. But, 
before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to 
treat more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, 
and to place them in a new light — which is the business of the following 
Didcgtus, 

In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any know- 
ledge of what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to intro- 
duce the notions I advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar 
manner; especially because they carry with them a great opposition to 
the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the 
common sense and natural notions of mankind. 

If the prindi^es which I here endeavour to propagate are admitted 
for true, the consequences which, I think, evidendy flow from thence 
are, that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intricate 
points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of 
science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced 
from paradoxes to common sense. 

And, although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflection to some 
that, when they have taken a circuit through so many refined and un- 
vulgar notions, they should at last come to think like other men; yet, 
methinks, this return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wan- 
dered through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is 
like coming home from a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure 
on the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed through, sets his 
heart at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future. 

As it was my intendon to convince Scepdcs and Infidels by reason, 
so it has been my endeavour stricdy to observe the most rigid laws of 
reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that 
the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immor- 
tality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of 
thought — whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling way, not 
altogether improperly termed Free-thinking, by certain libertines in 
thought, who can no more endure the restraints of logic than those 
of religion or government. 

It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so far as it tends to 
ease the mind of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few 
speculative persons ; but, if by their speculations righUy placed, the study 
of morality and the law of nature were brought more into fashion among 
men of parts and genius, the discouragements that draw to Scepticism 
removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the 
principles of Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully 

s 2 



26o THE PREFACE. 

disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences — ^there 
are grounds to think these effects would not only have a gradual influ- 
ence in repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the worid; 
but also, by shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach 
of human inquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose aD 
prudent, unprejudiced persons to a modest and waiy treatment of those 
sacred mysteries which are above the comprehension of our faculties. 

It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these 
Diakgtus till he has read them through. Otherwise he may lay them aside, 
in a mistake of their design, or on accoimt of difficulties or objections 
which he would find answered in the sequel. A treatise of this nature 
would require to be once read over coherendy, in order to comprehend 
its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and dis- 
position of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, this, 
I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain ; especially if recourse 
be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon Vtiian, and the 
Treatise concerning the Principles of Human KncwUdge — ^wherein divers 
notions advanced in these Dialogues are farther pursued, or placed in 
different lights, and other points handled which naturally tend to confirm 
and illustrate them. 



THREE DIALOGUES 

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS, IN OPPOSITION 

TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS. 



THE FIRST DIALOGUE. 

FUlomous. Good morrow, Hjlas\ I did not expect to find you 
abroad so early. 

HjUs. It is indeed something unusual ^ but my thoughts were 
so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that 
finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in 
the garden. 

Phil, It happened well, to let you see what innocent and 
agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a plea- 
santer time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year ? 
That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant 
bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising 
sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the 
soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at this time 
fresh and lively, are fit for these meditations, which the solitude 
of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us 
to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed 
very intent on something. 

Hyl. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will 
permit me to go on in the same vein ; not that I would by any 
means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always 
flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am 
alone : but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my 
reflections to you. 



262 Tfu First Dialogue 

Fhsl. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested 
myself if you had not prevented me. 

HyL I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in 
all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the 
vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to 
believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extra^vagant things 
in the worlds This however might be borne, if their paradoxes 
and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of 
general disadvantage to mankind. But the misdiief lieth here; 
that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have 
spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an 
entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are 
repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will 
be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important 
truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable. 

Fhsl, I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the 
affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of 
others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that 
I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their 
schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word, since 
this revolt from metaphysical notions, to the plain dictates of 
nature and common sensed, I find my understanding strangely 
enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many 
things which before were all mystery and riddle. 

Hyl, I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I 
heard of you. 

Fhsl Pray, what were those ? 

Hyl You were represented in last night's conversation, as one 
who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered 
into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as 
matersal suhtance in the world. 

Fhsl That there is no such thing as what Philosophers call 
matersal suhstance^ I am seriously persuaded : but, if I were made 
to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, 1 should then have 
the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to 
reject the contrary opinion. 

^ Cf. Principiis of Human Kwywledge% revolt from abstract notions of Matter. 
Introduction, sect. i. Substance, Cause, Space, and Time, to a 

■ Berkeley's philosophy i* professedly a reflective Common Sense. 



between Hylas and Philonaus. 263 

HyL What ! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant 
to common sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to 
believe there is no such thing as matter ? 

FUL Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove, that you, 
who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, 
and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to common sense, 
than I who believe no such thing ? 

Hyl, You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the 
whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should 
ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point. 

PA»7. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, 
which, upon examination, shall appear most agreeable to common 
sense, and remote from Scepticism ? 

Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes 
atxxit the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear 
what you have to say. 

Fhil. Pray, Hylas^ what do you mean by a sceptic ? 

Hyl, I mean what all men mean — one that doubts of everything. 

FhiL He then who entertains no doubt concerning some par- 
ticular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a 
sceptic. 

Hyl. I agree with you. 

Fbfl. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirma- 
tive or negative side of a question ? 

HyL In neither ; for whoever understands English, cannot but 
know that douhting signifies a suspense between both. 

Fhil, He then that denieth any point, can no more be said to 
doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of 
assurance. 

HyL True. 

FUl. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be 
esteemed a sceptic than the other. 

Hyl, I acknowledge it. 

Fhil. How Cometh it to pass then, Hylas^ that you pronounce 
me a sceptic^ because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence 
of Matter ? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in 
my denial, as you in your affirmation. 

Hyl. Hold, FUhmmts^ I have been a little out in my definition; 
but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted 



264 The First Dialogue 

on. I said indeed that a sceptic was one who doubted of every- 
thing; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and 
truth of things. 

VhlL What things ? Do you mean the principles and theorems 
of sciences ? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, 
and consequently independent of Matter \ the denial therefore of 
this doth not imply the denying them. 

HjL I grant it. But are there no other things ? What think 
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of 
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not 
this sufficient to denominate a man a sceptic f 

Phi/. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies 
the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance 
of them y since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the 
greatest sceptic f 

HyL That is what I desire. 

Fhil. What mean you by Sensible Things ? 

HyL Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can 
you imagine that I mean anything else ? 

Fhil. Pardon me, Hylas^ if I am desirous clearly to apprehend 
your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me 
then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only per- 
ceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may 
those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived 
mediately, or not without the intervention of others ? 

HyL I do not sufficiently understand you. 

PhiL In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the 
letters, but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my 
mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters 
are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt : 
but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them 
to be so too. 

HyL No, certainly; it were absurd to think God or vhtue 
sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested to 
the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary 
connexion. 

FhiL It seems then, that by sensthle things you mean those only 
which can be perceived immediately by sense ? 



between Hylas and Philonous. 26gr 

Hyl. Right. 

FAr/. Doth it not follow from this, that though I sec one part 
of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence 
elldently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of 
colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or 
perceived by the sense of seeing ? 

Hyl. It doth. 

PfcV. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I 
cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds ? 

HyL You cannot. 

Fbtl. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and 
heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the 
cause of its heat or weight ? 

Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you 
once for all, that by sensihle things I mean those only which are 
perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing 
which they do not perceive immediately : for they make no in- 
fcrences^. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from 
effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, 
entirely relates to reason. 

FhiL This point then is agreed between us — ^that sensible things 
mrt those only which are immediately perceived ty sense. You will 
farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight any- 
thing beside light, and colours, and figures ; or by hearing, any- 
thing but sounds^ by the palate, anything beside tastes; by 
the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible 
qualities. 

Hyl. We do not. 

Fhil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible 
qualities, there remains nothing sensible ? 

Hyl. I grant it. 

FUl. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many 
sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities ? 

Hyl. Nothing else. 

Fhil. Heat then is a sensible thing ? 

Hyl. Certainly. 

Fhil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being 

' Of. Tbtory q/ Viuon Vmdicattd, sect 4a. 



266 The First Dialogue 

perceived ? or, is it something distinct fix)m their being perceived, 
and that bears no relation to the mind ? 

HjL To exist is one thing, and to heferceiveJ is another. 

PM. I speak with regard to sensible things only : and of these 
I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence 
exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived ? 

ffyl, I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without 
any relation to their being perceived. 

Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist 
without the mind ? 

Hyl. It must. 

Phi/. Tell me, Hy/asy is this real existence equally comparible 
to all degrees of heat, which we perceive ; or is there any reason 
why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others ? and if 
there be, pray let me know that reason. 

Hy/. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, wc may 
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. 

Phil. What ! the greatest as well as the least? 

Hyl. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both: 
they are both perceived by sense ; nay, the greater degree of heat 
is more sensibly perceived ; and consequently, if there is any dif- 
ference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be 
of the reality of a lesser degree. 

Phil. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat 
a very great pain ? 

Hyl. No one can deny it. 

Phil. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or plea- 
sure? 

Hyl. No certainly. 

Phil. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being 
endowed with sense and perception ? 

HjfL It is senseless without doubt. 

Phil. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain ? 

Hyl. By no means. 

Phil. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, 
since you acknowledge this to be no small pain ? 

Hyl. I grant it. 

Phil. What shall we say then of your external object; is it 
a material Substance, or no ? 



between Hylas and Philonous. 267 

HyL It is a material substance with the sensible qualities in- 
hering in it. 

FJUL How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it 
caumot in a material substance ? I desire you would clear this 
fioiiit. 

HyL Hold, FUlonous^ I fear I was out in yielding intense heat 
to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something 
distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it. 

FUL Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive 
one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations ? 

HyL But one simple sensation. 

FUL Is not the heat immediately perceived ? 

HyL It is. 

FUL And the pain ? 

HyL True. 

FhiL Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at 
the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple, or 
uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both 
the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain ; and, conse- 
quently, that the intense heat immediately perceived, is nothing 
distinct from a particular sort of pain. 

HyL It seems so. 

FUL Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas^ if you can conceive 
a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure. 

HyL I cannot. 

FUL Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or 
pleasure, in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, 
cold, tastes, smells ? &c. 

HyL I do not find that I can. 

FbiL Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing 
distinct fh)m those sensations or ideas — in an intense degree ? 

HyL It is undeniable ; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect 
a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it. 

FbiL What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, 
between affirming and denying ? 

HyL I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent 
and painful heat cannot exist without the mind. 

FUL It hath not therefore, according to you, any real being ? 

Hyl, I own it. 



268 The First Dialogue 

FhiL Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature 
really hot ? 

HyL I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only 
say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat. 

FUL But, did you not say before that ail d^rees of heat were 
equally real ; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were 
more undoubtedly real than the lesser ? 

HyL True: but it was because I did not then consider die 
ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now 
plainly see. And it is this : — because intense heat is nothing else 
but a particular kind of painful sensation ; and pain cannot exist 
but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can 
really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no 
reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in 
such a substance. 

Phil. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat 
which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it ? 

HyL That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain 
cannot exist unperceived ; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is 
a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of 
heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them. 

FhlL I think you granted before that no unperceiving being 
was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain. 

HyL I did. 

PhiL And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than 
what causes uneasiness, a pleasure ? 

HyL What then ? 

PhtL Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an 
unperceiving substance, or body. 

HyL So it seems. 

PhiL Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not 
painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance ; 
may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable 
of any degree of heat whatsoever ? 

HyL On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that 
warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain. 

PhiL I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as 
heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it 
serves to make good my conclusion. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 269 

HyL I could rather call it an indolence. It seems to be nothing 
more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such 
a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, 
I. hope you will not deny. 

FUL If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle 
d^ree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you 
otherwise, than by appealing to your own sense. But what think 
you of cold ? 

HyL The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of 
oold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a 
great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; 
but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of 
heat. 

Fhil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our 
own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded 
to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them ; and those, 
upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be 
thou^t to have cold in them. 

Hyl. They must. 

FbiL Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man 
into an absurdity ? 

Hyl. Without doubt it cannot. 

Fhil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing 
should be at the same time both cold and warm ? 

Hyl. It is. 

Fhil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, 
and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water^ 
in an intermediate state ; will not the water seem cold to one 
hand, and warm to the other* ? 

Hyl. It will. 

Fhil. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude 
it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, 
according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity ? 

Hyl. I confess it seems so. 

Fhil. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since 
you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity. 

Hyl. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, 
there is no heat in the fire ? 

* Cf. PrimeipUt of Human Knowltdgt, lect. 14. 



270 The First Dialogue 

FbiL To make the point still clearer; tell mc whether, in tvo 
cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment ? 

HyL We ought. 

PUL When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and 
divide the fihres of your flesh ? 

Hyl. It doth. 

Vhil. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more? 

Hyl. It doth not. 

Fhil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occa- 
sioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin ; you shooid 
not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensatioo 
occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire. 

HyL Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this 
point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations 
existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to 
secure the reality of external things. 

Phil. But what will you say, Hylas^ if it shall appear that 
the case is the same with regard to all oUier sensible qualities^ 
and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, 
than heat and cold ? 

HyL Then indeed you will have done something to the pur- 
pose ; but that is what I despair of seeing proved. 

Phil. Let us examine them in order. What think you of 
tastes — do they exist without the mind, or no ? 

HyL Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, 
or wormwood bitter ? 

Phil. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind oi 
pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not ? 

HyL It is. 

Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain? 

HyL I grant it. 

PhiL If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corpo- 
real substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and 
bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree to them ? 

HyL Hold, Philamousy I now see what it was deluded me all 
this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and 
bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain ; 
to which I answered simply, that they were. Whereas I should 

^ Cf. Prineiplt% of Human Knowledgt^ sect. 14, 15. 



between Hylas and Philofious. 271 

have thus distinguished : — those qualities, as perceived by us, are 
frieasures or pains ; but not as existing in the external objects. 
We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no 
heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or 
sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. 
What say you to this ? 

PArV. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse pro- 
ceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined 
to be, the things *we Immediately perceive by our senses. Whatever 
Other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, 
I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the 
point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered 
certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those 
insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be 
made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. 
Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, 
sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are 
perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind ? 

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the 
cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds 
oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet. 

Fbil. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with 
you : that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distem- 
pered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that 
divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food; since 
that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could 
this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food ? 

HyL I acknowledge I know not how. 

FhiL In Uie next place, odours are to be considered. And, with 
regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said 
of tastes doth not exactly agree to them ? Are they not so many 
pleasing or displeasing sensations ? 

HyL They are. 

FhiL Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist 
in an unperceiving thing ? 

HyL I cannot. 

FhiL Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those 
brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same 
smells which we perceive in them ? 



2/2 The First Dialogue 

Hyl. By no means. 

PbiL May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other 
forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a per- 
ceiving substance or mind ? 

Hyl. I think so. 

PhiL Then as to sounds^ what must we think of them : are 
they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not ? 

HyL That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from 
hence ; because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air- 
pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought 
the subject of sound. 

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas ? 

HyL Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we per- 
ceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion ; but 
without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all. 

PhiL And granting that we never hear a sound but when some 
motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer 
from thence, that the sound itself is in the air. 

HyL It is this very motion in the external air that produces in 
the mind the sensation of sound. For, striking on the drum of the 
ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being 
communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with 
the sensation called sound. 

Phil. What ! is sound then a sensation ? 

HyL I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation 
in the mind. 

PhiL And can any sensation exist without the mind ? 

HyL No, certainly. 

PhiL How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, 
if by the air you mean a senseless substance existing without the 
mind? 

Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous^ between sound as it is 
perceived by us, and as it is in itself ^ or (which is the same thing) 
between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which 
exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of 
sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory 
motion in the air. 

PhiL I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by the 
answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. 



between Hylas and Philonaus. 273 

But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really 
nothing but motion ? 

Hyl. I am. 

Fbil. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth 
be attributed to motion ? 

HyL It may. 

Phil. It is then good sense to speak of motiam as of a thing 
that is Imtdy sweety acute^ or grave, 

HyL I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not 
evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, 
or smmd in the common acceptation of tiie word, but not to sound 
in the real and philosophic sense ^ which, as I just now told 
you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air ? 

Fbil. It seems then there are two sorts of sound — the one 
vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real ? 

HyL Even so. 

FhiL And the latter consists in motion ? 

HyL I told you so before. 

FhiL Tell me, Hylas^ to which of the senses, think you, the 
idea of motion belongs ? to the hearing ? 

HyL No, certainly ; but to the sight and touch. 

FhiL It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds 
may possibly be seen or felt^ but never heard. 

HyL Look you, PislonouSy you may, if you please, make a jest 
of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, 
indeed, the inferences you draw me into, sound something oddly ; 
but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of 
the vulgar : we must not therefore wonder, if expressions adapted 
to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way. 

PUL Is it come to that ? I assure you, I imagine myself to 
have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing 
from common phrases and opinions ; it being a main part of our 
inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common 
road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. 
But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say 
that real soimds are never heard^ and that the idea of them is 
obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this 
contrary to nature and the truth of things ? 

HyL To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the 



274 ^^ First Dialogue 

concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too 
have no real being without the mind. 

VhlL And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge 
the same of colours. 

HjL Pardon mc : the case of colours is very difiinrent. Gm 
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects? 

^UL The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal 
Substances existing without the mind ? 

HjL They are. 

VhlL And have true and real colours inhering in them ? 

HjL Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it. 

ThiL How ! is there anything visible but what we perceive by 
sight ? 

Hjl. There is not. 

ThlL And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not 
perceive immediately ? 

HyL How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? 
I tell you, we do not. 

TbiL Have patience, good Hylas -, and tell me once more, 
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, 
except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; 
but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same 
opinion. 

HyL I do. 

Phil, Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, 
or made up of sensible qualities ? 

HyL What a question that is ! who ever thought it was ? 

Phil. My reason for asking was, because in saying, each vifiile 
ohject hath that colour *which *we see in ity you make visible objects to 
be corporeal substances ; which implies either that corporeal 
substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something 
beside sensible qualities perceived by sight : but, as this point was 
formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is 
a clear consequence, that your corporeal substance is nothing 
distinct from sensible qualities. 

HyL You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, 
and endeavour to perplex the plainest things ; but you shall never 
persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own 
meaning. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 275 

VUL I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since 
you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance 
examined^ I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to 
let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in 
external bodies, or some other. 
HjL The very same. 

¥ImL What ! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on 
yonder clouds really in them ? Or do you imagine they have in 
themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour ? 

HjL I must own, Fhihnousy those colours are not really in 
the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only 
apparent colours. 

FM. Afpmmt call you them ? how shall we distinguish these 
apparent colours from real ? 

HjL WtTj easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, 
appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach. 

FbiL And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are 
discovered by the most near and exact survey. 
HyL Right 

FbiL Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of 
a microscope, or by the naked eye ? 
HyL By a microscope, doubtless. 

FbiL But a microscope often discovers colours in an object 
different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in 
case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is 
certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would 
appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye. 

HyL And what will you conclude from all this ? You cannot 
argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: 
because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made 
to vanish. 

FbfL I think it may evidently be concluded from your own 
concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are 
only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon 
a more close and accurate inspection which is afibrded us by 
a microscope. Then, as to what you say by way of prevention : 
I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better 
discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is 
less sharp ? 

T 2 



2/6 The First Dialogue 

HyL By the former without doubt. 

FbiL Is it not plain from Dioptrics that microscopes make the 
sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would 
appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most 
exquisite sharpness ? 

Hyl. It is. 

FUL Consequently the microscopical representation is to be 
thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or 
what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived arc more 
genuine and real than those perceived otherwise. 

HyL I confess there is something in what you say. 

Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there 
actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive 
those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our 
sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals 
perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind? 
Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the 
same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears 
in that of all other animals ? And if it hath, is it not evident 
they must see particles less than their own bodies, which will 
present them with a far different view in each object from that 
which strikes our senses^? Even our own eyes do not always 
represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice 
every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore 
highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very 
different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with 
different humours, do not sec the same colours in every object that 
we do ? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all 
colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we 
perceive are really inherent in any outward object ? 

HyL It should. 

FhiL The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in 
case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external 
bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change 
wrought in the very bodies themselves : but, is it not evident from 
what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon 
a change happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of 
distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself, 

• Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80—86. 



between Hylas and Philonaus. 277 

the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear ? 
Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the 
situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours 
to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in 
various degrees of light. And what is more known than that 
the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from 
what they do in the open day ? Add to these the experiment of 
a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters 
the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of 
a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether 
you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour 
inhering in it ; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther 
from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what 
peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of 
light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distin- 
guishing it from apparent ones. 

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally 
apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering 
in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And 
what confirms me in this opinion is that in proportion to the 
light colours are still more or less vivid \ and if there be no light, 
then arc there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are 
colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive 
them ? For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first 
on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion ; 
and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. 
A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye, nor consequently 
make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it 
plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, 
which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: 
and such is light. 

FbiL How ! is light then a substance ? 

HyL I tell you, PMamousy external light is nothing but a thin 
fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a 
brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different 
surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different 
motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain, 
cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with 
the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c. 



278 The First Dialogue 

FUL It seems then the lig^t doth no more than shake the 
optic nerves. 

Hyl. Nothing else. 

Fhil. And, consequent to each particular motion of the nerves^ 
the mind is afiected with a sensation, which is some particular 
colour. 

Hyl. Right. 

Fhil. And these sensations have no existence without the mind. 

Hyl. They have not 

Fhil. How then do you affirm that colours are in the ligfit; 
since by light you understand a corporeal substance external to 
the mind? 

Hyl. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant 
cannot exist without the mind. But, in themselves they are only 
the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of 
matter. 

Fhil. Colours then, in the vulgar sense,or taken for the inmsediate 
objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance. 

Hyl. That is what I say. 

FUl. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sen- 
sible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind 
beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those 
invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to 
dispute about them ; only I would advise you to bethink yourself, 
whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for 
you to affirm — the red and blue *mUch *me see are net real colmtrs^ hut 
certain unknown motions and figures^ which no man ever did or cam sety 
are truly so. Are not these shocking notions, and are not they 
subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged 
to renounce before in the case of sounds ? 

Hyl, I frankly own, Fhilonous^ that it is in vain to stand out 
any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed 
secondary qualities^ have certainly no existence without the mind. 
But, by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate 
anything from the reality of Matter or external objects ; seeing 
it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who never- 
theless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the 
clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities 



between Hylas and Philonotis. 279 

are by philosophers divided into frimary and secondary f. The former 
arc Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest. And 
these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above 
enumerated; or, briefly, all sensible qualities beside the Primary, 
which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing 
nowhere but in the mind." But all this, I doubt not, you are 
apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there 
was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was never 
thorou^y convinced of its truth until now. 

FbiL You are still then of opinion that extemim and figures 
are inherent in external unthinking substances ? 

HyL I am. 

Fbil. But what if the same arguments which are brought 
against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also? 

HyL Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only 
in the mind. 

FbiL Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you 
perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance ? 

Hyl. It is. 

FUL Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same 
of the figure and extension which they see and feel? 

HyL Without doubt, if they have any thought at all. 

FUL Answer me, RyUs. Think you the senses were be- 
stowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in 
life ? or were they given to men alone for this end ? 

Hyl. I make no question but they have the same use in all 
other animals. 

FbiL If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them 
to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable 
of harming them ? 

HyL Certainly. 

FUL A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, 
and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some con- 
siderable dimension ; though at the same time they appear to you 
scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points" ? 

HyL I cannot deny it. 

' On Primtry and Secondary Qnalitiet of and Hamilton's edition of Reid, pp. 313 — 
Matter, cf. PrineipUsi^ Human Kmmisdft, 318, also Note D. pp. 825—875. 
icct9: fee also Locke's £tfay,Bk«H.ch. 8, ' Cf. JVmr 7V)ry 0/ Kwom, sect. 80. 



28o The First Dialogue 

FhiL And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger? 

Hyl. They will. 

FhU. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to 
another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain ? 

HyL All this I grant. 

Fhil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself 
of different dimensions ? 

HyL That were absurd to imagine. 

FhiL But, from what you have laid down it follows that both 
the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite 
itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each 
of them the true extension of the mite's foot ; that is to say, by 
your own principles, you are led into an absurdity. 

HyL There seems to be some difficulty in the point. 

FhlL Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent 
property of any object can be changed without some change in 
the thing itself? 

HyL I have. 

FhsL But, as we^ approach to or recede from an object, the 
visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred 
times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow fix)m 
hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object ? 

HyL I own I am at a loss what to think. 

FhiL Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will 
venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have 
done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good 
argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because 
it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other ? 

HyL It was. 

FhiL Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no 
extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem 
little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the 
other, great, uneven, and angular ? 

HyL The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen ? 

FhiL You may at any time make the experiment, by looking 
with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope. 

HyL I know not how to maintain it, and yet I am loath to give 
up extension^ I see so many odd consequences following upon such 
a concession. 



between Hykus and Philonaus. 281 

• 

FUL Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, 
I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. [^But, on the 
other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning 
which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include 
extension? If it be allowed that no idea nor anything like 
an idea can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it 
follows that no figure or mode of extension, which we can either 
perceive or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent 
in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be 
in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from 
extension, to be the substratum of extension. Be the sensible 
quality what it will — ^figure, or sound, or colour ; it seems alike 
impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.] 

HyL I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right 
to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false 
step in my progress to it. 

PJUL That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and 
extension being despatched, we proceed next to motim. Can a 
real motion in any external body be at the same time both very 
swift and very slow ? 

HyL It cannot. 

FbiL Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal propor- 
tion to the time it takes up in describing any given space ? Thus 
a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times fester 
than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours. 

Ryl. I agree with you. 

Fbil. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in 
our minds? 

Hyl. It is. 

FUL And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another 
twice as fest in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some 
spirit of another kind ? 

HyL I own it. 

FUL Consequently, the same body may to another seem to 
perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth 
to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other propor- 
tion : that is to say, according to your principles (since the motions 
perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the 

' What foUows, within brackets, ii not contained in the first and second editions. 



282 The First Dialogue 

same body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very 
swift and very slow. How is this consistent either with common 
sense, or with what you just now granted ? 

HyL I have nothing to say to it. 

tbil. Then as for soUJU^ $ either you do not mean any sensible 
quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry : or if you do, 
it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the 
other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident tiiat 
what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who 
hath greater force and firmness of limte. Nor is it less plain 
that the resistance I feel is not in the body. 

HyL I own the very sensation of resistance, which is all you 
immediately perceive, is not in the My$ but the cause of that 
sensation is. 

Phil, But the causes of our sensations are not things imme- 
diately perceived, and therefore not sensible. This point I thought 
had been already determined. 

Hyl. I own it was ; but you will pardon me if I seem a little 
embarrassed : I know not how to quit my old notions. 

PhiL To help you out, do but consider that if extemsiam be 
once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the 
same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity — 
since they all evidently suppose extension 'o. It is therefore super- 
fluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying 
extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence. 

HyL I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those 
philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence, 
should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference 
between them, how can this be accounted for ? 

PJbiL It is not my business to account for every opinion of the 
philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned 
for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather 
annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and 
cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or 
disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion afiFect 
us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or 
pleasure can be in an unperceiving Substance, men are more easily 
weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary 

'* What really is Berkeley's theory of the mutual relation of extension and motion ? 



between Hylas and Philonatis. 283 

than the Primary Qtialities. You will be satisfied there is some- 
thing in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an 
intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real 
existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is 
no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent 
sensation is as truly a stnsattm as one more pleasing or painful ; 
and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to 
exist in an unthinking subject. 

Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have some- 
where heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible ex- 
tension ^i. Now, though it be acknowledged that p^tat and tnuilly 
consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings 
have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the 
Substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same 
with regard to absolute extension^ which is something abstracted 
from great and smally from this or that particular magnitude or 
figure. So likewise as to motion ; swift and sltm are altc^ether 
relative to tiie succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth 
not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not with- 
out the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them 
doth not. 

FUL Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one 
part of extension, from another ? Is it not something sensible, as 
some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude 
or figure peculiar to each? 

Hyl. I think so. 

FUL These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible proper- 
ties^ are without all specific and numerical differences, as the 
schools call them. 

Hyl. They are. 

put. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion 
in general. 

HyL Let it be so. 

FUL But it is a universally received maxim that Everything 
vMcb exists is farticuUr^^. How then can motion in general, or 
extension in general, exist in any corporeal Substance ? 

n Cr. Ntm JUory 0/ Futon, sect. laa— >' Cf. Prmeiplss of Human KmmUdgt, 

is6; PrmeMm ^HumoH KmmUdgt, sect. Introduction, sect 15. 
13^ Ac ; &rU^ mcL 170, &c 



284 The First Dialogue 

HfL I will take time to solve your difiSculty. 

FbiL But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without 
doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that 
idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If yoa 
can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of nxytion or 
extension ; divested of all those sensible mode% as swift and skyw, 
great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acr 
knowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point 
you contend for. But, if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on 
your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of. 

HyL To confess ingenuously, 1 cannot^ 

FhiL Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion 
from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the 
distinction term secondary t 

HyL What ! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and 
motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? 
Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them ? 

Phil. I acknowledge, HylaSy it is not difficult to form general 
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without men- 
tioning any other ^ and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them 
abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce 
the word motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind 
exclusive of body ? Or, because theorems may be made of extension 
and figures, without any mention of great or sntally or any other 
sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an 
abstract idea of extension, without any particular ^^size or figure, 
or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended 
by the mind ? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regard- 
ing what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being 
altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying 
aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you 
will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension**. 

HyL But what say you to pure intellect ? May not abstracted 
ideas be framed by that faculty ? 

P/fiL Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at alP^, it is plain 

" *Sizc, or figure, or sensible quality* — sect. Ii8 — 13a. 

•liie, colour, &c./ in the first and second " Of. New Theory 0/ ViuoH, sect, i aa— 

editions. 1 36 ; Principles of Human KmeMlge, In. 

'* Of. Principles of Human Knowledge, troduction, sect. lo-ao. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 285 

I cannot frame them by the help of purt intellect ,• whatsoever 
faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire 
into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as vhrtuey 
remsom^ GeJj or the like, thus much seems manifest — that sensible 
things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the 
imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally 
perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect : but, for your 
farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, 
abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other 
sensible qualities. 

HyL Let me think a little I do not find that I can. 

PHI. And can you think it possible that should really exist 
in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception ? 

HyL By no means. 

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to 
disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible 
qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there neces- 
sarily the other exist likewise ? 

Hyl. It should seem so. 

Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you ad- 
mitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without 
any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, 
if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities 
coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place ? Do they 
ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other 
visible and tangible qualities ? 

Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, 
if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings 
hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence 
without the mind>^ But, my fear is that I have been too liberal 
in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. 
In short, I did not take time to think. 

Phil. For that matter, Hylas^ you may take what time you 
please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty 
to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you 
have omitted which makes for your first opinion. 

Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this — that I did not 



*• 'withcmt the mind/ i.e. unperceiycd mind — unintelligible. C(. Priticipits qfHti' 
and uoconcdfed— oat of relation to any man KnowUdgt, sect. 3. 



a86 The First Dialogue 

sufficiently distinguish the object from the semsatiw^T. Now, though 
this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence 
follow that the former cannot. 

FUl. What object do you mean ? The object of the senses ? 

Hyl. The same. 

FhiL It is then immediately perceived ? 

Hyl. Right. 

Thil. Make me to understand the difference between what is 
immediately perceived, and a sensation. 

HyL The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving ; 
besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call theW^frf. 
For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the 
act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip. 

FbiL What tulip do you speak of ? Is it that which you see ? 

Hyl. The same. 

FhiL And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension's ? 

Hyl. Nothing. 

Fhil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are 
coexistent with the extension ; is it not ? 

Hyl. That is not all ; I would say they have a real existence 
without the mind, in some unthinking substance. 

Fhil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is 
manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist 
independent of your mind or mine ; but, that any immediate object 
of the senses — that is, any idea, or combination of ideas — ^should 
exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in 
itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this 
follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and 
yellow were on the tulip you saw^ since you do not pretend to see 
that unthinking substance. 

HyL You have an artful way, Fhilanous^ of diverting our 
inquiry from the subject. 

Fhil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To 
return then to your distinction between sensation and object ; if I 
take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the 
one an action of the mind, the other not. 

" So Reid's Inquiry, ch. II. sect. 8, 9 ; sect. 8, &c. 
Essays on the IntelUchtal Powers, II. ch. " i. e. extended and figured colour. Cf . 

16. Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, New Theory of Vision, sect. 43. &c. 



between Hylas and Philonaus* 287 

HyL True. 

P£f/. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to^ any unthink- 
ing thing *9; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may ? 

HjL That is my meaning. 

^tU. So that if there was a perception without any act of the 
mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an un- 
thinking substance ? 

HyL I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such 
a perception. 

pa;/. When is the mind said to be active ? 

HyL When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything. 

Vlnl. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or <±ange anything, 
but by an act of the will ? 

HyL It cannot. 

FbiL The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its per- 
ceptions so far forth as voUtion is included in them ? 

Hyl. It is. 

TbiL In plucking this flower I am active ; because I do it by the 
motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so like- 
wise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling ? 

Uyl. No. 

VlnL 1 act too in drawing the air through my nose ; because 
my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. 
But neither can this be called smelling : for, if it were, I should 
smell every time I breathed in that manner ? 

HyL True. 

PUL Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this ? 

HyL It is. 

PUL But I do not find my will concerned any farther. What- 
ever more there is — as that I perceive such a particular smell, or 
any smell at all — ^this is independent of my will, and therein I am 
altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas ? 

HyL No^ the very same. 

PJbiL Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your 
eyes, or keep them shut ; to turn them this or that way ? 

HyL Without doubt. 

PhiL But, doth it in like manner depend on your will that in 
looking on this flower you perceive white rather than any other 

** Cf. PrincipUt o/Httman KntmHtdgt, sect, as, a6. 



288 The First Dialogue 

colour ? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the 
heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun ? Or is lig^t or darkness 
the eflFect of your volition ? 

HyL No certainly, 

FhiL You are then in these respects altogether passive ? 

HyL I am. 

ThiL Tell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving light 
and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes ? 

HyL Without doubt, in the former. 

FhiL Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and 
colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were 
speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation ? And, doth it 
not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of li^t 
and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unper- 
ceiving substance ? And is not this a plain contradiction ? 

HyL I know not what to think of it. 

FhiL Besides, since you distinguish the active and passive in 
every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it 
possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist 
in an unperceiving substance ? In short, do but consider the point, 
and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, 
sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. 
You may indeed call them external objects^ and give them in words 
what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, 
and then tell me whether it be not as I say ? 

HyL I acknowledge, Fhilonous^ that, upon a fair observation of 
what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am 
a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations^ neither is 
it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unper- 
ceiving substance. — But then, on the other hand, when I look on 
sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many 
modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material suh- 
stratum^ without which they cannot be conceived to exist^. 

FhiL Material substratum call you it ? Pray, by which of your 
senses came you acquainted with that being ? 

HyL It is not itself sensible ; its modes and qualities only being 
perceived by the senses. 

^ Cf. Principles of Human KnowUdge, given rise, had been acutely presented by 
sect. i6-20,&c. — The objections to material Bayle, in various articles of his Dictionary, 
Substance, and the disputes to which it had some years before. 



between HylcLS and PAilonous. 289 

FUL I presume then it was by reflection and reason you 
obtained the idea of it ? 

HyL I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. How- 
ever, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to 
exist without a support. 

FhiL It seems then you have only a relative notion of it, or 
that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation 
it bears to sensible qualities ? 

HyL Right. 

FUL Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation 
consists. 

HyL Is it not sufiBciently expressed in the term sutstratumy or 
smistsmcef 

FbiL If so, the word sutstratum should import that it is spread 
under the sensible qualities or accidents ? 

HyL True. 

FbiL And consequently under extension ? 

HyL I own it. 

FbiL It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely 
distinct from extension ? 

HyL I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is some- 
thing that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing sup- 
ported is different from the thing supporting ? 

FbiL So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, exten- 
sion is supposed to be the sutstratum of extension ? 

HyL Just sa 

FUL Answer me, Hylas, Can a thing be spread without extension? 
or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in sfreading 1 

HyL It is. 

FbiL Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything 
must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of 
that thing under which it is spread ? 

HyL It must. 

FbiL Consequently, every corporeal substance being the suhstrm^ 
turn of extension must have in itself another extension, by which 
it is qualified to be a substratum : and so on to infinity ? And I ask 
whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you 
granted just now, to wit, that the substratum was something dis- 
tinct from and exclusive of extension ? 

u 



290 The First Dialogue 

HyL Aye but, Fhilamous^ you take me wrong. I do not mean 
that Matter is sfread in a gross literal sense under extension. The 
word substratum is used only to express in general the same thing 
with substance, 

FhiL Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the 
term substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents ? 

Hyl, The very same. 

Vhil, But, that one thing may stand under or support another, 
must it not be extended ? 

Hjl, It must. 

Vhil. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same 
absurdity with the former ? 

Kjl, You still take things in a strict literal sense ^ that is not 
fair, Fhilonous, 

Fhil, I am not for imposing any sense on your words : you are 
at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, 
make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter 
supports or stands under accidents. How ! is it as your legs 
support your body ? 

Hyl, No ^ that is the literal sense. 

Fhil, Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that 
you understand it in. . . . How long must I wait for an answer, 
Hylas ? 

Hyl, I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I un- 
derstood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting acci- 
dents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend 
it ; in short I find that I know nothing of it. 

Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor 
positive, of Matter ; you know neither what it is in itself, nor 
what relation it bears to accidents ? 

Hyl, I acknowledge it. 

Fhil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how 
qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the 
same time a material support of them ? 

Hyl. I did. 

Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of 
qualities, you do withal conceive something which you cannot 
conceive ? 

HyL It was wrong I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy 



between Hylas and PhUonous. 291 

or other. Pray what think you of this ? It is just come into my 
head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of 
each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot 
singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without exten- 
sion, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, 
as the several qualities united or blended together form entire 
sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be 
supposed to exist without the mind. 

FUL Either, RyUs^ you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. 
Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after 
another ; yet my arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere 
tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each 
alone by itself ; but, that they were not at all without the mind. 
Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could 
not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in 
thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to 
conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the 
only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all 
that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will 
have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you 
can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, 
or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I 
will grant it actually to be so^i. 

HyL If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What 
more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, inde- 
pendent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever ? I do at 
this present time conceive them existing after that manner. 

PArV. How say you, Hylas^ can you see a thing which is at the 
same time unseen ? 

HyL No, that were a contradiction. 

FhiL Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of camceivmg a 
thing which is umanceived'^'^ ? 

HyL It is. 

FUL The tree or house therefore which you think of is con- 
ceived by you ? 

HyL How should it be otherwise ? 

*■ Cf. PHndpUt 0/ Human KnowUdge, sect. 23 ; Ferrier'i Thtory </ Kmcmmg cmd 
icct. as. Bmng, Prop. III. obt. 15 — 18. 

* Cf. FHmcipUt of Human Knau4§dg9^ 

U 2 



292 The First Dialogue 

FhiL And what is conceived is surely in the mind ? 

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind. 

PUL How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree 
existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever ? 

Hyl. That was I own an oversight ^ but stay, let me consider 
what led me into it. — ^It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was 
thinking of a tree in a solitary place where no one was present to 
see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unper- 
ceived or unthought of — not considering that I myself conceived it 
all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame 
ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts 
the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And 
this is far from proving that I can conceive them esdstmg ma of the 
mmds of all Spirits* 

Fhii. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive 
how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than 
in a mind ? 

Hyl. I do. 

FhiL And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that 
which you cannot so much as conceive ? 

HyL I profess I know not what to think; but still there arc 
some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at 
a distance ? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, 
to be a great way ofF ? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses? 

FhsL Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like 
objects ? 

Hyl. I do. 

Fhsl. And have they not then the same appearance of being 
distant ? 

HyL They have. 

Fhsl. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a 
dream to be without the mind ? 

HyL By no means. 

FhiL You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects 
are without the mind, from their appearance or manner wherein 
they are perceived. 

HyL I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in 
those cases ? 

FhiL By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately 



between Hylas and Philonous. 293 

perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually 
exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are 
affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. 
And these you will not say are without the mind. 

HyL True : but, beside all that, do you not think the sight 
suggests something of outness or Mstance ? 

FUL Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size 
and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all 
distances ? 

HyL They are in a continual change. 

FfcV. Sight therefore doth not suggest or any way inform you 
that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a dis- 
tance ^a, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; 
there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each 
other during the whole time of your approach. 

HyL It doth not ; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what 
object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance : 
no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still 
something of distance suggested in the case. 

FbiL Good Hylas^ do but reflect a little on the point, and then 
tell me whether there be any more in it than this : — From the 
ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience 
learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the 
standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain 
succession of time and motion. 

HyL Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else. 

PhiL Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind 
was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience 
of what may be suggested by sight ? 

HyL It is. 

FhiL He would not then, according to you, have any notion of 
distance annexed to the things he saw ; but would take them for 
a new set of sensations existing only in his mind ? 

HyL It is undeniable. 

PUL But, to make it still more plain : is not distance a line 
turned endwise to the eye ? 

*" [See the ffiajr towards a N«w Tbtory what follows N§w Thtory of Vitiom, sect, a, 
c/ FlitoM, and its VinSc4»tion^ Note by 8tz, ; PrincipUt of Human KnowUdge, sect. 
the AmAor in the 1734 edition. Cf. with 43>44; Aleiphrom, Dial. IV. 8. 



294 ^^ First Dialogue 

Hjl. It is. 

^hil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight ? 

HyL It cannot. 

^UL Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not propolj j 
and immediately perceived by sight ? 

HyL It should seem so. 

^hil. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance? 

HyL It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind. 

VhiL But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the 
same place with extension and figures ? 

HyL They do. 

PifoV. How can you then conclude fix)m sight that figures exist 
without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensiUe 
appearance being the very same with regard to both ? 

HyL I know not what to answer. 

VhiL But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately 
perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed 
out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an 
idea : and can any idta exist out of the mind ? 

HyL To suppose that were absurd : but, inform me, Philonous, 
can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas ? 

VbiL As for the rational deducing of causes fix>m effects, that 
is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell 
whether you perceive anything which is not immediately per- 
ceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived 
are other than your own sensations or ideas ? You have indeed 
more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared 
yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to 
have departed from what you then thought. 

HyL To speak the truth, fhilonous^ I think there are two kinds 
of objects : — the one perceived immediately, which are likewise 
called ideas i the other are real things or external objects, perceived 
by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and represen- 
tations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind ; but 
the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this 
distinction sooner ; it would probably have cut short your 
discourse. 

PUL Are those external objects perceived by sense, or by some 
other faculty ? 



between Hylas and Philonous. 295 

HyL They are perceived by sense. 

PbsL How ! is there anything perceived by sense which is not 
immediately perceived ? 

HyL Yes, Pkilommsy in some sort there is. For example, when 
I look on a picture or statue of Julius Cxsar, I may be said after 
a manner to perceive him (though not inunediately) by my senses. 

PAii. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are 
immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things : and that 
these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a con- 
formity or resemblance to our ideas ? 

HyL That is my meaning. 

PUL And, in the same way that Julius Cassar, in himself in- 
visible, is nevertheless perceived by sight ; real things, in them- 
selves imperceptible, are perceived by sense. 

HyL In the very same. 

PUL Tell me, HylaSy when you behold the picture of Julius 
Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and 
figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole ? 

HyL Nothing else. 

PUL And would not a man who had never known anything of 
Julius Caesar see as much ? 

HyL He would. 

PUL Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as 
perfect a degree as you ? 

HyL I agree with you. 

PJUL Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to 
the Roman emperor, and his are not ? This cannot proceed from 
the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived ; since you 
acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect. 
It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: 
should it not ? 

HyL It should. 

PUL Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that 
anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. 
Tbou^ I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive ^< 
sensible things mediately by sense — that is, when, from a frequently 

^ Mark here the meaning assigned to the perception, in which conception it implied 
term *perception;'and the distinction between —a distinction so important in the interpre* 
fanmediatc or proper perception, and mediate tation of Berkeley. 



The First Dialogue 



1 



perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by -me 
sense suggests to the mind otliers, perliaps belonging to anolhef- 
sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance^ 
when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive 
only the sound ; but, from the experience I have had that such, 
a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach* 
It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can. 
be htard but sound; and the coach is not then properly perceived 
by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when wt 
are said to see a red-hot bar of iron j the solidity and heat of the 
iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination 
by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that 
sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly per- 
ceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case 
that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other 
things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by expe- 
rience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to youf' 
comparison of Oesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, yoO. 
must hold the real things or archetypes of our ideas arc not per- 
ceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason 
or memory. I would therefi^re fain know what atpiments you 
can draw from reason fiar the existence of what you call real thinff 
or material objects. Or, whether you remember to have seen them 
formerly as they are in themselves ; or, if you have heard or read 
of any one that did. 

Hyl. I see, Phihnou!, you arc disposed to raillery; but that wilt 
never convince me. 

Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the 
knowledge of material beings. Whatever we perceive is perceived 
immediately or mediately : by sense ; or by reason and reflection.. 
But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you 
have to believe their existence; or what medium you can possibly 
make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understandings 

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Philonous^ now I consider the pointy 
I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much 
seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may 
really exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing 
them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons 
to the contrary. 



between Hylas and Pkilonous. 297 

Fhil. What! is it come to this, that you only believe the 
existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded 
barely on the possibility of its being true ? Then you will have 
me bring reasons against it: though another would think it 
reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. 
And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to main- 
tain, without any reason, is in efiect what you have more than 
once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to 
pass over all this ; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas 
do not exist without the mind j but that they are copies, images, 
or representations, of certain originals that do ? 

Hyl. You take me right. 

FUl. They are then like external things*^* ? 

Hyl. They are. 

FUL Have those things a stable and permanent nature, inde- 
pendent of our senses ; or are they in a perpetual change, upon 
our producing any motions in our bodies — suspending, exerting, or 
altering, our ^ulties or organs of sense ? 

HyL Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which 
remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in 
the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect 
the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the 
same effect on things existing without the mind. 

FUL How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting 
and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything 
fixed and constant ? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, 
as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually 
changing upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or 
instruments of sensation ; how can any determinate material 
objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct 
things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? 
Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall 
we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the felse ones ? 

HyL I profess, FUlmous^ I am at a loss. I know not what to 
say to this. 

FUL But neither is this all. Which are material objects in 
themselves — perceptible or imperceptible ? 

HyL Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but 

" Cf. PrindpUs of Humtm KrutUfUdge, t«ct. 8. 



298 The First Dialogue 

ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insen- 
sible, and to be perceived only by our ideas. 

VhiL Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals 
insensible ? 

Kjl. Right. 

'BhiL But how can that which is sensible be like that which is 
insensible ? Can a real thing, in itself imvissile^ be like a rv/W j 
or a real thing, which is not audible^ be like a smmdf In a word, 
can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation 
or idea ? 

Hyl. I must own, I think not. 

PhiL Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? 
Do you not perfectly know your own ideas ? 

Hyl. I know them perfectly ; since what I do not perceive or 
know can be no part of my ideate. 

Fhil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me 
if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind ? 
or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the 
mind? 

HyL Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or 
understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it 
is most evident that no idea can exist ^without the mind. 

Fhil. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the 
reality of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an 
absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are 
a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to 
shew your principles led to Scepticism. 

Hyl. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least 
silenced. 

Phil. I would fain know what more you would require in 
order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of 
explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips 
in discourse laid hold and insisted on ? Or were you not allowed 
to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served 
your purpose ? Hath not everything you could say been heard 
and examined with all the fairness imaginable ? In a word, have 
you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth ? 
and, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former 

** Cf. PrineipUs of Human KnowUdge, sect. 35. 



between Hylas and Pkilonotis. 299 

concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new 
distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not 
produce it? 

Hyl. A little patience^ PU/amous. I am at present so amazed 
to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the laby- 
rinths you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be 
expected I should find my way out. You must give me time to 
look about me and recollect myself. 

PJUL Hark ; is not this the college bell ? 

Hyl. It rings for prayers. 

PbsL We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again 
to-morrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your 
thou^ts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any 
fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself. 

HyL Agreed. 



L ^' 



THE SECOND DIALOGUE. 

Hylas. I beg your pardon, Fhilanous^ for not meeting you 
sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late 
conversation that I had not leisure to think of the time of the 
day, or indeed of anything else. 

FUlonaus. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if 
there were any mistakes in your concessions, or fellacies in my 
reasonings from them, you will now discover them to me. 

Hyl. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but 
search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have 
minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse : but 
all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear 
still more clear and evident j and, the more I consider them, the 
more irresistibly do they force my assent. 

Fhil. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, 
that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason ? 
Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets 
them both oflF* to advantage ; while the false lustre of error and 
disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected. 

Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can 
any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd 
consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead 
to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there seems, 
on the other hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and 
intelligible, in the modem way of explaining things that, I pro- 
fess, I know not how to reject it. 

Fhil, I know not what way you mean. 

HyL I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas. 

FhU. How is that? 

HyL It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of 
the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence 
extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by 



The Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 301 

the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, com- 
municate certain vibrative motions to the nerves ; and these being 
filled with spirits propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, 
which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made 
in the brain, is variously affected with ideas. 

FhiL And call you this an explication of the manner whereby 
we are affected with ideas ? 

HyL Why not, Fhiltmous ,• have you anything to object against it ? 

FhtL I would first know whether I rightly understand your 
hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes 
or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the train you 
mean any sensible thing. 

HyL What else think you I could mean ? 

FhiL Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those 
things which are inmiediately perceivable are ideas; and these 
exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, 
long since agreed to. 

HyL I do not deny it. 

FhiL The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, 
exists only in the mind'. Now, I would fain know whether you 
think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in 
the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how 
do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself? 

HyL I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain 
which is perceivable to sense — ^this being itself only a combination 
of sensible ideas — but by another which I imagine. 

FUL But are not things imagined as truly in the minJ as things 
perceived^? 

HyL I must confess they are. 

FhiL It comes, therefore, to the same thing ; and you have been 
ail this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impres- 
sions of the brain, that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether 
sensible or imaginable it matters not. 

HyL I begin to suspect my hypothesis. 

* With Berkeley, the human body, in- while mmd may, at leatt conceivably, exist 

dnding of course the brain, exists in the independently of its sensible organitation, 

miod, and not the mind in the body ; — for and of sensible things. Cf. Sirii, sect. 285, 

brain and body (if we apply the term 29^, Sec. 

existence to them in any intelligible mean- ' Cf. PrmdpUt 0/ Hunum Kmoivlfdgf, 

ing) depend on being perceived or imagined ; sect. 23 ; also pp. 991, 992. 



I 302 



Th4 Secimd Dialogm 



I 



Phi/. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own 
ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by 
impressions in the brain, do you conceive this bratn or no? 
If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing 
that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, yuu 
talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis. 

Hyl. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing 
in it. 

Pl»l, You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this 
way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satis- 
fied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between 
a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in 
the mind ? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that ? 

Hyl. But I could never think it bad so little in it as now it 
seems to have. 

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things 
have a real^ existence; and that you are in truth an arrant tttftkf 

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied. 

Pint. Look ! are not the fields covered with a delightful 
verdure ? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the 
rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports 
the soul ? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some 
huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy 
forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in 
rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How 
sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth ! 
To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night 
alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change her dress 
with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What 
variety and use [' in the meanest productions of nature !] What 
delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable 
bodies! How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their 
particular ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole! 
And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off 
and illustrate each other ? Raise now your thoughts from this ball 
of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch 
of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they 



between Hylas and Philonaus. 303 

not admirable for use and order ? Were those (miscalled erratic) 
globes ever known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the 
pathless void ? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever pro- 
portioned to the times ? So fixed, so immutable are the lawsby which 
the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid 
and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars ! How magnificent and 
rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered 
throughout the whole azure vault ! Yet, if you take the telescope, 
it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked 
eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view 
immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss 
of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The 
feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving 
round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an 
all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense 
nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless 
extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring 
mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still 
stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast 
bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote 
soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, 
linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other, 
even with this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts 
and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system im- 
mense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought ! 
What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would 
deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all reality ? How 
should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all 
the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare ? To be 
plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought 
extravagantly absurd by all men of sense ? 

HyL Other men may think as they please ; but for your part you 
have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as 
much a sceptic as I am. 

FUl. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you. 

HyL What ! have you ail along agreed to the premises, and do 
you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those para- 
doxes by myself which you led me into ? This surely is not fiair. 

PUl. 1 deny that 1 agreed with you in those notions that led to 



^ 



t 304 TAf Second Dialagw 

Scepticism. You indeed said the rea/ifyi of sensible things con- 
sisted in an ai/solute existence out of the minds of spirits, or distinct 
from their being perceived. And, pursuant to this notion of 
reality, you are obliged lo d.-ny sensible things any real existence: 
that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourectf 
a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible 
things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident, 
for the reasons you allow of, thai sensible things cannot exist 
otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that 
they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not oo 
my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived 
by me '■, tdere muit be some other mlvd luherein they exist. As sure, 
therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an 
infinite omnipresent Spirit, who contains and supports it. 

Hyl. What! this is no more than I and all Christians boldj. 
nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He 
knows and comprehends all things. 

Phil. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly 
believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because 
they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, 
immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because 
all sensible things must be perceived by Him. 

Hyl, But, SO long as wc all believe the same thing, what matter 
is it how we come by that belief? 

Phil, But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For 
philt>sophcrs, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be 
perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsis- 
tence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever, 
which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying. 
There is a God^ therefore He perceives all things ; and saying, Sensikit 
things do really exist ; and^ if they really exist ', they are ttecessarilj 
perceived ky an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind^ or 
God} This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demon- 
stration, from a most evident principle'', of the Mng of n God. 



of iheii bring fKfceivtiJ or imigini 
linile mindi. is We iiiumcd, it a conri 
of Common Stmt. This pcmiaiwnc 



vo!v«, according 10 Berkeley, Ihe 
of Supreme Mind uid iconiTinl Piondencc 
* The 'principle' ii ihal of llie nalily, 
which im)^et Ihe Jurmaiuici and «t<(r> 
tinlily (in Berkelcy'i meaning of 
' rxtemal ') of HDiible ihingi. Cf. 



between HyUts and Pkilotwus. 305 

Divines and plii losopliers had proved beyond all controversy, from 
the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, 
that it was the workmanship of God. But that^setting aside all 
help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the 
contrivance, order, and adjustment of things — an infinite mind 
should be necessarily inferred from the bare existmce of the 
sensible world, is an advantage to them only who have made this 
easy reflection: that the sensible world is that which we perceive 
by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses 
beside ideas ; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist 
otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious 
search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious 
length of discourse, oppose and baiHe the most strenuous advocate 
fur Atheism ; those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal 
succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous 
concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, 
and Spinoxa: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not 
entirely overthrown, by this single reflection on the repugnancy 
included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude 
and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind ? Let 
any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own 
thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, 
a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms ; how anything at 
ail, either sensible or imaginable, can exist mdcpendent of a 
mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. 
Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, 
and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in 
thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to 
allow it a real existence' ? 

Hyi. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable 
10 religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks 
very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns%of ««»g 
tiUlhrngfinGod? 

of Human KnoultJgt, lect. go. A per- implin the clemal exirtenee of Mind, if 

iiuneiit or ciiemal niiteiial world of th» Sonielhing mun exulctcnially.inJ if Bclug. 

wrt ii, on Berkeley'* priociplei, iiecei»»rily >i ioch, involvei Mind. BttkeleyS NilunI 

pounded on Supreme Mind, beciuw »l»o- Theology coma M. ihij. grounded m il 

lulely dependent on mind, and neserthtleij i> in the »ery aiiumn of lenjiUe Ihingi, 

only panially ind il iiiterrik luilained by apirl from mirki of design. 
flotU m crealrf mindi. * He rcfen of coune to Malebranche. 

• "n* ptaeni nislcncc of Sometlung whoie Divine Vitimi wa> an itieii-in w ■ 



1 



306 • The Second Dialogue 

Fhil. I would gladly know that (q>imon : pray explain it to me. 

HyL They conceive that the soul, being immaterial^ is incah 
pable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them 
in themselves ; but that she perceives them by her union with tike 
substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelli- 
gible, or capable of being the inunediate object of a ^Hxifs 
thought. Besides, the Divine essence contains in it perfectkns 
correspondent to each created being; and which are, for that 
reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind. 

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things 
altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part 
(or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an 
impassive, indivisible, pure, active being* Many more di£5culties 
and objections there are which occur at first view against this 
hypothesis ; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absur- 
dities of the conunon hypothesis^ in making a created world exist 
otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath 
this peculiar to itself — that it makes that material world serve to 
no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other 
hypotheses in the sciences that they suppose nature or the Divine 
wisdom to make something in vain, or do that by tedious round- 
about methods which might have been performed in a much more 
easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis 
which supposes the whole world made in vain ? 

Hyl But what say you, are not you too of opinion that we see all 
things in God ? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it. 
Phil, [ypew men think, yet all have opinions. Hence men's 
opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that 
tenets, which in themselves are ever so diflFerent, should nevertheless 
be confounded with each other by those who do not consider them 
attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men 
imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malcbranchc j though 
in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most 
abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an 
absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we 
are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the 

reconcile the Cartesian duality in Being, tually represented. 

with the unity of Perception, through God, • The passage within brackets is not 

in whom all things are ideally or intellec- contained in the first and second editions. 



between Hylas and Philoiwus. 307 

true forms and figures of extended bein^; of all which I hold the 
direct contrary. So that upon the whoSe there are no principles 
more ftindamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be 
owned that] 1 entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, 
' That in God we live and move and have our being.' But that 
we sec things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, 
1 am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning — 
It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and 
that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain 
that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or 
their archetypes I", exist independently of my mind j since I know 
myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to deter- 
mine at pk-asurc what particular ideas 1 shall be affected with 
upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in 
some other mind, whose^will it is they should be exhibited to me". 
The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, 
call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation 
exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? 
This indeed is inconceivable ' ' ; and to assert that which is incon- 
ceivable is to talk nonsense : is it not ? 

Hyt. Without doubt. 

Ph'it, But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they 
should exist in and be produced by a Spirit '■' ; since this is no more 
than I daily exp^-rience in myself, inasmuch as 1 perceive number- 
less ideas i and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of 
them, and raise them up in my imagination; though, it must be 
confessed, these creatures of the fancy arc not altogether so 
distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived 
by my senses ' ■ — which latter are called rtal things. From all which 



" He does nol iffirm that out mdiriduil 
pefcepli Ihcmwlvn have an eiiiteDCe that 
it independent of any mind, even of the 
mind of the percipient. They may be only 
tjgai ol external and independent exidence 
or powet — in other niindi, and ultimately 
in the Supreme Mirul. 

" Cf. Frinciplis of Human Kn/naliJgt. 
ttci. J9— 33. 

" Cf. Priiuifla a/ Human Knomlidgt, 



imagination another 

ivine, perceiving and 

lillc thingi : became t have 




my own mind. I cannot repreient to my- 
self senjible ihingi eiiwing absolutely un- 
percrivcd and unimagined ; because t can- 
not, without a conlradlction, have an ex- 
ample of ihii in my own experience. 

'* I'hat i> lo lay, the mumhm of Supreme 
Mind is inTened fiom one common-tense 
belief in the permanent eiiltence of a 
material world; the ttaraclir of the Su- 
preme Will ii infened from the manner 
in which sensible phenomena eoexiil and 
succeed one another — from ihc language of 
lueture — the tenH>tymbolism which ve ate 
eonitantly trying to interpret. Cf. JVf 
rieory o/ Vhiom VmdicaliJ. p.s.im 



3o8 The Second Dialogue 

I conclude, there is a Mind luhich affects me every mmment imth M the 
sensible impressions I perceive. And, from the variety, order, and 
manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be «wf^ 
fowerfuly and good^ beyond comprehension i^, Mark it well ; I do not 
say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the 
intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but 
I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, 
and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this 
most plain and evident ? Is there any more in it than what a little 
observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not 
only enable th us to conceive, but also obligeth us to acknowledge? 

HyL I think I understand you very clearly ; and own the proof 
you give of a Deity seems no less evident than surprising. But, 
allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of all 
things, yet, may there not be still a third nature besides Spirits 
and Ideas ? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause 
of our ideas ? In a word, may there not for all that be Matter ? 

PhiL How often must I inculcate the same thing ? You allow 
the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere 
without the mind ; but there is nothing perceived by sense which 
is not perceived immediately : therefore there is nothing sensible 
that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you 
still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose j something that 
may be discovered by reason ^6, and not by sense. 

HyL You are in the right. 

Phi/, Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is 
grounded on ; and what this Matter is in your present sense of it. 

HyL I find myself aflPected with various ideas, whereof I know 
I am not the cause ; neither are they the cause of themselves, or 
of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being 
altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have there- 
fore some cause distinct from me and them : of which I pretend 
to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas ^7. And this 
thing, whatever it be, I call Matter. 

" Cf. Principles of Human KnowUJge, cause of our sense-experience is unknown, 

sect. 30. and unknowable by human reasoning — 

'" 'reason,' i.e. by reasoning or necessary that wc cannot either affirm or deny 

inference. that it is an intelligent voluntary Agent. We 

" Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge^ know the sensible efftetSy as matter of fact, 

sect. 51—53. — An important objection it is said, but we can tell nothing about 

(though not suggested by Hylas) is, that the their caMs# — as matter of science at any rate. 



between Hylas and Pkilonous. 



309 



PUL Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the 
current proper signification attached to a common name in any 
language ? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that 
in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire ; and, upon 
explaining himself, you found he meant by the word fire that which 
others call water ; or, if he should assert that there are trees that 
walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term trees. Would you 
think this reasonable ? 

Hfl. No, I should think it very absurd. Conmion custom is 
the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect 
speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can 
never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply 
disputes where there is no difference in opinion. 

PtiL And doth not Matter ^ in the common current acceptation 
of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, 
inactive Substance ? 

Hyl. It doth. 

Phil. And, hath it not been made evident that no such sub- 
stance can possibly exist *« ? And, though it should be allowed to 
exist, yet how can that which is inactive be a cause ,* or that which 
is unthinking be a cause of thought? You may, indeed, if you 
please, annex to the word Matter a contrary meaning to what is 
vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it — an unex- 
tended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. 
But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that 
very fault you just now condemned with so much reason ? I do by 
no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect 
a cause from the phenomena : but I deny that the cause deducible 
by reason '9 can properly be termed Matter. 

HjL There is indeed something in what you say. But I am 
afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by 
no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the 
Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate 



* Bcrkeky*! material tubsianet it the syn- 
thcsif of extended, solid, moTeable, unthink- 
ing, intctiTe idios or phenomena^ in a word 
the bondk of qualities which is commonly 
caOed a ' sensible thing,' and which is pre- 
•emcd, or conditionally {>resentable, in a finite 
soiiC'^qKrience, but is ultimately dependent 
on or substantiated in Supreme Mind. 



** Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it 
must be a Rational WiU — which it would t>e 
absurd to call Matter. But he overlooks 
the objection already mentioned, that no 
ultimate cause at all of sensible phenomena 
can be determined by scimee^ which cannot 
transcend the phenomena themselves, and their 
order as contemporaneous and successive. 



3IO The Second Dialogue 

to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior 
nature, which concurs in the production of our ideas^ not bjr any 
act of will or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of actioD 
which belongs to Matter, viz. motion. 

PhlL I find you are at every turn relapsing into your dd 
exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, 
substance existing without the mind. What! have you already 
forgotten you were convinced, or are you willing I should 
repeat what has been said on that head ? In truth this is not fair 
dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have 
so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther 
on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas 
are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action 
in them 20. 

Hyl. They are. 

FUL And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas ? 

HyL How often have I acknowledged that they are not. 

FhiL But is not motion a sensible quality ? 

HyL It is. 

PA/7. Consequently it is no action ? 

HyL I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when 
I stir my finger it remains passive ; but my will which produced 
the motion is active. 

FhiL Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion 
being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides 
volition : and, in the second place, whether to say something and 
conceive 2 J nothing be not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, 
having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to 
suppose any efficient or active cause of our ideas, other than Spirit^ 
is highly absurd and unreasonable ? 

HyL I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not 
be a cause, yet what hinders its being an instrument subservient to 
the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas ? 

FhiL An instrument say you ; pray what may be the figure, 
springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument ? 

* Cf. Principles of Human Knoiuledge, conveys for f« any metning into the term 

sect. 35. Cause, to employ that tenn when volition 

^ It is here argued that as volition is is absent is to make it equivalent to the 

the only cause of which w* have any ex- term nothing — at least to meaninglessness 

perience, and which consequently alone or unintelligibility. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 311 

HjL Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the sub- 
stance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me. 

VUL What ! You are then of opinion it is made up of 
unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown 
shaped 

HjL I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, 
being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an 
unperceiving substance. 

VhiL But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument 
void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself? 

KjL I do not pretend to have any notion of it. 

FUL And what reason have you to think this unknown, this 
inconceivable Somewhat doth exist ? Is it that you imagine God 
cannot act as well without it ; or that you find by experience the 
use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind ? 

HjL You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray 
what reasons have you not to believe it ? 

'BlnL It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence 
of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist 
dn reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know 
what it is you would have me believe ; since you say you have no 
manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider 
whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common 
sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you know 
not why. 

HjL Hold, Fhllmous. When I tell you matter is an instrument^ 
I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the par- 
ticular kind of instrument ; but, however, I have some notion of 
instmrnent in general^ which I apply to it. 

VUL But what if it should prove that there is something, even 
in the most general notion of instfument^ as taken in a distinct 
sense from cause^ which makes the use of it inconsistent with the 
Divine attributes ? 

HjL Make that appear and I shall give up the point. 

VUL What mean you by the general nature or notion of 
tnstfuwuHt f 

HyL That which is common to all particular instruments com- 
poseth the general notion. 

FUl. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied 



312 The Second Dialogue 

to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by 
the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an 
instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volitioiL 
But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up 
a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind ? Or, can you 
shew any example where an instrument is made use of in pro- 
ducing an effect immediately depending on the will of the agent? 

HyL I own I cannot. 

VhiL How therefore can you suppose that an all-perfect Spirit, 
on whose will all things have an absolute and inmiediate depend- 
ence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing 
it, make use of it ? Thus, it seems to me that you are obliged to 
own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible 
with the infinite perfection of God ; that is, by your own con- 
fession, to give up the point. 

HjL It doth not readily occur what I can answer you. 

ThiL But, mcthinks you should be ready to own the truth, when 
it hath been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of 
finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the 
use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of 
another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in 
such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear 
consequence, that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or 
instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner 
exerted than executed, without the application of means — which, 
if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of 
any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce 
any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or 
those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is 
Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever. 

HyL I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. 
However, I would not be understood to give up its existence 
neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still 
be an occasion"^-. 

Phil. How many shapes is your Matter to take ? Or, how often 
must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part 
with it ? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of 
disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the 

" Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge^ sect 68 — 79. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 313 

signification of the principal term) — I would fain know what you 
mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already 
denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense 
you understand aceasian^ pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew 
me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion 
of our ideas ? 

HyL As to the first point: by occasion I mean an inactive 
unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in 
our minds. 

PM. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking 
being? 

HyL I know nothing of its nature. 

PM. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason 
why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, 
unknown thing. 

HyL When we see ideas produced in our minds after an orderly 
and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed 
and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited. 

PM. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our 
ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions. 

HyL That is my opinion. 

PM. Those things which you say are present to God, without 
doubt He perceives. 

Hy/. Certainly ; otherwise they could not be to Him an occa- 
sion of acting. 

PM. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypo- 
thesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it 
is liable to : I only ask whether the order and regularity observable 
in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not suffi- 
ciently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and 
whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He 
is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to 
act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case 
I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your 
purpose — it not being easy to conceive how the external or ab- 
solute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its 
being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are 
certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him 
the occasion of producing ideas in us ? 



314 T^f^^ Second Dialogue 

Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of 
occasion seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest. 

Fhil. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different 
acceptations of Matter^ you have been only supposing you know 
not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use ? 

HyL I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they 
have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks^ I have 
some confused perception that there is such a thing as Mmtter. 

VhiL Either you perceive "^^ the being of Matter immediately, or 
mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the 
senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by ^riiat 
reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive 
immediately. So much for the perception. — Then for the Matter 
itself, I ask whether it is object, substratum^ cause, instrument, or 
occasion ? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting 
your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one 
shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been 
disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new 
to advance I would gladly hear it. 

KyL I think I have already offered all I had to say on those 
heads. I am at a loss what more to urge. 

PA/V. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. 
But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what 
has been hitherto su^ested, you will farther consider whether, 
upon supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive 
how you should be affected by it ? Or, supposing it did not exist, 
whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with 
the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same 
reasons to believe its existence that you now can have^^ ? 

HyL I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things 
just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; 
neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce 
any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely 
satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as 
Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot 



** Mark here again the double meaning are conscious of. 

of the terms perceive, perception, &c. ; they ^ Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, 

arc in some places equivalent to conscious- sect. 20. 
ness, and in others to inference from what we 



between Hylas and Philonous. 315 

help supposing that there is Matter in some sense or other. 
What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine. 

VInL I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of 
that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is 
a Substance — and if so, whether you can suppose a substance 
without accidents ; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or 
qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, 
at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them ? 

HjL We have already argued on those points. I have no vaoit 
to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell 
you I at present understand by Matter neither substance nor 
accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, 
nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, distinct from all 
these". 

VhiL It seems then you include in your present notion of 
Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of entitj. 

HjL Nothing else, save only that I superadd to this general 
idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, 
that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend. 

VhiL Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist ? 

HjL Oh Fhilamaus ! now you think you have entangled me ; for, 
if I say it exists in place then you will infer that it exists in the 
mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the 
mind : but I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not 
where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is 
a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all 
the questions you put for the future about Matter. 

PU/. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to 
inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you 
mean by its existence ? 

HjL It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is per- 
ceived. 

FkiL But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its 
existence ? 

HjL Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive 
notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to 
own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its existence^ or 
how it exists. 

* Cr. Prmeipln af Human KnowUdgi, sect 80, 8i. 



3i6 The Second Dialogue 

FUL Continue, good HyUsy to act the same ingenuous part, 
and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of 
Entity in general, prescinded fiom and exclusive of all thinking 
and corporeal beings ^^, all particular things whatsoever. 

HyL Hold, let me think a little 1 profess, FUUmms^ I do 

not find that I can. At first glance, methought 1 had some dilute 
and airy notion of pure Entity in abstract ; but, upon closer 
attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think 
on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving 
none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree 
of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its wAirr, its 
hvw^ its entity^ or anything belonging to it. 

PA/7. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, 
you have not any notion in your mind ? 

HyL None at all. 

VhiL Pray tell me if the case stands not thus : — at first, from 
a belief of material substance, you would have it that the imme- 
diate objects existed without the mind ; then that they are arche- 
types ; then causes ^ next instruments ; then occasions : lastly, 
something in general^ which being interpreted proves nothing. So 
Matter comes to nothing^^. What think you, Hylas^ is not this 
a fair summary of your whole proceeding ? 

HyL Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not 
being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its 
existence ^^. 

FhiL That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other cir- 
cumstance there may reasonably be inferred the existence of 
a thing not immediately perceived ; and that it were absurd for 
•any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his 
having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, 
where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor 
revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where 
we have not even a relative notion of it ; where an abstraction 
is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and 
idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate 
or faint idea pretended to — I will not indeed thence conclude 

«« i. c. all Spirits and Ideas. " So Sir W. Hamilton in hit !)»««- 

^ Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge^ sions and Lectures, 
sect. 34, 80. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



317 



against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything ; but 
my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you 
employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or 
signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how 
mere jargon should be treated. 

Hyl. To deal frankly with you, PJU/otumsy your arguments 
seem in themselves unanswerable ; but they have not so great an 
e£R»:t on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty 
acquiescence, which attends demonstration "^9. I find myself still 
relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, matter. 

FUL But, are you not sensible, Hylas^ that two things must 
concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the 
mind ? I^t a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if 
there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed 
towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And, though a demon- 
stration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there 
is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the under- 
standing, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly and 
adhere firmly to the truth ? No, there is need of time and pains : 
the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repe- 
tition of the same thing placed ofl in the same, oft in different 
lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and 
inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pre- 
tending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what 
reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in 
any art or science, any sect or profession of men ? Or is there 
anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met 
with even in the lowest of common conversation ? But, perhaps 
you will still say, Matter may exist ; though at the same time you 
neither know what is meant by Matter^ or by its existence. This 
indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether 
voluntary [^J^and of your own head], you not being led to it by 



* This, according to Hume (who somehow 
tikef for granted that Berkeley*! reasonings 
can produce no conviction) is the natural 
effect of Berkeley's philosophy. — • Most of 
the writings of that very ingenious author 
(Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepti- 
dm wMch are to be found either among 
the andent or modem philosophers, Bayle 
not excepted. . . . That all his arguments, 



though otherwise intended, are, in reality, 
merely sceptical appear from this — ibat thty 
admit of no atuwtr^ and product no eon- 
wetion. Their only effect is to cause that 
momentary amazement and irresolution and 
confusion, which is the result of scepti- 
cism.* (Hume's Ettayt^ vol. II, Note N., 

P- 554) 

* Omitted in last edition. 



31 8 The Second Dialogue 

any oiie reason^ for I challenge you to ^ew me that thing in 
nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it. 

HyL The reality of things cannot be maintained without sup- 
posing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good 
reason why I should be earnest in its defence ? 

FUl. The reality of things ! What things, sensible or in- 
telligible ? 

HyL Sensible things. 

Pit/7. My glove for example ? 

HyL That or any other thing perceived by the senses. 

FbiL But to fix on some particular thing ; — is it not a sufficient 
evidence to me of the existence of this glwiy that I see it, and fed 
it, and wear it ? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should 
be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this 
place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did 
or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, 
or in no place at all ? How can the supposed reality of that which 
is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists ? Or, 
of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of 
anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists ? Do 
but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you. 

HyL Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of 
Matter is highly improbable ; but the direct and absolute impos- 
sibility of it does not appear to me. 

FhiL But, granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account 
merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden 
mountain or a centaur. 

HyL I acknowledge it j but still you do not deny it is possible ; 
and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist. 
FhiL I deny it to be possible ; and have, if I mistake not, 
evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In 
the common sense of the word Matter^ is there any more implied 
than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance existing 
without the mind ? And have not you acknowledged, over and 
over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility 
of such a substance ? 

HyL True, but that is only one sense of the term Matter. 
FhiL But, is it not the only proper genuine received sense ? 
and, if Matter in such a sense be proved impossible, may it not 



between Hylas and Pkilonous. 319 

be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible ? Else how 
could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could 
there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes 
the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of 
words? 

Hyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more 
accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the 
common acceptation of a term. 

Fhil. But this now mentioned is the common received sense 
among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have 
you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased ? 
And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent, 
sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out or putting 
into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served 
your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and Ic^c ? 
And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our 
dispute to an unnecessary length ^ Matter having been particularly 
examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those 
senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute 
impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every 
particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in ? 

HyL But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved 
the impossibility of matter, in the last most obscure abstracted 
and indefinite sense. 

Fhil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible ? 

HyL When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas 
comprehended in its definition. 

FhiL But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be 
demonstrated between ideas ? 

Hyl. I agree with you. 

FhiL Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense 
of the word Matter^ it is plain, by your own confession, there was 
included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense, which 
is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I 
should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no 
ideas ^ or the impossibility of Matter taken in an unknown sense, 
that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant 
nothing i and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your 
various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at 



\ 



320 TAe Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philanous. 

all, or, if anything, an absurdity '^K And if this be not su£5cient to 
prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know 
what is. 

HyL I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible ; 
nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the 
same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For 
surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was : 
and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. 
But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the 
present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend 
in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's 
conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again 
about the same time. 

Fhil. I will not fail to attend you. 

^ Cf. Prineifin of Human KnowUdgi^ that such existence if impossible — every 

sect. 23, 34, where, as well as in other attempt at a positive conception of it ' ' 

places, Berkeley argues, not merely that the inconsistent with intelligibility, 
absolute existence of Nfatter is unproved, but 



THE THIRD DIALOGUE. 

PUUmoitf. iTell me, HylaSy what are the fruits of yesterday's 
meditation? Hath it confirmed you in the same mind you were in 
at parting ? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion ? 

Hylas. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike 
vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to- 
morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives 
in the pursuit of it, when, alas ! we know nothing all the while ; 
nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this 
life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly 
never intended us for Speculation. 

PM. What ! say you we can know nothing, Hy/as ? 

Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we 
can know the real nature, or what it is in itself. 

Fhil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is ? 

HyL You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water 
fluid J but this is no more than knowing what sensations are pro- 
duced in your own mind, upon the applicatiop of fire and water 
to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true 
and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that. 

PhiL Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, 
and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree ? 

Hyl. Know ? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should 
know It. All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or 
appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree 
or stone ? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you 
perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least 
like them. The same may be said of all^other real things or 
corporeal substances which compose the world. They have none 
of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by 

' 'So Hylas' — in first and second editionk. 

Y 



322 The Third Dialogue 

us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know 
anything of them, as they are in their own nature. 

Fhil. But surely, Hylas^ I can distinguish gold, for example, from 
iron : and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was ? 

Uyl. Believe me, VhtUmous^ you can only distinguish between 
your own ideas. That yellowness, that weigjit, and other sensible 
qualities, think you they are really in the gold ? They are only 
relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. 
And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the 
appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he 
that should conclude two men were of a difierent species, because 
their clothes were not of the same colour. 

VhlL It seems, then, we are altogether put oflF with the appear- 
ances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and 
the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel. 

KyL Even so. 

Fknl. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus 
imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses ? And yet I 
know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and per- 
form all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if 
they really knew the things they are conversant about. 

HyL They do so : but you know ordinary practice does not 
require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar 
retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shifl to bustle 
through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things. 

ThiL You mean, they know that they knvm nothing, 

HyL That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge ^ 

VhlL But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas i and are you 
seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose 
you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, 
like another man ; and do you not know what it is you call for ? 

HyL How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature 
of any one thing in the universe ? I may indeed upon occasion 
make use of pen, ink, and paper. But, what any one of them is 
in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the 
same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what 
is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of 
things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we 

* S«c Hamilton's Discmsions^ pp. 634 — 649. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



323 



perceive such certain appearances or ideas ; but it cannot be con- 
cluded fiom thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on 
it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that 
it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in nature. 

FhiL You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and 
extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not 
evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of 
material suistamce? This makes you dream of those unknown 
natures^ in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing 
between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to 
this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else 
knows perfectly well. Nor is this all : you are not only ignorant 
of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether any 
thing really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all ; 
forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or 
external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, 
as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means 
either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are 
obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, 
and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. 
And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable 
Scefticism that ever man was*^. Tell me, Hylas ^ is it not as I say ? 

HyL I agree with you. Material substance was no more than 
an hypothesis, and a false and groundless one too. I will no 
longer spend my breath in defence of it. But, whatever hypothesis 
you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its 
stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false : let me but be 
allowed to question you upon it. That is, sufier me to serve you 
in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as 
many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of 
Scepticism that I myself am in at present. 



' VarioQtly ciUed MOtmMiia, *thingt-in- 
tbemselTeiy' abtobte or unknown Substance 
dec. — all which Berkeley*! philosophy ban- 
iihct from eziitence, on the ground of their 
oointelligibility, and thus annihilates all ques- 
tioQs concerning them. Existence and reality 
are confined by Berkeley within the conscious 
ejq>erienoe of Minds — finite and Divine. 

' Bericeley of course claims that his doc- 
trine supersedes scepticism, and excludes the 
posiibiKty of fiUlacy in scnse^in excluding 



a representative perception. He assumes 
nevertheless our trust in the language of 
nature — in the reality and constancy of 
natural law. When we see an orange, for 
instance, the visual sense guarantees only its 
colour. The other phenomena, which we 
associate with its colour — iu other 'quali- 
ties' — are, when we merely look at the 
orange, believed in by sumstion or sense- 
suggested infcrenct. Cf. 7Vor;yr </ ViMkm 



; sect. 9^11. 



Y a 



324 



The Third Dialogue 



FhiL I assure you, Hylas^ I do not pretend to frame any hypo- 
thesis at all '. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my 
sanses, and leave things as I find them. To be plai% it is my 
opinion that the real things are those very things I sec and feci, 
and perceive 5 by my senses. These I know, and, finding they 
answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to 
be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible 
bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand 
times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you 
speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other 
sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help 
thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by 
snow and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving 
substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be aflfec- 
tions inherent in them. But I, who understand by those words 
the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. 
And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so 
neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really 
perceived by my senses <>, and at the same time not really exist, is 
to me a plain contradiction ^ since I cannot prescind or abstract, 
even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its 
being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the 
like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that 
I know. And I should not have known them but that I perceived 
them by my senses ^ and things perceived by the senses are imme- 
diately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; 
and ideas cannot exist without the mind ; their existence there- 
fore consists in being perceived ; when, therefore, they are actually 
perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then 
with all that Scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. 
What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of 
sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of 
God " ; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of 



* He assumes the common belief on which 
all interpretation of natural language proceeds 
—that sensible phenomena are evolved in a 
uniform and rational order, which is independ- 
ent of, and in that respect external to, the 
will of the percipient. 

* Mediately as well immediately perceive. 

* We can hardly be said to have an 



immediate sense-perception of any * thing' — 
meaning by ' thing' a congeries of sense-ideas 
or phenomena, presented in the different 
senses. We immediately perceive some of 
its qualities, and infer the others which these 
est. See the last three notes. 



su^g 



He probably refers to Des Cartes. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



325 



intuition or demonstration^ ! I might as well doubt of my own 
being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel. 

HyL Not so fast, Fhilomms : you say you cannot conceive how 
sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not ? 

PA/7. I do. 

HyL Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it 
possible that things perceivable by sense may still exists ? 

Phil. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When 
I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not 
mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they 
have an existence exterior to my mind ; since I find them by ex- 
perience to be independent of it*^ There is therefore some other 
mind wherein they exist > ', during the intervals, between the times 
of my perceiving them : as likewise they did before my birth, and 
would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true 
with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows 
there is an ommfresent eternal Mind^ which knows and comprehends 
all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and 
according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us 
termed the laws of nature. 

Hyl. Answer me, Fhilanous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert 
beings ? Or have they any agency included in them ? 

Fhil. They are altogether passive and inert >2, 



' As Locke docs. See Euay^ B. fV. ch. 11. 

* Cf. PrineipUt of Hitman Knowledge^ 
sect. 45 — 48. — • You ask me whether we are 
not in the wrong in imagining things to 
exist when they are not perceived by the 
senses, I answer no. The existence of our 
ideas consists in their being sensibly per- 
ceired, imagined, or thought on. When- 
ever they are imagined or thought on they 
do exist. Whenever they are mentioned, 
they are imagined or thought on. . . Bodies, 
taken for powers, do exist when not per- 
ceived; but this existence is not actual. 
When I uy a power exists, no more is 
meant than that t/, in the light, I open my 
eyes, and look that way, I shall see the 
body. . . . Bodies do exist whether we think 
of them or no : — they being taken in a two- 
fold sense for (i) collections of thoughts or 
perceptions ; (a) collections of powers to 
cause these thoughts. TT)ete latter exist; 
though perhaps it may be one simple perfect 
power— the Divine Will.' (Berkeley's MS. 
Commom Piaee Book.) 



^^ This is Berkeley's argument for the real 
or external existence of his sensible world — 
in his meaning of the terms real and ex- 
ternal. Cf. Principles of Human Know- 
ledge^ sect. 90. 

" It is in the assumptions involved in this 
proposition that Berkeley differs, for example, 
from Hume and Comte and Mr. J. S. Mill; 
who accept sense-given phenomena, and as- 
sume the orderly constancy of their reappear- 
ances, as a matter offact^ while they profeu 
ignorance of the ultimate cause of that steady 
order. The ground of sensible things, which 
Berkeley refers to Supreme Mind, Mr. Mill 
expresses by the term * permanent possibiliiy 
of sensations.' (See his Examination qJT 
Hamilton, ch. ii.) Our belief in the con- 
tinued existence of a sensible thing in our 
absence merely means, with him, our convic* 
tion, derived from custom, that we should 
perceive it if our circumstances were different 
from what, at the time, they happen to be. 

» Cf. PrineipUt </ Human KmmMgg, 
, sect. 35. 



326 The Third Dialogue 

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active ? 

PUL I acknowledge it. 

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the 
nature of God ? 

PhiL It cannot. 

Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, 
how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in 
His mind ? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, witbout 
having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive 
the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it? 

Phil. As to your first question : I own I have properly no Wm, 
either of God or any other spirit ; for these being active, cannot 
be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do 
nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, 
exist ais certainly as I know my ideas exist >»• Farther, I know 
what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I know this imme- 
diately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive 
a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that 
indivisible unext ended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. 
I say indivisible^ because unextended; and umextemJedy because 
extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which 
perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, 
nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And 
Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not 
therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking 
the word idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me 
with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God — ^though indeed 
extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is 
obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and 
removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an 
inactive idea, yet in myself somt sort of an active thinking image 
of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I 
have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflection and reasoning. 
My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge 
of ; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possi- 
bility of the existence of other spirits and ideas^*. Farther, from my 

*• Cf. PrineipUs of Human Knowledge^ conscious of myself, I can only infer, or 

sect, a, 37, 135 — 142. gather inductively the existence of other 

>* Mark that, with Berkeley, while I am finite minds. I cannot of course be conscious 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



327 



own being, and from the dependenqr I find in myself and my ideas, 
I do, by an act of reason 1^, necessarily infer the existence of a God, 
and of all created things in the mind of God. So much for your 
first question. For the second : I suppose by this time you can 
answer it youi^lf. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, 
as you do an inactive being or idea^^; nor know it, as you do your- 
self, by a reflex act *7j neither do you mediately apprehend it by 
siniilitude of the one or the other ^s. nor yet collect it by reasoning 
from that which you know immediately ^ 9. AH which makes the 
case of Matttr widely different from that of the 'Dettj. 

\^KjL You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of 
an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknow- 
ledge you have, properly speaking, no idea of your own soul. 
You even aflBrm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether 
different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like 
a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit 
nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have 
no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as 
material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. 
Is this fair dealing ? To act consistently, you must either admit 
Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this ? 

PifoV. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence 
of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but 
because the notion of it is inconsistent ; or, in other words, because 
it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, 
for ou^t I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man 



of another consdoDsnett than my own ; yet 
Berkeley has by lome been erroneously sup- 
posed to say the contrary. 

^ 'reason,' i.e. reasoning or necessary 
inference — ^foonded here on our sense of 
penooal dependence, and not merely on 
our faith in the permanent existence of 
thoae syntheses of sense-given phenomena 
which we call sensible things. Our in- 
doctiTe inference of the existence of finite 
minds is a subordinate and contingent ap- 
plication of the same general belief. 

^ Cf. PrmdpUt tf Human KnowUdgt, 
sect. 135 — 138. 

^ Does this imply that with Berkeley the 
moiiom of self, as distinguished from the id*a$ 
of not-idf, is not an original datum, but 
the fcmh of reflection upon experience — 
the mh fteiiut or permanent, so to speak, 



as distinguished from its objtcHvt or variable 
phase of experience ? Yet he says in many 
I^ces that we are conscious of *our own 
being.' Cf. Principles of Human KnowUdgt, 
sect. 89. 

" Cf. Ibid. sect. 8. 

^ Cf. Ibid. sect. ao. 

** This, perhaps the most important 
passage in the Dialogues (pp. 327 — 319), 
printed within brackets, is not contained in 
the first and second editions. It is, by anti- 
cipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's 
application of the objections to the reality 
and possibility of Absolute or Unknown 
Matter, to the reality and possibility of the 
Ego or Self of which we are aware through 
memory, as identical amid the changes of itt 
ideas or successive states. 



328 The Third Dialogue 

hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then 
those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent mist 
be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we 
believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not 
believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason ftr 
such belief : but I have no reason for believing the existence rf 
Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can 
I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or 
passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance— 
either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas 
the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking 
principle, I evidently know by reflection -^^ You will forgive mc if 
I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the 
very notion or definition of materml Substance^ there is included 
a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be 
said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth 
not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant 
But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing ^ould 
be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. 
It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a 
demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; 
but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with 
material substances : if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it 
be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred 
by no argument, and there is a probability for the other ; if we sec 
signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and 
see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of 
Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I 
have not, strictly speaking, an idea of if^'^ I do not perceive it 
as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflection. 

KyL Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, 
according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of 
your own principles, it should follow that/w are only a system of 
floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are 
not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more 
meaning in spiritual Substance than in material Substance^ the one is 
to be exploded as well as the other. 

Vhil, How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of 

" See note " on preceding page. » Cf. Principles of Human KnowMge, sect. 14a. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 329 

tny own being; and that / myself zm not my ideas, but somewhat 
clse^, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and 
operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, 
perceive both colours and sounds : that a colour cannot perceive 
a sound, nor a sound a colour : that I am therefore one individual 
principle, distinct from colour and sound ; and, for the same reason, 
from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like 
manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter**. 
On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and 
that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I 
know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance 
or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. 
But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unper- 
ceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or 
the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no 
parity of case between Spirit and Matter.] 

HyL I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in 
earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in 
their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all man- 
kind distinguish between them ? Ask the first man you meet, and he 
shall tell you, to he perceived is one thing, and to exist is another. 

Phi/. I am content, Hy/as^ to appeal to the common sense of 
the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he 
thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell 
you, because he sees and feels it ; in a word, because he perceives 
it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be 
there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. 
What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith 
it // or exists j but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, 
hath no being. 

HyL Yes, Fhilonous^ I grant the existence of a sensible thing 
consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived. 

Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea 
exist without being actually perceived? These arc points long 
since agreed between us. 

* Cf. PrindpUt 0/ Httman KnowUdgt^ * That is of miterial Subrtince existing 

sect. a. Does he suppose thit this Self exists independently of any mind. Berkeley 

when it is not actually conscious or cognisant refers here to a eoMctotfSiMtt of matter, 

of any ideas — sensible or other? Or, does i.e. consciousness of a belief in material 

he allow that mind is ever unconicious? Substance. 



I 



330 The Third Dialogue 

Hyl. But, be your opinion never so true, ytt surely you will w* 
deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common s^nsc of men*>. 
Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of hi* 
mind : what answer think you he would make ? 

Thil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist 
out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be 
shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly 
known and comprehended by (that is exists in) the infinite mind 
of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the 
direct and immediate pro-jf there is of this ; inasmuch as the very 
being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind 
wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question 
between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have 
a rea/ existence out of the mind of this or that person, but, 
whether they have an Absolute existence, distinct from being per- 
ceived by God, and exterior to a!t minds"'. This indeed some 
heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains 
notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of 
another opinion. 

Hyl. But, according to your notions, what diflcrencc is there 
between real things, and chimeras fijrmed by the imagination, or 
the visions of a dream^since they are all equally in the mind"? 

Fhil. The ideas formed by the imagination are feint and indis- 
tinct ; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But 
the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, arc more vivid 
and clear i and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct 
from us, have not the Uke dependence on our will. There is 
therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing : and 
there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, 
which are dim, irregular, and confiised. And, though they should 
happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being 
connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent 
transactions of our lives, they might easily he distinguished from 
realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish thimgi 
from chimtTM on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold 



^^_ V' 



" Cr. Frintiflti nf Human KiKtuJtdge, isU — iht negative and (ht potilive ait of 

lecl. 54 — 57. hif doetrine. 

" Tbit one lEntoue ciprtiict ihe whole " Cf. Prineiflu 0/ Human Knewltjgt, 

qpcttion between Berkeley and hi> antigon- eccI. ><>— 41- 



^1^ 



between Hylas and PhiUmous. 331 

also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived 
difference ; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that 
you perceive. 

VLjL But still, PhiUtums^ you hold, there -is nothing in the 
world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknow- 
ledge, sounds very oddly. 

FUl. I own the word iJea^ not being commonly used for things 
sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, 
because a necessary 28 relation to the mind is understood to be 
implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philo- 
sophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. 
But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it 
includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense ; which in 
eflfect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only 
things perceiving, and things perceived ; or that every unthinking 
being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, 
perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet 
certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom ^ we live, and 
move, and have our being.' Is this as strange as to say, the 
sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be 
sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real 
natures — ^though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by 
all our senses? 

HyL And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are 
no such things as physical or corporeal causes ; but that a Spirit is 
the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature ? Can there 
be anything more extravagant than this ? 

Fhil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say — a thing 
which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving 
is the cause of our perceptions, [29 without any regard either 
to consistency, or the old known axiom, Not/Umg cmm give to 
smatber that whici it hath mat itself]. Besides, that which to you, 
I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more 
than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God 
is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those e£Fects 



" ' necetiary' — lee whit Berkdej uy% at existence of things sensible, that is external 

the close of the Second Dialogut, and else- to or independent of all sentient and intelli- 

where« as to the impossibilitj of the existence gent being. 

of Matter ; and of the unmeaning nature of * The words within brackets are omitted 

propositions which pretend to express an in the last edition. 



332 The Third Dialogue 

which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to 
Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so 
much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to 
confirm it by citations, x 

KjL You are not aware, Fhil^ws^ that, in making God the 
immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the 
Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins. 

PA/V. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of 
guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or 
without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act 
by the mediation of an instrument, or occasion, called MMtter^ you 
as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the 
immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to 
Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not 
consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the in* 
tfernal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. 
This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting 
a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful ; though the out- 
ward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, 
therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making 
God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him 
the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the 
only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true 
I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits j but this 
is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in 
the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately 
indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of 
their own wills •'5'', which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt 
of their actions. 

HyL But the denying Matter, Fhslonous^ or corporeal Substance ; 
there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not 
repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute 
to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would give 
up the point, without gathering the votes. 

Fhil, I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted 
to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the 
prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one 

'• The existence of secondary causes is recognised by Berkeley only in the form of finite 
minds or spirits. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 333 

who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and 
Feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence ; and you fiedrly 
set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepti- 
cism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the deter- 
mination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance 
ivherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that 
the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. 
And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no 
Dne can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no su^stratitm 
of those qualities but spirit ; in which they exist, not by way of 
mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives 
it '^^ I deny therefore that there is any unthitiking substratum of the 
objects of sense, and in that acceptation that there is any material 
substance. But if by material suhtance is meant only sensible body, 
that which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the 
world, I dare say, mean no more), then I am more certain of 
matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to 
be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind 
averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehensi6n that I 
deny the reality of sensible things : but, as it is you who are guilty 
[>f that and not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against 
/our notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as 
certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal 
substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses) ; and that, 
granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor 
think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown 
natures and philosophical quiddities which some men are so fond of. 

Hyl. What say you to this ? Since, according to you, men 
judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be 
mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot 
in diameter ; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round ; or an 
3ar, with one end in the water, crooked^^ ? 

Fhil, He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually 
perceives, but in the inferences he makes from his present per- 
ceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately 
perceives by sight is certainly crooked ; and so far he is in the 
right. But, if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out 
if the water he shall perceive the same crookedness ; or that it 

** Cf. PrimeipUt of Human Knoudtdgt, sect. 49. ^ Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. 9. 



334 ^^ Third Dialogue 

would aflR^ his touch as crooked things are wont to do : in Aat 
he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what 
he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the 
moon or tower, he should still be afiected with the like ideaS;, he 
he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he percei?es 
immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to 
suppose he should err in respect of that), but in the wrcnig judg- 
ment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be con- | 
nected with those immediately perceived : or, concerning the ideas 
chat, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be 
perceived ia other circumstances. The case is the same with 
regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any j 
motion of the earth : but it were erroneous thence to conclude, 
that, in case we were placed at as great a distance fiom that as 
we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive 
its motion 33. 

HyL I understand you^ and must needs own you say things 
plausible enough : but, give me leave to put you in mind of one 
thing. Pray, FUlanauSy were you not formerly as positive that 
Matter existed, as you are now that it does not ? 

FUL I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my posi- 
tiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice^ but 
now, after inquiry, upon evidence. 

Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than 
things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we 
are affected with ideas from without is evident j and it is no less 
evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) powers 
without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these 
powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of 
them necessarily to be admitted, which I call Matter^ and you call 
Spirit. This is all the difference. 

FhsL Pray, Hylas^ is that powerful being, or subject of powers, 
extended ? 

HyL It hath not extension ; but it hath the power to raise in 
you the idea of extension. 

FhiL It is therefore itself unextended ? 

HyL I grant it. 

FhiL Is it not also active ? 

" Of. Principles of Human Knotvltdfe, $«ct. 58. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 335 

HyL Without doubt : otherwise, how could we attribute powers 
to it? 

ThiL Now let me ask you two questions: 'Phrst^ whether it 
be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give 
the name Matter to an unextended active being ? And, Secondly^ 
(whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary 
to the common use of language ? 

HyL Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will 
tiavc it so, but some third nature distinct from Matter and Spirit. 
For what reason is there why you should call it spirit ? Does not 
the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and 
mextended ? 

Vhtl. My reason is this : because I have a mind to have some 
notion of meaning in what 1 say : but I have no notion of any 
surtion distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to 
!>e anywhere but in a spirit ; therefore, when I speak of an active 
t>eing, I am obliged to mean a spirit. Beside, what can be plainer 
than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart 
them to me ^ and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a spirit. To 
make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible — 
[ assert as well as you that, since we are afiected from without, 
wc must allow powers to be without, in a being distinct fit)m our- 
selves. So far we are agreed. But then we diflfer as to the kind 
3f this powerful being ^4. I will have it to be ^irit^ you Matter, or 
[ know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third 
nature. Thus, I prove it to be spirit. From the effects I see 
produced I conclude there are actions^ and, because actions^ 
volitions ; and, because there are volitions, there must be a will, 
^ain, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their 
irchetypes, out of my mind : but, being ideas, neither they nor their 
irchetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding ^ there is 
iierefore an understanding. But will and understanding constitute 
in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, 
:hercfore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a sfirit. 

" This is the gist of the whole question. is absolutely unknown, and we cm only 

icoording to the Materialists, sensible phe> generalize them inductiirely, through cus- 

KMnena are due to Matmrial S^dntOHCt, or to torn, as facts. For Berkeley's rindication 

cine unknown * third nature ;' according of his Theism, see AUipbnm, Dial. IV., and 



o Berkeley, to Rational Will; according NnoThmtryofVukmirmdUiUtd, Also 
o Home and the Positivists, their origin eifUt of Humtm Kntrndtdgt, *ttX. 29—33 



336 The Third Dialogue 

HyL And now I warrant you think you have made the point 
very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly 
to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imper- 
fection in God ? 

Fhil. Without a doubt. 

HyL To suffer pain is an imperfection ? 

FUl. It is. 

HyL Are we not sometimes afiected with pain and uneasiness 
by some other being ? 

PhiL We are. 

HyL And have you not said that being is a spirit, and is not 
that spirit God ? 

FhlL I grant it. 

HyL But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive 
from without are in the mind which afiects us. The ideas, 
therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God ; or, in other words, 
God suffers pain : that is to say, there is an imperfection in the 
Divine nature, which, you acknowledge, was absurd. So you are 
caught in a plain contradiction 3''. 

FhiL That God knows or understands all things, and that He 
knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of 
painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, 
I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and some- 
times causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I 
positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are 
liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, 
which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful 
and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who 
perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and 
independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or 
resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer 
nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any 
sensation at all. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our 
perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of 
our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous 
parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly con- 
sidered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas 

* A similar objection is urged by Erdniann, in the criticism of Berkeley in his Grundris}^ 
der Gescbicbte der Pbilosopbie. 



I 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



337 



as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind : so 
that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means 
no more than a correspondence in the order of nature between 
two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is 
a pure spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural ties. 
No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or 
pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable is certainly 
a perfection ; but to endure, or suiFer, or feel anything by sense, 
is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not 
the latter. God knows or hath ideas; but His ideas arc not con- 
veyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, 
where there is so manifest a difiference, makes you fancy you 
see an absurdity where there is none. 

Hyl. But, all this while you have not considered that the quan- 
tity of Matter hath been demonstrated to be proportioned to the 
gravity of bodies i^ And what can withstand demonstration ? 

Phil. Let me see how you demonstrate that point. 

Hjl. I lay it down for a principle that the moments or quan- 
tities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of 
the velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, 
where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly 
as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience 
that all bodies {bating the small inequalities, arising from the 
resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity ; the motion 
therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, 
which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to 
the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated. 

Thil. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the 
quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity 
and Matter taken together; and this is made use of to prove 
a proposition from whence the existence of Matter is inferred. 
Pray is not this arguing in a circle ? 

Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion is propor- 
tional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity. 

Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence 
follow that gravity is proportional to Matter, in your philosophic 
sense of the word ; except you take it for granted that unknown 
suistrttHfn^ or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those 

" Cf, Principln of Human KnouUdgt, led, 50; AWi, mi. 3I9, 



338 The Third Dialogue 

sensible qualities ; which to suppose is plainly begging the ques- 
tion. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance,^ per- 
ceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may 
be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that 
either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers produdng 
them, do exist in a material substratum i — this is what I deny, and 
you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration^ have 
not yet proved. 

HyL I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, 
however, you shall persuade me the natural philosofdiers have 
been dreaming all this while ? Pray what becomes of all their 
hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the 
existence of Matter-57 ? 

PAiV. What mean you, Hylas^ by the phenomena f 

HyL I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses. 

FhiL And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not 
ideas? 

HyL I have told you so a hundred times. 

FhiL Therefore, to explain the phenomena is to shew how we 
come to be aflFected with ideas, in that manner and ^^ order wherein 
they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not ? 

HyL It is. 

FhiL Now, if you can prove that any philosopher hath ex- 
plained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help 
of Matter^ I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been 
said against it as nothing ; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge 
the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with 
knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily 
understood. But, that a Being which is utterly destitute of these 
faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect 
an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say — though 
we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its 
qualities, and could comprehend its existence — would yet be so 
far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable 
thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that 
philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and 
reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws 

" Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge. '* 'order* — * series' — in first and seroua 

sect. .^8. editi'Mis. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 339 

and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful 
and entertaining. 

Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all 
mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole 
world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such 
thing? 

FUL That every epidemical opinion arising from prejudice, or 
passion, or thoughtlessness may be imputed to God, as the Author 
of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we 
father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to 
us by supernatural revelation ^ or because it is so evident to our 
natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that 
it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it.' But 
where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts 
the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, 
taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our 
senses, is thought to exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any 
except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be 
at ? Your question supposes these points are clear ; and, when 
you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you 
another answer. In the meantime let it suffice that I tell you, 
I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all. 

HyL But the novelty, PhilomouSy the novelty! There lies the 
danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they 
unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end. 

FhiL Why the rejecting a notion that hath no foundation, 
either in sense,, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be 
thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded 
on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in 
government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be dis- 
countenanced, I freely own. But, is there the like reason why 
they should be discouraged in philosophy ? The making anything 
known which was unknown before is an innovation in know- 
ledge : and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men 
would have made a notable prc^ess in the arts and sciences. 
But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and para- 
doxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects : 
that we must not believe our senses : that we know nothing 
of the real nature of things, and can never be assured ev^n 

z 2 



340 The Third Dialogue 

of their existence : that real colours and sounds are nothing 
but certain unknown figures and motions : that motions are in 
themselves neither swift nor slow : that there are in bodies 
absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: 
that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit : 
that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended 
parts: — these are the novelties, these are the strange notions 
which shock the genuine uncomipted judgment of all mankind; 
and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts 
and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations 
I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, 
I may perhaps be obliged to use some ambages^ and ways of 
speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly 
understood, that which is most singular in them will, in efiect, 
be found to amount to no more than this : — ^that it is absolutely 
impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking 
being should exist without being perceived by a mind. And, if 
this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so at this time 
of day, and in a Christian country. 

KyL As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, 
those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your 
own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for 
changing all things into ideas ? You, I say, who are not ashamed 
to charge me with scepticism. This is so plain, there is no 
denying it. 

ThiL You mistake me. I am not for changing things into 
ideas, but rather ideas into things ^9 • since those immediate objects 
of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of 
things, I take to be the real things themselves. 

HyL Things ! you may pretend what you please ; but it is 
certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the 
outside only which strikes the senses. 

ThiL What you call the empty forms and outside of things 
seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or 
incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition — that Matter ^*^ is 
an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, 

^ Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. 38. Berkeley it not for making things 
subjective, but ideas objective. 
*** i.e. AbsoluteMatter. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 341 

agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein 
we differ, you will have them to be empty appearances, I real 
beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do. 

HjL You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud 
yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, 
therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. 
If so, whence comes that disagreement ? Why, is not the same 
figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways ? 
And why should we use a microscope the better to discover the 
true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked 
eye? 

^M. Strictly speaking, Kjlas^ we do not see the same object 
that we feeH> ; neither is the same object perceived by the micro- 
scope which was by the naked eye^^. But, in case every variation 
was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the 
endless number or confusion of names would render language 
impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this as well as other incon- 
veniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine 
tc^ether several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the 
same sense at difierent times, or in different circumstances, but 
observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either 
with respect to co-existence or succession — all which they refer to 
one name, and consider as one thing. Hence, it follows that 
when I examine by my other senses a thing I have seen, it is not 
in order to understand better the same object which I had per- 
ceived by sight — the object of one sense not being perceived by 
the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is 
not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already 
with my bare eyes ; the object perceived by the glass being quite 
different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to 
know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man 
knows of the connexion of ideas *3, the more he is said to know 
of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are 
variable ; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected 
with the same appearances? It will not thence follow they are 
not to be trusted, or that they are inconsistent either with them- 
selves or anything else; except it be with your preconceived 

•" Cf. Ntw Tbnry of Vi$i<m, »ect. 49 ; •• Of. N€W Theory of Vision, sect. 84 — 

and Tbiory qf Viaom Vindieattd, lect. 9, 10, 86. 
¥5, Ac. ^ i.e. *en»t\At%% or preMntationi. 



342 The Third Dialogue 

notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceiv- 
able, real nature, marked by each name : which prejudice seems 
to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common 
language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into 
one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect 
several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the 
same original : while they began to build their schemes not so 
much on notions as words, which were framed by the vulgar, 
merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of 
life, without any regard to speculation^^, 

HjL Methinks I apprehend your meaning. 

PAiV. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses 
are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our know- 
ledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true 
representations of those originals. But, as these supposed origi- 
nals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far 
our ideas resemble them ; or whether they resemble them at all^*. 
We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. 
Farther^ as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change 
in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all 
be true copies of them : or, if some are and others are not, it is 
impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this 
plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider 
the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an 
idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind : nor con- 
sequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in 
nature 4^ The result of all which is that we are thrown into the 
most hopeless and abandoned Scepticism. Now, give me leave to 
ask you. First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely 
existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the 
source of all this Scepticism *7 ? Secondly, whether you are in- 
formed, either by sense or reason ^s^ of the existence of those 
unknown originals ? And, in case you are not, whether it be not 
absurd to suppose them ? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you 
find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the dhsolute 
or external existence of unperceivtng substances*^? Lastly, Whether, 

'* Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, ** Cf. Ibid. sect. 6. 

IntroAiction, sect. 23 — 25. *^ Cf. Ibid. sect. 87—90. 

** Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, *« Cf. Ibid. sect. 18. 

sect. 8—10, 86, 87. *» Cf. Ibid, sect. 24. 



between Hylas and Philomms. 



343 



the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, 
trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about un- 
known natures <x substances^, admit with the vulgar those for real 
things which are perceived by the senses ? 

KjL For the present, I have no inclination to the answering 
part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. 
Pray are not the objects perceived by the senses of one, likewise 
perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more 
here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as 
I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with 
the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this make a 
diSerence between the former sort of objects and the latter? 

FhiL I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference 
between the objects of sense and those of imagination ^ ' . But what 
would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible 
objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many. 

KyL I own I can make nothing of that objection : but it hath 
led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses 
we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds? 

P*f7. It is. 

HjL But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in 
yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from 
your principles, that no two can see the same thing "^^ ? And is not 
this highly absurd ? 

TbiL If the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is 
certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that 
different persons may perceive the same thing ; or the same thing 
or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition ; 
and, since men are used to apply the word same where no distinc- 
tion or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their per- 
ceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, several saw the 
same things so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use 



"* i. c. MOtffiMfftf, * thtngs-in-theniselTet/ 
dec. 

* Cf. PrmeipUt of Human KnouMgi, 
Mct. ap — ^41. 

" Sec Himilton'i Reid, p. 384 ; ilto Col- 
lier's CSavis Umptrtalit, p. 6, where Collier 
says that he does not mean that the world, or 
any object in it which is percdred, for exam- 
ple, by John, is dependent on any other mind 



except John's. ' Two or more persons who are 
present at a concert of music may indeed 
in some measure be said to hear the sami 
notes ; yet the sound which the one hears is 
not the Tcry same with the sound which 
another hears, bteausi tbt touls or pertoms 
art suppoud to ht d^fmrtni; therefore the 
sound which Peter hears is external to, or 
independent on, the soul of John.* 




I 



I 



The Third Dialogue 

phrase, without any deviation either from propriety Cf 
language, or the truth of things. But, if the term samt be used in 
the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted 
notion of identity, then, according to their sundry drtinitions of 
this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic 
identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persow 
to perceive the same thing'-'. But whether philosophers shall think 
fit to call a thing the tame or no, is, I conceive, of small import* 
ance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued wttfa tbe 
same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by tbeii 
senses, and who had yet never known the use of language ; they 
would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though per- 
haps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the 
uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the samt tiling: 
others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, 
might choose the denomination of different things. But who sees 
not that all the dispute is ahout a word ? to wit, whether what is 
perceived by different persons may yet have the term x*»w applied 
to it ? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remain- 
ing unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones 
built in their place ^ and that you should call this the samty and 1 
should say it was not the same house: — would we not, for all this, 
perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? 
And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you 
should say. We differ in our notions; for that you superadded to 
your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, 
whereas I did not; I would tel! you, I know not what you mean 
by the abstracted Idea ef identity -, and should desire you to look 

into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself. 

Why so silent, Hylasi Are you not yet satisfied men may dis- 
pute about identity and diversity, without any real difference 
in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take 
this farther reflection with you — that whether Matter be allowed 
to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. 
For, the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immedi- 
ately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, 

" B«ikdey iccDit \o hold th>t ihtrc ii tonal idenlity he i> obicuie. Cr. Svit, mc(. 

identity olhet lh»n pirfifct ii *' ' ' 



kinji iiidividuiU buidn prrtimi. Ai lo pel- j 



between Hylas and Philonous. 345 

therefore, that no two see the same things makes equally against 
the Materialists and me. 

Kyi. [*< Ay, Philonous^ But they suppose an external archetype, 
to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to 
perceive the same thing. 

PUL And (not to mention your having discarded those arche- 
types) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles ; 
— txtemaly I mean, to your own mind ; though indeed it must be 
supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all things; but 
then, this serves all the ends of identity^ as well as if it existed 
out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less 
intelligible. 

Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me — either that there is 
no difficulty at bottom in this point ; or, if there be, that it makes 
equally against both opinions. 

PUL But that which makes equally against two contradictory 
opinions can be a proof against neither. 

HyL I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonaus^ when I con- 
sider the substance of what you advance against Scepticism^ it 
amounts to no more than this : — We are sure that we really see, 
hear, feel ; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions. 
PUL And how are we concerned any farther? I see this 
cherry^ I feel it, I taste it : and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, 
or felt, or tasted : it is therefore real^K Take away the sensations 
of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the 
cherry. Since it is not a being distinct from sensatioas; a cherry^ 
I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas 
perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one 
thing (or have one name given them) by the mind ; — because they 
are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is 
a£Fected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red 
colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I 
see, and feel, and taste, in sundry certain manners, I am sure the 
cherry exists, or is real ; its reality being in my opinion nothing 
abstracted from those sensations. But if, by the word cherry^ you 
mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, 

** Omitted in last edition. the cherry includes ideas suggested to imagi- 

** But I am not actually sentiert of all nation,and not actually given in sense, when I 

its quftlttict uwttdtanmmdy. My notion of merely s€t or ioueh it, e.g. its Uste, odour, &c. 



34^ The Third Dialogue 

and by its existence something distinct from its being perceived; 
then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be 
sure it exists. 

Uyl. But, what would you say, FUhmeus^ if I should bring the 
very same reasons against the existence of sensible things in 
a mind, which you have offered against their existing in a material 
suhstratum ? 

Fhil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to 
say to them. 

HyL Is the mind extended or unextended ? 
FhiL Unextended, without doubt. 

HyL Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind ? 
FhiL They are. 

HyL Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impres- 
sions ? 

FUL I believe you may. 

HyL Explain to me now, O Fhilemeusl how it is possible 
there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in 
your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is 
unextended ? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing 
void of all solidity ? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as 
books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the 
figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to 
understand those expressions ? Explain me this if you can : and 
I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to 
me about my suhstratum. 

FhiL Look you, Hylas^ when I speak of objects as existing in 
the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood 
in the gross literal sense — as when bodies are said to exist in 
a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning 
is only thai the mind comprehends or perceives them ; and that it 
is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself*^. 
This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to 
make your tenet of an unperceiving material suhstratum intelli- 
gible, 1 would fain know. 

HyL Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be 
made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this ? 

* This explanation of what is meant by existence *in mind,' or intelligible existence, 
is continually overlooked by Berkeley's critics. 



between Hylas and Pkilonous, 347 

FUL None at all. It is no more than common custom, which 
]rou know is the rule of language, hath authorized : nothing being 
more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate ob- 
jects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is 
there anything in this but what is conformable to the general 
analogy of language ; most part of the mental operations being 
signified by words borrowed from sensible things ; as is plain in 
the terms eomprehtnd^ reflect^ discoursey ^r., which, being applied to 
the mind, must not be taken in their gross original sense. 

HyL You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there 
still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will 
get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could 
solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you 
must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles. 

FUL Let me know this mighty difficulty. 

HyL The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to 
me utterly irreconcilable with your notions ^7. Moses tells us of 
a creation : a creation of what ? of ideas ? No certainly, but of 
things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your 
principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you. 

FbiL Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, 
plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the 
beginning created by God, I make no question. If by ideas you 
mean fictions and fancies of the mind^^, then these are no ideas. 
If by Ideas you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or 
sensible things which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind "^^^ 
then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them 
ideasy it matters little. The difference is only about a name. 
And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the 
truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common talk, 
the objects of our senses are not termed ideas but things. Call 
them so still — ^provided you do not attribute to them any abso- 
lute external existence — and I shall never quarrel with you for 
a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a crea- 
tion of things, of real things. Neither is this in the least 
inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I 

^ Cf. FrineipUi of Human KnowUdgt, restricted popular meaning. 
sect. 83—84. " i.e. if yoM take the term idia in iti 

** i. e. if you ttke the term idta in iti philosophical meaning. 



348 The Third Dialogue 

have now said; and would have been evident to you without 
this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. 
But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where 
Moses makes any mention of them ; and, if they should be men- 
tioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be 
incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the 
vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the 
philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or an unknown ftdJMty^ vjhb 
an absolute existence. When you have proved these points, then 
(and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into 
our dispute. 

Kyi. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content 
to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is 
some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the 
creation and your notions ? 

VhiL If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter 
of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles 
as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But 
there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I da 
Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence 
of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist with- 
out the mind. 

Hyl. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in. 

PA/V. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the crea- 
tion, I should have seen things produced into being — that is 
become perceptible — in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. 
I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and 
now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When 
things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean 
this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eter- 
nally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal 
existence in His mind : but when things, before imperceptible to 
creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are 
they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created 
minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the crea- 
tion, I understand that the several parts of the world became 
gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper facul- 
ties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth 
perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to 



between Hylas and Philonous. 349 

me by the words of the Holy Scripture : in which is included no 
mention or no thought, either of substratum^ instrument, occasion, 
or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be 
found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, 
never think of those things any more than L What metaphysical 
sense you may understand it in, you only can tell. 

HyL But, PUlonauSy you do not seem to be aware that you allow 
created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently 
hypothetical being : that is to say, upon supposition there were 
men to perceive them, without which they have no actuality of 
absolute existence wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, 
therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any 
inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not 
this directly contrary to the Mosaic account ? 

PhiL In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin 
to exist in the mind of other created intelligences beside men. 
You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between 
Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other 
order of finite created spirits in being before man. I say farther, in 
case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time a parcel 
of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible power, 
in a desert where nobody was present — that this way of explaining 
or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they de- 
prive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable ^ that it exactly 
suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of man- 
kind ; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God ; and 
consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is 
possible that important article of our faith should have in making 
men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [^ great] Creator. 
1 say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested 
of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the 
actuality of ^absolute existence. You may indeed raise a dust with 
those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I 
entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell 
me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon. 

HyL I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But 
what say you to this ? Do you not make the existence of sensible 
things consist in their being in a mind ? And were not all things 

** In fint and tecond eaitiont only. 



350 The Third Dialogue 

eternally in the mind of God ? Did tliey not therefore exist from 
all eternity, according to you ? And how could that whidi was 
eternal be created in time ? Can anything be clearer or better 
connected than this ? 

Fhil. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things 
from eternity ? 

HyL I am. 

ThiL Consequently they always had a being in the Divine in- 
tellect 

Kyi. This I acknowledge. 

l^hiL By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or 
begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in 
that point. 

HyL What shall we make then of the creation ? 

PibV. May we not understand it to have been entirely in re- 
spect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may 
properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, ix^en God 
decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures^ in 
that order and manner which He then established, and we now call 
the laws of natiu-e ? You may call this a relative^ or bypptbettesl 
existence if you please. But so long as it supplies us with the most 
natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the 
creation ; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great 
article ; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or 
meaning in its stead ; why should we reject this ? Is it to comply 
with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense 
and unintelligible ? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory 
of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable 
that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence ex- 
trinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created 
spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or 
omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate de- 
pendence of all things on Him ? Nay, would it not rather seem to 
derogate from those attributes ? 

HyL Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things 
perceptible, what say you, Fhilonaus — is it not plain, God did 
either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain 
time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only 
designed to will ? If the former, then there could be no creation 



between Hylas and Philanous. 351 

<Mr b^inning of existence in finite things. If the latter, then we 
must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity ; which im- 
plies a sort of change : and all change argues imperfection. 

TbiL Vmy consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this 
objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense ^ nay, 
against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of 
nature ? None of which can we conceive, otherwise than as per- 
formed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of 
transcendent and unlimited perfections : His Nature, therefore, is 
incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be ex- 
pected, that any man, whether Materialist or Imrnaterialist^ should 
have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of 
operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your 
difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our con- 
ceptions of the Divine nature — which is unavoidable on any 
scheme, but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one 
word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected. 

HyL I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to 
clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, 
and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But 
I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such 
peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion : 
though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know. 

FUL What would you have ? Do I not acknowledge a two- 
fold state of things — the one ectypal or natural, the other arche- 
typal and eternal ? The former was created in time ; the latter 
existed from everlasting in the mind of God**. Is not this agree- 
able to the common notions of divines ? Or is any more than 
this necessary in order to conceive the creation ? But you suspect 
some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. 
To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but con- 
sider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the 
creation on any hypothesis whatsoever ; and, if so, there is no 
ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on 
that score : or you are able to conceive it ; and, if so, why not 
on my principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken 
away ? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, 
imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before 

•» Cf. Shit, lect. 347 — 349. 



352 The Third Dialogue 

apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by 
raticxrination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, 
imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If^ therefore, the 
notion you have of the creation by other principles be intelligible, 
you have it still upon mine ; if it be not intelligible, I conceive 
it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And 
indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, 
that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot 
serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not 
be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make 
the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it incon- 
ceivable can be no objection against its non-existence. 

HjL I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this 
point of the creation. 

WtL I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. Yoa 
tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and 
Immaterialism : but you know not where it lies. Is this reason- 
able, Hylas 7 Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without 
knowing what it is ? But, to pass by all that, would not a roan 
think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the 
received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings ? 

HyU And so I am. 

PA/V. O ght the historical part of Scripture to be understood 
in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical 
and out of the way ? 

HyL In the plain sense, doubtless. 

^hiL When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having 
been created by God ; think you not the sensible things commonly 
signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical 
reader ? 

HyL I cannot help thinking so. 

PA/V. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be 
denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist ? 

HyL This I have already acknowledged. 

PA/V. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the 
creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, 
but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, 
wherein creation might terminate ? 

HyL True. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 353 

I •' tUL Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter 
destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their 
notions are utterly inconsistent ; and instead of it obtrude on us 
I know not what, something equally unintelligible to themselves 
and me? 

HjL I cannot contradict you. 

Fkil. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what ? of 
unknown quiddities, of occasions, or suhstratum ? No, certainly ; 
but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this 
with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them. 

HyL I see you can assault me with my own weapons. 

FUL Then as to absolute existence i — was there ever known 
a more jejune notion than that ? Something it is so abstracted 
and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not 
conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But, allowing 
Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as 
clear as light, yet, was this ever known to make the creation more 
credible ? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of 
all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation ? 
That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence 
without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, 
by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing 
so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only 
the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modem 
and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with 
the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether 
Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things. 

HyL I own, Vhiltmims^ I think it does not. This of the 
cremtiom is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs 
own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. 
Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccount- 
able backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions. 

FUL When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side 
of the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the 
effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted 
notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief 
of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary 
opinion, with men of a learned education. 
HyL I confess it seems to be as you say. 

A a 



354 ^^ Third Dialogue 

FhiL As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us 
throw into the scale the great advantages ^'^ that arise from the belief 
of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. 
— The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great 
articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most 
immediate evidence ? When I say the being of a Gady I do not 
mean an obscure general cause of things, whereof we have do 
conception, but God^ in the strict and proper sense of the word; 
a Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omni- 
science, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the 
existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the falla- 
cious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more 
reason to doubt than of our own being. — Then, with relation to 
human sciences: in Natural Philosophy, what intricacies^ what 
obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men 
into ! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, 
continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. — do they not pre- 
tend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according 
to the laws of motion ? and yet, are they able to comprehend how 
one body should move another ? Nay, admitting there was no di£B- 
culty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in 
conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; 
yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, 
have they been able to reach the mechanical production of any one 
animal or vegetable body ? Can they account, by the laws of 
motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours, or for the regular 
course of things ? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for 
the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts 
of the universe ? But laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, 
and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not 
all the effects of nature easy and intelligible ? If the phenomtnd 
are nothing else but ideas ,• God is a //>/>/>, but Matter an unin- 
telligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited 
power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an 
inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can 
never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, 
but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely 

"^ Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge^ scientific advantages of Immaterialism are 
sect. 85 — 156, in which the reHgious and illustrated. 



between Hylas and Philonous. 355 

are great advantages in physics. Not to mention that the appre- 
hension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence 
in their moral actions, which they would be more cautious of, in 
case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their 
minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second 
causes. — ^Then in metaphysics: what difficulties concerning entity 
in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, 
^substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of 
Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two indepen- 
dent substances so widely different as Spirit and Matter^ should 
mutually operate on each other ? what difficulties, I say, and end- 
less disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like 
points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas ? — Even 
liie wuabematics themselves, if we take away the absolute existence 
of extended things, become much more clear and easy ^ the most 
shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences 
depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension, which 
depends on that supposition. — But what need is there to insist on 
the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science 
whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modem Sceptics, built 
on the same foundation ? Or can you produce so much as one 
argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of 
that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not sup- 
pose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? 
Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of 
colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in 
the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the 
like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute 
external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting 
indeed, and changeable; — however, not changed at random, but 
according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that 
constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of 
life, and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions 
of the fimcy ^. 

HyL I agree to all you have now said, and must own that 

I • *tabffUncetiidtccident' — ^* subjects and 300—318, 335, 359—365, where we have 

r * adja&cts,' — in first and second editions. glimpses of a more transcendental doctrine, 

. * Cf. PrindpUM 0/ Human KnowUdgt, allied to Platonism and Hegelianism. 

r sect. 1% — 4a; alto SirU, sect. 294 — 297, 



A 9 ^ 



356 The Third Dialogue 

nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than tiK 
advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and 
this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts^ 
what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of dis- 
putation, what an ocean of false learning may be avoided by that 
single notion of Immaterialtsm ! 

Phil. After all, is there anything ferther remaining to be 
done ? You may remember you promised to embrace that opinioo 
which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Commoo 
Sense and remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is 
that which denies Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal 
things. Nor is this all j the same notion has been proved several 
ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and 
all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence 
of its truth ? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true 
opinion and yet be false ? 

H^l. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all 
respects. But, what security can I have that I shall still continue 
the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthou^t-of 
objection or difficulty will occur hereafter ? 

PiffL Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once 
evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections 
or difficulties it may be liable to ? Are the difficulties that attend 
the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of con- 
tact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make 
you hold out against mathematical demonstration ? Or will you 
disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some 
particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? 
If there are difficulties attending Immaterialism^ there are at the 
same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence 
of Matter there is not one proof, and far more numerous and 
insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those 
mighty difficulties you insist on ? Alas ! you know not where 
or what they are ; something which may possibly occur hereafter. 
If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, 
you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from 
exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated. 

HyL You have satisfied me, Philonous. 



between Hylas and Philonaus. 35/ 

TUL But, to arm you against all future objections, do but con- 
sider — ^that which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions 
can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty 
occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of 
the Materialists, Be not deceived by words; but sound your own 
thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help 
of Materialism^ it is plain it can be no objection against Jwr- 
wsaterialism. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would 
probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting ; 
since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is 
explained by Matter : nay, which is not more unintelligible with 
than without that supposition, and consequently makes rather 
agdmst than for it. You should consider, in each particular, 
i^ether the difficulty arises from the ntm^xistence of Matter. If it 
doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of 
extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty 
against Immaterialism, And yet, upon recollection, I believe you 
will find this to have been often if not always the case. You 
should likewise take heed not to argue on a fetitio frindfii. One 
is apt to say, the unknown substances ought to be esteemed real 
things, rather than the ideas in our minds : and who can tell but 
the unthinking external substance may concur as a cause or 
instrument in the productions of our ideas ? But, is not this pro- 
ceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances ? 
And to suppose this, is it not begging the question ? But, above 
all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that 
vulgar sophism which is called ignaratio elenchi. You talked often 
as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible 
Things : — whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured 
of their existence than I am : and it is you who doubt ; I should 
have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, 
heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles 
I embrace, a real being, but not on yours. Remember, the Matter 
you contend for is an unknown somewhat (if indeed it may be 
tenned somewhat)^ which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, 
and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the 
mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object which is hard 
or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. ; — ^for all 
these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have 



358 The Third Dialogue 

an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out 
of* all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be 
attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will 
not comprehend the state of the question; without which your 
objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, 
may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) 
against your own notions. 

HjL I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept 
me from agreeing with you more than this same tmstskmg the 
question. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to 
imagine you deny the things we see and feel : but, upon reflection, 
find there is no ground for it. What think you, thereftwe, of re- 
taining the name Matter^ and applying it to sensible things ? This 
may be done without any change in your sentiments : and, believe 
me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons 
who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in 
opinion. 

Fhil. With all my heart: retain the word Matter^ and apply 
it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not 
attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being 
perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. 
Matter^ or material substance^ are terms introduced by philosophers; 
and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a sub- 
sistence distinct from being perceived by a mind : but are never 
used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate 
objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the 
names of all particular things, with the terms sensible^ substance^ 
body^ stuffs and the like, are retained, the word Matter should be 
never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses 
it seems the best way to leave it quite out : since there is not, 
perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened 
the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use 
of that general confused term. 

UyL Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the 
notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think 
you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word Matter 
as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities 
subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other sub- 
stance, in a strict sense, than Spirit. But I have been so long 



between Hylas and Philonous. 



359 



accustomed to the term Matter that I know not how to part with 
it. To say, there is no Matter in the world, is still shocking 
to me. Whereas to say — There is no Mattery if by that term be 
meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but 
if by Matter is meant some sensible thii^, whose existence 
consists in being perceived, then there is Matter : — this distinction 
gives it quite another turn ; and men will come into your notions 
with small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. 
For, after all, the controversy about Matter in the strict acceptation 
of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose 
principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable 
to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. 
There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, 
or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. 
But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, 
to do with Absolute Existence ; or with unknown entities, ab- 
stracted from all relation to us? It is evident, things regard us 
only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please 
or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, 
therefore, we are not concerned ; and thus far you leave things 
as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this 
doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers, 
nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case 
stands in that respect ; precisely, what you have added to, or 
altered in my former notions. 

FhiL I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My 
endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that 
truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philo- 
sophers :— the former being of opinion, that those things they imrne^ 
Jiatefy perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things 
immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind^\ Which 



** These two propositions are a summary 
of Berkeley's theory of unuhit thingt. 
The second is, at least superficially, at rari- 
ance with Natural Realism, according, for 
instmnce, to Hamilton and Dr. Mansel. 
' The (immediate) objects of sense are real,' 
says the latter, *as having an existence 
independently of the act of perception ; 
while the phantasnu of the imagination may 
he called unreal, as extstinff only as modi- 
ficatioos of the Ego.' {Prwgtmuna Logica, 



p. 398.) But, with Berkeley, the immediate 
objects of sense, substantiaUy dependent on 
perctptioH, are independent of the wilt of 
the percipient, and thus external to his 
proper personality. Berkeley's * external 
world,' resulting from two factors. Divine 
and human, is causally independent of each 
finite mind ; but neither causally nor substan- 
tially independent of Mind. And in what 
other meaning of the term is * independ- 
ence' of the percipient act intelligible? 



360 The Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 

two notions put together, do^ in eflfect, constitute the substance 
of what I advance. 

HyL I have been a long time distrusting my senses ; methoiig^ 
I saw things by a dim lig^t and through false glasses. Now the 
glasses are removed and a new li^t breaks in upon my under- 
standing. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native 
forms, and am no longer in pain about their umkm0vm msfmres or 
absolute existence. This is the state I find myself in at present ; 
though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet 
thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles 
that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do, and for 
a long time it looked as if you were advancing their Philosophical 
Scepticism ; but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite 
to theirs. 

'BhiL You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is 
forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height \ at whidi 
it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose : its 
ascent as well as descent proceeding from the same uniform law 
or principle of cavitation. Just so, the same principles which, at 
first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring 
men back to Common Sense. 



THE END. 



E DI TO R'S PREFACE 



TO THK 



THEORY OF VISION, OR VISUAL LANGUAGE, 
VINDICATED AND EXPLAINED. 



i 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 



TO THE 



THEORY OF VISION, OR VISUAL LANGUAGE, 
VINDICATED AND EXPLAINED. 



THIS Tract, ostensibly a * Vindication ' of the New Theory of Vision, 
is a summaiy of the principles in which Berkeley's early metaphysical 
and theological philosophy originated. It was published twenty years 
later than the Dialogues between Hylas and Phthnous^ and twenty-four 
years later than the original Essay on Vision. 

Alciphron^ which was Berkeley's chief polemic against Free-thinkers, 
on behalf of fundamental beliefs in Ethics, Natural Theology, and 
Christianity, appeared in March 1732. The Fourth Dialogue defends 
faith in the present existence, intelligence, and goodness of God, by 
resting it upon the Theory of Visual Symbolism, conjoined with the 
proof of the impossibility of abstract or substantial Matter. 

A new edition of the Essay icwards a New Theory of Vinon was 
appended to Alciphrm, 

On the 9th September, 1732, the 'Anonymous Letter' placed at the 
end of the following Tract, appeared in the Dublin Daily Post-Boy^ 
with its eight objections to the New Theory that Vision is 'the sole 
language of God.' 

This 'Anonymous Letter' was the immediate occasion of the 'Vin- 
dication,' which was published in London, ' printed for J. Tonson in the 
Strand,' in March 1733. 

The fortune of the ' Vindication ' illustrates the chronic tendency to 
misconceive and neglect Berkeley's philosophy. A brief and ingenious 
summary of his speculation, in one of its most interesting applications — 
it was at first misimderstood and then overlooked, and has since been 
unaccountably omitted in all the collected editions of Berkeley's Works. 



364 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

For nearly a hundred years after its publication it obtained only digfal 
and unappreciative recognition. It was the subject of a reference in 
Smith's Optics, in 1738; and, in the present century, it is alluded to 
by Sir J. Mackintosh in his Dissertation (art Shafteshufy^ note), and b]r 
Sir W. Hamilton in his Discussions (Idealism; with reference to the Schem 
of Arthur Collier, &c.). An annotated edition was published in i860, 
by Mr. H. V. H. Cowell, Associate of King's College, London, whidi 
has made the Tract familiar to recent students in metaphysics. 

The opening sections of the 'Vindication* suggest the theological 
value of the Theory that Vision is a Divine Language. It was 
offered as a new and striking evidence of the perpetual presence and 
providence of God, in an age of Atheistical and Pantheistical free- 
thought. 

Sect. 9—18 determine the meanings of certain terms apt to be mis- 
conceived in the discussion, and explain the scope of the New Theory. 
In particular, the distinction between the immediate ejects of conscious- 
ness in the five senses (to which objects the names idea and 
sensation are also applied) and their Cause is insisted on, as of 
prime importance in the Theory of Vision. The immediate objects 
given in any one of the senses are (in themselves, and abstracted 
from their Cause) antithetical to the objects presented in the other 
senses. Experience assures us of this. We can find nothing common 
to the sensation of colour and the sensation of hardness, for example ; 
for we are conscious of an antithesis between these two kinds of sen- 
sation. Notwithstanding, a sensation previously given in one of the 
senses may be suggested in imagination by a present sensation in 
another — under the associative law according to which signs suggest 
meanings in artificial language. What we are visually conscious of 
* suggests' what we have been tactually conscious of; while neither of 
these two kinds of sensation contains in itself any revelation of its 
external Substance, or its external Cause. 

Now, the ontological problem of Substance and Cause must not, 
Berkeley warns us, be confused with the psychological study of the 
different sorts of sensation ; and of the laws under which these suggest 
one another as sign and signification, in Natural Language. The 
reflex study of our various sense-consciousnesses should precede that 
of the problem of externality, at least in the Theory of pure Vision — 
which Theory indeed is exhausted when it has reached the conception 
that visible objects or sensations are signs in a language of Nature ; 
although it opens the way to the still higher conception of the world of 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 365 

presented sensations, regarded as a system of signs in a Divine Language, 
and of the entire phenomenal miiverse of the senses, as a collection of 
objects and effects in which Mind is the only Substance and Cause. 

For the effectual expression of the distinction between what we are 
actuaUy conscious of, and the cause of what we are thus conscious of, 
the contrasting terms imtnediaie object^ sensation, idea, phenomenon, sensible 
effect, &c. on the one hand ; and suhsianee, cause, power, external existence, 
Ac. on the other, are, it is argued, indispensable. 

Answers in succession to the eight objections of the 'Anonymous 
Letter,' and a general statement of the intended scope of the New 
Theory of Vision, are given in sect. 19 — 34, on the basis of the pre- 
liminary verbal explanations in the preceding sections. 

Sect 35 — 47 contain an exposition of the New Theory, arrived at in 
the early JEssqy by analytical research, with a view to apply it in this 
'Vindication' deductively as the solution of questions in psychological 
Optics. The tendency of the previous analysis was to dissolve pre- 
judices produced in the himian mind by the constant association of 
visual and tactual experience ; to exhibit the essential antithesis of these 
two sorts of sensation; and to explain the fact of their subsequent 
synthesis — a task, in the author's view, at least as necessary to a com- 
prehensive or philosophical theory of Optics as is either the physiological 
examination of the material organ of sight, or an attempt to explain our 
visual judgments by the aid of geometry. 

In these sections, as well as in those which follow, the order of the 
original Bssqy is reversed. The conclusion in which that I^ssqy issues 
is here assumed at the outset, and is applied, in the sections which follow, 
to explain our judgments of the situations, signs, and distances of 
the things we seem to see — in short, our acquired faculty or habit of 
seeing. This conclusion involves the assumption that human imagination 
is governed by an associative law of accidental but constant concomi- 
tance (sect 39). There need be no resemblance, or necessary connexion 
between the phenomena given in sight and those given in the other 
senses, especially touch ; for there is none between the meanings in an 
artificial language and the signs by which they are expressed. In Visual 
Language the signs are light and colour (sect. 4a). Colour in its varieties 
is, on this principle of suggestion, and on this alone, suf&cient to reproduce 
in imagination the correlative modifications of tactual, muscular, and 
locomotive sensation with which it is associated in the constitution of 
the sensible universe. Physiological questions regarding the mechanism 



366 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

of the eye have nothing to do with the psychological laws whidi 
explain how the mind learns to 'see/ Le. to interpret visual signs 
(sect. 49). The pervading principles of the New Theory are stated 
to be, the absolute heterogeneity of the visible and the tangible; die 
presumption of man's inability, either by instinct or by reasoning, apait 
from experience, to comprehend the tactual and practical meaning 
of visual signs ; and the proof that constant association in the senses, 
in conjunction with faith in the permanence of that association, is aUe 
to infuse a real meaning into the sensations of our visual consciousness 
(sect 41—47)- 

In sect. 48 — 5 a, the law of suggestion by constant sensible asso- 
ciation is applied to explain our habit of interpreting aright the visual 
signs of real or tangible Situation, i. e. the visible, tactual, muscular, 
and locomotive sensations into which Locality may be analysed; and, 
in particular, to solve the difficulty, long a puzzle to inquirers in Optics, 
of vision by means of inverted images on the retina. 

The same Theory of suggestion or association is applied, in sect 
53 — 61, to explain oiu- acquired visual discernment of real Magnitude, 
as well as certain subordinate problems involved in this. 

Sect. 62 — 69 employ the New Theory to explain, by means of visible 
signs, our visual judgment of real Distance, and of the distances of 
particular things from the eye. These signs are enumerated and 
verified in detail. 

In these applications and verifications of the Theory (sect. 48 — 69), 
its purely psychological character is sustained throughout, by a steady 
appeal to what we are conscious of, unadulterated by facts in physiology, 
or demonstrations in geometry. The structure and functions of the eye 
cannot, it is assumed, throw any light upon the question of the origin 
— whether instinctive, ratiocinative, or experienlial — of our visual judg- 
ments of Extension in its three dimensions, and of the relations of 
material things to Space. The physiology of the eye is, in short, 
irrelevant to the New Theory of Vision ; which disposes, accordingly, 
for the purposes of this * Vindication,' of investigations like those of 
Mr. Wheatstone, and reasonings like those of Mr. Abbott. 

The 'Vindication' closes (sect. 70) with an allusion to Cheselden's 
since celebrated record, in the Philosophical TramactionSy of the case 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 367 

of a person born blind, and afterwards made to see. As he was, of 
course, previously to the experiment, in possession of tactual, mus- 
cular, and locomotive experience, the case does not prove — what 
requires no proof — that pure visional sensation of colour is not the 
sensation of resistance. Cases like that of Cheselden are, however, 
appealed to in support of that part of the Theory which assumes 
that our power of interpreting the real or tactual meaning of purely 
visual signs is not due to an Original Instinct, and that it may be ex- 
plained by the known laws of Suggestion, under a divinely-established 
association of the visible and tangible worlds. 

The ultimate aim of the Theory of Vision, as here vindicated, is to 
restore belief in the Divine — ^by teaching us that even the sensible forms 
of nature are the expression of Deity; that man is so constituted that 
he cannot help interpreting them ; and that he may, by reflection, find 
in them a perpetual reminder of that Divine Essence in Existence of 
which he is always apt otherwise to lose the consciousness. A similar 
aim is manifest in Sin's, This philosophy virtually implies that the 
Sensible World is, for each of us, the phenomenal expression of an 
external Wt'll and of Absolute Intelligence. 

A. C. F. 



THE 



THEORY OF VISION, 



OR 



VISUAL LANGUAGE, 

SHEWING THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE AND PROVIDENCE 

OF A DEITY, 

VINDICATED AND EXPLAINED. 



BT THE AUTHOR OF 

Alciphrm, or, The Minute Philosopher, 



Acts xrii. 28. 
In Him we liv«, and moTe, and haTC our being. 



'733- 



Bb 



THE 



THEORY OF VISION 



VINDICATED AND EXPLAINED: 

In answer to an Anonymous Writer, 

1. AN ill state of health, which permits me to apply myself but 
seldom and by short intervals to any kind of studies, must be my 
apology. Sir, for not answering your Letter > sooner. This would 
have altogether excused me from a controversy upon points either 
personal or purely speculative, or from entering the lists with 
declaimers, whom I leave to the triumph of their own passions. 
And indeed to one of 'this character, who contradicts himself and 
misrepresents me, what answer can be made more than to desire 
his readers not to take his word for what I say, but to use their 
own eyes, read, examine, and judge for themselves ? And to their 
Common Sense I appeal. For such a writer, such an answer may 
suffice. But argument, I allow, hath a right to be considered, and, 
where it doth not convince, to be opposed with reason. And 
being persuaded that the Theory of Vision^ annexed to The Minute 
PhihsopheTy affords to thinking men a new and unanswerable 
proof of the Existence and immediate Operation of God, and the 
constant condescending care of His Providence, 1 think myself 
concerned, as well as I am able, to defend and explain it, at a time 
wherein Atheism hath made a greater progress than some are 
willing to own, or others to believe. 

2. ^He who considers that the present avowed enemies of 

* [Pobfished in the (Dublin) * Daily Post- the growth of Atheism out of English Deism, 

Boy' of September the 9th, 173a; which in the early part of last century. Cf. 

we in the Appendix] — ^Avtbor. Aleipbron, Dial. I. sect. 7 — 9, &c. 

' SecL a— -3 coottin obtenrationi upon 

B b 2 



372 The Theory of Vision 

Christianity began their attacks against it under the specious pre- 
text of defending the Christian Church and its rights 3, when he 
observes the same men pleading for Natural Religion, will be 
tempted to suspect their v^iews, and judge of their sincerity in one 
case from what they have shewed in the other. Certainly the 
notion of a watchful, active, intelligent, free Spirit, with whom we 
have to do, and in whom we live and move and have our being, is 
not the most prevailing in the books and conversation even of 
those who are called Deists. Besides, as their schemes take effect, 
we may plainly perceive moral virtue and the religion of nature 
to decay, and see, both from reason and experience, that the de- 
stroying the Revealed Religion must end in Atheism or Idolatry. 
It must be owned, many minute philosophers would not like at 
present to be accounted Atheists. But how many, twenty years 
ago, would have been affronted to be thought Infidels, who would 
now be much more aflFronted to be thought Christians ! As it 
would be unjust to charge those with Atheism who are not really 
tainted with it ^ so it will be allowed very uncharitable and im- 
prudent to overlook it in those who are, and suflFer such men, 
under specious pretexts, to spread their principles, and in the event 
to play the same game with Natural Religion that they have done 
with Revealed. 

3. It must, without question, shock some innocent admirers of 
a certain plausible pretender to Deism and Natural Religion 4, if 
a man should say, there are strong signatures of Atheism and 
irreligion in every sense, natural as well as revealed, to be found 
even in that admired writer :— and yet, to introduce taste instead of 
duty, to make man a necessary agent, to deride a future judgment, 
seem to all intents and purposes atheistical, or subversive of all 
religion whatsoever. And these every attentive reader may plainly 
discover to be his principles ^ although it be not always easy to fix 
a determinate sense on such a loose and incoherent writer. There 
seems to be a certain way of writing, whether good or bad, tinsel 
or sterling, sense or nonsense, which, being suited to that size of 
understanding that qualifies its owners for the Minute Philosophy, 
doth marvellously strike and dazzle those ingenious men, who are 

'The allusion is to Matthew Tind.-xl, published in 1706. Cf. p. 374, note 9. 
His Rights of the Christian Church asserted * Shaftesbury, against whom the Third 

against the Romish and other Priests was Dialogue in Alciphron is directed. 



Vindicated and Explained. 



373 



by this means conducted they know not how, and they know not 
whither. Doubtless that Atheist who gilds^ and insinuates^ and, 
even while he insinuates, disclaims his principles, is the likeliest to 
spread them. What availeth it, in the cause of Virtue and Natural 
Religion, to acknowledge the strongest traces of wisdom and 
power throughout the structure of the universe, if this wisdom is 
not employed to observe, nor this power to recompense our actions ; 
if we neither believe ourselves accountable, nor God our Judge ? 

4* All that is said of a vital principle, of order, harmony, and 
proportion ; all that is said of the natural decorum and fitness of 
things ; all that is said of taste and enthusiasm, may well consist 
and be supported, without a grain even of Natural Religion, with- 
out any notion of Law or Duty, any belief of a Lord or Judge, or 
any religious sense of a God ; — ^the contemplation of the mind upon 
the ideas of beauty, and virtue, and order, and fitness, being one 
thing, and a sense of rehgion another. So long as we admit no 
principle of good actions but natural aflFection, no reward but 
natural consequences; so long as we apprehend no judgment, 
harbour no fears, and cherish no hopes of a future state, but laugh 
at all these things, with the author of the Characteristics^ and those 
whom he esteems the liberal and polished part of mankind*, how 
can we be said to be religious in any sense ? Or what is here that 
an Atheist may not find his account in as well as a Theist ? To 
what moral purpose might not Fate or Nature serve as well as a 
Deity, on such a scheme ? And is not this, at bottom, the amount 
of all those fair pretences ? 

5. Certainly that atheistical men, who hold no principles of 
any religion, natural or revealed, are an increasing number, and 
this too among people of no despicable rank, hath long since been 
expressly acknowledged ^ by one who will be allowed a proper judge, 
even this same plausible pretender himself to Deism and enthu- 
siasm. But if any well-meaning persons, deluded by artful writers 



* rC&anK/fmlftcs, toI. III. Miscel. 3, 
ch. aj — AuTHOiu • The fortune of the Cba- 
raettri$tie%^ laji Sir J. Mackintosh, *has 
been iinguUr. For a time the work was 
admired more undistingnishingly than its 
literary character warrants. In the suc- 
ceeding period it was justly criticised, but 
too aererely condemned. Of late, more 
«i|iistly than in either of the two former 
cases, it has been generally neglected. It 



seemed to haTC the power of changing the 
temper of its critics. It proToked the 
amiable Berkeley to a harshness equally un- 
wonted and unwarranted ; while it softened 
the rugged Warburton so far as to dispose 
the fierce yet not altogether ungenerous 
polemic to praise an enemy in the very 
heat of conflict.' — DUtertaAon on tbi Pro- 
grea o/Etbicai Pbtiotopby, sect. V. 
' [MoraliiU, part II. sect. 3]— Autboe. 



374 



The Theory of Vision 



in the Minute Philosophy, or wanting the opportunity of any 
unreserved conversation with some ingenious men of that sect, 
should think that 'LjslcUs'i hath overshot the mark, and misrepre- 
sented their principles j — to be satisfied of the contrary, they need 
only cast an eye on the 'Philosophical DissertatioH up9m DeatJb^y lately 
published by a minute philosopher. Perhaps some man of leisure 
may think it worth while to trace the progress and unfolding of 
their principles, down from the writer in defence of the Rights rf 
the Christian Church^y to this plain dealer, the admirable author upon 
Death, During which period of time, I think one may observe 
a laid design gradually to undermine the belief of the Divine 
Attributes and Natural Religion ; which scheme runs parallel with 
their gradual, covert, insincere proceedings, in respect of the 
Gospel. 

6. That atheistical principles have taken deeper root, and arc 
farther spread than most people are apt to imagine, will be plain 
to whoever considers that Pantheism, Materialism, Fatalism are 
nothing but Atheism a little disguised ; that the notions of HaUes, 
Spinoza y Leihnitz^^y and Bayle are relished and applauded; that as 
they who deny the Freedom and Immortality of the soul in eflfect 
deny its being, even so they do, as to all moral effects and natural 
religion, deny the being of God, who deny Him to be an observer, 
judge, and rewarder of human actions ; that the course of arguing 
pursued by infidels leads to Atheism as well as Infidelity. 

[An instance of this may be seen in the proceeding of the 
author of a book^^ intituled, A Discourse of Free-thinking occasioned hy 



^ One of the interlocutors in Alclpbron^ 
on the free-thinking side. 

■ A Philosophical Dissertation upon Deaths 
composed for the Consolation of the Unhappy. 
By a Friend to Truth. London, 1732. 
This work is attributed to A. Radicati, 
Count de Passerano, and the translation to 
John (Thomas?) Morgan. The fear of 
death, as well as the moral feelings and 
judgments of men, are referred in this Essay 
to habit and education ; and the licence of 
a morality according to circumstances is vin- 
dicated, as well as the lawfulness and oc- 
casional expediency of suicide. 

» The Rights of the Christian Church 
asserted against the Romish and other 
Priests who claim an independent power over 
it. With a Preface concerning the Govern- 
ment of the Church of England as by Law 



established, London, 1706. The author, 
as is well known, was Matthew Tindal, one 
of the English Deists. The work called forth 
a host of controversial pamphlets. It was 
defended, however, by Le Clerc and others 
as simply an attack on Sacerdotalism. In 
1 731, Tindal published Christianity as old as 
the Creation : or the Gospel a republication 
of the Religion of Nature. 

*** Leibnitz is here associated with Hobbes, 
Spinoza, and Bayle, his professed anta- 
ponists, probably on the ground of his 
Necessarianism, more or less developed in his 
Theodic^ey and in his Correspondence with 
Dr. Samuel Clarke. 

^' Anthony Collins, whose Discourse ap- 
peared in 1713, and was the occasion of 
much controversy. Sec in particular Re- 
marks upon a late Discourse of Free-thinking: 



Vindicated and Explained. 



375 



tht 'Base and Growth of a Sect called Free-thinkers^ who, having 
insinuated his infidelity from men's various pretences and opinions 
concerning revealed religion, in like manner appears to insinuate 
his Atheism from the differing notions of men concerning the 
nature and attributes of God — particularly from the opinion of our 
knowing God by Analogy (see p. 4a of the mentioned book), 
as it hath been misunderstood and misinterpreted by some of late 
years. Such is the ill effect of untoward defences and explana- 
tions of our faith ^ and such advantage do incautious friends give 
its enemies. If there be any modern well-meaning writer, who 
(perhaps from not having considered the Fifth Book of Euclid) 
writes much of Analogy without understanding it, and thereby hath 
slipped his foot into this snare, I wish him to slip it back again, 
and, instead of causing scandal to good men and triumph to 
Atheists, discreetly explain away his first sense, and return to 
speak of God and His attributes in the style of other Christians ; 
allowing that knowledge and wisdom do, in the proper sense of 
the words, belong to God, and that we have some notion, though 
infinitely inadequate, of these Divine attributes, yet still more 
than a man blind from his birth can have of sight and colours 1^.] 

But to return, if I see it in their writings, if they own it in 
their conversation, if their ideas imply it, if their ends are not 
answered but by supposing it, if their leading author J3 hath pre- 
tended to demonstrate Atheism, but thought fit to conceal his 
Demonstration from the public ; if this was known in their clubs, 
and yet that author was nevertheless followed, and represented to 
the world as a believer of Natural Religion j if these things are 



m a LiiUr to T, H., DJ), (Dr. Hare, after- 
wards Bishop of Chichester), by Pbileleu' 
Atnu LiptUmU (Dr. Bentley). London, 
1713. It was in 17 13 that the Essays 
against the Free-thinkers, attributed to 
Berkeley, appeared in the * Guardian.' 

«* Cf. Aleipbron, Dialogue IV. sect. 16— 
J a, in which the nature of man's notion of 
Ood, and the insufficiency of the analogical 
hypothesis to account for our theological 
knowledge is discussed. This alleged heresy 
u defended with acuteness and learning in 
the Dhrint Analogy of Bishop Brown, which 
appeared in 1733, almost contemporaneously 
with AUiphroH. Besides Berkeley and 
Brown, both Irish bishops, and opposed on 
<juettion of an analogical knowledge of 



* things Divine and Supernatural,' two arch- 
bishops of Dublin and three English prelates, 
are associated with it. See Archbishop 
King's discourse on Tbe Right Method of 
interpreting Scripture^ in what relates to tht 
Nature 0/ the Deity, edited with notes by 
Archbishop Whately; Bishop Law's Notes 
on Archbishop King's Essay on the Origin 
of Evil ; Bishop Coplestoo's Inquiry into the 
Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination ; 
and Bishop Hampden's Bampton Lectures 
on The Scholastic Philosophy in its relation 
to Christian Theology; to which may be 
added Dr. Mansel's well-known Bampton 
Lectures on The Limits of Religious Thought. 
" Anthony CoUins. Cf.il/ct>*roii—* Ad- 
vertisement,' note. 



376 The Theory of Vision 

so (and I know them to be so), surely what the favourers of Arir 
schemes would palliate, it is the duty of others to display and 
refute. 

7. Arid although the characters of Divinity are large and l^ibk 
throughout the whole creation to men of plain sense and commoa 
understanding, yet it must be considered that we have other adver- 
saries to oppose, other proselytes to make — ^men prejudiced to feisc 
systems and proof against vulgar arguments, who must be dealt 
with on a different footing. Conceited, metaj^ysical, disputing 
men must be paid in another coin ; we must shew that truth and 
reason in all shapes are equally against them, except we resolve to 
give them up, what they are very fond of being thou^t to engross, 
all pretensions to philosophy, science, and speculation* 

8. Meanwhile thus much is evident : those good men who shall 
not care to employ their thoughts on this Theory of Vinam have no 
reason to find fault. They are just where they were, being left in 
full possession of all other arguments for a God, none of which are 
weakened by this. And as for those who shall be at the pains to 
examine and consider this subject, it is hoped they may be pleased 
to find, in an age wherein so many schemes of Atheism are 
restored or invented, a new argument of a singular nature in proof 
of the immediate Care and Providence of a God, present to our 
minds, and directing our actions. As these considerations con- 
vince me that I cannot employ myself more usefully than in con- 
tributing to awaken and possess men with a thorough sense of the 
Deity inspecting, concerning, and interesting itself in human 
actions and affairs : so, I hope it will not be disagreeable to you 
that, in order to this, I make my appeal to Reason, from your 
remarks upon what I have wrote concerning Vision ; since men 
who differ in the means may yet agree in the end, and in the same 
candour and love of truth. 

9. '^By a sensible object I understand that which is properly per- 
ceived by sense. Things properly perceived by sense are imme- 
diately perceived » \ Besides things properly and immediately per- 

" Sect. 9 — 13 contain Berkeley's cxpla- jects (i. e. sensations) and their nnperceiTable 

nation of the term senable object^ i. e. sense- cause. 

idea or sensation ; and enforce the, with him, " i. e. our percepts proper are sensations 

essential distinction between perceivable ob- (or idtas, as Berkeley calls them) which we 



Vindicated and Explained. 377 

-ceived by any sense, there may be also other things suggested to 
the mind by means of those proper and immediate objects j — which 
things so suggested are not objects of that sense, being in truth 
only objects of the imagination, and originally belonging to some 
other sense or faculty. Thus, sounds are the proper object of hear- 
ing, being properly and immediately perceived by that, and by no 
other sense. But, by the mediation of sounds or words, all other 
things may be suggested to the mind ^ and yet things so suggested 
are not thought the object of hearing. 

10. The peculiar objects of each sense, although they are truly or 
strictly perceived by that sense alone, may yet be suggested to the 
imagination by some other sense. The objects therefore of all the 
senses may become objects of imagination, which faculty represents 
all sensible things. A colour, therefore, which is truly perceived by 
sight alone, may, nevertheless, upon hearing the words blue or red, 
be apprehended by the imagination. It is in a primary and 
pectiliar manner the object of sight ; in a secondary manner it is 
the object of imagination : but cannot properly be supposed the 
object of hearing. 

11. The objects of sense, being things immediately perceived, 
are otherwise called Ideas, The cause of these ideas, or the power 
of producing them, is not the object of sense — not being itself per- 
ceived, but only inferred by reason from its effects, to wit, those 
objects or ideas which are perceived by sense. From our ideas of 
sense the inference of reason is good to Power, Cause, Agent. 
But we may not therefore infer that our ideas are like unto this 
Power, Cause, or Active Being. On the contrary, it seems evident 
that an idea can be only like another idea, and that in our ideas 
or immediate objects of sense, there is nothing of Power, Causality, 
or Agency included '^ 

I a. Hence it follows that the Power or Cause of ideas is not 
an object of sense, but of reason. Our knowledge of the cause is 
measured by the effect; of the power, by our idea. To the 
absolute nature, therefore, of outward causes or powers, we have 
nothing to say : they are no objects of our sense or perception. 

are conscious of in our actual senie-ex- an object of sense, but of imagination, when 

perience, and not mere representations imagination ministers to belief. 

which we are induced to belieTc by sug- >* Cf. PrineipUt of Human KnowUdg€, 

gtKdon, or by inductire inference founded sect. 25 — a 8. 

00 the sensations. What is suggested is not 



378 



The Theory of Vision 



Whenever, therefore, the appellation of sensible atject is used in a 
determined intelligible sense, it is not applied to signify the abso- 
lutely existing outward cause or power, but the ideas i' themselves 
produced thereby. 

13. Ideas which are observed to be connected together arc 
vulgarly considered under the relation of cause and eflFect, whereas, 
in strict and philosophic truth, they are only related as the sign to 
the thing signified i®. For, we know our ideas, and therefore know 
that one idea cannot be the cause of another. We know that our 
ideas of sense are not the cause of themselves. We know also 
that wf do not cause them. Hence we know they must have some 
other efficient cause, distinct from them and us ^9. 

14. 2oln treating of Vision, it was my purpose to consider the 
effects and appearances, the objects ^<> perceived by my senses, the 
ideas'21 of sight as connected with those of touch ^ to inquire how 
one idea comes to suggest another belonging to a different sense, 
how things visible suggest things tangible, how present things 
suggest things more remote and future, whether by likeness, by 
necessary connexion, by geometrical inference, or by arbitrary 
institution 22, 

15. It hath indeed been a prevailing opinion and undoubted 
principle among mathematicians and philosophers that there were 
certain ideas common to both senses : whence arose the distinc- 
tion of primary and secondary qualities. But, I think it hath been 
demonstrated that there is no such thing as a common object — as 
an idea, or kind of idea perceived both by sight and touches. 

16. In order to treat with due exactness on the nature of Vision, 



" i. e. sensations. 

^* The whole theory of (physical) causa- 
tion, as developed by Hunie» Dr. Thomas 
Brown, Mr. J. S. Mill, and other recent 
theorists on the methods of positive science, 
is involved in this sentence. Cf. Principles 
of Human Knowledge^ sect. 25, 26, 51 — 53, 
65, 66. &c. 

*" This is Berkeley's explanation of our 
notion and belief of externality. The ex- 
ternal world is essenti-iUy dependent on 
mind, but actually independent of each finite 
will or efficient cause, and thus impersonal. 
Cf. Principles of Human Knowledgey sect. 
56, 57' «Scc. 

*'** Sect. 14 — 18 explain the design and 
scope of the Essay towards a New Theory 



of Vision, published twenty-four years pre- 
viously. 

'^^ i. c. the sensible objects (called ideas by 
Berkeley) of which we arc conscious, as 
distinguished from their causes, of which we 
are not, and cannot be, immediately per- 
cipient. This corresponds to the distinction 
between perception proper and mediate or 
suggested perception. 

** The doctrine of visual suggestion, by 
the synthesis of arbitrary association, is 
the essence of the New Theory of Vision, 
which is founded upon the phenomenal 
heterogeneity of the visible and tangible 
worlds. 

* [Theory of Vision, sect. 127, &c.] — 
Author. 



Vindicated and Explained. 



379 



it is necessary in' the first place accurately to consider our own 
ideas ^^ ; to distinguish where there is a difference ^ to call things 
by their right names ; to define terms, and not confound ourselves 
and others by their ambiguous use ; the want or neglect whereof 
hath so often produced mistakes. Hence it is that men talk as if 
one idea was the efficient cause of another; hence they mistake 
inferences of reason for perceptions of sense ; hence they con- 
found the power residing in somewhat external with the proper 
object of sense — which is in truth no more than our own idea^ 

17. When we have well understood and considered the nature 
of Vision ^% we may, by reasoning from thence, be better able to 
collect some knowledge of the external, unseen Cause of our 
ideas; whether it be one or many, intelligent or unintelligent, 
active or inert, body or spirit. But, in order to understand and 
comprehend this Theory, and discover the true principles thereof, 
we should consider the likeliest way is not to attend to unknown 
substances, external causes, agents, or powers, nor to reason or 
infer anything about or from things obscure, unperceived, and 
altogether unknown. 

18. As in this inquiry we are concerned with what objects we 
perceive, or our own ideas, so, upon them our reasonings must 
proceed. To treat of things utterly unknown as if we knew them, 
and so lay our beginning in obscurity, would not surely seem the 
properest means for the discovering of truth. Hence it follows, 
that it would be wrong if one about to treat of the nature of 
Vision, should, instead of attending to visible ideas, define the 
object of sight to be that obscure cause, that invisible power or 
agent, which produced visible ideas in our minds. Certainly such 
cause or power does not seem to be the objett either of the sense 
or the science of Vision, inasmuch as what we know thereby we 
know only of the effects. — Having premised thus much, I now 
proceed to consider the principles laid down in your Letter, which 
I shall take in order as they lie. 



•• In other words, a theory of Tision im- 
plies preliminary reflection upon the objteis 
of which we are conscious in the Tarioos 
senses — the sentation* given in each sense. 

" i.e. the objects we are actually con- 
icioQS of in seeing — in themseWes, apart 
lirom extreme substances or causes. This 
purijbd sense-consciousness is Berkeley's 



foundation for his theory of externality in 
another consciousneu than oiur own ; in 
contrast to the theory of an unknowable 
externality, independent of any mind^his 
philosophy of substances and causes as 
necessarily Mind, or at least dependent oa 
Divine and finite Minds. 




i, 



The Theory of Vision 

9. -"In yout prit paragraph or settiom, you say that 'whatever 
it is without which is the cause of any idea within, you call the 
object of sense j' and you tell us soon after this'", 'that wc cannot 
possibly have an idea of any object without.'— Hence it follows 
that by an oiject of sense you mean something that we can have 
no manner of idea of. This making the objects of sense to be 
things utterly insensible seems to mc contrary to common sense 
and the use of language. That there is nothing in the reason of 
things to justify such a definition is, I think, plain from what has 
been premised J^. And that it is contrary to received custom and 
opinion, I appeal to the experience of the lirst man you meet, who 
1 suppose will tell you that by an object of sense he means that 
which is perceived bysense"^", and nota thing utterly unpcrceivable 
and unknown. The beings, substances, powers which exist with- 
out may indeed concern a treatise on some other science, and may 
there become a proper subject of inquiry. But, why they should 
be considered as objects of the visive faculty, in a treatise of 
Optics, I do not comprehend. 

30. Tlic real objects of sight wc see, and what we see we know. 
And these true objects of sense and knowledge, to wit, our own 
idea£, are to be considered, compared, distinguished, in order 
to understand the true Theory of Vision. As to the outward cause 
of these ideas, whether it be one and the same, or various and 
manifold, whether it be thinking or unthinking, spirit or body, 
or whatever else we conceive or determine about it, the visible 
appearances do not alter their nature — our ideas arc still the same. 
Though I may have an erroneous notion of the cause, or though 
I may be utterly ignorant of its nature, yet this docs not hinder 
my making true and certain judgments about my ideas; my 
knowing which arc the same, and which different ; wherein they 

* Sect 19—34 conlab answers [o the ot iileii)i on the one lund. ind. oa the olIicT 

ipeciil Dbjectioni of the ^Bonymoiu HViwr, hind, <a) what, ai concdv»b!e, may b^ 

and general lemirkt upon hii Ltlltr. indeed ii. itiggaltd hj the Mrualion. whethet 

" l^f^- *]— AiTTHOB. cilled physical lubctance or phriical ciote 

" \SapTa, Kcl. 9. II, ij]— Author. —which he icceptt; as well u (b) ahnrail 

Berkeley aod hit critic use the tenn objici or inconceivable labdance and cauK — 

differenlly, which mint be remembered in which he absolutely rejecu. The conttul 

what followi. between objtaf-fraprr, and thdr nnun 

" i, c. imnndialtly perceived, or of which (whelhei unintelligible or spiritual), is the 

t have 1 tenK-K:oiiKiou»iesi. Here, as cardinal fict in iheu lectiom. The fonntt 

elsewhere, Berkeley insists Dpon the dii- alone, he sayi, belong to the Theory ot 

" -' Jibetwetm tlie teiiMlionsofwhich we Viiion. 

ually cpniciont (which he calli objects 



i 



Vindicated and Explained. 381 

agree, and wherein they disagree ; which are connected together, 
and wherein this connexion consists^ whether it be founded in 
a likeness of nature, in a geometrical necessity, or merely in 
experience and custom^®. 

a I. In your second section^ you say 'that if we had but one 
sense, we might be apt to conclude there were no objects at all 
without us ; but that, since the same object is the cause of ideas 
by different senses, thence we infer its existence.* — Now, in the 
first place, I observe, that I am at a loss concerning the point 
which is here assumed, and would fain be informed how we come 
to know that the same object causeth ideas by different senses. 
In the next place, I must observe that, if I had only one sense, 
I should nevertheless infer and conclude there was some cause 
without me (which you, it seems, define to be an ohject\ producing 
the sensations or ideas perceived by that sense. For, if 1 am 
conscious that I do not cause them, and know that they are not 
the cause of themselves, both which points seem very clear, it 
plainly follows that there must be some other third cause distinct 
from me and them^*. 

22. In your third section, you acknowledge with me ' that the 
connexion between ideas of different senses ariseth only from 
experience.* — Herein we are agreed. In your fourth section you say 
* that a word denoting an external object, is the representative 
of no manner of idea. Neither can we possibly have an idea 
of what is solely without us.* — ^What is here said of an external 
unknown object hath been already considered 39. 

23- In the following section of your Letter, you declare 'that 
our ideas have only an arbitrary connexion with outward objects, 
that they are nothing like the outward objects, and that a variation 
in our ideas doth not imply or infer a change in the objects, which 
may still remain the same/ — Now, to say nothing about the con- 
fused use of the word 'object,* which hath been more than once 
already observed, I shall only remark that the points asserted in 
this section do not seem to consist with some others that follow. 

24. For, in the sixth section^ you say ' that in the present 

"* To which last it ic referred by Berke- ont of the fensef— our conTiction of our 

ley. own personml agency, and of its limits, being 

*> Hence, an external or independent world of course assumed. 

(of tome sort) may be inferred from the ** [Supra, sect. 19] — Author. 
•duattons of which we are conscious in any 



382 



The Theory of Vision 



situation of things, there is an infallible certain connexion between 
the idea and the object/ — But how can we perceive this connezioo, 
since, according to you, we never perceive such object, nor can 
have any idea of it? or, not perceiving it, how can we know 
this connexion to be in^libly certain ? 

25. In the seventh secttm^ it is said <that we may, frcnn our 
infallible experience, argue from our idea of one sense to that of 
another/ — But, I think it is plain that our experience of the con- 
nexion between ideas of sight and touch is not infallible ^ since, 
if it were^ there could be no deceptio visuSy neither in painting 
perspective, dioptrics, nor any otherwise. 

26. In the last section^ you affirm ' that experience plainly 
teaches us that a just proportion is observed in the alteration of 
the ideas of each sense, from the alteration of the object/ — Now, 
I cannot possibly reconcile this section with the fifth, or compre- 
hend how experience should shew us that the alteration of the 
object produceth a proportionable alteration in the ideas of 
difFcrent senses^ or how indeed it should shew us anything at 
all either from or about the alteration of an object utterly 
unknown, of which we neither have nor can have any manner 
of idea. What I do not perceive or know, how can I perceive or 
know to be altered ? And, knowing nothing of its alterations, how 
can I compute anything by them, deduce anything from them, or 
be said to have any experience about them'^a? 

27. From the observations you have premised, rightly under- 
stood and considered, you say it follows ^ that my New Theory of 
Vision must in great measure fall to the ground ; and the laws of 
Optics will be found to stand upon the old unshaken bottom/ 
— But, though 1 have considered and endeavoured to understand 
your remarks, yet I do not in the least comprehend how this 
conclusion can be inferred from them. The reason you assign 
for such inference is, ^because, although our ideas in one sense 
are entirely different from our ideas in another, yet we may 



" In the preceding sections, Berkeley is 
virtually arguing against the possibility of 
an ultimately representative perception or 
intelligence of the supposed material sub- 
stance and cause. We can imagine and 
infer only what we have had examples of 
in our previous presentative experience. He 
here and elsewhere anticipates objections of 



Reid and Hamilton to a representative per- 
ception of things whose externality consists 
in an absolute divorce from mind, and which, 
therefore, have not been previously, through 
the senses, in presentative relation to the 
mind in which, nevertheless, they are as- 
sumed to be represented. 



Vindicated and Explained, 383 

justly argue from one to the other, as they have one common 
cause without j of which, you say, we cannot possibly have even 
the faintest idea.* — Now, my theory nowhere supposeth that we 
may not justly argue from the ideas of one sense to those of 
another, by analogy and by experience \ on the contrary, this very 
point is affirmed, proved, or supported throughout 3^. 

28. Indeed I do not see how the inferences which we make 
from visible to tangible ideas include any consideration of one 
common unknown external cause, or depend thereon, but only on 
mere custom or habit. The experience which I have had that 
certain ideas of one sense are attended or connected with certain 
ideas of a di£ferent sense is, I think, a sufficient reason why the 
one may suggest the other. 

29. In the next place, you affirm 'that something without, 
which is the cause of all the variety of ideas within, in one sense, 
is the cause also of the variety in another: and, as they have a 
necessary connexion with it, we very justly demonstrate, from our 
ideas of feeling of the same object, what will be our ideas of 
seeing/ — As to which, give me leave to remark that to inquire 
whether that unkjMwn something be the same in both cases, or 
diflFerent, is a point foreign to Optics j inasmuch as our per- 
ceptions by the visive faculty will be the very same, however we 
determine that point. Perhaps^^ I think that the same Being^s 
which causeth our ideas of sight doth cause not only our ideas of 
touch likewise, but also all our ideas of all the other senses, with all 
the varieties thereof. But this, I say, is foreign to the purpose 37, 

30. As to what you advance, that our ideas have a necessary 
connexion with such cause, it seems to me gratis dictum ; no reason 
is produced for this assertion ; and I cannot assent to it without 
a reason. The ideas or effijcts I grant are evidently perceived : 
but the cause you say is utterly unknown •''s. How then can you 
tell whether such unknown cause acts arbitrarily or necessarily ? 
I see the effects or appearances: and I know that effects must 

»* \Thwry of Vision, $cct. 38 and 78, * God. 

&cj — Author. " For, in Optics we are concerned ex- 

* Docs this • perhaps* imply any besita- clusively, according to Berkeley, with the 

lion on Berkeley's part as to the essence of tjfiets (i. e. our sensations or sense-ideas) ; 

his early philosophy — the substantiality and and their relations to one another, as imme- 

causality of sensible things in Ood, as op- diately- perceived sign and mediately -per- 

posed to their substantiality and causality in ceiTed meaning, 

an unknown and incognisable essence, out ** [LtUtr, sect i and 4] — Authob. 
of all relation to Mind. 



384 The Theory of Vision 

have a cause: but I neither see nor know that their connexion with 
that cause is necessary. Whatever there may be, I am sure I see 
no such necessary connexion, nor, consequently, can demonstrate 
by means thereof from ideas of one sense to those of another. 

31. You add that although to talk of seeing by tangible angles 
and lines be direct nonsense, yet, to demonstrate from angles and 

• 

lines in feeling to the ideas in seeing that arise from the same 
common object is very good sense. If by this no more is meant 
than that men might argue and compute geometrically by lines 
and angles in Optics, it is so far from carrying in it any opposition 
to my theory that I have expressly declared the same thing^^. 
This doctrine, as admitted by me, is indeed subject to' certain 
limitations; there being divers cases wherein the writers of Optics 
thought we judged by lines and angles, or by a sort of natural 
geometry, with regard to which I think they were mistaken, and 
I have given my reasons for it. And those reasons, as they arc 
untouched in your letter, retain their force with me. 

32. I have now gone through your reflexions, which the con- 
clusion intimates to have been written in haste, and, having 
considered them with all the attention I am master of, must now 
leave it to the thinking reader to judge whether they contain any- 
thing that should oblige me to depart from what I have advanced 
in my Theory of Vision, For my own part, if I were ever so 
willing, it is not on this occasion in my power to indulge myself 
in the honest satisfaction it would be frankly to give up a known 
error j a thing so much more right and reputable to denounce than 
to defend. On the contrary, it should seem that the Theory will 
stand secure j since you agree with me that men do not see by 
lines and angles j since I, on the other hand, agree with you that 
we may nevertheless compute in Optics by lines and angles, as 
I have expressly shewed j since all that is said in your Letter about 
the object, the same object, the alteration of the object, is quite 
foreign to the theory, which considereth our ideas ^0 as the object 
of sense, and hath nothing to do with that unknown, unperceived, 
unintelligible thing which you signify by the word object ^^, Cer- 
tainly the laws of Optics will not stand on the old, unshaken 

*• [Theory of Vision, sect. 78] — Author. *> i. c. our sensations. 

" [Supra, sect. 14] — Author. 



Vindicated and Explained. 385 

bottom, if it be allowed that we do not see by geometry ^2 • if it 
be evident that explications of phenomena given by the received 
theories in Optics are insufficient and faulty j if other principles 
are found necessary for explaining the nature of vision j if there 
be no idea, nor kind of idea, common to both senses -*«, contrary to 
the old received universal supposition of optic writers. 

33. We not only impose on others but often on ourselves, by 
the unsteady or ambiguous use of terms. One would imagine that 
an ohject should be perceived. I must own, when that word is 
employed in a dijfcrent sense, that I am at a loss for its meaning, 
and consequently cannot comprehend any arguments or con- 
clusions about it. And I am not sure that, on my own part, some 
inaccuracy of expression, as well as the peculiar nature of the 
subject, not always easy either to explain or conceive, may not 
have rendered my Treatise concerning Vision difficult to a cursory 
reader. But, to one of due attention, and who makes my words 
an occasion of his own thinking, I conceive the whole to be very 
intelligible : and, when it is rightly understood, I scarce doubt but 
it will be assented to. One thing at least I can affirm, that, if 
I am mistaken, I can plead neither haste nor inattention, having 
taken true pains and much thought about it. 

34. And had you. Sir, thought it worth while to have dwelt 
more particularly on the subject, to have pointed out distinct 
passages in my Treatise, to have answered any of my objections 
to the received notions, refuted any of my arguments in behalf of 
mine, or made a particular application of your own ; I might with- 
out doubt have profited by your reflections. But it seems to me 
we have been considering, either diffijrent things, or else the same 
things in such different views as the one can cast no light on the 
other. I shall, nevertheless, take this opportunity to make a 
review of my Theory, in order to render it more easy and clear; 
and the rather because, as I had applied myself betimes to this 
subject, it became familiar— and in treating of things familiar to 
ourselves, we are too apt to think them so to others. 

35. ^^It seemed proper, if not unavoidable, to begin in the 

• UAUtr^ lect. 8]— Author. ♦• Sect. 35—47 contain ■ restetement of 

* [7Vory(/KtffOff,sect. la;] — Author. the iVirNr Tbwry of ■ Dirine Langutge in 

C C 



386 The Theory of Vision 

accustomed style of optic writers — admitting divers things as true, 
which, in a rigorous sense, are not such, but only received by the 
vulgar and admitted as such. There hath been a long and close 
connexion in our minds between the ideas ^^ of sight and toudi. 
Hence they are considered as one thing — ^which prejudice suiteth 
well enough with the purpose of life ; and language is suited to 
this prejudice. The work of science and speculation is to unravel 
our prejudices and mistakes, untwisting the closest connexions, 
distinguishing things that are diflPerent j instead of confused or 
perplexed, giving* us distinct views j gradually correcting our 
judgment, and reducing it to a philosophical exactness. And, as 
this work is the work of time, and done by degrees, it is extremely 
difficult, if at all possible, to escape the snares of popular lan- 
guage, and the being betrayed thereby to say things strictly 
speaking neither true nor consistent *^ This makes thought and 
candour more especially necessary in the reader. For, language 
being accommodated to the prsenotions of men and use of life, 
it is difficult to express therein the precise truth of things, which 
is so distant from their use, and so contrary to our prxnotions. 

36. In the contrivance of Vision, as that of other things, the 
wisdom of Providence seemeth to have consulted the operation 
rather than the theory of man ; to the former things are admirably 
fitted, but, by that very means, the latter is often perplexed. For, 
as useful as these immediate suggestions and constant connexions 
are to direct our actions ; so is our distinguishing between things 
confounded, and as it were blended together, no less necessary to 
the speculation and knowledge of truth. 

37. The knowledge of these connexions, relations, and dif- 
ferences of things visible and tangible, their nature, force, and 
significancy hath not been duly considered by former writers on 
Optics, and seems to have been the great destderatum in that 
science, which for want thereof was confused and imp>erfect. 
A Treatise, therefore, of this philosophical kind, for the under- 
standing of Vision, is at least as necessary as the physical con- 
sideration of the eye, nerve, coats, humours; refractions, bodily 
nature, and motion of light j or the geometrical application of lines 

Vision, conveyed to us by suggestion. — In sensible things. 

sect. 48 — 70 this Theory is employed to ** i. e. sensations. 

explain deductively our visual discernment of ** Cf. Principles 0/ Human Knowledge — 

the real Situation, Size, and Distance c f • Introduction.* 



Vindicated and Explained. 



387 



and angles for praxis or theory, in dioptric glasses and mirrors, for 
computing and reducing to some rule and measure our judgments, 
so far as they are proportional to the objects of geometry. In 
these three lights Vision should be considered, in order to a 
complete Theory of Optics. 

38. It is to be noted that, in considering the Theory of Vision, 
I observed a certain known method, wherein, from false and 
popular suppositions, men do often arrive at truth. Whereas in 
Ac synthetical method of delivering science or truth already 
found, we proceed in an inverted order, the conclusions in the 
analysis being assumed as principles in the synthesis. I shall 
tiiercfbre now begin with that conclusion — That Vssson ss the Lan^ 
g»^ge of the Author of Nature^ from thence deducing theorems and 
solutions of phenomena, and explaining the nature of visible 
things and the visive faculty ^r, 

39. Ideas which are observed to be connected with other ideas 
come to be considered as signs, by means whereof things not 
actually perceived by sense are signified or suggested to the 
imagination ; whose objects they are, and which alone perceives 
them* And, as sounds suggest other things, so characters surest 
other sounds; and, in general, all signs suggest the things 
signified, there being no idea which may not offer to the mind 
another idea which hath been frequently joined with it. In cer- 
tain cases a sign may suggest its correlate as an image, in others 
as an effect, in others as a cause. But, where there is no such 
relation of similitude or causality, nor any necessary connexion 
whatsoever, two things, by their mere coexistence, or two ideas, 
merely by being perceived together, may suggest or signify one 
the other — their connexion being all the while arbitrary ; for it is 
the connexion only, as such, that causeth this effect-*^. 



* In the original Etsay towards a New 
Theory of VtMion, Berkeley proceeds ana- 
lytically ; whereat, in the following synopsis, 
be first hypothetically assumes the Theory 
of a Vifoal Language — with which the earlier 
treatise concludes, and then Terifies it, by 
showing sjmthetically how it explains the 
phenomena of Vuion ; and in particular solves 
dUflkuhies contained in our judgments of the 
sitaations, sizes, and distances of things. 
See Editor's Pre&oe to the Euay, p. 6, note. 

* This doctrine of 'suggestion' is the 



eonstntetivt principle of the New Theory; 
which is an application, on a great scale, of 
the law of constant association, regulating 
imagination and belief in individuals, in 
esublished harmony with the Divine Asso- 
ciations among sensations, common to a 
plurality of individuals, and which expreu 
the order of external nature. It should be 
compared with Kant's theory of perception, 
according to which sensations, received into 
the necessary forms of space and time, are 
constructed or made intelligible by the cate- 



C C 2 



388 The Theory of Vision 

40. A great number of arbitrary signs, various and opposite, do 
constitute a Language. If such arbitrary connexion be instituted 
by men, it is an artificial Language ; if by the Author of Nature, 
it is a Natural Language. Infinitely various are the modificatiaos 
of light and sound, whence they are each capable of supplying 
an endless variety of signs, and, accordingly, have been eadi 
employed to form languages^ the one by the arbitrary appoint- 
ment of mankind, the other by that of God Himself ^9. A con- 
nexion established by the Author of Nature, in the ordinary 
course of things, may surely be called natural^ as that made by 
men will be named artificial. And yet this doth not hinder but 
the one may be as arbitrary as the other. And, in fact, there is no 
more likeness to exhibit, or necessity to infer, things tangible 
from the modifications of light, than there is in language to cd- 
lect the meaning from the sound ^o. But, such as the connexicni is 
of the various tones and articulations of voice with their several 
meanings, the same is it between the various modes of light and 
their respective correlates, or, in other words, between the ideas 
of sight and touch. 

41. As to light, and its several modes or coloiu^, all thinking 
men are agreed that they are ideas peculiar only to sight ; neither 
common to the touch, nor of the same kind with any that are 
perceived by that sense. But herein lies the mistake, that, beside 
these, there are supposed other ideas common to both senses, 
being equally perceived by sight and touch — such as Extension, 
Size, Figure, and Motion. But that there are in reality no such 
common ideas, and that the objects ^> of sight, marked by these 
words, are entirely different and heterogeneous from whatever is 
the object ^2 of feeling, marked by the same names, hath been proved 
in the Theory ^^^ and seems by you admitted^ though I cannot con- 
ceive how you should in reason admit this, and at the same time 
contend for the received theories, which are so much ruined as 
mine is established by this main part and pillar thereof. 

42. To perceive is one thing; to judge is another. So likewise, 

gories. Cf. •S'iris, sect. 318, where Berkeley " i.e. the immediate objects, or sensa- 

says that space is neither an intellectual tions, of which we are visually conscious, 

notion, nor perceived by any of the senses. ^ i. e. the immediate objects, or sensa- 

*• \Minute Pbilosopber^ Dial. IV. sect. 7, tions, of which we arc tactually and mus- 

lll — Author. cularly conscious. 

** [Theory of Vision, sect. 144 and 147] " [Tbtory of Vision,%tc\. 127] — Author. 
— Author. 



Vindicated and Explained. 389 

to be suggested is one thing, and to be inferred another. Things 
are suggested and perceived by sense. We make judgments and 
inferences by the understanding. What we immediately and 
properly perceive by sight is its primary object— light and colours. 
What is suggested, or perceived by mediation thereof, are tangible 
ideas — which may be considered as secondary and improper objects 
of sight. We infer causes from effects, effects from causes, and 
properties one from another, where the connexion is necessary. 
But, how comes it to pass that we apprehend by the ideas of 
sight certain other ideas, which neither resemble them, nor cause 
them, nor are caused by them, nor have any necessary connexion 
with them ? — the solution of this problem, in its full extent, doth 
comprehend the whole Theory of Vision**. This stating of the 
matter placeth it on a new foot, and in a different light from all 
preceding theories. 

43. To explain how the mind or soul of man simply sees is 
one thing, and belongs to Philosophy. To consider particles as 
moving in certain lines, rays of light as refracted or reflected, or 
crossing, or including angles, is quite another thing, and apper- 
taineth to Geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the 
mechanism of the eye is a third thing, which appertaineth to 
Anatomy and experiments. These two latter speculations are 
of use in practice, to assist the defects and remedy the distempers 
of sight, agreeably to the natural laws contained in this mundane 
system. But the former Theory is that which makes us understand 
the true nature of Vision, considered as a faculty of the soul. 
Which Theory, as I have already observed *% may be reduced to this 
simple question, to wit, How comes it to pass that a set of ideas, 
altogether different from tangible ideas, should nevertheless sug- 
gest them to us — there being no necessary connexion between 
them ? To which the proper answer is — That this is done in virtue 
of an arbitrary connexion, instituted by the Author of Nature. 

44« The proper, immediate object of vision is light, in all its 

■* According to Berkeley, the Theory of with necessary truth, and not with arbitrary 

Vision inTohret merely the two elements of associations, either in the subjectire im- 

mmudiait p9rupiim{pi^t. proper objects or agination of individual men, or in that ob- 

Knaations of each sense) ; and tuggettion in jcctive Providence of Ood by which the 

tmagimatUm (of what had previously been sense-experience, and consequently the im- 

percdved simultaneously in another of the agination, of individuals is determined. 



1). Judgmmi and rtatonmg are as- ^ See preceding lectioo. 

iigDed to the Uiidersttnding, as conversant 



390 The Theory of Vision 

■ 

modes and variations, various colours in kind, in d^ree, in 
quantity; some lively, others foint; more of some and less of 
others ; various in their bounds or limits ; various in their order 
and situation ^«, A blind man, when first made to see, might per- 
ceive these objects *7 J in which there is an endless variety ; but he 
would neither perceive nor imagine any resemblance or ccmnexioQ 
between these visible objects and those perceived by feeling^. 
Lights, shades, and colours would suggest nothing to him about 
bodies, hard or soft, rough or smooth : nor would their quantities, 
limits, or order suggest to him geometrical figures, or extension, 
or situation — which they must do upon the received supposition, 
that these objects are common to sight and touch. 

45. All the various sorts, combinations, quantities, d^;rees, and 
dispositions of light and colours, would, upon the first perception 
thereof, be considered in themselves only as a new set of sensations 
and ideas. As they are wholly new and unknown, a man bom 
blind ^9 would not, at first sight, give them the names of things 
formerly known and perceived by his touch. But, after some 
experience, he would perceive^ their connexion with tangible 
things, and would, therefore, consider them as signs, and give 
them (as is usual in other cases) the same names with the things 
signified. 

46. More and less, greater and smaller, extent, proportion, 
interval are all found in Time as in Space ; but it will not therefore 
follow that these are homogeneous quantities. No more will it 
follow, from the attribution of common names, that visible ideas 
are homogeneous with those of feeling. It is true that terms 
denoting tangible extension, figure, location, motion, and the 
like, are also applied to denote the quantity, relation, and order of 
the proper visible objects, or ideas of sight. But this proceeds 
only from experience and analogy. There is a higher and l(ywer in 
the notes of music; men speak in a high or a low key. And this, 
it is plain, is no more than metaphor or analogy. So likewise, to 
express the order of visible ideas, the words situation^ high and Ityw^ 

^ Cf. Esiay towards a New Theory of passages in which the experience of the 

Vision, sect. 43. • born blind,' when they first receive sight, 

^ i. e. be conscious of these sensations. is inferred. 

" [TTfeory 0/ Vision, sect. 41 and 106] — ** i.e. mediately, or through suggestion. 

Author. but not by the immediate perception involved 

* Cf. Essay, sect. 41, and various other in his origmal experience in seeing. 



Vindicated and Explained. 391 

up and dvwn^ are made use of ^ and their sense, when so applied, 
is analogical. 

47. But, in the case of Vision we do not rest in a supposed 
analogy between different and heterogeneous natures. We sup- 
pose an identity of nature, or one and the same object common to 
both senses. And this mistake we are led into ; forasmuch as the 
various motions of the head, upward and downward, to the right 
and to the left, being attended with a diversity in the visible ideas, 
it cometh to pass that those motions and situations of the head, 
which in truth are tangible, do confer their own attributes and 
appellations on visible ideas wherewith they are connected, and 
which by that means come to be termed high and /^w, right and 
left^ and to be marked by other names betokening the modes of 
position^' ; which, antecedently to such experienced connexion, 
would not have been attributed to them, at least not in the primary 
and literal sense. 

48. From hence we may see how the mind is enabled to discern 
by sight the Situation ^2 of distant objects. Those immediate objects 
whose mutual respect and order come to be expressed by terms 
relative to tangible place, being connected with the real objects of 
touch, what we say and judge of the one, we say and judge of the 
other — transferring our thought or apprehension from the signs to 
the things signified ; as it is usual, in hearing or reading a discourse, 
to overlook the sounds or letters, and instantly pass on to the 
meaning^'. 

49. But there is a great difficulty relating to the situation of 
objects, as perceived by sight. For, since the pencils of rays 
issuing from any luminous object do, after their passage through the 
pupil, and their refraction by the crystalline, delineate inverted 
pictures in the retina — which pictures are supposed the immediate 
proper objects of sight, how comes it to pass that the objects whereof 
the pictures are thus inverted do yet seem erect and in their natural 
situation ? For, the objects not being perceived otherwise than by 
their pictures, it should follow that, as these are inverted, those 
should seem so too. But this difficulty, which is inexplicable on 

•■ \Thtory of Vision, lect. 99] — Author. the Eisay, which correspond to them. 

• Sect. -^—53 treat of our visual dis- " [Minutt PbUotopbtr, Dial. IV. sect. 1 2] 

cemment of Situation by suggestion, and — Author. 
may be compared with sect 88 — 119 in 



3^2 The Theory of Visum 

all the received principles and theories^ admits of a most natml 
solution, if it be considered that the r^tima^ crystalline, pupil, ni|9) 
crossing refracted, and reunited in distinct unages, oomeasfouksSi 
and similar to the outward objects, are things altogether of t 
toMgiUe nature* 

50. The pictures, so called, being formed by the xadious pencils^ 
after their above-mentioned crossing and refraction, are not so 
truly pictures as images, or figures, or projections — ^tangible ^ures 
projected by tangible rays on a tangible rerimM^ which are so fax 
from being the proper objects of sig^t that they are not at all 
perceived thereby, being by nature altogetiier of the tangible kind, 
and apprehended by the Imagination alone, when we suppose them 
actually taken in by the eye. These tangible images on the re^ntt 
have some resemblance unto the tangible objects frxim which the 
rays go forth^ and in respect of those objects I grant they are 
inverted. But then I deny that they are, or can be, the proper 
immediate objects of sight. This, indeed, is vulgarly supposed by 
the writers of Optics: but it is a vulgar error; i^di being re- 
moved, the forementioned difficulty is removed with it, and admits 
a just and fiill solution, being shown to arise from a mistake. 

51. Pictures, therefore, may be understood in a twofold sense, or as 
two kinds quite dissimilar and heterogeneous — ^the one consisting 
of light, shade, and colours ; the other not properly pictures, but 
images projected on the retina. Accordingly, for distinction, I 
shall call those pictures^ and these images. The former are visible, 
and the peculiar objects of sight. The latter are so far otherwise, 
that a man blind from his birth may perfectly imagine, understand, 
and comprehend them. And here it may not be amiss to observe 
that figures and motions which cannot be actually felt by us, but 
only imagined, may nevertheless be esteemed tangible ideas y foras- 
much as they are of the same kind with the objects of touch, and 
as the imagination drew them from that sense. 

52. Throughout this whole affair the mind is wonderfully apt 
to be deluded by the sudden suggestions of Fancy, which it con- 
founds with the Perceptions of Sense, and is prone to mistake a 
close and habitual connexion between the most distinct and 
diflFerent things for an identity of nature «*. The solution of this 

•• {Tbeory of Vision, $cct. 1 44] — Author. ray$ on the retina, are not themselves what 
In truth the so-called * images,' or concurrent we see : they are merely organic conditions 



Vindicated and Explained. 393 

knot about inverted images seems the principal point in the whole 
Optic Theory ; the most difficult perhaps to comprehend, but the 
most deserving of our attention, and, when rightly understood, the 
surest way to lead the mind into a thorough knowledge of the 
true nature of Vision. 

53. It is to be noted of these inverted images on the retina that, 
although they are in kind altogether different from the proper 
objects of sight or pictures, they may nevertheless be proportional 
to them ; as indeed the most different and heterc^eneous things in 
nature may, for all that, have analogy, and be proportional each to 
other. And although those images, when the distance is given, 
should be simply as the radiating surfaces; and although it be 
consequently allowed that the pictures are in that case proportional 
to those radiating surfaces, or the tangible real magnitude of 
things; yet it will not thence follow that in common sight we 
perceive or judge of those tangible real magnitudes simply by the 
visible magnitudes of the pictures ; for, therein the distance is not 
given, tangible objects being placed at various distances ; and the 
diameters of the images, to which images the pictures are propor- 
tional, are inversely as those distances, which distances are not 
immediately perceived by sight fi\ And, admitting they were, it is 
nevertheless certain that the mind, in apprehending the magni- 
tudes of tangible objects of sight, doth not compute them by means 
of the inverse proportion of the distances, and the direct proportion 
of the pictures. That no such inference or reasoning attends the 
common act of seeing, every one's experience may inform him. 

54. To know how we perceive or apprehend by sight the real 
Magnitude^ of tangible objects, we must consider the immediate 
visible objects, and their properties or accidents. These imme- 
diate objects are the pictures. These pictures are some more 
lively, others more faint. Some are higher, others are lower in their 
own order or peculiar location ; which, though in truth quite dis- 
tinct, and altogether different from that of tangible objects, hath 
nevertheless a relation and connexion with it, and thence comes 

of Tisual consciousness by means of which sect. 53 — 87 in the E%My. See record of 

we see. experiments by Wheatstone, PMotopbual 

• rrhtory 0/ Vision, sect. 2] — Author. Transaeitoru (185 a). in explanation of the 

** Sect. 54'--6l treat of the (mediate) visual discernment of Magnitude. 
pcrceptioa of Magnitude by suggestion. Cf. 



39^ The Theory of Vision - 

our judgment concerning its tangible magnitu<te comes hf d^iees 
to depend more entirely on its visiUe magnitude. For the fidotr 
ness is lessened as the quantity of intercepted air and vapoois is 
diminished* And as the object riseth the eye of the spectator is 
also raised above tiie horizon : so that tiie two concurring ciicum- 
stances, of faintness and horizontal situaticm, ceasing to Anflnence 
the suggestion of tangible magnitudes, this same suggestion or 
judgment doth, in proportion thereto, become the sole effect of 
the visible magnitude and tiie prxnotions. But, it is evident that 
if several things (for instance, the faintness, situation, and visihk 
magnitude) concur to enlarge an i^ea, upon the gradual omission 
of some of those things, the idea will be gradually lessened. This 
is the case of the moon^s, when she ascends above the horizon, and 
gradually diminisheth her apparent dimension, as her altitude 
increaseth. 

6i. It is natural for mathematicians to regard the visual aii^e 
and the apparent magnitude as the sole or principal means of our 
apprehending the tangible magnitude of objects. But, it is plain 
from what hath been premised, that our apprehension «is much 
influenced by other things 73, which have no similitude or necessary 
connexion therewith. 

62. And these same means, which suggest the magnitude of 
tangible things, do also suggest their Distance 7^ • and in the same 
manner, that is to say, by experience alone, and not by any neces- 
sary connexion or geometrical inference. The feintness, therefore, 
and vividness, the upper and lower situations, together with the 
visible size of the pictures, and our prxnotions concerning the 
shape and kind of tangible objects, are the true medium by which 
we apprehend the various degrees of tangible distance"*. Which 
follows from what hath been premised, and will indeed be evident 
to whoever considers that those visual angles, with their arches or 
subtenses, are neither perceived by sight, nor by experience of any 
other sense. Whereas it is certain that the pictures, with their 



n 

73 

74 



Theory of Viuon^ sect. 73] — Author. towards a New TTfeory of Vision. Sect. 77 

'Suftra, sect. 58] — Author. refers to Distance in connexion with Mag- 

[lieory of Vision^ sect. 77] — Author. nitade. 

The invisibility of real Distance, and the " Note that Berkeley's problem refers to 

Theory of the suggestion of the distances tangible or real distance, and not to its 

of objects by experience or custom, are ex- visible signs. 

pressly treated in sect. 7 — 51 of the Essay 



Vindicated and Explained. 397 

magnitudes, situations, and degrees of feintness, are alone the 
proper objects of sight j so that whatever is perceived 76 by sight 
must be perceived by means thereof. To which perception the 
prsenotions also, 'gained by experience of touch, or of sight and 
touch conjointly, do contribute. 

63. And indeed we need only reflect on what we see to be 
assnred that the less the pictures are, the fainter they are, and 
the higher (provided still they are beneath the horizontal 77 line or 
its picture), by so much the greater will the distance seem to be. 
And this upper situation of the picture is in strictness what must 
be understood when, after a popular manner of speech, the eye 
is said to perceive fields, lakes, and the like, interjacent 78 between 
it and the distant object — the pictures corresponding to them 
being only perceived to be lower than that of the object 79. Now, it 
is evident that none of these things have in their own nature any 
necessary connexion with the various degrees of distance. It will 
also appear, upon a little reflexion, that sundry circumstances of 
shape, colour, and kind, do influence our judgments or apprehen- 
sions of distance ; all which follows from our prxnotions, which 
are merely the effect of experience. 

64. As it is natural for mathematicians to reduce things to the 
rule and measure of geometry, they are prone to suppose that the 
apparent magnitude hath a greater share than we really find, in 
forming our judgment concerning the distance of things from 
the eye. And, no doubt, it would be an easy and ready rule to 
determine the apparent place of an object, if we could say that 
its distance was inversely as the diameter of its apparent magni- 
tude, and so judge by this alone, exclusive of every other circum- 
stance* But that this would be no true rule is evident, there 
being certain cases in vision, by refracted or reflected light, 
wherein the diminution of the apparent magnitude is attended 
with an apparent diminution of distance ^o. 

65. But further to satisfy us that our judgments or apprehen- 
sions, either of the greatness or distance of an object, do not 
depend absolutely on the apparent magnitude, we need only ask 
the first painter we meet, who, considering Nature rather than 

*• L c perceiTed mediately, or through ^* \Tbecry of Vision, lect. 3] — Autrok. 

mnettioa. ^ [Supra, sect. 55]— Author. 

^ [Smfra, lect 56]— Author. •• Cf. Nfw Tbwry «/ Kwom, lect 29. 



3^8 1%B Tkeory of Vim 

Geometry, well knows that several otiber ctfcranstaiitts cootrilMlt 
thereto : and, since art can only deceive us as it imitates naton^ 
we need but observe pieces of perspective and landscapes to be 
able to judge of this point. 

66. When the object is so near that tiie in^nrvid between tbe 
pupils beareth some sensible proporticm to it, the sensation nindi 
attends the turning or straining of the eyes, in ordter to oMe 
the two optic axes therein, is to be ccMisiderad as one means of 
our perceiving distance »^. It must be owned^ this sensalioa te^ 
longetii properly to the sense of fieeling; but, as it waits vqpan and 
hath a regular connexion with distinct vision of near distance 
(the nearer this, the greater that), so it is natural tiittt it sfaoiiU 
become a sign Uiereof, and suggest it to the mind«>. And tiiat it 
is so in feet follows from that known experiment dS Kafigiiig up 
a ring edge-wise to the eyes, and then endeavouring, widi one cjt 
shut, by a lateral motion, to insert into it the end of a stick; 
which is found more di£Bcult to perform than with both eyes open, 
from the want of this means of judging by tiie sensation attending 
the nearer meeting or crossing of the two optic axes. 

67. True it is that the mind of man is pleased to observe in 
nature rules or methods, simple, uniform, general, and reduciUe 
to mathematics, as a means of rendering its knowledge at once 
easy and extensive. But we must not, for the sake of uniformities 
or analogies, depart from truth and fact, nor imagine that in all 
cases the apparent place or distance of an object must be sug- 
gested by the same means. And, indeed, it answers the end of 
vision to suppose that the mind should have certain additional 
means or helps, for judging more accurately of the distance of 
those objects which are the nearest, and consequently most con- 
cern us. 

68. It is also to be observed that when the distance is so small 
that the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable proportion to it, 
the object appears confused. And this confusion being constantly 
observed in poring on such near objects, and increasing as the 
distance lessens, becomes thereby a means of suggesting the place 
of an object 83. For, one idea is qualified to suggest another, merely 
by being often perceived with it. And, if the one increaseth 

•» \Tbeory of Vision, ttct 16, 17]— " [Supra, sect 39]— Attthoiu 

Author. • [Tbtory of Vision, sect. 21]— Author. 



f . 



Vindicated and Explained. 399 

cither directly or inversely as the other, various degrees of the 
former will suggest various degrees of the latter, by virtue of such 
habitual connexion, and proportional increase or diminution. 
And thus the gradual changing confiisedness of an object may 
concur to form our apprehension of near distance, when we look 
only with one eye. And this alone may explain Dr. Barrow^s 
di£Eiculty, the case as proposed by him regarding only one visible 
point®*. And when several points are considered, or the image 
supposed an extended surface, its increasing confusedness will, in 
that case, concur with the increasing magnitude to diminish its 
distance, which will be inversely as both. 

69. Our experience in Vision is got by the naked eye. We 
apprehend or judge from this same experience, when we look 
through glasses. We may not, nevertheless, in all cases, conclude 
from the one to the other ^ because that certain circumstances, 
either excluded or added, by the help of glasses, may sometimes 
alter our judgments, particularly as they depend upon prxnotions. 

70. What I have here written may serve as a commentary on 
ray Essay towards a New Theory ofVision ,• and, I believe, will make 
it plain to thinking men. In an age wherein we hear so much 
of thinking and reasoning, it may seem needless to observe, how 
useful and necessary it is to think, in order to obtain just and 
accurate notions, to distinguish things that are diflFerent, to speak 
consistently, to know even our own meaning. And yet, for want 
of this, we may see many, even in these days, run into perpetual 
blunders and paralc^isms. No friend, therefore, to truth and 
knowledge would lay any restraint or discouragement on thinking. 
There are, it must be owned, certain general maxims, the result 
of ages, and the collected sense of thinking persons, which serve 
instead of thinking, for a guide or rule to the multitude, who, 
not caring to think for themselves, it is fit they should be con- 
ducted by the thoughts of others. But those who, set up for them- 
selveS) those who depart from the public rule, or those who would 
reduce them to it, if they do not think, what will men think of 
them ? As I pretend not to make any discoveries which another 
mi^t not as well have made, who should have thought it worth 
his pains: so I must needs say that without pains and thought 

•• \Tb€ory of Vision, sect. 29] — Author. 



400 The Theory of Vision Vindicated a$id E^Udned. 

no man will ever understand the true nature of Vision, tx cooh 
prehend what I have wrote concerning it. 

71. s^Befbre I conclude, it may not be amiss toadd the fidlowiiig 
extract from the FtiUstftiad lysmsaohmSy relating to a person 
blind from his inBuicy, and long after made to see : — ^ When he 
first saw, he was so far from making any judgment sdxxit^iistaiices 
that he thought all objects whatever toudied his eyes (as he ex- 
pressed it) as what he felt did his skin, and thouglit no objects 
so agreeable as those which were smooth and r^;ular, tbougli he 
could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was ia 
any object that was pleasing to him. He knew not the diape of 
anything^ nor any one thing from another, however di£Ferent m 
shape or magnitude : but upon being told what things were^ wbdK 
form he before knew fix)m Feeling, he would carefully obsofe 
them that he mi^t know tiiem again; but having too many 
objects to learn at once, he fbrgpt many of them; and (as he said) 
at first he learned to know, and again forgot, a thousand dungs 
in a day. Several weeks after he was couched, being deceived 
by pictures, he asked which was the lying sense — ^Fe^ling or 
Seeing? He was never able to imagine any lines beyond the 
bounds he saw. The room he was in, he said, he knew to be part 
of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house 
could look bigger. He said every new object was a new delight, 
and the pleasure was so great that he wanted ways to express it®^.* 
— ^Thus, by fact and experiment, those points of the theory which 
seem the most remote from common apprehension were not a 
little confirmed, many years after I had been led into the discovery 
of them by reasoning. 



; 



"* Sect. 71 contains Berkeley's principal 
reference to external observation and experi- 
ment, as distinguished from reflection upon 
what we are conscious of— in verification 
of the New Theory, and especially in veri- 
fication of the principle that our power of 
interpreting the real or tangible meaning 
of visual signs is due, not to an original 



instinct, but to the suggestion of custom. 

^ [Pbilosopbieal TYansaeiions, No. 40a] 
— Author. This is Berkeley's only allu- 
sion to the famous experiment of Cheselden, 
recorded in the PbQosophieal TVanstietktni 
for 1 728. This original record is given at 
full length in a supplementary note at the 
end of this volume. 



FINIS. 



-/f Ijttterfrom an Awmymous Writer to the Author of the Minute 

Fhilosopher ^ 

RsvKREND Sir, 

I have read over your treatise called Alciphron, in which the 
Free-thinkers of the present age, in their various shifted tenets, are 
pleasantly, elegantly, and solidly confuted. The style is easy, the 
language plain, and the arguments are nervous. But upon the Treatise 
annexed thereto ^ and upon that part where you seem to intimate that 
Vision is the sole Language of God', I beg leave to make these few 
observations, and offer them to your's and your readers' consideration. 

1. Whatever it is without that is the cause of any idea within, I call 
the object of sense ; the sensations arising from such objects, I call ideas. 
The objects, therefore, that cause such sensations are without us, and 
the ideas within. 

2. Had we but one sense, we might be apt to conclude that there 
were no objects at all without us, but that the whole scene of ideas 
which passed through the mind arose from its internal operations; 
but since the same object is the cause of ideas by different senses, 
thence we infer its existence. But, though the object be one and 
the same, the ideas that it produces in different senses have no manner 
of similitude with one another. Because, 

3. Whatever connexion there is betwixt the idea of one sense and 
the dea of another, produced by the same object, arises only from 
experience. To explain this a little familiarly, let us suppose a man 
to have such an exquisite sense of feeling given him that he could 
perceive plainly and distinctly the inequality of the surface of two 
objects, which, by its reflecting and refracting the rays of light, produces 



> This 'Letter' appeared in the Dcaly * The Esuty towards a New Theory of 

FoUSoy, September 9, 1732. The first Vision — which was annexed to Alcipbrom, 

tdSltioQ of Aleifhron, or T*b€ Minute Pbiloso- on account of its connexion with the Fourth 

published in Dublin six months Dialogue. 



bdbffc, and the Theory 0/ Vision Vindicated * e.g. Essay, sect. 147 ; with which cf. 

four months after its appear- Alcipbron, Dial. IV. sect. 7 — 15. 



aooe. The 'Letter is appended to the latter. 
VOL. I. D d 



402 Letter to the 

the ideas of colours. At first, in the dark, though he plainly perceived 
a difference by his touch, yet he could not possibly tell which was red 
and which was white, whereas a little experience would make him feel 
a colour in the dark, as well as see it in the light. 

4. The same word in languages stands very often for the object 
without, and the ideas it produces within, in the several senses. When 
it stands for any object without, it is the representative of no manner 
of idea ; neither can we possibly have any idea of what is solely without 
us. Because, 

5. Ideas within have no other connexion with the objects withoot 
than from the frame and make of our bodies, which is by the arbitrary 
appointment of God ; and, though we cannot well help imagining that 
the objects without are something like our ideas within, yet a new set 
of senses, or the alteration of the old ones, would soon convince us of 
our mistake; and, though our ideas would then be never so different, 
yet the objects might be the same. 

6. However, in the present situation of affairs, there is an infallible 
certain connexion betwixt the idea and the object; and, therefore, 
when an object produces an idea in one sense, we know, but from 
experience only, what idea it will produce in another sense. 

7. The alteration of an object may produce a different idea in one 
sense from what it did before, which may not be distinguished by 
another sense. But, where the alteration occasions different ideas in 
different senses, we may, from our infallible experience, argue from 
the idea of one sense to that of the other; so that, if a different idea 
arises in two senses from the alteration of an object, either in situation 
or distance, or any other way, when we have the idea in one sense, 
we know from use what idea the object so situated will produce in 
the other. 

8. Hence, as the operations of Nature are always regular and uniform, 
where the same alteration of the object occasions a smaller difference 
in the ideas of one sense, and a greater in the other, a curious obsen'er 
may argue as well from exact observations as if the difference in the 
ideas was equal ; since experience plainly teaches us that a just propor- 
tion is observed in the alteration of the ideas of each sense, from the 
alteration of the object. Within this sphere is confined all the judicious 
observations and knowledge of mankind. 

Now, from these observations, rightly understood and considered, 
your New Theory of Vision must in a great measure fall to the ground, 
and the laws of Optics will be found to stand upon the old unshaken 
bottom. For, though our ideas of magnitude and distance in one sense 



Author of the Minute Philosopher, 403 

are entirely different from our ideas of magnitude and distance in 
another, yet we may justly argue from one to the other, as they have 
one common cause without, of which, as without, we cannot possibly 
have the faintest idea. The ideas I have of distance and magnitude 
by feeling are widely different from the ideas I have of them by seeing ; 
but that someihtng without which is the cause of all the variety of the 
ideas within, in one sense, is the cause also of the variety in the other ; 
and, as they have a necessary connexion with it, we may very justly 
demonstrate from our ideas of feeling of the same object what will 
be our ideas in seeing. And, though to talk of seeing by tangible 
angles and tangible lines be, I agree with you, direct nonsense, 
yet to demonstrate from angles and lines in feeling^, to the ideas in 
seeing that arise from the same common object, is very good sense, 
and so vice versd. 

From these observations, thus hastily laid together, and a thorough 
digestion thereof, a great many useful corollaries in all philosophical 
disputes might be collected. 

I am. 

Your humble servant, &c. 



Dda 



APPENDIX. 



A. 



BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 

[After the Principles of Human Knowledge had passed through the 
press, I found Berkeley's autograph of a rough draft of the Introduction, 
in the manuscript department of the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. 
It seems to have been written in November and December, 1708. I here 
present it to the reader, who will find that it varies considerably from 
the published version, besides containing erasures and interlineations 
which have a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical interest. 
As this Introduction forms Berkeley's early attack upon metaphysical 
abstractions, and his reasoned exposition of what has since been called 
his Nominalism, it may be well to have so important a part of his philo- 
sophy placed before us in various verbal forms which it successively 
assumed when it was struggling into the final expression. The student 
of his mind may like also to compare these with still earlier illustrative 
fragments in the Commonplace Book^ appended to his Life and Letters^ as 
well as with the theory of universals in Alciphron and especially in Siris. 
What Berkeley here means to deny is the existence of any physical 
reality, corresponding to general names, apart from actual or imagined 
sensible phenomena. In this early attack upon 'abstract ideas,' his 
characteristic ardour carried him in appearance to the extreme of re- 
jecting the universalizing element, by which Mind constitutes and gives 
objectivity to things, and of resting knowledge on the shifting founda- 
tion of phenomena or ideas — particular, contingent, and subjective. But 
if he seems to do this in the Introduction, he virtually proceeds in the 
body of the Principles upon the assumption that personal substantiality 
and efficient or voluntary causality are universal and uncreated necessities 
of Being — axiomatic truths involved in all concrete consciousness of 
phenomena. This assumption (along with the assumed general fact of 
established cosmical order) redeems his philosophy from subjectivity, 
and gives cohesion and fixedness to knowledge. This stable inteUectu- 
ality is more manifest in Siris, But he everywhere leans on living acts, 
not verbal formulas. 

A. C. F.] 



4o8 Appendix A. 



Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and 
truth, it may seem strange that they who have spent much time 
and pains in it, do usually find themselves embarrassM with more 
doubts and difficulties than they were before they [^camc to 
that study. There is nothing these men can [ * touchj with their 
hands or behold with their eyes but has its inaccessible and dark 
sides. Something ] they imagine to be in every drop of water, 
every grain of sand which can puzzle [ ^ and confound] the most 
clear and [ * elevated] understanding, and are often by their prin- 
ciples led into a necessity of admitting the most irreconcilable 
opinions for true, or (which is worse) of sitting down in a 
forlorn scepticism. 

The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, 
together with the natural weakness and imperfection of our 
understanding. It is said the senses we have are few, and these 
designed by nature only for the support of life, and not to pene- 
trate into the constitution and inward essence of things. Besides, 
the mind of man being finite when it treats of things which par- 
take of infinity, it is not to be wonder'd at if it run into 
absurdities ^ and contradictions, out of which it is [ ^ absolutely] 
impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature 
of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite ^. 

But I cannot think our faculties are so weak and inadequate in 
respect of things, as these men would make us believe. I cannot 
be brought to suppose that right deductions from true principles 
should ever end"^ in consequences which cannot be maintained or 
made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more 
bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire 
for that which he had placed quite out of their reach, and so made 
it impossible for them to obtain. Surely our wise and good 
Crcatour would never have made us so eager in the search of truth 
meerly to baulk and perplex us, to make us blame our faculties. 



* On the opp)Osite page of the MS., instead ' Erased. 

of what follows within brackets — * meddled * 'comprehensive.* 

with that study. To them the most common * ' absurdities' instead of ' inconsistencys* 

and familiar things appear intricate and per- erased. 

plex'd, there's nothing but has its dark fides. * on the margin of this paragraph is 

Somewhat' written — * Nov. 15, 1708.' 

* • handle.' ^ * end' instead of ' terminate' erased. 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 409 

t 

and bewail our inevitable ignorance. This were not agreeable to 

the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever 
appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually 
fiimish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not 
fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole my opinion is, that the far 
greatest part, if not all, of those difficultys which have hitherto 
amus'd philosophers, and block'd up the way to knowledge, are 
entirely owing to themselves. That they have first raised a dust, 
and then complain they cannot see. 

My purpose therefore is, to [®^ try if I can] discover [• and 
point out] what those principles are which have introduc'd all that 
doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurditys and contradictions 
into the several sects of philosophy, insomuch that the wisest 
men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise 
from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And at 
the same time to establish such principles in their stead, as shall 
be free from the like consequences, and lead the mind into a clear 
view of truth. And surely it is a work well deserving of our 
pains^ to try to extend the limits of our knowledge, and ['^do 
right to] human understanding, by making it to appear that those 
lets and difficultys which stay and embarrass the mind in its 
enquirys [ ^^ after truth] do not spring from any darkness and 
intricacy in the objects, or [ ^^ natural] defect in the intellectual 
powers, so much as from false principles which have been insisted 
on, and might have been avoided. 

How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, 
when I consider what a number of men of very great and extra- 
ordinary abilitys have gone before me, [ ^ and miscarry*d] in the 
like [ ^' designs, yet] I am not without some hopes, upon the con- 
sideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and 
that he who is shortsighted will be apt to draw the object nearer, 
and by a close and narrow survey may perhaps discern that which 
had escaped far better eyes. 

[ ^* In my entrance upon this work] I think it necessary to take 

* Instead of ' endeavour to/ * Erased. '* Instead of * But here in the entrance, 

** Instead of ' beat down those mounds before I proceed any further.* On the 

and barriers that have been put to.' blAk page opposite we have — * In my en- 

>* Within brackeU in the MS. trance upon this work [before I descend to 

>* Instead of ' incurable ' erased. more particular subjects] [uid] 

" Instead of ' undertakings.* [to more particular enquirys].' 



I 

I 

1 
1 

ft 



I 410 

notice of [ ^' that wh seems to have been the source of a great many 
errours, and to have made the way to knowledge very intncalt 
and perplex'd, that wch seems to have had a chiefe part in rendering 
speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have been the source « 
innumerable errours and difficulties in almost all parts of know- 
ledge] — and that is the opinion that there are Abstract Ideas or 
General Conceptions of Things. He who is not a perfect stranger 
to the writings and ['^notions] of philosophers must needs 
acknowledge that [ " no small] part of [ " them] are spent '* about 
Abstract Ideas. These are, in a more special manner, thought to ■ 
be the objects of those sciences that go by the name of It^ic anJ ' 
metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion rf 
the most abstracted and sublime philosophy. In all whidi 
[ '" speculative sciences] you shall scarce find any question handW 
[ '" by the philosophers] in such a manner as does not suppose their 
existence in the mind, and that it is very well acquainted with 
them ; [ '"' so that these parts of learning must of necessity be 
overrun with [very much] useles wrangling and jargon, [innu- 
merable] absurdities and contradictions [opinions], if so be that 
Abstract General Ideas are perfectly inconceivable, as I am well 
cssur'd they [never were — cannot be] conceived by me, [ *' nor do 
I think it possible they should be conceiv'd by any one else].] 

By abstract idea, genera, species, universal notions, all which 
amount to the same thing, as I find these terms explain'd by the 
best and clearest writers, we are to understand ideas which 
equally represent the p.irticulars of any sort, and are made by the 
mind which, observing that the individuals of each kind agree io 
some things and differ in others, takes out and singles from the 
rest that which is common to all, making thereof one abstract 
general idea; which [^"general idea] contains all those ideas 
wherein the particulars of that kind agree [ -'" and partake]^ 
separated from and exclusive of all those other concomitant ideas 



" liKlnii of — ■ y* w"" «f m 10 mt [one] " initeid of ■ vaj great.' 

very powerful and nnirecta! cante of erroi " Intlnd of ' their diiputei and t oa tati- 

and confusion thronghoul Ihe phiiotophy of plilioni l>pecuIatioiiiJ .' 

all icctt and agn' — and the oppoiile page, " ' concerning ' initead of ' about * etaaed. 

' that which Kerns to me a wide>ipread Jlin '* T.mei, 

philoKipfaical enquirjt] ihroughonl lb< phi- " On opposite page — 'and I *«]r mncb 

lotophy of all lectt and ag«.' qneition ohether they ercr were 01 ran be 

" BnckeU in the MS. by any one elie." 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 4 1 1 

whereby they [ ^^ individuals] are distinguished [ ^ from each 
other] one from another. [ *2 To this abstract general idea thus 
framed the mind gives a general name, and lays it up and uses it 
as a standard whereby to judge what particulars are and what are 
not to be accounted erf" that sort, those onely which contain every 
part of the general idea having a right to be admitted into that 
sort and called by that name.] 

For example, Ae mind having observed that Peter, James, and 
Jcdm, &c. resemble each other in certain common agreements of 
diape and other quality, leaves out of the complex idea it has of 
Peter, James, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retaining onely 
that which is common to all. And so it makes one [ '^ abstract ] 
complex idea^ wherein all the particulars partake, abstracting 
entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differ- 
ences which might determine it to any particular existence : and 
after this manner you come by [^*the] precise abstract idea of [**a] 
man. In which [ ^ idea] it is true there is included colour^ because 
there is no man but hath some colour, but then it can be neither 
white [ 2« colour] nor black [ ** colour] nor any particular colour, 
but colour in general, because there is no one particular colour 
wherein all men partake. In like manner you will tell me there 
is included stature, but it is neither tall stature nor low stature, 
nor yet middling stature, but stature in general. And so of the rest. 
[** Suppose now T should ask whether you comprehended, in this 
your abstract idea of man, the ideas of eyes, or ears, or nose, or 
legs, or arms, [this might perhaps put you to a stand for an answer, 
for] you will own it to be an odd and mutilated idea of a man 
w*'* is without all these. Yet it must be so to make it consistent 
with the doctrine of abstract ideas, there being particular men 
that want, some arms, some legs, [some] noses, &c.] 

r ** But supposing the abstract idea of man to be very conceiv- 
able, let us proceed to see [ 2« how] it comes to be enlarged into the 
more general and comprehensive idea of animal.] There being a 
great variety of other creatures [ ^ as birds] that partake in some 
parts, but not all, kA the complex idea of man, the mind leaving 

* Erased. ** Instead of ' general.' same page — * it must needs [make an odd 
^ Instead of ' a clear.' and frigntftil figure the idea] of [a] man 

* Erased. On opposite page, but erased, without all these,' also erased. 

arc the words—' an odd and mutilated idea, " Instead of * by what steps and abstrac- 

tluit of man without all these.' And on the tions.* 




I 



Appendix A. 

out those parts which arc peculiar to men, and retaining those 
onely which are common to all the living creatures, frames the 
idea of animal, \y which is more general than that of man, a 
comprehending not only all particular men, but also all birdS) 
beasts, fishes, and insects.] The constituent parts whereof ["rf 
the complex idea of animal] are body, life, sense, and spontaneois 
motion. By body is meant body [■" in general], without anji 
particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure com- 
mon to all animals, without covering either of hair, or feather;;, 
or [ »« scales], and yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers, [ ** scales], and 
nakedness being peculiar distinguishing properties of [ ^^ the] par. 
ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the [^ abGtract] 
idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be 
neither walking nor flying nor creeping, it is nevertheless a 
motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to say. 

In like manner a man \y having seen several lines] by leaving 
out of his idea of a line [^the particular colour and length], 
comes by the idea of a line, which is neither black, nor white, nor 
red. Sec, nor long nor short, which he calls the abstract idea of 
a line, and which, for ought that 1 can see, is just nothing. 
r^ For I ask whether a line has any more than one particular 
colour and one particular length, which [when they are] being left 
out, I beseech any ■'' one to consider what it is that remains.] 

Whether others have this [ ^^ wonderful ] faculty of abstracting 
their ideas, they can [ ^* best ] tell. For myself, I dare be confident 
I have it not ; [ ^ and I am apt to think that some of those who 
iancy themselves to enjoy that privilege, would, upon looking 
narrowly into their own thoughts, find they wanted it as much 
as I. For there was a time when, being banter'd and abus'd by 
words, I did not in the least doubt my having it. But upon a 
strict survey of my abilitys, I not only discover my own deficiency 
in that point, but also cannot conceive it possible that such a 
person should be even in the most perfect and exalted under- 
standing.] I find I have a faculty of imagining, conceiving, or 
representing to myself the ideas of those particular things 1 have 



" EiiKil. '* liisleid of ' I 

■ IniMad of" gcneril.' 
^ Initcad or ■ ill pirticulir Colon 
kU pinicvlu length.' 



' ' oi.c ■ iiutcad of ■ man.' 
" Inilcad of ' mtrvcUoui.' 
■ liuteid of ■better.' 



Principles of Human Knowledge, 



413 



perceiv'd, and of variously compounding and dividing them. 
I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a 
man joyn'd to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, 
the eye, the nose each by itself [ ^* abstracted or ] separated from 
the rest erf" the body. But then whatever eye or nose I imagine, 
they must have some particular shape and colour. The idea of 
man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, 
or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling 
sized man. I cannot by any eflFort of [ ^* thought] frame to myselt 
an idea of man [ ^^ prescinding from all particulars] that shall have 
nothing particular in it. [ ®® For my life I cannot comprehend 
abstract ideas 3"^.] 

And there are grounds to think [ ^® most ] men will acknow- 
ledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which 
are simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is 
said they are difficult and not to be attained without much study 
and speculation, we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if 
such there be, they are altogether confinM to the learned. 

But it must be confessed, 1 do not see what great advantage they 
give them above the rest of mankind. He who considers that 
whatever has any existence in nature and can any wise affect or 
concern [^^is] him is particular, will not find great cause to be 
discontent with his facultys, if [ ^* they ] cannot reach a piece of 
knowledge as useless as it is refin*d ; [ ^* and ] which whether it 
be to be found even in those deep thinkers may well be made 
a question. 

For besides the [ <o incomprehensibleness ] of abstract ideas to 
my understanding (which may pass for an argument, since those 
gentlemen do not pretend to any new facultys distinct from those 
of ordinary men), there are not wanting other proofs against them. 
[ *^ It is, I think, a received axiom that an impossibility cannot 
be conceived. For what created intelligence will pretend to 



^ Instead of ' singled out and.' 

"* Instead of * imagination.' 

** Erased. 

* On opposite page the words — * I can 
conceive well enough what is meant by 
adequate and inadequate, clear and obscure, 
distinct and confiis'd [ideas], but' — are 
written and erased. 

" Instead of ' the far greatest part of.' 

» Instead of ' he.' 



** Instead of ' incomprehensibility,' and 
on opposite page, but erased — ' incomprehen- 
sibleness to my understanding by 
any [intellect — ^understanding] whatsoerer.' 

** Erased. On opposite page — * That a 
contradiction cannot be conceiv'd by any 
human understanding whatsoerer is, I think, 
agreed on all hands. And to roe it is no 
less clear that the description of an abstract 
idea doth include a contradiction in it.' 




I 



Appendix A. 

conceive that which God cannot cause to be? Now it is on all 
hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general caa be made naUf 
to exist j whence it should seem to foUow, that it caimot havc« 
much as an ideal existence in the understanding.] 

['^ I do not think it necessary to insist on any more proc^, 
against the doctrine of abstraction in this place, especially for lial 
the absurditys, which in the pragrtss of this work I shall obscnc 
to have sprung from that doctrine, will yield plenty of argumeob 
a posteriori against it.] I proceed [ *i therefore ] to examine 
what can be aliedged in defence [ *^ of the doctrine of abstrac- 
tion], and try if I can discover what it is that [** inclines] lie 
men of speculation to embrace an opinion so pregnant of 
absurditys, and so remote from common sense as that s=«i» 
to be. 

There has been a late excellent and deservedly estccm'd philo- 
sopher, to whose judgment, so far as authority is of any weight 
with me, I would pay the utmost deference. This great man, 
no doubt, has very much countenanc'd the doctrine of abstraction 
by seeming to think [ *■■ it ] is that which puts the widest difierence 
in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. Thus speakl 
he: 'The having of general ideas is tliat which puts a perfect 
distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency whicb 
the facultys of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is 
evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of 
general signs for [^"making] universal ideas; from which we have 
reason to imagme that they have not the faculty of abstracting, 
or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any 
other general signs.' And a little lower ; ' Therefore I think we 
may suppose that 'tis in this that the species of brutes are dis- 
criminated from men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they 
are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a 
distance. For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare 
machines {as some would have them), we cannot deny them to 
have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some 
of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense, 
but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receiv'd them from 
their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 4 1 5 

narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlai^e 
them by any kind of abstraction.' (Essay on Human VnderstanMng^ 
Book 2. chap 11. s. 10, 11.) I readily agree with this authour that 
the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to the making of 
abstract general ideas. But then if that inability to abstract be 
made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a 
great many of those that now pass for men must be reckoned into 
tiieir number. 

The reason which is here assigned why we have no grounds 

to think that brutes have general ideas, is that we observe in 

them no use of words or any other general signs — which is built 

cm this supposition — that the making 'use of words implys the 

having of general ideas, and that [ *'' on the other hand ] those 

who have general ideas fail not to make use of words, or other 

universal signs, [*® whereby] to express [^ and signify them ], 

[ *• That this is the ] From which it must follow, that men who 

use language are able to abstract and generalize their ideas, but 

brutes [ *9 that ] use it not are destitute of that faculty. TTiat 

this is the sense and arguing of the authour of the Essay^ will 

farther appear, by his answering the question he in another place 

puts. Since all things that exist are only particulars^ how come 

we by general terms ? His answer is — ^ Words become general by 

being made the signs of general ideas.' {Essay on Human Under- 

stanJhtgy b. 3. c. 3. s. 6.) From which assertion I must crave 

leave to dissent^ being of opinion that a word becomes general 

by being [ *o,the ] made the sign, not of a general idea, but of many 

particular ideas. Sure I am, as to What concerns myself, when 

I say the word Socrates is a proper [ ^^ or particular] name, and the 

word man an appellative or general name, I mean no more than 

this, viz. that the one is peculiar and appropriated to one particular 

person, the other common to a great many particular persons, each 

["of which] has an equall right in propriety of language to 

be called by the name man. [ •*«* This, I say, is the whole truth 

of the matter, and not that I make any incomprehensible abstract 

idea whereunto I annex the name man. That were to [ make ] 

my words stand for I know not what.] 

That great man seems to think the necessary ends of language 

«» Instead of * reciprocally; ~ Within brackeU in the MS. 

•• Erased. *• Instead of « who.' " Instead of 'whereof.' 



could not be attain'ii [ ^^ to] without the use of abstract ideas. B. j. 
c, 6. s. 39 ['^he shews it] and elsewhere he shews it to be ha 
opinion that they are made in order to naming. B, 3. c. 1. s. j 
he has these words : 'It is not enough for the perfection of 
language that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless tbcsc 
signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular 
things: for the multiplication of words would have pcrplcjc'd their 
use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be 
signified by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet 
a farther improvement in the use of general terms whereby one 
word was made to mark a number of particular existences, which 
advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference 
of the ideas they were miidc signs of. Those names becoming 
general which are made to stand for general ideas, and those 
remaining particular where the ideas they are used for are par- 
ticular.' Now I would fain know why a word may not be mAde 
to comprehend a great number of particular things in its signi- 
fication, without the [*'help] of a general idea? Is it not 
possible to give the name [ ^* colour to black, white, and red, fitc.] 
without having first made that strange and to me incomprehen- 
sible idea of ["■ colour in abstract ] ? Or must we imagine that 
a child upon sight of a particular body, and being told it is 
called an apple, must first frame to himself an abstract general 
idea [ ■"'" exclusive of ] all particular colour, tast, and figure before 
he can attain to the use of the word apple, and apply it to all the 
particulars of that sort of fruit that come in his way? [" This 
surely is a task too hard and metaphysical to be perform'd by aa 
infant just beginning to speak.] Nay, I appeal to the experience 
of any grown man, whether this be the course he takes 
acquainting himself with the [*^ right] use and signification of 
any word ? Let any man take a fair and impartial view of his 
own thoughts, and then determine whether his general words do 
not become so only by being made to mark a number of particular 
existences, without any the least thought of abstraction. For 
what, 1 pray, are words but signs of our thoughts ? and how are 



" En«<l. 

" liumd of ■ ii 

•• Initud Df-i 
John.' 



d of ■ Ihneof, abilncling fr 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 417 

signs of any sort render'd universal otherwise than by being made 
to signify, or represent indiflperently, a multitude of particular 
things? 

The ideas that are in every man's mind ly hid[**den], and 
cannot of themselves be brought into the view of another. It 
vas therefore necessary, for discourse and communication, that 
men should institute sounds to be signs of their ideas, which 
being [ ^^ excited ] in the mind of the hearer [ «® might ] bring 
along with them [ ^^ into his understanding ] such ideas as in 
the propriety of any language were annexed to them. But because 
of the almost infinite number and variety of our [ ^^ ideas ], it is 
impossible, and if it were possible would yet be a useless thing, 
to appropriate a particular [ *® word to a ] sign or name to every 
one of them. From which it must necessarily follow, that one 
word be made the sign of a great number of particular ideas, 
between which there is some likeness and which are said to 
be of the same sort. [ ^^ But then these sorts are not determined 
and set out by nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor 
yet are they limited by any precise abstract ideas settl'd in the 
mind, with the general name annexed to them, as is the opinion 
of the authour of the Essaj^ nor do they in truth seem to me to 
have any precise bounds or limits at all. For if [there were] 
they had I do not see how there could be those doubts and 
scruples about the sorting of particular beings which [that authour 
insists on as a good proof] are observed sometimes to have 
happened. Neither do I think it necessary the kinds or species 
of things should be so very accurately bounded and marked out, 
language being made by and for the common use of men, who 
do not ordinarily take notice of the minuter and less considerable 
differences of things.] From [ *« all ] which to me it seems 
evident that the having of general names does not imply the 
having of general ideas, but barely the marking by them a 
number of particular ideas, and that all the ends of language 



" Erased. * Instead of * raised.' either for universal natures distinct from our 

** Instead of ' shall.' conceptions as was held by the Peripatetics 

** Instead of ' thoughts.* and generality of the Schoolmen, nor jret for 

* Erased. On the opposite page we universal notions or ideas as is the opinion 

hsve— 'Every one's experience may con- of that sort of Schoolmen called Nominala 

vioce him that this is all that's meant by and of the authour of the Euay: 

general names, and that they do not stand 

VOL. I. E e 



41 8 Appendix A. 

may be and are attained without the help of any such facidtj 
as abstraction. 

Which will be made yet more manifest if we consider the 
diflFerent manners wherein words [ ^ and ideas [ are ] do stand 
for and represent things ] represent ideas, and ideas things. There 
is no siniilitude or resemblance betwixt words and the ideas that 
are marked by them. Any name may be used indiflerently for 
the sign of any idea, or any number of ideas, it not being deter- 
mined by any likeness to represent one more than another. But 
it is not so with ideas in respect of .things, of which they are 
supposed to be the copies and images. They are not thought to 
represent them [ ^^ any ] otherwise than as they resemble them. 
Whence it follows that an idea is not capable of representing 
indifferently anything [ ^ whatsoever ], it being limited by the 
likeness it beares to some particular [^^ thing] to represent it 
rather than any other. The word man may equally be put to 
signify any particular man I can think of. But I cannot frame 
an idea of man which shall equally represent and correspond to 
each particular of that sort of creatures that may possibly exist. 

I shall [^ only] add one more passage out of the Bssaj tm 
Human Understanding^ which is as follows: * Abstract ideas are 
not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind 
as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men 'tis only 
because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For 
when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general 
ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry diffi- 
culty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we arc 
apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and 
skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none 
of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult), for it must be 
neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor 
scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is some- 
thing imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of 
several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 'Tis 
true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, 
and makes all the hast to them it can, for the conveniency of 
communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which 

"Erased. ** Instead of ' or number of things.' ** Instead of 'existence.* 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 419 

it is naturally very much enclin'd; but yet one has reason to 
suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this 
is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are 
not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, 
nor such as its earlyest knowledge is conversant about/ B. 4. c. 7. 
8. 9* If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such 
an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend 
to dispute him out of it, nor would I go phout it. All I desire is 
that every one would fiilly and certainly inform himself whether 
he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard 
task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any .one 
to look a little into his own understanding, and there try whether 
be has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with 
the description here given of the general idea of a triangle which 
is neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, 
nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? He that can 
* conceive such manifest contradictions and inconsistencys, 'tis 
fit he enjoy his privilege. For my part [ ^ I am well assured] ^7 1 
have not the power of so doing, nor consequently of making to 
myself these general ideas ; neither do I find that 1 have any need 
of them either for the conveniency of communication or the en- 
largement of knowledge [ ^ for the conveniency of communication 
and enlargement of knowledge. For which I am not sorry, because 
it is here said one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of 
our impirfection. Tho', 1 must own, 1 do not see how this agrees 
with what has been above quoted [out of the same authour], viz. 
die having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction 
betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of 
hnites do by no means attain unto.] 

It is observable [ ^s what it is here said] of the difficulty that 
abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill that is 
requisite to the forming [^ of] them. To the same purpose Aristotle 
(who was certainly a great admirer and promoter of the doctrine 
of abstraction) has these words : y(jihhv 5c koI xoAcTrwrara yvn^pCC^iv 
rote iufOfnivois 'ori to, ^Aicrra Kad6\ov 'noj^ponriiTui yap r^v aUBrf(T€iiv 
Wi. There is scarce anything so incomprehensible to men as 

** Erased. understanding, that/ 

^ Od opposite page — erased — ' I must ^ Instead of * that which is [here] said by 

own I have so much of the brute in my that authour on this occasion.' 

E e 2 



420 Appendix A, 

the most universal notions, because they are most remote from 
sense. Metafh, lib. i. cap. 2®^. It is on all hands agreed, that 
there is need of great pains and toil and labour of the mind, to 
emancipate [''^our thoughts] fiom particular ideas such as ait 
taken in by the senses, and raise [ '^^ them] to those lofty specu- 
lations [ "f^ which] are conversant about abstract and universal 
ones. 

From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that 
so difficult a thing as the forming of abstract ideas is not necessary 
for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of 
men, even the most barbarous and unreflecting. But we are told, 
if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, *tis only because by 
constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know 
at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that diffi- 
culty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary [ '^^ materials] 
of discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then they 
are not conscious of any such pains-taking. It remains therefore 
to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and 
multiply^ labour of framing general notions will be found a hard 
task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that 
a couple of children cannot commune one with another of their 
sugar-plumbs and rattles, and the rest of their little trinkets, till 
they have first tack'd together numberless inconsistencys, and so 
framed in their minds general abstract ideas, and annexed them 
to every common name they make use of? 

Nor do I think they are a whit more needful for enlargement 
of knowledge, than for communication. For tho* it be a point 
much insisted on in the Schools that all knowledge is about 
universals, yet I \^^ can by no means see the necessity of] this 
doctrine. It is acknowledged that nothing has a fairer title to 
the name of knowledge or science than geometry. Now I appeal 
to any man's thoughts whether, upon the entrance into that study, 
the first thing to be done is to try to conceive a circle that is 
neither great nor small, nor of any determinate radius, or to make 
ideas of triangles and parallelograms that are neither rectangular 

* Text as in Schwcgler — (rx«8^K 8i koX '* Instead of ' that.' 

Xa^**<^TOTo toDto -ywpi^iiv ro7s ivdpuirot*, " Instead of • praeliminarys.* 

Ta fidKKrra KaB6\ov iroppwrarw yap t«f '^ Instead of • [could never] bring myself 

tutrd^ifftwp 4(my. to comprehend.* 

^0 Instead of 'it.' 



Principles of Human Knowledge* 42 1 

nor obllquangular^ &c. ? It is [ '^^ true] one thing for a proposition 
to be universally true, and another for it to be about universal 
natures or notions. ]J^ Because] that the three angles of a triangle 
are equal to two right ones is granted to be a proposition uni- 
versally true, it will not therefore follow that we are to understand 
it of universal triangles, or universal angles. It will suffice that 
it be true of \J^ any particular tri] the particular angles of any 
particular triaiigle whatsoever. 

But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition 
to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen 
it demonstrated of the general idea of a triangle, which equally 
agrees to and represents them all ? For because a property may 
be demonstrated to belong to some one particular triangle, it will 
not thence follow that it equally belongs to [ '* some] any other 
triangle which in all respects is not the same with the former. 
For instance, having demonstrated that the three angles of an 
isosceles, rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot 
therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which 
have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore, 
that to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must 
either make a particular demonstration for every particular 
triangle, which is impossible, or else we must, once for all, 
demonstrate it of the general idea of a triangle in which all 
the particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are 
all equally represented. 

To which I answer, that notwithstanding the idea I have in my 
mind, whilst I make the demonstration, be that of some particular 
triangle, e.g. an isosceles, rectangular ones whose sides are of 
a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain that it 
extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness 
soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, 
nor determinate length of the legs are at all concern'd in the 
demonstration. *Tis true the diagram I have in my view does 
include these particulars, but then there is not the least mention 
made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said 
the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them 
is a right angle, or because the legs comprehending it are [ ^* equal] 

^* Ented. ^^ hut cad of * Thus [notwithstanding].' 



422 Appendix A, 

of the same length; which sufficiently shews that the right angle 
might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and yet the 
demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that 
I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which 
I had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle; 
and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the general 
idea of a triangle which was all and none, it not being possible 
for me to conceive any triangle whereof I cannot delineate the 
like on paper. But I believe no man, whatever he may conceive, 
will pretend to describe a general triangle with his pencill. This 
being rightly considered, I believe we shall not be found to have 
any great [ 76 want] need of those eternal, immutable, universal 
ideas about which the philosophers keep such a stir, and without 
which they think there can be no silence at all. 

But what becomes of these general maxims, these first principles 
of knowledge, [ '''' so frequently in the mouths] of [ 76 the] meta- 
physicians, all w^h are suppos'd to be about abstract and universal 
ideas ? To which all the answer I can make is, that whatsoever 
proposition is made up of terms standing for general notions or 
ideas, the same is to me, so far forth, \^^ absolutely] unintelligible: 
and whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest 
and profound study attainM to an elevation of thought above the 
reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, or whatever else be 
the cause, sure I am there are in their writings many things which 
I now find myself unable to understand. Tho' being accustom'd 
to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty 
in them. But this one thing seems ["6 to me] pretty plain and 
certain. How high soever that goodly fabrick of metaphysics 
might have been rais'd, and by what venerable names soever it 
may be supported, yet if ["^^ withall] it be built on [78 no other] 
foundation [ 7^ than] inconsistency and contradictions, it is after 
all but a castle in the*air««. 

It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the 
Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, and all others 
whether ancient or modern logicians and metaphysicians, thro' 
those numerous inextricable labyrinths of errour and dispute, 

'* Erased. ■«» Instead of ' of.' 

"^ Instead of these curious speculations.' ^ On margin,* Dec. I.' 

" Instead of * the sandy.* 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 423 

which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have 
led them into. What bickerings and controversys, and what a 
learned dust has been raised about those matters, and what 
[ *^ great] mighty advantage has been from thence derived to 
mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need to be 
insisted on by me. Nor has that doctrine been confined to those 
two sciences, that make the most avowed profession of it. The 
contagion thereof has spread through [ *^ out] all the parts of philo- 
sophy. It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of physic 
and divinity, and even the mathematicians themselves have had 
their full share of it. 

When men consider the great pain, industry and parts that have 
[ '^ in] for so many ages been la/d out on the cultivation and 
advancement of the sciences, and that [^^ notwithstanding] all 
this, the far greatest part of them remain full of doubts and 
uncertainties, and disputes that are like never to have an end, 
and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear 
and cogent demonstrations do contain in them paradoxes that are 
perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that 
taking all together a very small portion of them does supply any 
real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent 
diversion and amusement — I say upon the consideration of all 
this, men are wont to be cast into an amazement and despondency, 
and perfect contempt of all study. But that wonder and despair 
may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles and wrong 
foundations of science [ ^^ which] that have been made use of. 
Amongst all which there is none, methinks, of a more wide and 
universal sway over the thoughts of studious men than that we 
have been endeavcxiring to detect and overthrow. [ ^^ To me 
certainly it does not seem strange that unprofitable debates and 
absurd and extravagant opinions should abound in the writings of 
those men who, disdaining the vulgar and obvious informations of 
sense, do in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract 
ideas •^.] 

I come now to consider the [®* source] of this prevailing 
[•* notion], and that seems to me most evidently to be language. 

•* Erased. •• Instead of * cause.' 

* Instead of * for.' ** Instead of ' imaginatioti in the minds 

■ On margin — • Dec. a.' of men.' 



424 Appendix A. 

And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have 
been the source of an opinion, as epidemical as it is ahsunL 
That [ *« words are] the conceit of abstract idea ows its birth and 
origine to words, will appear, as from other reasons, so also from 
the plain confession of the ablest patrons of y* doctrine, who [^^do] 
acknowledge that they are made in order to naming^ from which 
it is a clear consequence that there had been no such thing as 
speech, or universal signs, there never had been [ se abstract ideas] 
any thought of abstract ideas. I find it also declared in express 
terms that general truths can never be well made known, and are 
very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in words; 
all which doth plainly set forth the inseparable connexion and 
mutual dependence [ s^ on each other] that is thought to be 
between words and abstract ideas. For whereas it is elsewhere 
said [ s^ there could be no communication by general names 
[ 87 without there being] also general ideas of which they were to 
be signs ; we are here, on the other hand, told that] that general 
ideas [ ss are] necessary for communication by general names \ 
here, on the other hand, we are told that names are needfiill for 
the understanding of [ ^^ abstract notions] general truths. Now 
by the bye, I would fain know how it is possible for words to 
make a man apprehend that which he cannot apprehend without 
them. I do not deny they are necessary for communication, and 
so making me know the ideas that are in the mind of another. 
But when any truth, whether [ ^^ about general or part] about 
general or particular ideas, is once made known to me by words, 
[ ^^ I cannot see any manner of] so that I rightly apprehend the 
ideas contained in it, I see no manner of reason why I may not 
omit the words, and yet retain as full and clear a conception of 
the ideas themselves, as I had [ ^6 of them] while they were cloathed 
with words. Words being, so far as I can see, of use only for 
recording and communicating, but not absolutely apprehending 
[ ^^ of] ideas. [ ^^ I know there be some things which pass for truths 
that will not bear this [stripping — being stript] of the attire of 
words, but this I always took for a sure and certain sign that there 
were no clear and determinate ideas underneath.] I proceed to 
show the manner wherein words have contributed to the growth 
and origine of that mistake. 

"* Erased. ^ Instead of ' except there were." ** Instead of * were.' 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 425 

That which seems [ ®^ to me principally] in a great measure to 
have drove men into the conceit of [ ®^ abstract] ideas, is the 
opinion, tiiat every name has, or ought to have, one only precise 
and settl'd signification : which inclines [ '* men] them to think 
there are certain abstract, determinate, general ideas that make 
the true and only immediate signification of each general name, 
and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a 
general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas 
there is in truth [^" a] diversity of significations in every general 
name whatsoever [89 except only the proper names]. Nor is there 
any such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed 
to each [ •• appellative] name. All which does evidently follow 
firom what has been already said, and will [ ^9 be ] clearly appear to 
any one by a little reflexion. 

But [ 89 here] to this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every 
name that has a definition is thereby tied down and restrained to 
[ 93 one certain] signification, e. g. a triangle is defin'd to be a plain 
surface comprehended by three right lines, by which that name is 
limited to denote one certain idea, and no other. To which I 
answer, that in the definition it is not said, whether the surface 
be great or small, black or white or transparent, or whether the 
sides are long or short, equal or unequal, or with what angles they 
are inclined to each other. In all which there may be great 
variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits 
the signification of the word triangle. Tis one thing for to keep 
a word [ 89 everywhere] constantly to the same definition, and 
another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea : [ 9a that] is 
necessary, but [ ^ this] is useless and impracticable. [ 89 Nor does 
it avail to say the abstract idea of a triangle, which bounds the 
signification of that name, is itself determined, tho' the angles, 
sides^ &c. are not. For besides the absurdity of such an idea, 
which has been already shown, it is evident that if the simple 
ideas or parts, i. e. the lines, angles, and surface, are themselves 
various and undetermin'd, the complex idea or whole triangle 
cannot be one settled determinate idea.] 



* Ented. *' Instead of * a particular.* 

** Instead of * general.* " Instead of * the former.* 

*^ Instead of * an hooionomy or.* ** Instead of * the latter.' 



426 



Appendix A. 



[^ But to give a farther account, how words caone to introduce 
the doctrine of umversal ideas, it will be necessary to observe 
there is a notion current amcmg those diat j^ass for tiie dtoepeit 
thinkers, that every significant name Stands (olt an idea. It Is 
^d by them that a proposition cannot otherwise be understood 
than by perceiving [96 the agreement <x disagreement of] the 
ideas marked by the terms [^thereof] of it. Whence it foOovrs^ 
that according to tix)se m^ every prc^x>siti<m tiiat is not jalgda * 
must consist of terms or names tiiat carry ak>ng witii them cad 
a determinate idea. This being so^ and it beif^ [certain] widttO 
certain that names whidi yet are not thought ^togeAer io^- 
nificant do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straig^itway 
concluded that they stand for general ones. 

In answer to this I say, that names, significant names, do ndt 
klways stand for ideas, but that they may be and are often used 
to good purpose [tho' they are] without being suppo^d to stand for 
or represent any idea at all. And as to ^M^iat we are told of uiider<* 
standing propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or disagree* 
ment of the ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many 
cases seems absolutely fisdse. For the better clearii^ and demon- 
strating of all which I shall make use of some particular instances. 
Suppose I have the idea of some one particular dog to which I give 



** On the opposite page, we have, instead 
of this paragraph, the following : — * Bat to 
give a farther account how words came to 
introduce the doctrine of general ideas, it 
[ * must be obscrv'd] that [ * it is a receiv'd 
opinion] that language hath no other end 
than the communicating our ideas, and that 
every significant name stands for an idea. 
This being so, and it being withall certain 
that names which yet are not thought 
altogether insignificant, do not always mark 
out particular ideas, it is straightway con- 
cluded that they stand for general ones. 

* That there are many names in use 
amongst speculative men, which do not 
always suggest to others determinate, par- 
ticular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is 
what nobody will deny. [ • And that there 
are significant names denoting things, whereof 
it is a direct repugnancy that any idea 
should be form'd by any understanding 
whatsoever, I shall in its due place endea- 
vour to demonstrate that it is] not neces- 



sary (even in the strictest reasonings) that 
significant names which ['are marks of 
ideas] stand for ideas shou'd every time they 
are used excite in the understanding the 
ideas they are made to [ ' signify] stand for. 
In reading and discoursing names are for the 
[ ' thinking on] most part us'd as [ ' figures 
in casting up a sum in which to compote 
exactly is jiot necessary] letters are in 
Algebra, in which, tho' a particular quantity 
be mark'd, by each letter, yet to proceed 
right it is not requisite that in every step 
[ * you have these particular quantitys in 
y' view. Tho* you regard only the letters 
themselves without ever thinking on what 
was denoted by them, yet if you work 
according to rule, you will come to a true 
solution of the question] each letter suggest 
to your thoughts that particular quantity 
[ • which] it was appointed to [* stand forj. 

•• Erased. 

^ This and some words that follow are 
within brackets in the MS. 



1 Instead of ' is necessary to oliserre.* 
'S Erased. * Instead of * whereof.' 



3 Instead of ' the common opinion of philosophers is.' 
S Instead of ' be the fij^re to make— denote.* 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 427 

the name Melampus, and then frame this proposition — Melampus 
is an animal. Where 'tis evident the name Melampus denotes 
one particular idea. And as for the other name or term of the 
proposition, there are a sort of philosophers will tell you thereby is 
meant not only a universal conception, but also [corresponding 
thereto] a universal nature or essence really existing without the 
mind, whereof Melampus doth partake, as tho' it were possible that 
even things themselves could be universal. And [ But] this with 
reason is exploded as nonsensical and absurd. But then those 
men who have so clearly and fiilly detected the emptyness and in- 
significancy of that wretched jargon [ of S.G.W.(?)], are themselves 
to me equally unintelligible. For they will have it that if I under- 
stand what I say I must make the name animal stand for an 
abstract general idea which agrees to and corresponds with the 
particular idea marked by the name Melampus. But if a man 
may be allowed to know his own meaning, I do declare that in my 
thoughts the word animal is neither supposed to stand for an 
universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, which to me is at 
least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other. Nor does it 
indeed in that proposition stand for any idea [at all] at all. All 
that I intend to signify thereby being only this — that the par- 
ticular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by 
the name animal. And I do intreat any one to make this easy 
tryal. Let him but cast out of his [thoughts] the words of the 
proposition, and then see whether two clear and determinate ideas 
remain [ ^® in his understanding] whereof he finds one to be con- 
formable to the other. I perceive it evidently in myself that upon 
laying aside all thought of the words ^ Melampus is an animal,' I 
have remaining in my mind one only naked and bare idea, viz. 
that particular one to which I gave the name Melampus. Tho' 
some there be that pretend they have also a general idea signified 
by the word animal, which they perceive to agree with the par- 
ticular idea signified by the word Melampus, [which idea is made 
up of inconsistencys and contradictions, as has been already shown.] 
Whether this or that be the truth of the matter, I desire every 
particular person to consider and conclude for himself.] 

And this methinks may pretty clearly inform us how men 
might first have come to think there was a general idea of animal. 

•• Erased. 



428 • Appendix A. ' 

For in the (Hioposition we have instanced in, it is fdain the wod 
animal is not supposed to stand for the iifea of any one particoltf 
[anima] [creature] animal. For if it be made stand fat 
another different from that is marked by tiie name MekmpiB^ 
the proposition is &Ise and includes a contradiction; and if it 
be made signify the very same individual tibat Melampiis doth, 
it is a tautology. But it is presumed that every name stands 
for an idea. It remains therefore that the word animal stands 
for [the] general abstract idea [of animal]. In like manner 
we may be able with a little attention to discover bow other 
general ideas [of all sorts] might at first have stolen into the 
tiiougjlits of man. 

But farther to make it evident that words may be used to good 
purpose without bringing into the mind determinate idea^ I AaSi 
add tills instance. We are told [that] the good things whidE 
God hath prepared for them that love him are such as eye badi 
not seen nor ear heard, xK)r hath it entered into the heart of man 
to conceive. What man will pretend to say these wends of tiie 
inspir'd writer are empty and [ ses (?)] insignificant ? And yet who 
is there that can say they bring into his mind [determi] dear 
and determinate ideas, or in truth any ideas at all [ ideas ] of 
the good things [ pre ] in store for them that love God ? It may 
perhaps be said that those words lay before us the clear and 
determinate abstract ideas of good in general and thing in general ; 
but I am afraid it will be found that those very abstract ideas 
are every whit as remote from the comprehension of men as the 
particular pleasures of the saints in heaven. But, say you, those 
words of the Apostle must have some import. They cannot be 
supposed to have been uttered without all meaning and design 
whatsoever. I answer, the saying is very weighty, and carrys 
with it a great design, but it is not to raise in the minds of men 
the abstract ideas of thing or good, nor yet the particular ideas 
of the joys of the blessed. The design is to make them more 
chearfull and fervent in their duty ; and how this may be compassed 
without making the words good things [to be] stand for and 
mark out to our understandings any ideas either general or par- 
ticular, I proceed to show. 

Upon mention of a reward to a man for his pains and per- 
severance in any occupation whatsoever, it seems to me that 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 429 

divers things do ordinarily ensue. For there may be excited in 
his understanding an idea of the particular good thing to him 
proposed for a reward. There may also ensue thereupon an 
alacrity and steddiness in fulfilling those conditions on which 
it is to be obtainM, together with a zealous desire of serving 
and pleasing the person in whose power it is to bestow that 
good thing. All these things, I say, may and often do follow 
upon the pronunciation of those words that declare the recompence. 
Now I do not see any reason why the latter may not happen 
without the former. What is it that hinders why a man may 
not be stirr'd up to diligence and zeal in his duty, by being told 
he shall have a good thing for his reward, tho' at the same time 
there be excited in his mind no other idea than barely those 
of sounds or characters? When he was a child he had fre- 
quently heard those words used to him to create in him an 
obedience to the commands of those that spoke them, and as 
be grew up he has found by experience that upon the mentioning 
of those words by an honest man it has been his interest to 
have doubled his zeal and activity for the service of that person. 
Thus there having grown up in his mind a customary connexion 
betwixt the hearing that proposition and being disposed to obey 
with cheerfulness the injunctions that accompany it, methinks 
it might be made use of, tho' not to introduce into his mind 
any idea marked by the words good thing, yet to excite in him 
a willingness to perform that which is required of him. And 
this seems to me all that is designed by the speaker, except 
only when he intends those words shall [be the mark of] signifie 
the idea of some particular thing : e. g. in the case I mentioned 
*tis evident the Apostle never intended the words [ good things ] 
should [mark out to] our understandings the ideas of those 
particular things our faculties never attain'd to. And yet I 
cannot think that he used them at random and without design ; on 
the contrary, it is my opinion that he used them to very good 
purpose, namely, to beget in us a cheerfulness and zeal and 
perseverance in well-doing, without any thought of introducing 
into our minds the abstract idea of a good thing. If any one 
will joyn ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been 
said, I doubt not it will evidently appear to him that general 
names are often used in the propriety of langu^^ without the 



430 Appendix A, 

speaker's designing them for marlcs of ideas in his own which 
he would [ them ] have them raise in the understanding of the 
hearer. 

[99 Even] proper names themselves are not always spoken with 
a design to bring into our view the ideas of those particular things 
that are supposed to be annexed to them. For example, when a 
Schoolman tells you that Aristotle hath said it, think you diat he 
intends [ ^ thereby ] to [ ra ] excite in your imagination the idea 
of that particular man? All he means by it is only to dispose you 
to receive his opinion with that deference and submission that 
custom has annex'd to that name. When a man that has been 
accustomed to resign his judgment [ of] to the authority of that 
philosopher [shall] [upon] in reading of a book meet with the 
letters that compose his name, he forthwith yields his assent to the 
doctrine it was brought to support, and that with such a quick and 
sudden [ ^ glance of thought] as it is impossible any idea either of 
the person or writings of that man should go before — ^so ctosc 
and immediate a connexion has long custom establish'd betwixt 
the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence 
in the minds of some men. 

1 intreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not 
oft happen, either in hearing, or reading a discourse, that the pas- 
sions of delight, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, &c. [^ do not] 
arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words 
without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words 
might have occasion'd ideas that may be apt to produce those 
emotions of mind. But if I mistake not, it will be found that 
when language is once grown familiar, ^ to a man the hearing of 
the sound or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended 
with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by 
the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. 

[* Further], the communicating of ideas marked by words is 
not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd. 
There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the 
exciting to or deterring from an action ^. To which the former 



** • Nor is it lesf certain that* erased. ' ' to a man * erased. 

* Erased. ♦ • From which it follows, that* erased. 

* • action of the mind' — on opposite ' On opposite page — ' the putting the 
page. mind in some particular disposition. Hence 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 



431 



is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes ^ entirely 
omitted when these can be obtained without it, as I think does 
not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language. 

I ask any man whether \J every time] he tells another that such 
an action is honourable and vertuous, with an ' intention to excite 
him to the performance of it, he has at that instant ideas of honour 
and virtue « in his [thoug] view, and whether in reality his intention 
be to raise [ >o that] idea, together with their agreement to the 
[ " particular] idea of that particular action, in the understanding of 
him he speaks to [ ^^ or rather whether this be not his full purpose, 
namely, that those words should excite in the mind of the hearer 
an esteem of that particular action, and stir him up to the 
performance of it ] . 

f^^Upon hearing the words lie [&] rascal, indignation^ revenge, 
and the suddain motions of aUger do instantly [ensue] in the minds 
of some men, without our attending to the definition of those 
names or concerning the ideas. they are supposed to stand for — 
all that passion and resentment having been by custom connected 
to those very sounds themselves and the manner of their 
utterance ".] 

It is plain therefore that a man may understand what is said 
to him without having a clear and determinate idea annexed to and 
marked by every particular [** word] in the discourse he hears. 
Nay, he may perfectly understand it. For what is it, I pray, to 
understand perfectly, but only to understand all that is meant 
by the person that speaks? which very oft is notliing more than 
barely to excite in [ ^*his mind] certain emotions without any 
thought of those ideas so much talked of and so little understood. 
For the truth whereof I appeal to every [man*s] one's experience. 

I know not how this doctrine will go down with those [philo- 
sophers] who may be apt to give the titles of gibberish and jargon 



ve maj conceke how it is possible for the 
promife that is made us of the good things 
of another life excite in us suitable dispo- 
■tioiis, tho* the words gtaod things do not 
bring into our minds particular ideas of the 
pletaores of heaven, nor yet the ideas of 
good in general or things in general. 

* • entirely * erased. 

* • when' erased. 

* * Tcrtuous with an * substituted for 
* vcrtooas.' 



* * virtue* substituted for ' vertue.* 

1® * thoce abstract' erased. 

1' Erased. 

*' On opposite page — 'Innumerable in- 
stances of this kind may be given — arise. 
But why should I be tedious in enumerating 
these things, which every one's observation 
will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto 
him?' 

** • name'— on opposite page. 

^* * the hearer'— on opposite page. 



432 Appendix A. 

to all discourse whatsoever so far forth as the words contained in 
it are not made the signs of clear and determinate ideas, who 
think it nonsense for a man to assent to any proposition each 
term whereof doth not bring into his mind a clear and distinct 
idea, and tell us [^* over and over] that every pertinent [ *• word] 
[ ^"^ hath an idea annexed unto] which never fails to accompany 
it where *tis rightly understood. Which opinion of theirs^ how 
plausibly soever it might have been maintained by some, seems to 
me to have introduced a great deal of difficulty and nonsense into 
the reasonings of men. Certainly nothing could be fitter to bring 
forth and cherish the doctrine of abstract ideas. For when men 
were indubitably conscious to themselves that many [>« wards] 
they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should 
be thought altogether insignificant^ they were of necessity driven 
into the opinion that they stood for Q^* general ones]. 

But more effectually to show the absurdity of an opinion that 
carrys with it so great an appearance of [clearness and strength 
of] reason, but is [^o in fact] most dangerous and destructive both 
to reason and religion, I shall, if I mistake not, in the progress 
of this work demonstrate there be names well known and fiuniliar 
to men, which tho' they mark and [stand] and signify things, 
cannot be suppos'd to signifie ideas of any sort, either general or 
particular, without the greatest nonsense and contradiction; it 
being absolutely impossible, and a direct repugnancy, that any 
intellect, how exalted and comprehensive soever, should frame ideas 
of these things. 

We have, 1 think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas. 
We have consider'd what has been said in behalf of them by their 
ablest patrors, and endeavoured to demonstrate they are of no use 
for those ends to which they 21 are thought necessary. And, lastly, 
we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which 
appears evidently to be language. 

Since therefore words have been discovered to be so very apt 
to impose on the understandings of men, I am resolv'd in my 
[22 inquiries] to make as little use of them as possibly I can. 

** Erased. " * good sense and sound ' — on opposite 

** * name * — on opposite page. P*85' 
" • is the mark of an idea *— on opposite * Instead of * withall.* 

page. ** * are * instead of * were.' 

names' — on opposite page. " Instead of * reasonings.' 



ill < 



Principles of Human Knowledge, 433 

Whatever ideas 1 consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare 
and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as 
I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so 
strictly united to them. 

Let us conceive a solitary man, one bom and bred in such 
a place of the world, and in such circumstances, as he shall never 
have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas. 
That man shall have a constant train of particular ideas passing in 
his mind. Whatever he sees, hears, imagines, or anywise con- 
<:eives, is on all hands, even by the patrons of abstract ideas, 
granted to be particular. Let us withall suppose him under no 
necessity of labouring to secure himself from hunger and cold, 
but at full ease, naturally of good facultys, [^^ and] contemplative. 
Such a one I should take to be nearer the discovery of certain 
great and excellent truths yet unknown, than he that has had 
the education of schools, [ ** has been instructed in the ancient 
and modem philosophy], and by much reading and conversation 
has [fumish'd his head] attained to the knowledge of those arts 
and sciences that make so great a noise in the [** learned] world. 
It is true, the knowledge of our solitary philosopher is not like 
to be so very wide and extended, it being confined to those few 
particulars that come within his own observation. But then, if he 
is like to have less knowledge, he is withall like to have fewer 
mistakes than other men. 

It cannot be deny*d that words are of excellent use, in that by 
their means all that stock of knowledge, which has been purchased 
by the joynt labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations, 
may be drawn into the view, and made the possession of one 
[•* particular] single person. But there [*« are some] parts of 
learning which contain the knowledge of things the most noble 
and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have 
had the ill fate to be so signally perplexed and darken'd by the 
abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they are 
deliver'd, that in the study [^^ of them] a man cannot be too 
much upon his guard, \^ whether] in his private meditations, 
or in reading the writings or hearing the discourses of other men, 
to prevent his being cheated [ 2* by the glibness and familiarity 

■ • but • erased. *♦ Eiascd. *• Instead of * thereof.' 

» Instead of * is one.' ^ Instead of ' either.* 

VOL. I. F f 



434 Appendix A. 

of speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, 
in truth, stand for none at all : which grand mistake it is 
almost incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over 
the understandings of men, otherwise the most rational and 
clear-sighted. 

I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [ '^^ to put 
myself in the posture of the solitary [Aiilosopher. I will confine 
my thoughts and enquiries to the naked scene of my own par- 
ticular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following 
advantages. 

First I shall be sure to get dear of all [ *^9 verbal ] controversies 
purely verbal. The [ ^ springing up of] which weeds in almost 
all the sciences has been [ ^^ the ] a most fatal obstruction to the 
growth of true and sound knowledge : and accordingly is at this 
day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complaint 
of the wisest men. 

Secondly. 'Tis reasonable to expect that [ *^ by this] the trouble 
of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion may 
be very much abridged. For it oft happens that a notion, when 
it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to 
be conceived, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas 
shrink into a narrow compass, and are viewed almost by one 
glance of thought. 

Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other men 
seem to have had. [ -^^ Because ] I find myself to want several 
of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philo- 
sophers do usually spend much pains and study. [ -^ nay, even 
of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that 
pass for simple, particular ideas. It [ is inconceivable what ] 
cannot be believM what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity 
of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words 
in his meditations. 

Fourthly. Having removed the veil of words, I may expect 
to have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my under- 
standing. To behold the deformity of errour we need only 
undress it.] 

** Erased. On the opposite page — 'to ** Instead of * insisting on.* 

take off the mask of words, and obtain a •'* Instead of * hereby.' 

naked view of my own particular ideas.' ^ Instead of * For that.* 

»• Erased. 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 435 

Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [ ^3 way ] to extricate 
myself out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas \ which 
has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men, 
and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much 
the finer and the more curious was the wit of any man^ by so 
much the deeper was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held 
therein. 

Sixthly, So long as I confine my [ ^^^ thoughts ] to my own 
ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mis- 
taken. The objects I consider I [ ^^ clearly ] and adequately know. 
I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have 
not. Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea 
that I have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own 
ideas are alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern 
the agreements and disagreements there are between my ideas, 
to see what siniple ideas are included in any [ ^^ compound ] 
idea, and what not, [ ^^7 there is nothing requisite but ] an attentive 
perception of what passes in my own understanding. 

But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose 
an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare 
scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a 
union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit, as that 
betwixt words and ideas. 

Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas*d by 
the [Js doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought 
abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it does not seem 
strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an im- 
practicable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract 
idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. 
This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about 
words, to which they supposM abstract ideas were connected, 
and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be con- 
ceived, tho* they could not without them. [ ^^ But surely those 

" Instead of * means whereby.' [* the writings and discoveries of other men 

** Instead of * contemplations.' or without having anj great parts of my 

* Instead of • perfectly.* own] there is nothing more re- 

'* Instead of 'complex.' qnisite.* 
** Erased here—* all this I can do without ** Instead of ' opinion of abstract ideas.' 

being taught by [ another], there being re- " Erased. 

qnisite thereto nothing more than.* Also — 

F f 2 



436 



Appenetiii A. 



ideas ougfit to be suqpected that caniiot endure the lig^t wHfaoot 
a covering.] 

Anotiier tiling whidi makes woids and ideas tlKNig^ modi 
[ ^ harder to sqparate ] than in truth tiiey are^ is the opinkHi 
that every name stands for an idea. [^ For] it is no wonder 
that men should fatigue themselves in vain^ and find it a very 
di£Bcult undertaking, when they endeavoured to [^ obtain a dear 
and naked ] view of [ ^ those] the ideas marked by tiiose ward% 
idiidi in truth mark n<)ne at all; [^^ as I have already dxiwB 
many names often do not, even when they are no| ahngedier 
[ insignificant ]j and I shall more fiiUy show it hereafter]. 

[ ^ This] seems to me the principal cause wlqr those men that 
have so emphatically recommended to others the layii^ aside die 
use of woixls in their meditations, and ccMitemplatii^ their bate 
ideas^ have yet been so little able to perform it themadves. Of 
late many have been very sen^ble of the absidd opinions^ and 
insignificant disputes, that grow out <^ tiie abuse <^ words. la 
order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend to die 
ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from the woids 
that signify them. But how good soever this advice may be that 
they have given others ^^ men, it is plain they little r^arded it 
themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of 
words was to signifie ideas, and that the immediate signification 
of every general name was a determinate abstract idea. 

Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now, 
with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of 
words. He that knows he hath no other than particular ideas, will 
not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract 
idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names [ ^ when 
made use of in the propriety of language] do not always stand for 
ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where 
there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now removed, 
I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost endeavour to 
attain a clear and naked view of [ ^® the] ideas he would consider 
[ ♦'' by separating] from them all that varnish and mist of words, 



^ Instead of ' more inseparable.' 
** Instead of * Now/ 
^ Instead of * strip and take a.' 
*> Erased. 



♦* Instead of * These.' 

*• * men* erased. 

^ Instead of ' his own.' 

^ Instead of * having separated.' 



Principles of Human Knowledge. 437 

which so fatally blhiti»^<tbe judgment and dissipates the attention 
of men. 

This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and 
cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend 
our view into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth. 
In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men, 
and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw the 
curtain of words, to behold the feirest tree of knowledge, whose 
fruit is excellent and within the reach of [ *® our hand]. 

Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge 
from the [ ^^ incumbrance and delusion] of words, [ *® the conse- 
quences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings 
upon them to no purpose. We may [ *^ deduce consequences from] 
consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we 
shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper 
entangled in difficulties and mistakes. 

I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following 
sheets, that he would make my words the occasion of his own 
thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in 
reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be 
easy for him \^'^ to discover the truth or &lsity of what I sayl. 
He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words. And 
I do not see what inducement he can have to err in considering 
his own naked, undisguised ideas. 

That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my 
thoughts [^ to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I shall 
throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest, plainest, and 
most familiar ^^ manner, abstaining from [*® all flourish and pomp 
of words], all hard and unusual terms which are [ ^ commonly] pre- 
tended by those that use them to cover a sense [ *® intricate and] 
abstracted and sublime. 

[ *^ I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and 
[ ^ accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable man.] 

** Instead of * [any man] to pluck it/ " Instead of * whatever mistakes I might 

*• Instead of 'cheat.* have committed.' 

^ Erased. ** After < manner * ' I shall ' erased. 
^ Instead of * lose ourselves in.' 



B. 



ARTHUR COLLIER. 

The simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of 
sensible reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has 
been considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am 
induced here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis: 
or J a new Inquiry after Truths being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, 
or Impossibility, of an External Wbrld^, The reader of Berkeley may 
thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis 
regarding the inexistence of the material world. 

Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680 — more than 
four years before Berkeley — at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wilt- 
shire. He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He suc- 
ceeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued 
to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours, 
during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English 
Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of An Essay towards the Theory 
of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701 — 4), who died in 171 1. 

From his own account. Collier seems to have adopted his new thought 
regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about 1703, though 
he did not publish it till 17 13, in the early part of which year the Clavis 
Universalis appeared. 

Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his notion 
of Matter, are given in Benson's Memoirs, Two of them were written in 
1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written in 1715 
is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to Samuel 
Low, a grammarian ; another was sent to Dr. Waterland ; and the last 
is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. 

' The motto of this work, taketi from vientum falsitatis is/ius opinionis cut as' 
Mi\cbT2nche/is Vtilgi assensus et ap/^robauo, tentitur. — I)c Inquir. Vcrit. Lib. III. p. 
circa materiam difficilem, est certum argu- 194. 



Arthur Collier, 439 

Collier seems to have been more disposed than Berkeley to apply 
philosophical speculation directly to Christian theology. His theological 
speculations occupied a considerable share of his life, and involved a 
subtle modification of Arianism— according to which the sensible world 
exists in the mind of man; the mind of man exists in Christ; and 
Christ exists in God — all exemplifying what he calls * in-existence/ or 
dependent existence. This chain of inexistekt being he deduces from 
speculative reason, and also from the words of Scripture. Collier was 
a friend and correspondent of Whiston, whose theory of * Primitive 
Christianity' was discussed about that time. 

Collier was a Tory and High Churchman, and curiously, like 
Berkeley, he published a sermon on the Christian obligation of sub- 
mission to the higher powers, founded on Romans xiii. i. 

It does not appear that Berkeley and Collier ever met, nor is he 
once named by Berkeley, though Berkeley is more than once named 
by him. 



THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS, 

* Wherein the Question in General is explained and staled, and the 
whole subject divided into tivo particular heads. 

Though I am verily persuaded that, in the whole course of the 
following treatise, I shall or can have no other adversary but prejudice ; 
yet, having by me no mechanical engine proper to remove it ; nor 
being able to invent any other method of attacking it, besides that of 
fair reason and argument ; rather than the world should finish its course 
without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists, (and for one 
reason more, which I need not name, unless the end desired were more 
hopeful) ; I am at last, after a ten years pause and deliberation, content 
to put myself upon the trial of the common reader, without pretending 
to any better art of gaining him on my side, than that of dry reason and 
metaphysical demonstration. 

The Question I am concerned about is in general this — Whether there 
be any such thing as an External World. And my title will suffice to 
inform my reader, that the negative of this question is the point I am to 
demonstrate. 

In order to which, let us first explain the terms. 

Accordingly, by World, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by 
the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c., if there be any 
other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or any 
of these terms. 

And now nothing remains but the explication of the word External. 



440 Appendix B. 

By this, ui general, I understand the same as is usually understood by 
the words, absolute, self-existent, independent &c.; and this is what I 
deny of all matter, body, extension, &c. 

If this, you wiU say, be all that I mean by the word external, I am 
like to meet with no adversary at all, for who has ever affirmed, that 
matter is self-existent, absolute, or independent ? 

To this I answer, What others hold, or have held in times past, I shall 
not here inquire. On the contrary, I should be glad to find by the event* 
that all mankind were agreed in that which I contend for as the truth, 
viz. that matter is not, cannot be, independent, absolute, or self-existent. 
In the mean time, whether they are so or no, will be tried by this. 

Secondly, and more particularly, That by not independent, not 
absolutely existent, not external, I mean and contend for nothing less 
than that all matter, body, extension, kc, exists in, or in dependence on, 
mind, thought, or perception ; and that it is not capable of an existence, 
which is not thus dependent. 

This perhaps may awaken another to demand of me. How ? to which 
I as readily answer — ^just how my reader pleases, provided it be somehow. 
As for instance, we usually say, An accident exists in, or in dependence 
on, its proper subject; and that its very essence, or reality of its 
existence, is so to exist. Will this pass for an explication of my 
assertion ? If so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of the words. 
Again, we usually say (and fancy too we know what we mean in saying,) 
that a body exists in, and also in dependence on, its proper placc^ so 
as to exist necessarily in some place or other. Will this description of 
dependence please my inquisitive reader ? If so, I am content to join 
issue with him, and contend that all matter exists in, or as much 
dependently on, mind, thought, or perception, to the full, as any body 
exists in place. Nay, I hold the description to be so just and apposite 
as if a man should say, A thing is like itself: for, I suppose I need not 
tell my reader that when I affirm that all matter exists in mind, after 
the same manner as body exists in place, I mean the very same as if 
I had said, that mind itself is the place of body, and so its place, as 
that it is not capable of existing in any other place, or in place after 
any other manner. Again^ lastly, it is a common saying, that an object 
of perception exists in, or in dependence on, its respective y<2rtt//>'. And 
of these objects there are many who will reckon with me, light, sounds, 
colours, and even some material things, such as trees, houses, &c., which are 
seen, as we say, in a looking-glass, but which are, or ought to be, owned 
to have no existence but /;/, or respectively on^ the minds or faculties of 
those who perceive them. But, to please all parties at once, I affirm 
that I know of no manner in which an object of perception exists in, 
or on, its respective faculty, which I will not admit in this place to be 
a just description of that manner of in-existetice after which all matter 
that exists is affirmed by me to exist in mind. Nevertheless, were 1 
to speak my mind freely I should choose to compare it to the in-existence 
of some, rather than some other objects of perception — particularly such 
as are objects of the sense of vision ; and of these, those more especially 
which are allowed bv others to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty ; 



Arthur Collier. 441 

such as objects seen in a looking-glass, by men distempered, light- 
headed, ecstatic, &c., where not only colours, but entire bodies, are per- 
ceived or seen. For these cases are exactly parallel with that existence 
which I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever. 

Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader 
notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence 
of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms, 
what I do not mean by it. 

Accordingly, I declare in the first place, That in affirming that there 
is no extemaJ world, I make no doubt or question of the existence of 
bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not It is with 
me a first principle, that whatsoever is seen^ is. To deny or doubt of 
this is errant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part 
or office of a disputant, or philosopher ; so that it will be remembered 
from this time, that my enquiry is not concerning the existence, but 
altogether concerning the ^.;»;/rtf-existeDce of certain things or objects; 
or, in other words, what I affirm and contend for, is not that bodies do 
not exist, or that the external world does not exist, but that such and 
such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist externally ; or in 
universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world. 

Secondly^ I profess and declare that, notwithstanding this my asser- 
tion, I am persuaded that I see all bodies just as other folks do ; that 
is, tiie visible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, seems to 
me, to be as much external or independent, as to its existence, on my 
mind, self, or visive faculty, as any visible object does, or can be pre- 
tended to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, as I know 
of, another nature, nor another knack of seeing objects, different from 
other persons, suitable to the hypothesis of their existence which I here 
contend for. So far from this, that I believe, and am very sure, that 
this seeming, or (as I shall desire leave to call it) quasi externeify of 
visible objects, is not only the effect of the Will of God, (as it is his 
Will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that heat 
should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it 
is a natural and necessary condition of their visibility : I would say that 
though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one visible 
object, which is granted to be not external, yet, by the condition of its 
being seen, it would, and must be, qwisi external to the perceptive 
faculty ; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually seen 
in this visible world. 

Moreover, thirdly. When I affirm that all matter exists dependently 
on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean 
by this — that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for instance, when 
I affirm or say, that the world, which I see, exists in my mind, I cannot 
be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the 
bodies which I see exist in that which common use has taught me to 
call my body. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because 
experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake 
me in this particular. 



44^ Appendix B. 

Fmrthly^ When I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or 
dependently on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be 
understood to mean no more than I say, by the words ndnd ^sA per- 
ceptive faadfy. In like manner I would be understood, what I affirm 
in general, Uiat all matter or body exists in, or dependently cm, mind. 
I say this to acquit myself from the imputation of holding dial the 
mind causes its own ideas, or objects of perception; or, lest anyone 
by a mistake should fancy that I affirm — that matter depends for its 
existence on the will of man, or any creature whatsoever. But now, 
if any such mistake should arise in another's mind, he has wherewith 
to rectify it; in as much as I assure him, that by miW, I mean that 
part, or act, or faculty of the soul which is distinguished by the name 
inUlUctioe or perceptive; as in exclusion of that other part which is 
distinguished by the term will. 

Ftfthfy^ When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no matter 
is externa], I do not mean that the world, or any visible object of it, 
which I (for instance) see, is dependent on the mind of any other 
person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any other 
person sees, is dependent on mine, or any other person's nund, or 
£^ulty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant, 
that tiie world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which 
Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the 
same in this as in any other case of sensation ; for instance, that of 
sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of 
music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the sanu notes or 
melody; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not 
the very same with the sound which another hears — ^because the souls 
or persons are supposed to be different ; and therefore, the sound which 
Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John, and 
that which John hears is external to the soul or person of Peter. 

Lastly^ When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but neces- 
sarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished by the 
proper names of John, Peter, &c., I have no design to affirm that every 
part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must needs exist in 
some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe that infinite 
worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather merely 
created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are thousands 
and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there is an 
Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numerically 
different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. By 
this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice created) 
matter, by which all things are produced ; or rather, (as my present 
subject leads me to speak,) by which the great God gives sensations 
to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not are 
preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were. 

And now I presume and hope, that my meaning is sufficiently imder- 
stood, when I affirm, That all matter which exists, exists in, or dependently 
on, mind ; or, that there is no such thing as an External World. 

Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems 



Arthur Collier. 443 

already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two. 
For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs be 
one article to shew that the visible world is not external; and when 
this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any 
opinion yet entertained by men, yet something still is wanting towards 
a full demonstration of the point at large, and to come up to the 
universal terms in which the question is expressed. 

Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. First, to shew that the 
visible world is not external. Secondly, to demonstrate more at large, 
or simply, that an external world is a being utterly impossible. Which 
two shall be the subjects of two distinct Parts or Books.' 

Collier in the end resolves the difference between sense-perception 
and imagination into a difference in degree merely. To imagine an 
object is to perceive it less vividly than we perceive it in the senses. ' I 
can no more,* he says, * understand how we can create the objects we 
imagine than the objects we are said to see.' What is imagined * exists 
as much, to all appearance, without, or external to, the mind which per- 
ceives it as any of those objects usually called visible — but not so vividly ; 
and this is that whereby I distinguish the act which we call imagination 
from the act which we call vision : but why is this, but because the 
common cause of both, viz. God, does not, in the former act, impress 
or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If He did, both acts 
would become one, or require the same name ; and there would be no 
difference between seeing and imagining*.' So Hume afterwards. Ber- 
keley's position in relation to the difference between sense-perception 
and mere imagination I have elsewhere noted. 

The difference is surely more than one of degree. There is a 
difference in kind between real existence in place, and a subjective 
imagination, peculiar to an individual mind. Is not this difference 
consistent with the real things present in sense, and also the space or 
place in which they exist, being alike dependent for their actual existence 
on Mind — in short, with their being grounded on Knowing, and not on 
an abstracted Unknown ? May not space be the uncreated or necessary 
condition of the possibility of all sense-experience like ours, but yet 
dependent for its actual existence upon the existence of the sense-experi- 
ence ? This is not to make it the abstract space against which Berkeley 
argues, nor need it involve quantitative infinity. 

' See Benton'i Memoirt o/Collurt pp. 26, 37. 



c 



THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 
ExPBBOoicn OF Persohs bobn buvd. 

In the last Section of die Vindicatim (p. 399), Berkeley refers to 
the now well-known experiment of Chesselden, in which »ght was given 
to a boy bom blind. As this case is described imperfectly in die 
Vindicatiott, and as it is often referred to in the controversy as to whether 
our power of interpreting the tactual, muscular, and locomotive meaning 
of visual signs is, on the one hand, original and instinctive, ot, on the 
other hand, the acquired result of mental association and habit, I hare 
reprint the entire Communication, given in the Philos, Trans., No. 402 : — 

* An account of some observations made by a young gentleman, who was 
born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no remembrance 
of ever having seen, and was couched between 13 and 1^ years of age. By 
Mr. Will. Chesselden, F.R.S., Surgeon to Her Majesty, and to St 
Thomas's Hospital. 

Tho' we say of the gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all 
people who have ripe cataracts, yet they are never so blind from that 
cause but that they can discern day from night; and for the most 
part in a strong light distinguish black, white, and scarlet; but they 
cannot perceive the shape of anything ; — for the light by which these 
perceptions are made, being let in obliquely through the aqueous 
humour, or the anterior surface of the chrystalline (by which the rays 
cannot be brought into a focus upon the retina), they can discern in 
no other manner; than a sound eye can thro' a glass of broken jelly, 
where a great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light that 
the several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye into 
their proper foci; wherefore the shape of an object in such a case, 
cannot be at all discern'd, tho' the colour may. And thus it was with 
this young gentleman, who though he knew these colours asunder in 
a good light, yet when he saw them after he was couch'd, the faint 



The Theory of Vision Vindicated. 445 

ideas he had of them before were not sufficient for him to know them 
by afterwards ; and therefore he did not think them the same, which 
he had before known by those names. Now scarlet he thought the 
most beautiful of all colours, and of others the most gay were the 
most pleasing, whereas the first time he saw black, it gave him great 
uneasiness, yet after a little time he was reconciled to it; but some 
months after, seeing by accident a Negroe woman, he was struck with 
great horror at the sight 

When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about 
distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as 
he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin ; and thought no objects 
so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho' he could 
form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object 
that was pleasing to him : he knew not the shape of anything, nor any 
one thing from another, however different in shape or magpditude ; but 
upon being told what things were, whose form he knew before from 
feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again; 
but, having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them ; 
and (as he said) at first he leam'd to know, and again forgot a thousand 
things in a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I will 
relate : — having forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he was 
asham'd to ask; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) he 
was observed to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, 
* So, Puss I I shall know you another time.' He was very much sur- 
prised that those things which he had lik'd best did not appear most 
agreeable to his eyes, exj)ecting those persons would appear most 
beautiful that he lov^d most, and such things to be most agreeable to 
his sight that were so to his taste. We thought he soon knew what 
pictures represented which were shewed to him, but we found after- 
wards we were mistaken ; for about two months after he was couch'd, 
he discovered at once, they represented solid bodies ; when to that 
time he consider'd them only as party-colour'd planes or surfaces diver- 
sified with variety of paint; but even then he was no less surprised, 
expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and 
was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow 
appeared now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest ; and ask'd 
which was the lying sense, — feeling or seeing ? 

Being shewn his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, 
and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vasdy sur- 
pris'd; asking how it could be that a large face could be express'd 
in so little room, saying, it should have seem'd as impossible to him 
as to put a bushel of anything into a pint 

At first he could bear but very little sight, and the things he saw 
he thought extreamly large ; but upon seeing things larger, those first 
seen he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond 
the bounds he saw ; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but 
part of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house 
could look bigger. Before he was couch'd he expected little advantage 
from seeing, worth undergoing an operation for, except reading and 



446 Appendix C. 

writing; for he said he thought he could have no more pleasure in 
walking abroad than he had in the garden, which he could do safdy 
and readily. And even blindness, he observ'd, had this advantage, that 
he could go anywhere in the dark much better than those who can 
see ; and after he had seen, h^ did not soon lose this quality, nor desire 
a light to go about the house in the night He said every new object 
was a new delight, and the pleasure was so great that he ¥ranted ways 
to express it; but his gratitude to his operator he could not conceal, 
never seeing him for some time without tears of joy in his eyes, and 
other marks of affection : and if he did not happen to come at any time 
when he was expected, he would be so griev'd that he could not forbear 
crying at his disappointment A year after first seeing, being carried 
upon Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly 
delighted with it, and called it a new kmd of seeing. And now being 
lately couch'd of his other eye, he says that objects at first appeared 
large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other; 
and looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it look'd 
about twice as large as with the first couch'd eye only, but not double, 
that we can anyways discover.' 

No very satisfactory inference can be drawn from a narrative so 
deficient in the refinement of thought and expression which the subject 
requires. The question is too subtle for experiments conducted in this 
fashion. Nor can more be said in favour of a succession of somewhat 
similar experiments recorded in the Philosophical Transactions, The 
most important are the following : — 

1. Case described by Mr. Ware, Surgeon, in the Philos. Trans. 
(1801). 

2. Two cases described by Mr. Home, in the Philos. Trans. (1807). 

3. Case of the lady described by Mr. Wardrop, Surgeon, in the Philos, 
Trans. (1826). 

To these may be added Stewart's * Account of James Mitchell, a boy 
born deaf and blind,' in the seventh volume of the Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh, See Hamilton's Edition of Stewart's Works, 
Vol. III. Appendix, pp. 300 — 370 ; also p. 388. 

As 1 have quoted one of the earliest described cases — that of Chesselden, 
I shall end by giving the following, which is one of the last and most 
philosophically described of any 1 have met with. It is contained in 
Mr. Nunnely's valuable scientific treatise on The Organs of Vision : their 
Anatomy and Physiology (1858) : — 

* The case was that of a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years 
of age, who had congenital cataract of both eyes, in whom the retina 
was more perfect than it commonly is at so advanced an age, as shown 



The Tluory of Vision Viiidicatcd. 447 

by the excellent sight he subsequently acquired. He had always lived 
in a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds. 
He could find his way all about this place. Walking along the middle 
of the road, when he heard any object approaching, he at once stopped, 
groped his way to the side of the road, and remained perfectly still until 
it had passed. Any one whom he knew he was able to recognise by 
the sound of the voice, and by passing his hands over the face and 
body of the person. He could perceive the difference between a 
bright, sunny, and a dark, cloudy day, and could follow the motions 
of a candle without discerning what it was. He had been sent to 
school for some time, and by means of models and a raised alphabet, 
could by touch alone arrange the different letters into short words. I 
presented to him in succession a great number of different objects, each 
one of which he took into both hands, felt it most carefully over with 
both, then Nvith equal minuteness with one, turning the object over and 
over again, in every direction ; the tongue was next applied to it ; and 
lastly, he applied it so near to the eye as to touch the eyelids, when 
he pronounced his opinion upon it, and generally with correctness, as to 
the nature and form of the object, when these were distinct. Thus 
he recognised books, stones, small boxes, pieces of wood and bone of 
different shapes, a broken piece of hard biscuit. A cube and a sphere 
he could readily recognise, saying the one was square and the other 
round, and that both were made of wood; but a sphere which was 
made of perfectly smooth, hard wood, he was very confident was bone. 
In an object where the angles were not very distinct, he made con- 
stant mistakes in the shape, first saying that it was square, then that 
it was round. Very bright light colours, when touching the eyelids, 
he could at once recognise, calling them all white; all dull and dark 
colours he said were black. Between a thin circle of wood and a 
sphere or a cube he instantly decided by the hand alone. On putting 
half-a-crown piece into his hands he immediately said it was money, 
but for long was undecided whether it was half-a-crown or a penny ; 
however, after carefully turning it over for some time, so as frequently 
to bring every part into contact with the hand, then putting it to the 
tongue, and afterwards so close to the eye that it touched the eyeball 
itself, he said decidedly, " It is half-a-crown." 

The lenses were very large, milky, with caseous particles, quite white 
and opaque, the capsules being clear and transparent. As is well 
known, in most cases, before this period of life, the lens itself has been 
absorl)cd, leaving only a leathery, opaque capsule, and, of course, not 
nearly so favourable for such observations as this one. After keeping 
him in a dark room for a few days, until the opaque particles of lenses 
were nearly absorbed, and the eyes clear, the same objects, which had 
been kept carefully from him, were again presented to his notice. He 
could at once perceive a difference in their shapes; though he could 
not in the least say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw 
they were not of the same figure. It was not until they had many times 
been placed in his hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the 
one which he had just had in his hands, from the other placed beside 



448 Appendix C. 

it. He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it ^\'as 
only after severaJ days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone, 
which was the sphere and which the cube; when asked, he always, 
before answering, wished to take both into his hands; even when this 
was allowed, when inmiediately afterwards the objects were placed before 
the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. Of distance he had not the 
least conception. He said everything touched his eyes, and walked 
most carefully about, with his hands held out before him, to prevent 
things hurting his eyes by touching them. Great care was requisite 
to prevent him falling over objects, or walking against them. Improve- 
ment gradually went on, and his subsequent sight was, and now is, 
comparatively perfect.' 

None of these experiments, taken by themselves, unequivocally de- 
termine the question — Whether the power of interpreting the visual signs 
of real or tangible extension is inspired, or is, on the contrary, acquired 
by association and constructive activity of intellect. But they confirm 
the conclusion, that visible signs are not less indispensable to an imagi- 
nation of trinal extension than the artificial signs of language are neces- 
sary to abstract thought and reasoning — that one bom blind can have 
only a vague perception of an external world. Moreover, when once we 
are experimentally acquainted with distances, a mathematical analysis 
of the perspective lines leading from any object to the eye is possible, 
with an involved sense of necessity, which seems to presuppose relations 
common to the visible signs and the felt reality. The difficulty which 
confronts Berkeley is, that on his theory space and its mathematical 
relations are relative to sensations which, per se, are contingent and 
phenomenal, and thus wanting in the element which alone gives abso- 
lute stability to mathematical science : quantitative infinity disappears, 
and space and its relations are the real but arbitrary results of creation 
or the voluntary activity of God. 



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